Independent power projects in Africa : balancing development and investment outcomes by Gratwick, Katharine Nawaal
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Independent Power Projects in Africa: balancing 
development and investment outcomes 
By Katharine Nawaal Gratwick 
Thesis Presented for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Cape Town 
Commerce Faculty 
Graduate School of Business 
November 2007 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
I, Katharine Nawaal Gratwick, hereby declare that this thesis is my own unaided work, both in 
concept and execution, and that apart from the normal guidance from my supervisor, I have 
received no assistance. Neither the substance nor any part of this thesis has been submitted in the 
past, or is being, or is to be submitted for a degree at this University or at any other university, 
except as stated below. 
Signature: ~ ~ 
2 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... 3 
Acronyms ..................................................................................................................... 7 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................... 10 
Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................... 11 
Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 12 
1.1 Statement of the problem and research objective: IPPs in Africa ................. 12 
1.2 Key research questions .................................................................................. 15 
1.3 Methodology ................................................................................................. 16 
1.3 .1 Foray into the literature and relevant theory ..................................... 16 
1.3.2 The cases ............................................................................................ 17 
1.3.3 Sifting facts and triangulation ............................................................ 18 
1.3.4 Ultimate goals .................................................................................... 20 
1.4 Outline of thesis ............................................................................................ 20 
Chapter 2 Contextualizing IPPs: power sector reform and FDI ............................... 21 
2.1 Power sector reform overview ...................................................................... 21 
2.2 Power history in brief: market forces once and again ................................... 22 
2.3 Powering ahead: the first reforms and reformers .......................................... 23 
2.3.1 United States ...................................................................................... 24 
2.3.2 Chile and Argentina ........................................................................... 24 
2.3.3 England and Wales ............................................................................ 25 
2.3.4 Norway .............................................................................................. 26 
2.3.5 Key take-aways .................................................................................. 26 
2.4 Powering ahead: subsequent reforms and reformers ..................................... 28 
2.4.1 Pre-reforms: a snapshot of developing region ESIs .......................... 28 
2.4.2 Antidote for poor perf rmance: evolving power sector reform ........ 31 
2.4.3 Advent of a new standard model ....................................................... 34 
2.4.4 Exceptions to the standard model and the role ofthe World Bank ... 37 
2.5 An unexpected ending to the story ................................................................ 41 
2.5.1 An illustration: Tanzania ................................................................... 42 
2.5.2 Reform paths taken ............................................................................ 44 
2.6 New imperative for FDI at the inception of power sector reforms ............... 47 
2.6.1 The obsolescing bargain (within FDI) ............................................... 48 
2.6.2 Obsolescing bargain and IPPs ........................................................... 50 
2.7 Towards an analytical framework for understanding IPP outcomes ............ 52 
2.7.1 IPPs reviewed .................................................................................... 52 
2.7.2 The Stanford PESD IPP study ........................................................... 55 
2.7.3 A new paradigm for understanding IPPs in Africa ............................ 59 
Chapter 3 Africa overview ......................................................................................... 66 
3.1 Development status: Africa ........................................................................... 66 
3.1.1 Economic and social development ............................ : ....................... 66 
3.1.2 FDI and the investment climate ......................................................... 69 
3.1.3 Credit ratings ..................................................................................... 70 
3.2 African ESIs .................................................................................................. 71 
3.2.1 Power generation and resource endowments ..................................... 71 
3.2.2 Installed capacity and consumption patterns ..................................... 74 
3.2.3 Quality of supply and the ESI.. .......................................................... 76 
3.2.4 Organization of the ESI, tariffs and funding ..................................... 77 
3.3 Private participation in infrastructure ............................................................ 79 
3 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
3.4 IPPs in Africa: an overview ........................................ : ................................. 82 
3.4.1 North Africa: Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia ....................................... 85 
3.4.2 East Africa: Kenya and Tanzania ...................................................... 90 
3.4.3 West Africa: Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria ................................ 93 
Chapter 4 Egyptian IPPs .......................................................................................... 101 
4.1 Introduction: the funding dilemma .............................................................. 101 
4.2 Egypt's electricity sector: past and present ................................................. 102 
4.2.1 Sector reforms that made the IPPs, and some that didn't.. .............. 102 
4.2.2 Snapshot of the current Egyptian ESI: results of the reforms ......... 105 
4.2.3 IPP frameworks, old and new .......................................................... 108 
4.3. A balance achieved? ................................................................................... 112 
4.4 Exogenous stresses ...................................................................................... 113 
4.5 Country level factors ................................................................................... 114 
4.5.1 Abundant low cost fuel: how long will it last? ................................ 116 
4.6 Project level factors that impacted IPPs ...................................................... 118 
4.6.1 Favourable equity arrangements ...................................................... 119 
4.6.2 Favourable debt arrangements ......................................................... 121 
4.6.3 Secure and adequate revenue streams and other risk management. 125 
4.6.4 Positive technical performance and strategic management.. ........... 127 
4.7 Final outcomes and conclusions .................................................................. 127 
Chapter 5 Kenyan IPPs ............................................................................................ 131 
5.1 Introduction: the IPP challenge ................................................................... 131 
5.2 Primary players in Kenya's ESI.. ................................................................ 132 
5.3 The means and the ends: Power sector reforms and results ........................ 136 
5.3.1 Power sector reform a la standard model, almost ............................ 136 
5.3.2 Recovery and the next set of reforms .............................................. 13 8 
5.4 The IPP results ............................................................................................ 141 
5.5 Operations and costs: the public vs. the private .......................................... 143 
5.6. Balancing act? ............................................................................................ 146 
5.7 Drought and other exogenous stresses ........................................................ 147 
5.8 Factors impacting on outcomes: the country leveL .................................... 148 
5.9 A host of project level factors impacting IPP development.. ...................... 149 
5.91 Analysis of proj ect partners .............................................................. 150 
5.9.2 Funding arrangements that made the IPPs ...................................... 152 
5.9.3 From 7 years to 20: evolution of contractual terms ......................... 155 
5.9.4 Public perception and its consequences ........................................... 157 
5.10 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 157 
Chapter 6 Tanzania's Experience with IPPs ............................................................ 161 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 161 
6.2 Tanzania's two main IPPs: IPTL and Songas ............................................. 162 
6.3 Power sector reform context ....................................................................... 166 
6.3.1. The start of reforms ......................................................................... 166 
6.3.2 Early efforts to commercialize and restructure TANESCO ............ 167 
6.3.3 The management contract and future reforms ................................. 168 
6.3.4 Structure of the sector ...................................................................... 170 
6.4 Development of Tanzania's IPPs ................................................................ 171 
6.4.1 Early gas discovery, drought and gas-to-electricity plan ................ 171 
6.4.2 Persistent power shortages and the emergence ofIPTL .................. 173 
6.4.3 The AFUDC and increasing Songas engagement ........................... 174 
6.4.4 IPTL agreement and disagreement .................................................. 175 
4 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
6.4.5 Implications ofIPTL dispute on Songas ......................................... 178 
6.5 Analysis ofIPP operations and costs .......................................................... 181 
6.5.1 Generation and capacity utilization ................................................. 181 
6.5.2 Fuel bills, deals and conversion ....................................................... 183 
6.5.3 Monthly charges to TANESCO ....................................................... 185 
6.5.4 Benchmarking costs ......................................................................... 188 
6.6 Balancing outcomes? ................................................................................... 189 
6.6.1 The investment climate: risk perceptions ........................................ 191 
6.6.2 The electricity sector: drought, doubt and reform ........................... 192 
6.6.3 Making and breaking the Songas project ........................................ 194 
6.6.4 Disputing and depending on IPTL. .................................................. 195 
6.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 196 
Chapter 7 Synthesis and conclusions ....................................................................... 199 
7.1 Recapitulation ............................................................................................. 199 
7.2 Reviewing the balance ................................................................................ 200 
7.3 Building up the contributing elements to success, at the country level ...... 202 
7.3.1 Favourable investment climate ........................................................ 202 
7.3.2 New policy frameworks and regulation ........................................... 203 
7.3.3 Coherent power sector planning and execution ............................... 206 
7.3.4 Competitive bidding practices ......................................................... 208 
7.3.5 Abundant low cost fuel and secure fuel contracts ........................... 209 
7.4 Building up the contributing elements to success, at the project level ....... 211 
7.4.1 Favourable equity arrangements ...................................................... 211 
7.4.2 Debt arrangements: global and local ............................................... 217 
7.4.3 Securing revenue: The PPA and other security arrangements ........ 221 
7.4.4 Credit enhancements and other measures ........................................ 223 
7.4.5 Positive technical performance ........................................................ 224 
7.4.6 Strategic management and relationship building ............................. 225 
7.6 Did bargains obsolesce? .............................................................................. 229 
7.6.1 Setting of the initial bargain and risk management measures ......... 230 
7.6.2 Evidence for the bargains obsolescing ............................................ 231 
7.6.3 A case for the new protections or for balancing outcomes? ............ 232 
7.7 Power sector reform framework .................................................................. 233 
7.7.1 The reform agenda emerges ............................................................ 233 
7.7.2 Enacting the reform agenda ............................................................. 234 
7.7.3 Mid-way or a new path? .................................................................. 235 
Appendix A .............................................................................................................. 239 
Egypt ................................................................................................................. 240 
Sidi Krir .................................................................................................... 240 
Port Said & Suez ....................................................................................... 241 
Morocco ............................................................................................................ 242 
lorfLasfar .................................................................................................. 242 
Compagnie Eolienne de Detroit (CED) .................................................... 243 
Tahaddart .................................................................................................. 244 
Tunisia ............................................................................................................... 245 
Rades II ..................................................................................................... 245 
Societe d'Electricite d'EI Biban (SEEB) .................................................. 246 
Kenya ................................................................................................................ 247 
Westmont .................................................................................................. 247 
Iberafrica ... , ............................................................................................... 248 
5 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
OrPower4 .................................................................................................. 249 
Tsavo ........................................................................................................ 250 
Tanzania ............................................................................................................ 251 
IPTL .......................................................................................................... 251 
Songas ....................................................................................................... 252 
Mtwara Energy Project ............................................................................. 253 
Cote d'Ivoire ...................................................................................................... 254 
Compagnie Ivoirienne de Production d'Electricite (CIPREL) ................. 254 
Azito ......................................................................................................... 255 
Ghana ................................................................................................................ 256 
Takoradi II ................................................................................................ 256 
Nigeria ............................................................................................................... 257 
AES Barge Limited .................................................................................. 257 
Okpai ........................................................................................................ 258 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 259 
6 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Acronyms 
ABB 
ADB 
AFD 
AfDB 
AFUDC 
AKFED 
ATJL 
Bcm 
BFI 
BOAD 
BOO 
BOOT 
BOT 
BTO 
CCGT 
CDC 
CED 
CIPREL 
CMS 
COD 
CPI 
CUE 
DEG 
DFI 
DFID 
DRC 
EAP 
ECA 
EDF 
EEHC 
EETC 
EIA 
EIB 
EPC 
ERA 
ERB 
ESI 
EWURA 
FDI 
FMO 
GDP 
GNI 
GoE 
GoK 
GoT 
HFO 
IADB 
ICB 
IDA 
IFC 
IMF 
IPO 
Asea Brown Boveri 
Asian Development Bank 
Agence Francaise de Developpement 
African Development Bank 
Allowance for funds used during construction 
Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development 
Artumas Tanzania (Jersey) Limited 
Billion cubic metres 
Bilateral finance institution 
West African Bank for Development 
Build own operate 
Build own operate transfer 
Build operate transfer 
Build transfer operate 
Combined cycle gas turbines 
Commonwealth Development Corporation 
Compagnie Eolienne de Detroit 
Compagnie Ivoirienne de Production d' Electricite 
Consumer Michigan Services 
Commercial operation date 
Consumer Price Index 
Cost of unserved energy 
German Investment & Development Corporation 
Development finance institution 
Department for International Development 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
East Asia and Pacific 
Europe and Central Asia 
Electricite de France 
Egyptian Electricity Holding Company 
Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
European Investment Bank 
Engineering, procurement, and construction 
Electricity Regulatory Authority (of Egypt) 
Electricity Regulatory Board (of Kenya) 
Electricity supply industry 
Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (of Tanzania) 
Foreign direct investment 
Netherlands Development Company 
Gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Government of Egypt 
Government of Kenya 
Government of Tanzania 
Heavy fuel oil 
Inter-American Development Bank 
International competitive bid 
International Development Association 
International Finance Corporation 
International Monetary Fund 
Initial public offering 
7 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
IPP 
IPS 
IPTL 
ISO 
ISP 
IT 
N 
JBIC 
KenGen 
km 
KPLC 
Ksh 
kV 
kVa 
kW 
kWh 
LAC 
LIB OR 
LNG 
Mcf 
MDG 
MEP 
MFI 
MIR 
MMBtu 
MMcfd 
MW 
O&M 
OCGT 
OECD 
ONE 
OPIC 
QoS 
PEL 
PESD 
PHCN 
PPA 
PPI 
PRG 
PRI 
PROPARCO 
PSCR 
PSEG 
PURPA 
ROE 
RSA 
SA 
SAPP 
SEEB 
Sida 
SSA 
STEG 
T&D 
TANESCO 
TAQA 
Independent power project 
Industrial Promotion Services 
Independent Power Tanzania Limited 
Independent system operator 
Independent service provider 
Information technology 
J oint venture 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
Kenya Generating Company Limited 
kilometre 
Kenya Power and Light Company 
Kenyan shilling 
kilovolt 
kilovolt ampere 
kilowatt 
kilowatt hour 
Latin America and Caribbean 
London Intebank Offered Rate 
Liquefied natural gas 
Million cubic feet 
Millennium development goal 
Mtwara Energy Project 
Multilateral finance institution 
Management Programme in Infrastructure Reform and Regulation 
Million British thermal units 
Million cubic feet per day 
Megawatt 
Operating and maintenance 
Open cycle gas turbine 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Office Nationale de l'Electricite (of Morocco) 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (of the United States) 
Quality of supply 
Pendekar Energy Limited 
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development 
Power Holding Company of Nigeria 
Power purchase agreement 
Private participation in infrastructure 
Partial risk guarantee 
Political risk insurance 
Promotion et Participation pour la Cooperation economique 
Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (of Tanzania) 
Public Service Enterprise Group 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
Return on equity 
Republic of South Africa 
South Asia 
Southern African Power Pool 
Societe d'Electricite d'El Biban 
. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Societe Tunisienne d'Electricite et du Gaz 
Transmission and distribution 
Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited 
Abu Dhabi National Energy Company 
8 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Tcf 
TDFL 
TPDC 
Transco 
TSO 
TWh 
UK 
USA 
VAT 
VIP 
VRA 
WDI 
YFP 
Trillion cubic feet 
Tanzania Development Finance Company Limited 
Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation 
Transmission company 
Transmission system operator 
Terawatt hour 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
Value added tax 
VIP Engineering Limited 
Volta River Authority 
World Development Indicators 
Yinka Folawiyo Power Limited 
9 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Abstract 
In the early 1990s, a new model emerged for the provision of electricity generation across 
developing regions. The model involved private sector participation in the form of independent 
power projects (IPP). Driving this change in business was insufficient public finance from host 
country governments, a reduction in concessionary loans from multilateral and bilateral 
development institutions, and a push for improved efficiency in a state-owned utility sector 
that was considered to be underperforming. This dissertation reviews how IPPs developed 
across both North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis focuses on the extent to which 
positive development outcomes (viz. reliable and affordable power) and investment outcomes 
(viz. favourable investment returns and the opportunity to grow investments) were both 
achieved. The dissertation posits that balancing development and investment outcomes leads to 
greater sustainability for projects. It further explores a range of elements that contribute to the 
success of projects, namely: the investment climate; policy, regulatory and planning 
frameworks; competitive procurement practices; availability of competitively procured fuel; 
favourable debt and equity arrangements, including new trends in the nature of IPP firms and 
credit enhancement arrangements; and new risk management techniques. In-depth case studies 
ofIPP experiences in Egypt, Kenya and Tanzania are used to explore the question of balancing 
outcomes and sustainability. Reviews of IPP experiences in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Morocco, 
Nigeria and Tunisia also supplement the analysis together with an evaluation of the foreign 
direct investment context and related theory. Framing the whole discussion is an examination 
of how the new model for electric power provision evolved and how power sector reform 
models need to be adjusted to better reflect the reality in developing countries and emerging 
economies. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Statement of the problem and research objective: IPPs in Africa 
At the beginning of the 1990s, virtually all major power generation throughout Africa was 
financed by public coffers, including via concessionary loans from development finance 
institutions (DFn.! These publicly financed generation assets were considered one of the core 
elements in state-owned, vertically integrated power systems. In the early 1990s, however, a 
confluence of factors brought about a significant change in business. With the main drivers 
identified as insufficient public funds for new generation and decades of poor performance by 
state-run utilities, developing countries throughout Africa began to adopt a new model for their 
power systems, influenced by pioneering reformers in the United States of America (USA), the 
United Kingdom (UK), Chile and Norway. Urged on by multilateral and bilateral development 
institutions, which largely withdrew from funding state-owned projects, a number of countries 
adopted plans to unbundle their power systems and introduce private participation and 
competition. Independent power projects (IPP), namely privately-fmanced, greenfield 
generation, supported by non-recourse or limited recourse loans, with long-term power 
purchase agreements (PPA) with the state utility or another off-taker, became a priority within 
overall power sector reform (World Bank 1993a:45,5l; World Bank and USAID 1994:1). IPPs 
were considered a quick and relatively easy fix to persistent supply constraints, and could also 
potentially serve to benchmark state-owned supply and gradually introduce competition (APEC 
Energy Working Group 1997). IPPs could be undertaken before sector unbundling. An 
independent regulator was also Rot a prerequisite since the PPA laid down a form of regulation 
by contract. 
In 1994, Cote d'Ivoire became among the first African countries to attract a foreign-led 
IPP to sell power to the grid under long-term contracts with the state utility. Cote d'Ivoire 
kicked off its IPP development with a 210 megawatt (MW) combined cycle gas-fired plant 
undertaken by Saur International and Electricite de France (EDF). Five years later, the country 
1 The term 'multilateral development institutions' (MDI) is used throughout this thesis to refer to such 
organizations as the World Bank Group (including the International Development Association (IDA), 
International Finance Corporation (lFC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)), Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other regional banks. The term 'bilateral development 
institutions' (BDI) is used to refer to bilateral funding agencies, such as the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID), the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), the 
Investment and Promotions Company for Economic Cooperation (PROPARCO) and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), which are distinct from Export Credit Agencies (ECA), 
for which funding is directly tied to exports. The term 'development finance institutions' (DFI) will be 
used throughout to refer to all such multilateral and bilateral organizations. 
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would build West Africa's largest IPP, Azito, at 330 MW.2 Egypt also became a magnet for 
private sector investment, with InterGen and EDF winning tenders to build approximately 2000 
MW of power. Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania and Tunisia, among others, also opened 
their doors to foreign and local investors. In 1997, later seen as the peak of investment, there 
was a record US$1.8 billion in IPPs in Africa (World Bank 2006c). 
Although IPPs were considered part of a larger power sector reform programme, reforms 
were not far reaching. In most cases, state utilities remained vertically integrated and 
maintained a dominant share of the generation market, with private power invited only on the 
margin of the sector.3 Policy frameworks and regulatory regimes, necessary to maintain a 
competitive environment, were limited. International competitive bids (ICB) for those IPPs that 
were developed were often not conducted due to tight timeframes, resulting in limited 
competition for the market and, due to long-term PP As, no competition in the market. These 
long-term PPAs and often government guarantees and security arrangements, such as escrows 
and liquidity facilities, exposed countries to significant exchange rate risks. Finally, while 
Africa has seen private participation in greenfield electricity projects continue, private 
investments have not achieved the levels of the late 1990s, with 1997 representing the zenith as 
illustrated below. 
Figure 1.1: Greenfields IPPs in Africa vs. all developing regions (US$ million) 
$2,000 $20,000 
$1,800 $18,000 
$1,600 $16,000 '" 
$1,400 s:: $14,000 .~ 
0/) 
'" 
$1,200 $12,000 ~ 
0 0/) 
~ $1,000 $10,000 .S 0. $800 $8,000 "> 
'"0 
$600 $6,000 < $400 $4,000 
$200 $2,000 
$0 $0 
Source: based on author's compilation and Private Participation in Infrastructure Database (World Bank 
2006c) 
Note: Africa figures include only greenfield electricity projects in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa 
whereas world figures include both greenfield electricity and natural gas projects (however electricity 
projects account for 84 per cent ofthe total value). 
2 In terms of size, Azito has since been superseded by another West African plant, the 450 MW Okpai 
IPP in Nigeria, which came online in 2005. The largest IPP in Africa is, however, Morocco's JorfLasfar, 
a 1360 MW coal-fired plant, which will be discussed in section 3.4.l. 
3 Exceptions are Cote d'Ivoire, Morocco and Tanzania, where independent power projects contribute 
significantly (more than 50 per cent) to overall electricity production. 
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Several factors explain the recent trends in investment. Private sector firms were deeply 
affected by the Asian and subsequent Latin American financial crises. The Enron collapse and 
its aftershocks also featured prominently in influencing American and European-based firms to 
reduce risk exposure in emerging and developing country markets and refocus on core 
activities at home. Futhermore, DFls began to reconsider their position of restricted 
infrastructure investment, which had predominated throughout the 1990s. As concessionary 
funding became available again, many countries opted for publicly funded projects, rather than 
their private sector counterpart, such as Egypt, which has seen its current five year power 
investment implemented by the incumbent, state-owned utility, and supported entirely by 
concessionary loans. 
Despite this revival of concessionary lending for power projects, investments are 
insufficient to address Africa's power needs, with only 25 per cent ofthe population presently 
with electricity access, and poor supply the rule, not the exception. With the original drivers for 
market reform still present, involvement of the private sector appears to be an inevitable part of 
the future. 
This thesis analyzes the experience of IPPs in Africa in order to understand how more 
positive development and investment outcomes may be achieved for the spectrum of public and 
private stakeholders to ensure the long-term sustainability of projects. Positive development 
outcomes are considered here as generally reliable and affordable power for the host country, 
while positive investment outcomes are roughly defined as satisfactory returns on investments 
and new investment opportunities. It should be noted that the definition of sustainability 
adopted by this thesis relates purely to whether contracts and projects endure (i.e. are not 
abandoned) and whether plants continue to produce power over the long-term; no attempt is 
made to consider IPP sustainability with regard to larger development goals.4 5 
The empirical data unearthed by this thesis, based largely on case studies ofIPPs in Egypt, 
Kenya and Tanzania, seeks to deepen knowledge and understanding of existing bodies of work 
related to power sector reform and the obsolescing bargain theory (within the area of foreign 
direct investment, FDI).6 Building on the literature related to IPPs, this thesis then aims to 
advance a new framework for understanding the sustainability ofIPP investments. 
4 Neither the use nor the definition of development outcomes and investment outcomes is unique to this 
thesis. What is, however, unique is the in depth analysis of such outcomes within the context of African 
IPPs. References to development and investment outcomes include Manibog (2003:22-25) and Victor 
(2004:11-13). 
5 Undoubtedly, there is overlap between the development and investment outcome, particularly when it 
comes to local investors who may be considered to be directly related to both outcomes. 
6 According to the theory of the obsolescing bargain, which will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 
two, if unequal bargaining power results in the deal inordinately favouring the investor, then once the 
concrete is poured and equipment bolted down, there is a risk of the host country expropriating the 
project in part or in full. The original investment deal (the bargain) thus may become obsolete, 
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1.2 Key research questions 
Do IPP contracts endure when affordability and reliability of power come at the expense 
of reasonable investment returns and vice versa, or does achieving a balance between 
development and investment outcomes significantly improve the sustainability of IPPs? If so, 
what are the steps to striking and protecting such a balance? This thesis posits that balancing 
outcomes is indeed the key to sustainability7, and attempts to offer a different and more 
realistic framework for power sector reform. 
The thesis aims to take the understanding of IPPs one step forward by exploring what 
elements contribute to both successful development outcomes and investment outcomes, given 
a suite of exogenous stresses, including macroeconomic shock and currency devaluation, 
drought and civil strife. How, for instance, does a favourable investment climate impact 
directly on outcomes? What is the relationship between a clear power sector policy framework 
and outcomes? Does clear, consistent andfair regulatory oversight hold the key to balanced 
outcomes and project sustainability? Or does the solution to sustainable project outcomes lie in 
coherent power sector planning, competitive bidding practices, and/or abundant low cost fuel. 
Each of the abovementioned elements (in italics) relate primarily to the host country 
purview, which may be linked most directly, although not exclusively, to development 
outcomes. In addition, this thesis will undertake a review of elements that relate to the project 
purview, which in tum relate primarily to investment outcomes, including inquiring into the 
relationship between sustainable outcomes and the following: favourable equity arrangements, 
favourable debt arrangements, secure and adequate revenue streams, other risk management 
and mitigation measures, secure fuel arrangements, positive technical performance and 
ongoing strategic management and relationship bUilding.8 
Although virtually all of these elements have been discussed before within the growing 
body of power sector reform literature, there exists no work in which such elements are 
evaluated systematically within the African context and within the broader framework of 
development and investment outcomes, the obsolescing bargain theory and power sector 
reform. This thesis, through a systematic treatment of these elements, seeks to reveal new 
insights and trends that are important not only for the future sustainability of IPP investment in 
Africa-but also for revising the broader literature and theoretic.al framework for 
understanding and advancing power sector reform and investments in developing countries. 
particularly in those investments that involve large fixed capital, which is typical in infrastructure 
rrojects. 
As noted in the Introduction, sustainability is defined narrowly by this thesis, namely whether projects 
endure (i.e. are not cancelled) and whether power is produced over the long-term. 
S The list of elements has emerged from several in depth country case studies, as will be described in 
greater detail under Methodology below (section 1.3.3). 
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1.3 Methodology 
The literature and relevant theory provide an analytical framework within which empirical 
data and experience may be better understood. Furthermore, analysis of new empirical data 
may result in a deepening or a modification of existing theoretical frameworks, which this 
thesis seeks to do. 
1.3.1 Foray into the literature and relevant theory 
The question of IPP sustainability was first addressed by this thesis in relation to the 
power sector reform context. Through an in-depth literature review as well as interviews with 
key authors, this thesis documents how a standard model for power sector reform emerged 
(including specifications for IPPs), which took on the status of a theoretical framework within 
which experience could be understood as well as a template for advocating future actions. A 
review was also undertaken of a small part of the foreign direct investment literature as it 
applies to large infrastructure projects such as IPPs, namely the obsolescing bargain. An 
inquiry into the relevance of the obsolescing bargain theory, which (as noted in footnote 6) 
posits that if the original investment is made on seemingly unequal terms, there is a strong 
likelihood that the balance will shift in favour of the host country government over time. This 
theory was considered potentially helpful to predict both investor and host country behaviour. 
Simultaneously, a review of existing IPP literature was undertaken, including work led by the 
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) at Stanford University, which 
included a multi-year, 13 country study that surveyed 34 IPPs.9 Not only did the Stanford 
PESD IPP study inform this thesis' inquiry related to the obsolescing bargain, as noted above, 
it also influenced the research approach and ultimately helped to guide the research questions, 
as will be examined in greater depth immediately below as well as in Chapter two. 
Collectively these surveys of relevant literature and related theories in tum informed the 
empirical analysis and helped to formalize definitions of development and investment 
outcomes as well as contributing elements to success that form the basis of the key research 
questions. 
9 The Stanford PESD IPP study referred to here was carried out primarily by Erik I. Woodhouse, under 
the guidance of David Victor and Thomas C. Heller of Stanford's PESD. An interim report was 
published (in Woodhouse, 2005), as were the main project findings (in Woodhouse, 2006a). In addition, 
a synopsis of development and investment outcomes for each of the country studies was released (in 
Woodhouse 2006b) as well as an abridged version of the paper (in Woodhouse 2006c). The work, 
spanning over two years, was based on over a dozen country studies conducted by over a dozen 
researchers including both Anton Eberhard and Katharine Nawaal Gratwick, based at the University of 
Cape Town's Management Programme in Infrastructure Reform & Regulation (MIR). 'Stanford PESD 
IPP study' is the chosen designation for the body of work throughout this thesis, with credit given in text 
referencing to the primary author of each ofthe different research pieces. 
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1.3.2 The cases 
The empirical work focused on IPP investments in Africa. First, the full universe of IPP 
projects was identified. At that time (in November 2004), it was found that three countries-
Egypt, Kenya and Tanzania-had at least three IPPs on the ground, and accounted for nearly 
half of the approximately 6000 MW of total IPP capacity installed in Africa. These three 
countries were selected for in-depth case studies and fieldwork, based on the rationale that 
projects within countries may be contrasted to enhance understanding as well as projects both 
within and outside different regions in Africa. 
Since the inception of the research in late 2004, the pool of IPPs has expanded. As of 
2005, Morocco also boasts three IPPs. Furthermore, several of those countries with less than 
three IPPs have emerged with important lessons to tell. Therefore, although Egypt, Kenya and 
Tanzania are the basis for the majority of the empirical data and the countries in which primary 
research was carried out, IPP experiences in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria and 
Tunisia are also summarized. tO In this larger sample, each country has a minimum of two 
IPPS,l1 which continues to allow for analysis across projects in any given country. By end-
2006, together these eight countries represented 80 per cent of the installed IPP capacity and 75 
per cent ofIPP investments in Africa (World Bank 2006c). Although this sample accounts for 
most of the African IPP capacity and investment, it is nonetheless still a limited sample, with 
only eight countries and less than 20 projects. t2 
Finally, this project tally takes into consideration neither any state-sponsored plants, which 
may be deemed 'independent' from the utility, nor emergency power plants. The latter, namely, 
mostly smaller plants leased by utilities for one to two years to plug shortages, stand in contrast 
to the IPPs as previously defined as greenfield generation investment, with long-term PPAs 
with state utilities or other off-takers, supported by non- or limited recourse loans. Such 
projects will be mentioned only insofar as they impact directly on IPP outcomes, including how 
for instance they may affect the investment environment. It should, however, be noted that 
emergency plants have become increasingly visible, particularly since the inception of power 
sector reforms, which focus on the introduction of private sector participation. 
10 It should be noted that this research was part of a broader assessment of African IPPs undertaken by 
MIR, that went beyond those studies included in the Stanford PESD analysis, noted in footnote 9. The 
author of this thesis has also been a co-author of reports on Morocco (Malgas, Gratwick et al. 2007a) and 
Tunisia (Malgas, Gratwick et al. 2007b), as well as forthcoming reports on Cote d'lvoire (Malgas, 
Gratwick et al. 2007c) and Ghana (Malgas, Gratwick et al. 2007d). In addition, an as of yet unpublished 
survey of Nigerian IPPs was conducted by the author of this thesis in collaboration with researchers at 
the Centre for Energy Research and Development at Obafemi Awolowo University in IIe-Ife, Nigeria. 
11 As will be discussed in section 3.4.3, only one of Ghana's three intended IPPs has produced electricity. 
12 Due to limited time and resources, cases (and the requisite field work to map the case studies) have 
been limited to three in depth studies as well as three country overviews, rather than canvassing all 
African countries with IPPs; extreme care has, however, been taken in selecting countries and carrying 
out field work to ensure that they are representative of the pool. 
17 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
1.3.3 Sifting facts and triangulation 
An inductive research approach was adopted at the outset, which involved initially 
conducting a review of relevant country and project documentation. Field studies were then 
carried out in January, November and December 2005, in Egypt, Kenya and Tanzania, which 
involved in-depth meetings with key stakeholders involved in IPPs. Interviews were also 
conducted via numerous conference calls to each of the focus countries as well as to relevant 
stakeholders in Washington, D.C., London and Israel. Where available, performance data was 
also compiled. 
The Figure immediately below depicts the primary stakeholders in a generic IPP deal. The 
terms and conditions that define the relationships between such stakeholders are generally 
spelled out in, among others, the: shareholders agreement, power purchase agreement, 
engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) agreement, operating and maintenance 
(O&M) agreement, loan agreements, intercreditor agreements, and security documentation, 
including sovereign guarantees from government to the IPP company as well as guarantees 
provided by multilateral and bilateral development institutions (Marais 2006: 1; Sinclair 
2007:5-15). 
Figure 1.2 Primary stakeholders and contracts in an IPP deal 
'--_. _c_o_;_:_~_t_or_-,·····'·········, ............. ,-I,, __ ~_D_D_i:_--,--!I--- CoI~'::::ial~//',--_S_h-,~_o~_:_i~_ld_e_r----, 
EPC Loan Loan Shareholders agreement 
r--_----...., ..... agreement 
.•............................•. 
.......... project agreement ........ .. ........ t 0:;1 
O&M 
Contractor 
Fuel supplier 
a~reement ............................ pp A.......... ~ Off-taker _ 
':'!:'nt/~l ~~~r r~ 3~ party grid acc'-es-'-s-----'---'-....J 
Fuel supply ...... ········· ....... . ....... . N'ational 
agreeme.Pt'·.... Sovereign 
'--_____ --"......... ...... License, PP A guarantee 
.............. approval and 
....................... 
'--------' 
Transmission 
,...------...,..----r 
Ministtyof 
Environment 
.......... 
EIA QoS 
1.;0 . Regulator : ; .1 
Implementing agreement 
Government. ·1 
Source: adapted by author from Ferreira (2004:5) and Sinclair (2007:5~15) 
Notes: MOl: multilateral development institution; BOl: bilateral development institution; EIA: 
Environmental Impact Assessment; QoS: Quality of Supply. 
The first step was to understand the extent to which stakeholders deemed that favourable 
development and investment outcomes were achieved (viz., the required power was delivered 
reliably and cost-effectively, and targeted rates of return and expectations of expanding 
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investment were attained) and whether outcomes were in balance and ultimately seen as 
sustainable or enduring. Performance data provided by stakeholders was also critical 10 
reaching conclusions about outcomes. Although attempts were made to gather information 
from all major stakeholders, research focused on the IPP company and the off-taker. The next 
step was to identify, also primarily through stakeholder interviews, the elements that could 
explain outcomes, including by grouping elements into country level and project level factors. 
While this process of identifying and articulating contributing elements was informed by 
Stanford PESD's research on IPPs, this thesis made a clear departure from the PESD 
framework, which focused on explaining the variation in IPP outcomes through a series of five 
hypotheses, as explained in detail in section 2.7.2. 
The data gathering phase involved extensive triangulation. First, the diverging views of 
different stakeholders were raised throughout the interviews, without divulging names, in an 
attempt to identify the general consensus. Second, original interview transcripts were sent back 
to each stakeholder to verify the content. Third, comments were sought from all major 
stakeholders on the final analysis. Wherever possible data provided by stakeholders was 
verified with published sources as well. This data collection process, involving both primary 
and secondary sources, spanned between six months and one year, depending on the country, 
and the author of this thesis went back to stakeholders no less than half a dozen times. Since 
this time, to follow up on new developments, correspondence and telephone exchanges 
continue to be conducted regularly, along with gathering new performance data-with data 
triangulation to verify comments also ongoing. Most data is current through May 2007. 
The example of research in Tanzania, detailed here, is representative of the approach 
adopted in each of the countries. Over 30 interviews were conducted with more than 20 
stakeholders in January, February, August, November and December 2005 in Dar-es-Salaam 
and via teleconference in Washington D.C. and London. Interviews were followed by em~il 
correspondence to clarify discussion points. Details presented on IPPs and reforms were also 
confirmed across a range of sources. Stakeholder interviews included present and former 
directors and managers at Orca Exploration, Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL) , 
Songas, Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM), Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory 
Authority (EWURA), Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC), Tanzania Petroleum 
Development Corporation (TPDC), VIP Engineering Limited (VIP), Tanzania Electric Supply 
Company Limited (TANESCO), NETGroup Solutions, Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (Sida), and the World Bank. TANESCO provided the majority of the 
performance data. 
Due to sensitivity of data, the names of stakeholders, who have been the primary source of 
data for this thesis, have largely been left out of the discussion; most stakeholders are only 
identified, if at all, by organizational affiliation in the text. As a result, much of the data, which 
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Chapter 2 
Contextnalizing IPPs: power sector reform and FDI 
IPPs emerged in the context of power sector reforms, which were driven by the need for 
new investment and improved sector performance. A second key contextual feature was the 
foreign direct investment experience of previous decades. Both of these contexts have been 
mapped out in bodies of literature. In this Chapter, this thesis undertakes to review significant 
portions of this literature in order to provide a theoretical context for an analysis and 
understanding of independent power projects. Building on literature that documents the IPP 
experience as well, the Chapter culminates by introducing a new analytic framework for 
understanding IPP outcomes. 
2.1 Power sector reform overview 
For diverse reasons in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of different countries, primarily 
from the industrialized world, began to make changes to the way they operated their electric 
power systems. 14 The changes these countries made were by no means uniform, and often 
were driven by ideology. Then, through a process of trial, error, research, writing and policy 
formation, a gradual understanding developed of the different elements of reform, which in 
tum were grouped into different categories. These categories subsequently became to be 
viewed as the building blocks of a standard model for power sector reform. The model did not 
represent the reform paths of the countries exactly but was considered to be both a general ideal 
for reform as well as an analytic framework to understand and characterize reform processes in 
different countries. This model was then taken up by a number of stakeholders working in less 
developed countries (from DFIs, to consultants and local policy makers) and, in certain 
instances, written into policy frameworks thereby codifying the standard model. While there 
are a range of opinions about the appropriateness of the recommendations, in no African 
country have reforms actually been undertaken in full. This section highlights the 
developments that led to how power sector reforms came to be defined as a standard model and 
theoretical framework in its own right as well as reviews how the model and framework were 
implemented and with what effect, including most importantly, with the regard to IPPs. 
14 The one exception was Chile, as discussed later in section 2.3.2, which, although categorized as a 
developing country due to its per capita gross domestic product (GDP), rated high in terms of electricity 
access (in contrast to most developing countries), with approximately 98 per cent of urban households 
and about 62 per cent of rural ones with access, prior to sector reform in the late 1980s (Fischer and 
Serra 2003). 
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forms the basis of Chapters four through six, is not cited. In certain instances, however, where 
stakeholders have indicated their willingness, citations do include names and the designation 
of "per com" for personal communication. 
1.3.4 Ultimate goals 
This thesis summarizes the country data, and then analyzes it within the context of the 
contributing elements of success, with three primary goals. First, the analysis seeks to 
illuminate the main question. That is, does balancing development and investment outcomes 
indeed yield more sustainable projects?13 Secondly, the analysis aims to extend and deepen the 
analytic framework (of stresses and contributing elements to success) to better understand 
outcomes and which elements contribute to success and failure. Finally, it is the goal of the 
analysis to reflect on the theoretical framework, namely what does such analysis reveal about 
the obsolescing bargain theory, IPPs and power sector reform. 
1.4 Outline of thesis 
Following this brief introduction, Chapter two identifies the main theoretical areas that 
inform the analytical framework of this thesis, namely the role of IPPs within power sector 
reform and the role of the obsolescing bargain (within the context ofFDI). Chapter three offers 
an overview of the African IPP experience, reviewing general investment and electricity 
conditions on the continent before, during and after the first IPPs. In Chapter four, the first 
country case, there is an extended discussion of how IPPs unfolded in Egypt. Chapter five 
introduces the contrast of Sub-Saharan African cases by recounting how IPPs developed in 
Kenya. This in tum is followed by a discussion in Chapter six of the case of Tanzania's IPPs. 
In Chapter seven, a summary of findings is provided and conclusions drawn, which intend to 
deepen knowledge and understanding, and expound on implications for power sector reform 
and future IPP investments. 
13 It should be noted here that although tools for measuring investment gains are limited (rates of returns 
are often confidential), efforts have been made to obtain as much information as possible, including the 
extent to which investors are making additional, similar investments, to adequately judge investment 
gains. 
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2.2 Power history in brief: market forces once and again 
Although the push for private sector participation in the power sector was a departure 
from the status quo that predominated in most developing countries in the early 1990s, it was 
not unprecedented. Throughout the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, 
the electricity supply industry (ESI) and other infrastructure industries such as water, transport 
and some telephone services, across North America, Europe and parts of South America, 
Africa and Asia, developed largely within free market conditions (Kess ides 2004:27). The 
Pearl Street Station, the first central power station, pioneered by Thomas Edison in 1882 in 
New York City, was the result of privately-financed and privately-managed efforts (Neil 
1942:322). In the same year in South Africa, private public partnerships would lead to the first 
electric street lights in the mining town of Kimberly, and later more widespread electrification, 
which helped fuel commercial and industrial development (Steyn 2006: 11; Eberhard 
2007:218). 
While the initial push was private, it was not long before deeper government involvement 
was evidenced. This occurred with varying degrees across countries, especially after World 
War II. The rationale was four-fold. First, the network component of the ESI was, after 
considerable trial and error, classified, as a natural monopoly. That is, one firm was thought to 
produce goods less expensively than ifthere were multiple firms in the market, as average costs 
declined as output increased (Joskow and Schmalensee 1983:29-20; Newbery 2001a:I-2).15 
Government ownership of the monopoly (or public regulation) was often justified on the 
grounds that the state was the custodian of the public interest and therefore would be the least 
likely to act in an opportunistic manner, as monopolists were prone to do. Secondly, with 
regard to public ownership of the generation component, the general argument was based on 
the fact that significant amounts of capital were needed, as increasingly large plants were built 
to capitalize on economies of scale. The state was often asked to guarantee these investments 
and became progressively directly involved through state-owned enterprises. Thirdly, 
ownership by one sole firm (government) also helped to ensure the necessary coordination 
among the different segments (generation, transmission and distribution). Finally, an 
overarching argument was made about the strategic nature of the ESI, especially for industrial 
development, which justified state ownership and operation (Yergin and Stanislaw 2002:7). 
Electric power activities thus were vertically integrated, which meant one supplier 
provided generation, transmission and distribution services to a given area (Hunt 2002:2,24). 
The only real variation evidenced was whether the monopolies were publicly or privately 
controlled, with the United States, Germany and Japan, all exhibiting significant private 
15 This conclusion was drawn only after, however, a number of countries had experimented with having 
multiple owners and operators of the network component, which was deemed to result in inefficiency 
(Yergin and Stanislaw 2002:7). 
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ownership, albeit heavy government regulation of the industry--but most countries opted for 
public ownership (Kahn 1988:3; Bacon 1995b:120,121; Patterson 1999:124). 
By the 1970s and 1980s, however, a number of political, financial and technical factors 
converged and started to chip away at the logic that electricity provision should be handled via 
a vertically integrated generally state-owned monopoly. Although not an exhaustive list, five of 
the major factors are summarized here. First, there was a growing movement away from public 
sector ownership especially in the UK and Chile, largely due to ideological reasons (Bacon 
1995b: 120).16 Secondly, as gas-fired combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) and other smaller, 
more modular technologies came on the market, capital costs of plants declined, along with the 
need for government guarantees, making them more easy to finance (Hunt 2002:26-27; Victor 
and Heller 2007:3). Thirdly, development of information and communication technologies 
enabled the electricity system to be organized and controlled without vertical integration. 
Fourth, there was increasing doubt of the efficiency of the highly regulated privately-owned but 
vertically integrated utilities (particularly in the USA) (Bacon 1995b: 120). Finally, publicly-
owned utilities in most developing countries were exhibiting persistent poor performance and 
governments were either unwilling and/or unable to provide further capital investment. These 
factors prompted a move toward private participation and competition (for the non-natural 
monopoly components of the system), which was expected would yield improved and less 
costly electricity supply (Bacon 1995b: 121; Wolak 1998: 81). 
2.3 Powering ahead: the first reforms and reformers 
The reform of ESls was piecemeal and varied, with the front-runners-USA, Chile, 
England and Wales and Norway-summarized below, each tackling the challenge in a slightly 
differently way.17 These reforms were based largely on untested theory (Patterson 1999:124; 
Manibog, Dominguez et al. 2003:50) and would later be brought to bear on countries 
throughout the developing world (Bacon and Besant-Jones 2002:6). 
16 Under the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, approximately 40 public companies were 
privatized. Initially, privatization was sought simply to reverse recent nationalizations, however, 
eventually the objective included reducing the hold of the unions as well as improving economic 
efficiency, which the Conservatives believed was being hampered by public ownership (Newbery 
2001a:9-16). One target was the coal miners' union. Restructuring and privatizing the electricity industry 
would introduce competition, including buying coal from other sources and introducing new fuels, such 
as gas. In Chile, privatization was led by a Augusto Pinochet together with the Chicago Boys (a group of 
policy makers, schooled in the free-market economics of Milton Friedman, at the University of 
Chicago). A rash of privatizations were carried out between 1973 and 1990, corresponding with 
Pinochet's rule, which, like in the UK, went well beyond returning nationalized assets to private hands 
(Collins and Lear 1991). 
17 This description of the early, largely Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) reformers, does not purport to be an exhaustive review of developments. For more extensive 
and up-to-date coverage, see, among others: Newbery (2001a), loskow (2003), Littlechild (2005) and 
Sioshansi (2006). 
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2.3.1 United States 
In 1978, the USA adopted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), which 
required utilities to purchase electricity, at their avoided cost, from "qualifying facilities", 
which comprised mainly cogenerators and small power producers (International Energy 
Agency 2001:29; Hunt 2002:257). The overarching goal of PURPA was to enhance energy 
security and environmental protection by promoting more thermally efficient cogeneration 
plants as well as renewable technologies (Joskow 2001: 12). This legislation set in motion a 
new way of business, and by 1992, IPPs in the USA accounted for 60 per cent of the new 
capacity (World Bank 1993a:42; Hunt 2002:257). The plants thus were important agents of 
change in terms of adding new capacity and introducing new (greener) technology (Hunt 
2002:257). New text: The next major development in the USA occurred in 1996 when the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) ordered third party access to the transmission 
system, a requirement set forth in the 1992 Energy Policy Act passed by the US Congress 
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 1996). This in turn facilitated wholesale competition 
as numerous large power exchanges, managed under non-profit regulated independent system 
operators (ISO), were established (O'Neill, Helman et al. 2006:480). As of 2006, six wholesale 
markets account for over half of the country's load. Meanwhile retail competition has spread to 
less than half the states, with switching evidenced primarily by commercial and industrial users 
(Sotkiewicz 2006: 18_19).18 
2.3.2 Chile and Argentina 
The same year that the PURP A legislation was passed in the United States, the National 
Energy Commission (CNE) was established in Chile, which led to a series of power sector 
reforms aimed at increasing efficiency. The General Law of Electric Services of 1982 was 
among the next significant steps, which stipulated third party access to transmission (well 
ahead of the USA's third party access) and defined the Economic Load Dispatch Centre 
(CDEC) as Chile's ISO (Raineri 2006:77). The 1982 Law also served to unbundle the two 
state-owned utilities, ENDESA and Chilectra. Privatization took hold gradually (World Bank 
1993a:70). By 1991, the ESI consisted of 11 generating companies and 21 distribution 
companies, as well as two integrated companies-virtually all privately owned (Newbery 
2001a:119-120). Since 1982, Chile has adopted wholesale and retail competition, with the 
latter phased in slowly (and since 2004 available for consumers of greater than 500 kilowatt, 
kW). Most small consumers continue to pay regulated prices (set by the Ministry of Economy, 
with input from CNE) (Raineri 2006:78; Sotkiewicz 2006:5). 
18 No attempt is made to discuss the intricacies of the California market or related challenges 
encountered in wholesale and retail trading, which is covered in: Besant-Jones and Tenenbaum (2001), 
Wolak (2003), and Sweeney (2006:319-381). 
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Although Chile was the pioneering Latin American country to reform its ESI, Argentina is 
also mentioned here briefly, primarily due to its connection to the developing countries 
assessed in this thesis. Argentina's reforms followed immediately on the heels of Chile, with 
the unbundling of the sector followed by the privatizing of generation, transmission and 
distribution (Dyner, Arango et al. 2006:595-616; Woodhouse 2006a:143). Important elements 
of Argentina's reform include on the one hand the lengthy and comprehensive consideration of 
the reform program before enactment and on the other hand the speed with which it was 
ultimately conducted, with an electricity market established within a two year period, following 
the enabling legislation (passed in 1989) (Besant-Jones 2006:25; Dyner, Arango et al. 
2006:604).19 
2.3.3 England and Wales 
A decade after reforms took off in Chile, the UK would embark on its own radical reform. 
In 1989, England and Wales passed an electricity act, which provided the legal framework for 
restructuring and regulation (Newbery 2006:109,115). Important characteristics of the ESI at 
the time included the central role of the UK's nationalized coal industry, which sold 
approximately three-quarters of its supply to the electricity sector and accounted for almost 70 
per cent of the primary fuel for power generation. Another defining feature, which complicated 
restructuring, was a fleet of nuclear plants that were deemed non-commercial (nuclear 
accounted for approximately 20 per cent f fuel for power generation) (Newbery 2006: 111-
113). Following the 1989 legislation, the state-owned Central Electricity Generation Board 
(CEGB) was vertically and horizontally unbundled, which led to the creation of three 
generation companies, a combination of a national grid and pumped storage company, and 12 
separate distribution companies. With the exception of one of the generation companies, 
Nuclear Electric, all assets were subsequently sold to the public by 1995 (Newbery 2006:112; 
Sotkiewicz 2006:6). One year later, the more modem plants within the nuclear fleet were sold 
(the balance of the stations remained in public hands until they were decommissioned). With 
unbundling and privatization, competition was also introduced and all generators (both private 
and public), starting in 1990, were mandated to sell their electricity in the Electricity Pool, with 
customers of greater than 1 MW able to buy in the wholesale market (International Energy 
Agency 2001:29; Newbery 2001b:1; Newbery 2006:112). Retail competition was extended to 
customers with consumption of greater than 100kW in 1994, and by 1999 all customers were 
free to switch-with about one half reportedly doing so (Sotkiewicz 2006:7) Among the 
19 It is important to note that although Argentina was initially hailed as an exemplary reform model due 
primarily to its success in attracting new investment for generation, the country was hit hard by 
macroeconomic shock (in 2001-2), as documented by Woodhouse (2006a:135,139). The shock prompted 
the government to, among other things, change the denomination of IPP contracts from dollars to pesos, 
which in tum prompted a huge exit by foreign investors (Woodhouse 2006a:135,143). 
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noteworthy aspects in the England and Wales reform, particularly in contrast to that in the USA 
and Chile, is the speed with which assets were unbundled and privatized and with which 
competition was introduced. Equally noteworthy is the fact that the Electricity Pool, established 
in 1990, was replaced approximately a decade later, in March 2001, by the New Electricity 
Trading Arrangements (NETA), characterized by bilateral wholesale contracts (Newbery 
2006: 127).20 
2.3.4 Norway 
Although the last among the early reformers profiled here, Norway was actually among 
the first to set up a spot market in 1971 to enhance the management of numerous large 
hydroelectric generators. In this market, generators who were low on water could purchase 
electricity instead of running down their reservoirs (Newbery 200la:246). This development 
did not involve any actual restructuring of the market, which would only happen twenty years 
later. In 1991, following the passage of the Energy Act of 1990, Norway commenced 
functional unbundling as well as introduced competition into generation and supply (Jamasb 
2002:38). A new spot and contract market was subsequently established, plus a parallel 
financial market, with various hedging instruments, which would eventually extend to 
encompass Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden and be termed the Nord Pool (Jamasb 
2002:39; Amundsen, Bergman et al. 2006:145). By 2003, full retail choice was available in 
Norway. Unlike the previous reformers mentioned, Norway is distinct in that it did not make 
privatization a cornerstone of its reform, although there is some private· ownership of assets 
(Jamasb 2002:39; Sotkiewicz 2006:12). 
2.3.5 Key take-aways 
Although ideology played a significant role, particularly in the UK and Chile, and there 
was no set blueprint, the early reformers and reforms generally sought. to improve efficiency 
across the ESI, primarily by introducing competition, and moving away from government 
involvement and toward what was perceived to be a more efficient private sector model of 
business.21 The text immediately below, excerpted from one of the countries' accountability 
offices, would therefore largely apply to all . 
... the federal government has pursued a policy to restructure the electricity industry with 
the goal of increasing competition in wholesale markets and thereby increasing benefits 
to consumers, including lower electricity prices and access to a wider array of retail 
20 NETA was subsequently replaced by the British Electricity Trading & Transmission Arrangements 
(BETTA) in 2005, which extended the trading regime beyond England and Wales to include Scotland 
(Newbery 2006, pp.109, 141). 
21 See footnote 16. 
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services. In particular, federal restructuring has changed how electricity is priced-
shifting from prices set by regulators to prices determined by markets; how electricity is 
supplied-including the addition of new entities that sell electricity; the role of electricity 
demand-through programs that allow consumers to participate in markets; and how the 
electricity industry is overseen-in order to ensure consumer protection (United States 
Government Accountability Office 2005 :2). 
Although a comprehensive reVIew of power sector reform outcomes will not be 
undertaken by this thesis, several points are worth noting in conclusion to this section. First, 
these first reforms were largely deemed to be positive (Hunt 2002; Besant-Jones 2006:121-125; 
Newbery 2006:29).22 Second, these reforms gradually crystallized into a standard model for 
power sector reform, which would be related to countries across the globe, as will be treated in-
depth below. It is worth, however, briefly noting some of the linkages at this point. A number 
of the consultants involved in the reforms in Chile, Argentina and the UK, subsequently were 
involved as advisors to DFIs and developing country governments, and were often directly 
involved in the design of power sector reform in developing countries. 
For example, among the many consulting groups to advise Tanzania on its power sector 
reform path, was one established in Buenos Aires in 1993 (Mercados 2007).23 London 
Economics, which was instrumental through, among other things, its report, The Case for 
Twelve, in providing advise on steps for UK privatization, also provided policy advise to 
several countries including Kenya and Mozambique (London Economics 1993; London 
Economics 1997; London Economics 2007). London Economics has collaborated with the 
World Bank in providing gene al arguments for power sector reform following the UK model 
as well as provided such advice across a wide array of fora (Bates and London Economics 
(Consultants) 1997; Webb 1998). National Economic Research Associates (NERA) also played 
an active role in the UK's reform, along with London Economics, and subsequently went on to 
share its expertise with several developing countries, including extensive work in India (NERA 
Economic Consulting 2007a) (NERA Economic Consulting 2007b). Oxera, yet another UK-
based consultancy, has played an active role in advising the UK's Department of Trade and 
Industry, which oversees electricity (Oxera 2007). Oxera has also since engaged actively in 
providing training to World Bank staff as well as working throughout Latin America and 
Africa on reform programmes. 
22 It should be noted that successful outcomes have been challenged by among others, Sharon Beder, in 
Power Play, who accredits the reduction in tariffs to reduced fuel costs and describes how only a select 
few have gained from power sector reform (2003:205, 275, 337). 
23 Millan (2007) treats, among other issues, this dimension of international influences and consultants as 
it relates to the unfolding of power sector reform, including in his discussion of how reforms took place 
in El Salvador (Chapter 5). 
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Thirdly, although not taken up in detail in this thesis, reforms were ongoing in many of the 
early reforming countries. In some instances, second and third waves of reforms have been 
initiated to address issues overlooked in the initial reform programmes, including policies to 
ensure social and environmental sustainability as well as more significant competition (Inter-
American Development Bank 2000:6). Finally, although, not always the loudest voice in the 
room, caution was urged in carrying out what was largely unprecedented work, a point which 
will be returned to later (in section 2.4.4) (Joskow and Schmalensee 1983:93). 
2.4 Powering ahead: subsequent reforms and reformers 
In many industrialized countries, as discussed above, reforms were initiated to improve 
economic efficiency, particularly with regard to the price of power, that is, a lowering of tariffs 
(Bacon 1995b:138; Victor and Heller 2007:262). In contrast, in many developing countries, 
reforms were sought to address poor financial management and technical delivery, which were 
compromising efficiency. This in turn often meant raising tariffs to revenue-sufficient levels. 
Reform efforts were also targeted at introducing a space for private participation as the public 
sector was no longer able to provide the requisite funds for system expansion (Jamasb 2002:1-
2). Although the challenges faced by countries were different, it was generally believed that the 
introduction of private sector participation and market competition was the means to achieve 
improvements in the ESIs (O'Neill, Helman et al. 2006:479). This section gives a brief 
overview of conditions at the inception of reforms in developing country ESIs, followed by a 
discussion of the standard model, which was formulated as the primary way to achieve 
improved efficiency. 
2.4.1 Pre-reforms: a snapshot of developing region ESIs 
By the late 1980s, poor technical and financial performance were the defining features of 
many ESIs across developing regions. Among the indicators of poor technical performance 
was the fact that transmission and distribution (T &D) energy losses averaged about 20 per cent, 
against a world average of approximately 9 per cent for the same period (World Bank 2006c). 
South Asia registered the highest T&D losses, with Bangladesh, as one example, recording 35 
per cent. These significant T&D losses (estimated to be 300 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) per 
year) translated into about US$30 billion in losses through increased supply costs (World Bank 
1993a:22-23)?4 Blackouts were frequent, with the Philippines representing 750 system 
blackout hours per year (hrs/yr), against a security standard of 7 hrs/yr. Load factors of above 
70 per cent were the aim, but closer to 50 per cent in reality (Adamantiades, Besant-Jones et al. 
1995:2). 
24 It is estimated that infrastructure industries (including water, railroads, roads, and electricity) across 
developing countries incurred a total of US$180 billion in losses in the early 1990s due to technical 
inefficiency and mispricing (World Bank World Development Report 1994 cited in Kessides 2004: 3). 
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Poor financial performance was reflected by low debt-coverage ratios as well as 
insufficient cash for new investments. A survey of 60 developing countries in the late 1980s 
recorded that the utilities generated funds sufficient to cover only 12 per cent of their 
investment requirements.25 Other cause for alarm was the average rate of return in many 
developing country utilities, which fell from about 9 per cent in 1973 to less than 5 per cent by 
the end of the 1980s, well below the cost of capital (World Bank 1993a:20). Further impeding 
productivity and impacting financial performance was the number of utility customers per 
employee. Among the worst performers in this regard was Rwanda with only 6 customers per 
employee and Burundi at 9 (World Bank 1993a:20). 
A further performance measure, which deserves mention in this context, were the low 
electricity access rates of approximately 46 per cent across developing regions in 1990, with 
only 16 per cent of the population in Sub-Saharan African with access to electricity (by 1990) 
(International Energy Agency 2002:20). Approximately 80 per cent of those without access 
lived (and still do) in rural areas (International Energy Agency 2002: 17). These low access 
rates contributed to low per capita consumption. Per capita consumption rates of low income 
countries amounted to just 279 kWh or just 13 per cent of the world average of2134 kWh per 
person (with considerable variation recorded across regions, including an average of 51 kWh 
per person in Sub-Saharan Africa and 1225 in Latin America and the Caribbean) (World Bank 
2007b).26 
Among the most immediate causes of the technical and financial deterioration was 
increasingly below cost tariffs, with tariffs in 1988 across a sample of developing countries 
amounting to 3.8 US cents per kWh, equivalent to about half of the average tariff in 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (World Bank 
1993a:25-26). Another more revealing measure of tariffs was that in 1992, it was estimated that 
total government subsidies for energy in developing countries were over US$50 billion, whi~h . 
was greater than the total official development assistance that these countries received that year 
(Goldemberg and Johansson 1995:7). Below cost tariffs meant that the utility itself was not 
able to finance technical improvements, through its own resources, let alone consider 
expansion of the grid. The poor financial indicators further prevented many utilities from 
accessing the capital markets given their perceived lack of creditworthiness (World Bank 
1993a:27). 
25 In 1990, it was estimated that capital expenditure for power expansion programmes for developing 
countries in the 1990s would amount to approximately US$1 trillion (in 1989 US dollar terms), (Moore 
and Smith 1990:i, 12), as will be discussed in greater detail in section 2.6. 
26 This regional data dates to 1992 (not 1990) in contrast to the other information presented in this 
paragraph as 1992 is the earliest year kWh per capita is available across regions. 
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\Vhat had cau~ed tarilfs to decline to thi~ levi.:! , and what were the other factors 
influcncing such poor techniGal and financial performance? Figure 2.1 uffers a description uf 
the poor performance and related caUSGs. 
Fig ure 2.1: Poor sector performance: indicators and causes 
Poor sector nerf(Onn~nce as indicated bv: 
. 
- --r -- (:lJjllilllcial PJlli~").r).l]llllCC: (-l technical law debt cover ra!io~ [lerformance: low KOK 1 blackouts low creditworthiness high T&D losses low self-financinl; ratios 
high employee to 
I low access rates customer ratio under-investment 
"-
~n'-'-"I;j).~ 
-be loy. cost tariffs 
-low collections 
-lack ofinvestment 
-poor governance of utility and sector 
-growing state budget deficits 
-povertyiaffordab i I it)' 
-politici.lation 
-exogenous factors: world oil priccs, restricted access [Q foreign loans, 
high interest rates & inflation 
Sourcc: based on author's compilation including: Jh irad (1990:365-375); Moore and Smith 1990; World 
Bank 1993a: 19-33; Kcssides 2004:3; Besant-Jones 2006: I 0; Victor and Heller 2007:25 7. 
1\ couple of points are worth noting. First, there was an interplay between poor technical 
and financial performance; that is, tt!chnical performanct! was impacted hy poor financial 
performance and vice versa. Secondly, there is some overlap in terms of th t! different factors 
and symptoms mentioned. For instance, 'low self-financing ratios', which is included as onc of 
the signs of poor financial performance in the Figure above. contributed to the ' lack of 
invt!stment', which had a direct impact on both poor technical and financia l performance 
(World Bank 1993a:19, 21-23). Th irdly. budgetary constraints at the national level together 
with a host of cxogenous factors h,lil a s ign ificant innllence on overall poor performance as 
well (World Bank 1993a:19). In sum, although poor performance prompted power sector 
reform, the causes of such performance were rnultifold and deep, which helps to explain the 
mixed outcomes of power sector rcform (treated in section 2.5.2). 
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An important point is that the conditions predominating in most developing countries' 
ESIs at the inception of power sector reform, as described above, were dramatically different 
from the conditions known in most of the early reforming countries (USA, Chile, UK and 
Norway). In the latter, there was generally significant excess capacity (Newbery 2001b:4), 
electricity access was nearly universal, and utilities did not face the same financial constraints. 
The drive in most industrialized states, as noted previously, was for economic efficiency, with 
the institutional foundations largely in place to help facilitate reform (Williams and Ghanadan 
2006:820). 
2.4.2 Antidote for poor performance: evolving power sector reform 
Despite the stark contrast in conditions, the experiences of the early reformers became the 
reference point for countries across the developing world. Stated in somewhat different terms, 
Bacon and Besant-Jones describe how, "the pioneering reforms to power sectors in Chile, 
England and Wales and Norway, during the 1980s ... have motivated numerous industrialized 
and developing countries to follow them in the 1990s" (Bacon and Besant-Jones 2002:6). The 
ways and means of "motivating" were multi-fold and included both domestic and international 
initiatives and initiators, including the World Bank, which will be treated in this section. 
Informed by recent reforms in the USA, Chile, England and Wales and Norway, and with 
clear indicators that developing country ESIs were performing sub-optimally, in 1993, the 
World Bank issued "The World Bank's Role in the Electric Power Sector: Policies for 
Effective Institutional, Regulatory and Financial Reform". The overarching argument was not 
for outright privatization of assets and competition, but rather improving performance through 
commercialization, corporatization, and enhanced regulation. Private participation was 
highlighted as a means to improve sector performance and help meet the investment gap 
(World Bank 1993a:12-18).27 
The electricity sector had historically been a main target of World Bank lending, with an 
estimated cumulative US$75 billion (in 1990 prices) or about 15 per cent of the Bank's total 
lending (from 1947 through 1991). It was estimated that in the 1980s, the World Bank 
accounted for approximately 7 per cent of total power investments in developing countries, not 
including co-financing that the Bank helped raise (World Bank 1993a:34). Thus, within the 
World Bank, electricity was recognized as a priority sector, and, in terms of total investment 
flows, the Bank's contribution was substantial, which made the 1993 electricity policies of 
particular significance. The document, which is considered among the earliest articulations of 
27 Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may have also been influential in advancing the 
reform agenda, the IMF, unlike the W orId Bank, never developed sector specific policies and reform 
recommendations, and therefore discussion of the institution's role remains limited in this thesis. 
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the new power sector reform for developing countries, laid out the World Bank's role and a 
general set of recommendations, grouped under five principles (World Bank 1993a:59-77). 
• Transparent regulatory processes, which included a clear legal framework as well as 
the enforcement of rules and (clear and transparent) means for amending such rules, 
were generally recommended and made a prerequisite for any power sector lending on 
behalf of the World Bank. Market pricing and demand-side management were also 
enumerated in this context as goals for the sector. 
• For the least developed countries importation of services were recommended, which 
would address the issue of insufficient human resources available to spearhead and 
manage (early) reforms. 
• It was imperative that commercialization and corporatization be adopted (by which it 
was meant that the entities within the ESI must operate as commercial enterprises, with 
government/state participation "more transparent") together with private sector 
participation. 
• Commitment lending was an explicit statement that the World Bank would only lend 
to countries with a clear commitment to improving their ESIs, following the principles 
laid out. 
• The World Bank would encourage private investment through a number of initiatives 
including lending to national financial intermediaries and providing investment 
guarantees. 
These policies would inform World Bank lending practices throughout the 1990s, which 
will be explored in further depth in sections 2.4.4 and 2.5.1 as well as throughout Chapters four 
through seven. Evidence may also be found amidst other DFIs such as the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) (DFID 2002).28 29 To take two such examples (ADB and 
IADB), in 1995, articulating its policy recommendations for the energy sector, the ADB 
identified as a first priority: private sector participation as pivotal in funding major energy 
projects. Thereafter the multilateral finance institution listed the importance of energy 
28 It should be noted that the World Bank did not withdraw from funding power infrastructure 
exclusively. Rather throughout the 1990s, there was a sharp reduction particularly in thermal power 
production investments, with some notable exceptions including two plants in Kenya (to be described in 
Chapter 5). Funds were concentrated in providing technical assistance to assist in investments by the 
private sector and in transmission and distribution projects, which as described in section 2.2, 
represented the natural monopoly components of the system. 
29 There appears to be no substantial evidence for United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
articulating and implementing the standard prescription related to power sector reforms. Instead, the 
UNDP appears to have focused its efforts on rural energy and diversification of generation to include 
renewable energy (UNDP per com 2007). 
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efficiency and more extensive integration of environmental concerns into energy sector 
development. In sum, however, "The overall thrust of the suggested policy initiatives is to 
encourage the [developing member countries] to develop appropriate market structures and to 
encourage greater competition in the energy sector" (Asian Development Bank 1995:30). 
In terms of the lADB, the organization's 1996 Public Utilities Sectoral Operational 
Policies (under which electricity was included) outlined five objectives, namely, ensuring long-
term sustainability of service; achieving economic efficiency; safeguarding quality; promoting 
accessibility; and meeting wider national objectives (Inter-American Development Bank 1996). 
In the new spirit of commercialization, the lADB indicated that: 
A number of important trade-offs exist among the objectives mentioned before .... however, 
there is one area in which no compromise should be made and that is, in meeting the 
objective of long-term service sustainability by ensuring that financial flows rise to a level 
compatible with full cost recovery, while guaranteeing economic efficiency as a general 
goal of service provision, (Inter-American Development Bank 1996). 
The means to achieving such objectives, as spelled out by the lADB, were multi-fold, with 
significant emphasis given to competition throughout each of the steps (Inter-American 
Development Bank 1996). Privatization and private participation, although alluded to, were not 
laid down as policy, however, at appr ximately the same time, the lADB did encourage 
extensive private sector participation, including via a "private sector window" for privately-
financed projects, including in infrastructure, that required no sovereign guarantee, as a means 
to facilitate private sector flows (Inter-American Development Bank 2006:3) (Inter-American 
Development Bank 1996). 
It should be reiterated, however, that influences were not merely external, and to quote 
one individual who played roles in both international and domestic organizations (in Latin 
America) at varying points of his career, "The [development] [blanks didn't impose the reform 
but promoted it" (Millan J. per com 2007). In other words, DFIs were at the forefront of 
reform, but they were not alone. Domestic actors and international policy consultants had a role 
to playas well in shaping and ultimately carrying out reform policy, as will be sketched in 
sections 2.4.4 and 2.5.1.30 
30 This assertion stands in contrast to some of the critics of power sector reform who charge that it was a 
top-down effort driven by multilateral finance institutions, "To facilitate the transition, donors and 
multilateral agencies provide not only reform-targeted loans but blueprints for the process as well. These 
agencies have been architects of the reforms, with many countries obliged to take on technical assistance 
as part of the loan package," (Wamukonya 2003:1274). See also Williams and Ghanadan (2006:818). 
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2.4.3 Advent of a new standard model 
Over the course of the decade, as power sector reform was being enacted throughout 
developing regions and ongoing in several industrialized countries, a series of key steps came 
to be identified. These steps are loosely connected to the 1993 electricity policies of the World 
Bank but go much further in setting out a course of action for full liberalization of power 
markets. By 1999, these reform steps had been formulated roughly as follows: 31 
1. Corporatization: involves the utility being transformed into a separate legal entity 
(separate from the ministry/government), with all associated rights and obligations 
including governance structures, managing budgets, borrowing, procurement, labour 
employment, payment oftaxes and dividends. 
2. Commercialization: represents a move toward cost-recovery in pricing, improvements 
in metering, billing and collections and could involve adopting internationally 
recognized accounting practices as well accounting for all subsidies. 
3. Passage of the requisite energy legislation: provides a legal mandate for restructuring, 
as well as the legal framework to allow private/foreign participation/ownership in the 
sector. 
4. Establishment of an (independent) regulator: aims to introduce efficiency, 
transparency and fairness in the management of the sector, specifically to prevent 
anticompetitive activity, encourage appropriate investment and protect consumers. 
5. IPPs: introduce new (private) investment in generation, with long-term PPAs. 
6. Restructuring: involves unbundling the incumbent (state-owned) utility, which may 
take the form of vertical andlor horizontal unbundling of generation, transmission and 
distribution assets as preparation for privatization of (profitable) assets and the 
introduction of competition. 
7. Divestiture of generation assets: divests state-ownership in part or full of generation 
assets to private sector. 
8. Divestiture of distribution assets: divests state-ownership in part or full of distribution 
assets to private sector. 
31 Reform steps have been identified in Bacon (1999:4), but have been embellished with definitions 
found in Adamantiades (1995:6-7), Besant-Jones (2006:11), Williams and Ghanadan (2006:822). 
Commercialization was not included as a separate step in Bacon's 1999 report, as has been noted above, 
however, in earlier work (Bacon 1995:131) the author clearly indicates: "an almost inevitable first step is 
to turn the state enterprise into a corporation and then submit this corporation to commercial discipline." 
Thus, commercialization was considered an extension of corporation. Also not identified in Bacon 
(1999) was 'competition', step 7, due to the fact that steps were largely based on what the author 
observed as being carried out in developing countries in 1998 (Bacon R. per com 2007a). "Basically at 
the time of research (1998) even the possibility of private entry was largely new. Competition would 
have been effectively meaningless with only a very few cases for those countries which had done some 
reform" (Bacon R. per com 2007b). 
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9. Competition: introduction of wholesale and retail markets. 
These milestones taken together have been referred to as the "standard prescription" (Hunt 
'2002:8, 239) or the "standard model" (Littlechild 2006:xviii), which draws on a "textbook 
architecture" (Joskow 2006:4,8; Littlechild 2006:xviii). In terms of the sequencing of the steps, 
by 1999, it was posited that: 
There is a logical sequence to reform steps if a country is working toward full private 
sector participation and competition, and the survey results were expected to show this 
pattern. First the state company must be corporatized and commercialized. Next a law 
permitting private entry must be passed. Then regulation must be implemented. After that 
the state enterprise should be restructured through vertical and horizontal separation. 
Private Greenfield investment could then be allowed. Finally, the existing assets should 
be privatized (Bacon 1999:3). 
Minor variations of the standard model have been laid out, with considerably greater 
emphasis placed on the creation of competitive wholesale and retail markets (linked to steps 6 
and 9 above), for more developed ESls. The following additional elements have been laid out 
as the textbook architecture for the creation of full competition (Hunt 2002:8): 
1. Demand Side: Hourly metering for most of the consumption and pricing plans that 
expose customers to the spot price for some of their consumption. 
2. Trading Arrangements: System operations separated from traders and regionally 
consolidated. Trading arrangements based on an integrated model, with central dispatch 
and locational energy prices. 
3. Transmission business model: Control of transmission separate from traders; pricing 
and expansion arrangements; [the] preference is for regional profit-making regulated 
transmission companies (transcos) incorporating the system operator.32 
4. Supply side: Remove barriers to entry. Buyout of the old regime by valuing assets. 
Expand market power control, divest utility generation into smaller parcels. 
5. Retail access: When production markets are working, choice for all customers, [which 
requires] extensive settlement mechanism and customer education, and decisions about 
default provision. 
32 Although outlined in Hunt (2002:8), it should be noted that a transmission model has not been widely 
prescribed; instead, the transmission sector has been marked by the diversity of different models 
embraced during reform. 
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Josko w's lal~ s l :md more slI(;ci nct vers ion of the " 1~x tht)Qk model " is: privatization of 
stat(:-owilcti cnte rpl is~s: vertica l and horizom;!l Tcstmi: lurmg 10 fm: ilitatc compt: til ion and 
mit igate sdf.de:ll ing an.1 c ross-subs id i7~1Iion problems: perfunnence based rt:!;\I1:tt ion applied 
to the regulated lIallsmission and d istr ibution segments; good .... holesak market designs Ihat 
fac ilitate emcient competit ion among exist ing gem:rators; compet it ive entry of new generators, 
anel reta il cOlllpclilion, ;11 leas t for indus tria l customers (2006:8), ViC10r and I-Ieller refer to Ihe 
"standard te'\toook mOller ', wh ich rough ly corrC5ponds lu these steps (2007 :6) all.1 is s imply 
staled as: IInbundk; privatize; create regulatory institutions: and create markct~. Hcsant-J otlcS 
(201)6 : II ) provides his wrsion, ident ifying it as "elements of full ,scale !llClrket reform" not a 
prescript ion per se, w ith tht! major addition. which i~ also stat~d in lIacon and BesHnt-Joncs, 
(2UU2 :4), of "fOCIISilig gove rnment 's role on policy formatiOn a lld exccutinll ." Duhash in 
Puwer Politics refers 10 "a co mplex ncw modd for the elcctricity ;,ccto r'< (2002.12) and details 
some bltt not all of the sleps listed in the text above. Other re ferences indude Williams and 
Ghanadan's " standHrd menu for rcfmm" (20()6:H21), which i~ bugcly I;.:lscd on llacon's siers, 
but again with the addilion of competition as a fi l:a l, sepmatc step.n 
Thl'SC s l,'ps have lx.',m assoc iated w ith four d ilTercnl ir.t.luslfY mode ls tha t illustrate the 
degree of compcliliOlI for and in (he market Ooskow and Schmalcns{'c )IJH3:93-105; 
All:unali tiades, Uesam-Jones e l al. 1995: 9; Hum 2002:42·54: Kessides 2004: 144,14&, 150). The 
fi rst mudel (below) depicts the verl ic:t1ly i n( ~gral","d monopoly structure , wh ich .;hamcte rized 
lOost ESls a t Ihc incept ion o f flower Sl,'(;tor re forms. 
Mudd [: 
Mc.'nop,) ly 
I Gen~rati(\l 1 I 
I Tr:\n ~ I\\i ss iQn I 
I n'~lrihulion I 
I CU~ltomc f) I 
Figure 2.2: Slan.Jard model: mo.lcls 1-3 
._-_., 
M(1d~ 1 2.: Singk 
Buyer (tPPs) 
~i' O;;n I~ 
Singlc Buy.'f 
I Oislri \m!j'Jn 
I C o" 1['c." 1 
" tilde! }; Wfll,!<!;l1 te 
Compc1l!ion 
Sourc~': lIunt (20V2:42·45) 
NOles: l,'Own G " refers 10 Sl:ue-owncd gef1er"~tiol1, l..-Ois' · re ft:r.s 10 dislrioution comp'lny. Hunt pnwides 
two d ifft:rent vari.u i,ms of Modd I and Model l , 1101 depk tcd here, whi.:h mcludc (In Modd I) a distinct 
distribut ion comp,my imd (in Model 2) IIUlny diSlinct distribution co:-::panit:s (lOOl :42-<:4) . 
l! There is an [mporumt d iSlinclion among the :tuthors .:;:iled here and abovc .. with Joskow, Hunt and 
Lin frchi1d Ilt oviding a nonnati ve fntm~,,"<)r1<; ;md Victor nnd lIella, f)ubash, it r.d Wiltiilms and 
Ghanadnn phlviding a descript ive Iramework. Bacon and Bt:sant,Joflu' work oppt:ars to be paJ(iatty 
descript ive om[ partially norm.uiw. 
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Figure 2.3: Standard motlc!: model 4 
Modcl 4: Rc,;alc C\lOlpelitlull 
)lrP ,~PP ~" " 1Y1' .: \ " ? L[S.o\ E." AKK 
, , 
. , 
n lyRctaikr : Retailer 
Cust C\l~' 
Soure..:: Hunt (20 02 :54) 
Notes: "Dis/Reta iler" refe rs to di stribution cOInpnny and /or re tailer; "Cust" refers to customer. as noted 
above. 
Thr..::\! points should be made in c<lnclud ing. Firsl. four of [lte n inc rdorm steps la id oul 
above, namely corporati/..::J lion, commereiali7.:l:I inn, passage of an energy law. and e,lab!ishmenl 
o f an independent regu l<: tor, m~y a ll take plm:e under tlte first model (mo nopoly) to enhance 
pcrform:lIlcc. These prel iminary s lcps il re ""hm arc required 10 transfo rm the ESI from" 
governmen t agcm:y or dcpartmcnt into a co:n merc ia l enlerprise (Hullt S. per co rn 2007). 
Secondly. Ihe c:( tendcd standard model for competition, dc.tni!cd .tbove as fi ve steps, is 
app licable to models 3 and 4 (Hunt S. per com :WO?), namely whok salc and ret.l il t.:ompct it ion. 
and presupposes the complet ion of the earlier .~ t cps outlined in Dacon ( 1999 ). Finally, to 
implc m~n t these fiv e steps and achieve e ither whoh!salc or retuil co mpeti tion (mo dels 3 or 4). 
sophisticated legal rind financia l infras tructur~ is requ ircd (Hunt S. per corn 2 007)}I--the 
alJ~encc of wh ic h. as alluded to previous ly, is one of the mlli n characteristics p f many less 
deve loped countries. Thus, although the modd described abo ve, emerged rlS a standard, it is 
arguable that a lmost half of the steps were not necessari ly relevant to lhe condilions on the 
ground in Illosl deve loping countr ies on which it was broughl lo bear. 
2.4.4 EXCE' llliOlls to the s tandard model :md the role of thl' World Ba nk 
T he previous .~\.'(: t i on concluded by advancing the ide.1 lhat there were clear prerequisi tes 
to introducing who lesale and retail competilio ll , a lso known as the culmination o f the standard 
mode\. Commerciali£at io:1, corpor.l tiz.::uion, and unbund ling were among su.::h prerC<juisites. In 
---------
J4 In its Sectoml O[l\: r:t tional Policies fur Public Utilities. as prev:ously rd crenced, t::c Inter· Amcrican 
DevclIJpmeut Bank. indicated that, "the existence o f compeli tion ir. the market. and some Kinds of 
private secl0r part icipat ion (.:tn only funct ion t'lTcdlVe ly within a !>p<:ci fic legal conte.'l \, cOunl:rie5 5houlJ 
carel'll])y study the :"ldcquacy and compatibl lit) o f the pfOposed u ptlOns with thell le!:al syslems, '"(lnler· 
Ameri~an Development Oank 1996 :4) 
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addition to this emphasis on proper sequencing, a series of exceptions to the reform model have 
been raised since the inception of power sector reforms in developing countries.35 This section 
does not purport to be an exhaustive inventory of references to exceptions, but rather to 
showcase approximately 10 examples, in roughly chronological order.36 The section also 
revisits broad generalizations on how the World Bank formulated, advocated and advanced the 
standard model for power sector reform in its client countries. 
Three years before the 1993 electricity sector policy document was issued, the World 
Bank's Industry and Energy Department, recommended through a discussion paper (not official 
Bank policy) that what was needed was not wholesale competition, which was deemed 
irrelevant to most least developing countries (World Bank 1990:81). 
Competition at the wholesale level is a policy issue that does not rank high on the agenda 
for power sector reforms in LDCs. In most countries, the efficient structure and size of the 
power industry leaves little or no room for market forces to guide the use of generation 
capacity. Furthermore, the concept of wholesale competition in itself is a questionable 
approach since the market forces it intends to stimulate may merely replicate the existing 
industry structure on the basis of contracts, (World Bank 1990:81). 
Instead what was advanced was ore-regulation' to ensure that utilities, whether privately or 
publicly owned, had both sufficient oversight and autonomy to improve performance (World 
Bank 1990:vi, 82). 
Although by 1993 ideas had advanced as previously described in the World Bank's 1993 
electricity sector policy, the policy document makes explicit that: it should serve as guiding 
principles; consideration should be given to the variation in country situations, and specific 
actions must be worked out at the country level (World Bank 1993a:13), i.e. a one-sized 
approach would not work for all. 
In 1995, Bacon, (1995a) in another World Bank discussion paper, challenged policy 
makers to reconsider whether horizontal and/or vertical unbundling was appropriate to small 
systems. According to Bacon, ''the most prominent case (England and Wales) is operated on a 
scale completely different from that in may countries for which it is being referred to as a 
model" (Bacon 1995a:4). With high costs associated with many of the steps related to 
unbundling and the introduction of competition, caution was urged, along with detailed 
economic analyses to ensure that benefits outweighed costs. Before the reform model is 
implemented, decision makers should be able to answer a series of questions including the 
3S Recall as well that caution was urged (Joskow and Schmalensee 1983:93), as previously referenced, 
for all reformers. 
36 All references appear in chronological order with the one exception of Ioskow 2006, which is cited 
before the World Bank 2004 due to the logic of the material. 
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extent to which unbundling of small systems will impact on employee efficiency, as career 
advancements may be stunted in a newly organized, smaller, firm (Bacon 1995a:19,33). 
Hunt and Shuttleworth (1996) provided such exceptions and Hunt (2002:27) reiterated 
them again in Making Competition Work in Electricity when she indicated that small countries, 
or those with low demand and/or inadequate transmission networks were considered possible 
candidates for continued monopolies. 
Alternatives to wholesale and retail competition were expounded on in Jamasb (2002:43-
47), who described how countries with smaller systems should aim for competition for the 
market, rather than in the market, through: the single buyer model, bilateral contracts (PPAs), 
and management contracts.37 
Although a strong proponent of the prescription, Joskow (2006:8) acknowledges that there 
may be some regulated vertically integrated monopolies that may perform well and for which 
"comprehensive reforms reflected in the textbook model might have little positive effect on 
performance. " 
In 2004, the World Bank's "Operational Guidance for World Bank Group Staff: Public 
and Private Sector Roles in the Supply of Electricity Services," again raised the exception of 
small systems, which may, as indicated by Hunt, be more efficient as monopolies (World Bank 
2004a:7-8). However, this document, which will be discussed further below, represented the 
first major World Bank policy document since the 1993 electricity sector policy, also went 
much further than simply referencing an exception. Rather, the document was premised on the 
need to rethink the approach to power sector reform, which included: integrating stronger 
poverty, affordability and environmental elements; treating all reform steps as means to 
enhanced performance and poverty reduction, not ends in themselves; and that many of the 
Bank's client countries actually fall into the category of being too small to support competition 
(World Bank 2004a:2-3,7). 
These points were reinforced by Besant-Jones, in his 2006 treatise, published by the 
World Bank, which was intended to complement the 2004 Operational Guidance note, cited 
above, and provide relevant and detailed applications of the policy advice to World Bank 
staffers as well as all those involved in making critical decisions related to ESI reform. Almost 
two decades since the first cautionary note was issued, Besant-Jones writes, "The case for 
unbundling gets weaker the smaller the system, the more undeveloped the institutional 
capacity, and/or the weaker the general country conditions" (Besant-Jones 2006:61). 
In summary, attention to important exceptions to the standard model have been raised 
throughout, however, there has often been a misunderstanding of the extent to which the World 
37 The Inter-American Development Bank in its 1996 Sectoral Operational Policies for Public Utilities 
also included warnings to consider market size and shape as well as the fact that such size and shape may 
preclude unbundling (Inter-American Development Bank 1996:2). 
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Bank, among the most significant development agencies in Africa,38 formulated, implemented 
and advocated what has come to be known as the standard prescription, as detailed by Bacon in 
general terms and Hunt and Joskow, among others, specifically with regard to creating 
competitive wholesale and retail markets. 
The World Bank did advance power sector reform through its 1993 policy, but never 
advocated outright liberalization (in any policy documents) as per many of the critics 
(Wamukonya 2003:1274; Williams and Ghanadan 2006:821; Yi-chong 2006:804). Caution 
about application was noted since the inception of the first reforms, recommending tailor-made 
solutions (World Bank 1993b:6). Such caution would be reiterated by specific World Bank 
staff over the decade. Although numerous technical papers were published, no formal policy 
guidance was provided between 1993 and 2004 when the World Bank issued its "Operational 
Guidance for World Bank Staff' (2004a). 39 The oft-cited Bacon Scorecard was not intended to 
be prescriptive, but rather in the words of the author "was essentially designed to allow simple 
yes Ino answers for the maximum number of countries and what we thought at that time were 
key reform steps" (Bacon R. per com 2007a). 
Nevertheless, certain World Bank staff as well as World Bank consultants appear to have 
advocated and ultimately implemented liberalization in power sector reform. But to reiterate, 
this was not spelled out in any policy document (World Bank per com 2007a). There is also 
evidence of the enthusiasm for the model being home grown, as seen for example in the case of 
Tanzania's Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC), treated in greater detail below 
(section 2.5.1), which while funded in part by donor agencies, also had significant local input 
and influence which rallied around the standard prescription. Furthermore, as previously 
discussed (section 2.3.5), numerous consultants working independently of the World Bank 
were also involved in spreading the standard model. 
The role of this thesis is not to be an apologist for the World Bank. After all, the Bank's 
role was pivotal in shaping power sector reform. For instance, in one of the more self-critica1 
texts published by the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department in 2003, it is written: 
38 In 2004, 2005 and 2006, net financial flows from IDA, the concessionary loan window of the World 
Bank, to Sub-Saharan Africa totalled approximately US$2.5 billion, which was greater than any other 
development agency and, in terms of IDA, greater than to any other developing region. (World Bank 
2005a:360) (World Bank 2004b, p.344; World Bank 2006a: 358) 
39 In Power for Development, the authors urge the World Bank Group to provide operational guidance to 
staff on how to promote private sector development in the electricity sector, given increased 
macroeconomic and political risk and limited private sector interest, and further recommend that such 
guidance should clearly emphasize how to deal specifically with poverty reduction and environmental 
aspects together with technical and financial performance improvements (Manibog, Dominguez et al. 
2003:57). The response was two-fold, first the 2004 Operational Guidancefor World Bank Staff(World 
Bank 2004a) and subsequently Reforming Markets in Developing Countries: What We Have Learned 
(Besant-Jones 2006). 
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The Bank's approach to sector reform, as it evolved in the 1990s, went beyond what was 
mandated by the 1993 Electric Power Lending Policy. The policy promoted 
commercialization and corporatization before privatization, as a means to introduce 
competition and innovation. It was based mainly on the reforms in Chile, England, and 
Wales, which were the only experiences available at that time. Most power sectors of 
Bank client countries, however, showed little prospect for reaching commercial standards 
because of the inefficiencies from state ownership and poor governance. Subsequent to 
the 1993 policy, and without enunciating it as a major strategic change, the Bank thus 
mostly advocated privatization (as well as private participation through management 
contracts) as a means to achieving commercialization (Manibog, Dominguez et al. 
2003:50) (italics added by author). 
The text clearly spells out how the Bank advanced privatization as a first step where 
commercialization was not initially achievable, however, as previously indicated, not only was 
this unwritten practice not official policy, it was practiced by some and not all. This 
disconnect between policy and implementation may explain why for instance many of the 
stakeholders in Kenya, Egypt and Tanzania have indicated (as will be detailed in Chapters four 
through six) that the World Bank was requiring competitive markets. The argument here is 
there appears to have been one official policy and one less official policy that was advanced on 
the ground. While this has been acknowledged in some reports, including (Besallt-Jones 
2006:31; Williams and Ghanadan 2006:821), it has not been emphasized to date and not been 
clearly documented. 
2.5 An unexpected ending to the story 
Despite the difference in starting conditions, and despite the exceptions noted, power 
sector reform and the standard model, shaped largely in industrialized countries, were appli~d 
to developing countries. To return once again to the example ofIPPs, Woodhouse provides the 
following observation, "While a body of theoretical and empirical work guided the architects of 
these early private participation in infrastructure (PPI) schemes, careful planning often faded to 
the background during the IPP boom years. In this environment, actual practice drifted from the 
theoretical foundations for PPI. .. particularly once the pioneers had blazed a trail that was 
easier for others to follow" (2006a:134). And so it happened that Tanzania, to consider one 
example, became a candidate for wholesale competition, with installed capacity of 
approximately 900 MW, a largely hydro-dominant system (at the time that plans for power 
sector reform were being developed), and a state utility that was far from following commercial 
practices. The next section commences by briefly reviewing one country example (Tanzania) to 
illustrate how power sector reform and the standard model were enacted. Subsequently, an 
overview of reform paths across developing countries is presented. What this section 
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deliberately does not undertake is a review of the literature assessing outcomes of power sector 
reform, including performance measurements, due to the controversial nature of such literature, 
which is partly the result of insufficient quantitative data mapping actual outcomes (as 
acknowledged most recently in Besant-Jones (2006:31). 40 41 
2.5.1 An illustration: Tanzania 
Still on the books, but not yet implemented, in Tanzania, is a plan to unbundle 
TANESCO, the state-owned utility, into separate generation, transmission and distribution 
companies, privatize assets and introduce competitive markets into the ESI (Mercados 2007; 
Mercados per com 2007; Parastatal Sector Reform Commission per com 2007; EWURA per 
com 2007a). The plan was developed by Mercados, a consultancy, as previously noted (in 
section 2.3.2), founded in 1993 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, a country which established 
wholesale competition starting in 1992 (Dyner, Arango et al. 2006:604). 
PSRC, a government agency established in 1992 to privatize government-owned 
enterprises in order to increase efficiency and enhance performance, commissioned Mercados, 
as well as a number of other consultants (including Stone & Webster), to design a series of 
plans to advance power sector reform in Tanzania. The World Bank and DFID, the primary 
DFIs, which fund the PSRC, may also be linked to the advancement of power sector reform. 
The challenge of assigning responsibility for the nature of the reform plans increases not 
only with the myriad actors involved, but also due to the inter-linkages. For instance, the World 
Bank provided the funding for Mercados' consultancy work, through credit #Q073:3304, the 
Privatization and Private Sector Development Project. According to PSRC and Mercados, 
however, World Bank staff did not interfere with the consultancy work, which was carried out 
independently by Mercados, and which both (Mercados and PSRC) also contend was tailor-
40 Among the more extensive econometric analyses, which reviewed panel data for 51 developing 
countries between 1985 and 2000, concludes that capacity utilization and hence technical performance 
improves with privatization (though not necessarily competition). There is no evidence for 
improvements in electricity penetration, capacity expansion and labour efficiency with privatization 
alone; improvements are observed only when privatization is coupled with either regulation or 
competition. The study provides no conclusive data on financial performance (Zhang, Parker et al. 
2002:22-23). These conclusions were, however, reached before many developing countries had 
implemented reforms and/or were in the midst of reforms. Other shortcomings are described in Jamasb, 
who offers an extensive review of the literature on the determinants and performance of electricity 
reform in developing countries and concludes that no comprehensive series of measures exist that assess, 
monitor and compare reforms on a regular basis. Studies that have been carried out lack, among other 
things, adequate performance indicators, market structure variables, and comprehensive panel data 
(2005:46). 
41 Kessides in reviewing the impact of reform across infrastructure industries makes the case that most 
empirical evidence points to positive results for privatization and restructuring, specifically the fact that 
privatization improves efficiency (as regards to labour and total factor productivity) as well as utilities' 
financial performance and causes service expansion. There is also a considerable body of evidence, he 
highlights, including Zhang noted above, that points to positive outcomes being contingent on post-
reform/privatization regulation as well as the degree to which competition has been introduced (2004:53-
54). 
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made to suit Tanzania's conditions, that is, not as the critics allege, a copy and paste job based 
on early experiences in Latin America (Mercados per com 2007; Parastatal Sector Reform 
Commission per com 2007). Still the World Bank did facilitate this exchange by underwriting 
it. 
Furthermore, long before Mercados' plan was issued in 2004, power sector reform, 
following the model carried out by the early reformers had found its way into Tanzania's 
policy. "In October 1999, the government approved a [World Bank funded] power sector 
restructuring strategy, which recommends unbundling TANESCO vertically and horizontally 
into generation, transmission and distribution businesses with the objective of introducing 
private sector investors and operators .. .Implementation of the reform programme is being 
supported by the Privatization and Private Sector Development Project [which was also later 
used to fund the Mercados work above] ... " (World Bank 2001:5). The World Bank thus played 
a critical role in funding this initiative, however, the project was also supported by a host of 
domestic actors (Tanzania Ministry of Energy and Minerals per com 2007; EWURA per com 
2007a).42 
This inter-linkage of influences and ideas may be seen perhaps most clearly through the 
steps that led to the 1999 strategy document referenced above, also known as the Framework 
for the New Direction of the Power Sector. The Framework was drafted throughout 1998, by 
experts from the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM), Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Planning, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, TANESCO and PSRC. Subsequent to 
the drafting, the authors of this document went on a tour of three Latin American countries, 
namely Argentina, Bolivia and Jamaica, which had all carried out degrees of power sector 
reform, with Argentina the most advanced of the three in terms of implementing the standard 
model (Tanzania Ministry of Energy and Minerals per com 2007; World Bank per com 
2007d).43 This tour was funded by Sida and organized together with the World Bank (World, 
Bank per com 2007d). Following the tour, the findings and lessons of the visit were 
internalized in the draft framework, which was then fmalized through two workshops, arranged 
42 Further evidence for both multilateral involvement in supporting power sector reform a la standard 
model may be noted in Tanzania's Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, issued in March 2000, 
which listed among other proposed completion conditions, the following: "initiate process for the 
unbundling of Tanzania Electric Supply Company Ltd.(T ANESCO) into autonomous commercial 
entities" (Tanzanian Authorities 2000:3). As noted for the 1999 World Bank funded initiative, however, 
each initiative had its domestic champions/counterparts (EWURA per com 2007a). 
43 Tours of the following countries were also conducted: Uganda, Mozambique and Zambia to address 
issues associated with the formation of the institutional framework for the handling of rural 
electrification programmes; Zambia, South Africa, USA and Mozambique for lessons and experiences in 
arranging regional grid interconnections and electricity trading via the 
Pools, which were arranged after the drafting of the Power Sector Reform Framework; and India, 
Malaysia and Singapore to enable the Government to understand the prons and cons of implementing the 
recommendations which were put forward by the restructuring and trading consultants. Finally, a tour in 
Sweden was made during the time when the Ministry was drafting its Energy Policy of 2003 (Tanzania 
Ministry of Energy and Minerals per com 2007). 
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by the MEM in collaboration with PSRC, with input from the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Swedish government, Japanese government, Spanish government, 
European Union, African Development Bank (AIDB) and European Investment Bank (EIB) 
(Tanzania Ministry of Energy and Minerals per com 2007). 
Among stakeholders in Tanzania as well as international funders, there is disagreement 
about who is most responsible for advancing the standard model, with Mercados, the World 
Bank and PSRC, each singled OUt.44 Also disputed is the applicability of the standard model, 
with PSRC and Mercados asserting that the creation of competitive markets is apt, but as per 
the consultants' recommendations, not right now, i.e. it will be appropriate in the long-term 
(Mercados per com 2007; Parastatal Sector Reform Commission per com 2007). Other policy 
makers in Tanzania and World Bank staff hold differing opinions, questioning the ultimate 
applicability given the country conditions (EWURA per com 2007 a; World Bank per com 
2007a). It is not the goal of this thesis to settle the dispute, but rather to showcase how the 
standard model evolved in the case of Tanzania. In closing, it is important to mention that 
however applicable or not the standard model may be to the Tanzania ESI, at this point, the 
only element of the model actually in place is an IPP programme, which will be evaluated in 
Chapter six. 
2.5.2 Reform paths taken 
The example of Tanzania highlighted above was intended to show how the standard model 
took root in the developing world. Although this thesis does not argue that such experience was 
uniform across developing countries, it is suggested that such experience is not altogether 
uncommon. This section provides a birds eye view of reforms actually carried out, with IPPs 
emerging as among the most significant pieces. 
Results for power sector reform across developing countries were reported in a systematic 
. way starting in 1999 in the oft-cited Scorecard, which found that from a total of 115 developing 
countries, about a third of the reform steps45 had been carried out (Bacon 1999:1). By this time, 
only 12 countries had embarked on all steps of reform identified, and 42 had not yet embarked 
on any, with the most activity occurring within the Latin American and Caribbean region and 
the least occurring in Sub-Saharan Africa. Also noteworthy is that IPPs were second only to 
corporatization in terms of reform steps undertaken (Bacon 1999:4). This data was reproduced 
in Bacon, noted below, which also shows how the prevalence of IPPs exceeded the reform 
44 The Ministry of Energy and Minerals although involved throughout and although including champions 
of power sector reform is largely seen to have been less involved in advancing the standard model than 
PSRC, the World Bank and Mercados (EWURA per com 2007a; World Bank per com 2007d). 
45 These reform steps refer to: corporatization/commercialization, energy law, IPPs, regulation, 
restructuring/unbundling, generation assets divested, distribution assets divested, as discussed in section 
2.4.3 above. 
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indicalor for eve ry region, unlike lor any other rcio rm s tep. induding corporatizatio l1 (Bacon 
and [3esant-Joncs 2002: 8). 
T:\l)k 2. 1: NUITlix'r ofco unlries h:n 'illg t:lkl"1I kev reform StCI)S by region as tlf 1998 
. 
r--Rc-g;on (No "Coun1rit""s) 
Key St.:'p AFN. (4&) EAP (9) ECA (21) Lee (IS) MN,\ (8) SAR ( 5) 
Corporatll.3 tion 1501%) 4 (44%) 17 (63%) I j {61%} 2 (25%) 2 (40"1o) 
Luw 7(15%) 3 (33%) II (4Wo) \4 (7&%) 1 (13%) 2 (40%)-
-
Regulator 4 (&%) I (II"/") \1(41 %) 15 (83%) 0(0'%) 2(40%) 
---
... 
-
.. .. 
'-9-rl3%l [713%) II'Ps 9(19%) 7 (78%) 15 (&3%) 5(100%) 
R~St ru,~ t u ri!lg " (8%) 4 (44%) 14 (52%) 13 (72%) 3 (38%) 2(40%) 
rdcn privatiz~tion ._-- .- - .. -.- .-------2 (4%) 2 (22%) 10 (37%) 7 (39%) 1 tI3%) 2 (40%) 
Dis privati7.i!tion -2(40/0) I (11 %) & (30%) & (44%) 1 (1 3%) \ (20%) 
Reform imli..;utor i 0.8tt (15%)[ 2.44 (41%) 2.70 (45%), 4.28 (71 %) 1.00 (17%) 3.00 (50%) 
I 
, 
I 
--
Source. Uacon ami Ucsant-Joncs (2002.8) 
Notes: AFR: Afr ica; EAP: East Asia ami Padfie; ECA: Europe and Central A~ i .. : LCe: Llltin Amerkll 
and the Caribbc:lIl. MNA: Middle East and North Afr i!;" ;J ; SAR: South .<\si <l. 
Gen: Gen~ rat ion : Il is: Ois tnbution. Shading added!Jy i!uthor. 
By 2000, th.: Worlt! Bank sur\'~y~d 116 de\"doping cOlll1u il!"s, a l b~il not according 10 the 
Scorecard metr ic. and progr.:ss was noted. For naOlple, industr ia l fi rms in 17 countries had a 
cho ice o f power s upplier; independent o r quasi-illdcpcndclIl regulators appc:.rcd to be working 
in 37 countries: and in 27 countries private sector partici pal ion was de<:m~d 10 be s ignificant. 
There was, how\::ver. 1inle evidence for true compdilion at th..: generation and retail level 
(Bacon and 13csant-l ones 2002:8. 2000 allalysi~ cited). 
Among the latest and most exlensi ve surveys o f reform sl('ps t:lkcn was reported in John 
13csallt-J(ll1CS (2006), resu lts for which are summaril.ed in the table below. Again, these do not 
map to the 1998 Scorecard steps. CommereialiLatioll, corporatiza tion. passage of requisite 
energy legis lation and c~tablishmen t of regu lator, have not been noted, but instead are implied 
by the current structure of the ESI. Furthermore. it is important to nOle that retai! competition is 
!lot featured as O!\~ of the eategorics,4Ii as it is deemed largely inapplicable to the samplc of 
dcveloping cou11Ir ies ([3esanl-Jones 1.E. per com 2007). [J) s t~ad. what IS featu red a rc the 
models presently predominating alllong de ... d oping cOuntries. namdy vcrticallJ integrah:d 
mono[)()l ics, wilh and w ithout IPl's (sec rows A & [3 below) as \\-cll as v31} ing degrees of 
wholcs:lle COIll I)Ctit ion (sec rows C Ihrough E below) . 
... R~lail COmllC!itioli is only induded in terms of "aggrcgalors of n: tail demand thm buy into the 
wholesale mark~l ." (Bcs .. nt-Jones J.E. per com 2007). 
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Ta ble 2.2: ESI Stru ctu re in ]50 Ut'veloping Co un tries 
G rouj;-' --C urrent slructure or pow{'r suppl~' Numb{"r 
of 
countries 
A Vcmc;llly intcgrated monopol ic!t 79 
R Vertica lly integrated monopolies \\ith 11'1' <; ) 6 
-C Si ngle buyer liS a natiunal g~n..:;o , transco or disco OR a combined I 16 
national g~nco..:~'!!.~se~.~c tr.l!.lsco-disco +1 PPs 
D Many d iscos and gencos, includ ing lPPs, tra ns1: 1) as s ingle buyer 6 
, with th ird p:llty access 
E Hower market of gellcos~.discos andl~rgc users, traus.:o alKi ISO I ) 
._.-----
1:2!E!.!..~~I.nrics _ __ __ _ ... _ 150 
SOUf e\!. "uthor s compilation based on Bcsant Jones (20oti.22) 
N(lh:~S: gencn: genermion C[l[llpany; transco: transm ission company; disco: di ~Tri b ution company 
Regional tr~nds have continued with Latin AmcriC il and the Caribbean being the 
fo r.:rwmil r in term s o f advallcing toward full privatization and compclitiuJI , followed by Euru pe 
lind Ce ntral Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa meanwhile continue ;;, to represent th e laq:\es t number of 
vertically in tegrated monopo lies (39). These regional trends arc in turn rei nforced by s ize o f 
ES t and (nl,;ome per capita. No country with lcs$ than \ ,000 VlW installed is operal ing a 
who lesale market (either group D or E above). Furthemlore, in (.;orms of Inw income cOll n! rics 
(defined as US$765/i1llllum or less), there is no ev idence o f the most de\eloped form of 
who lesa le competit ion (group E :lbove), and only one c~ample of the second to Ill()st developed 
fO(1II of who lesale competition (group 0 abo ve). ] 11C majol ity of low income countries (4]) 
appear to be ven iea lly illlcgrated monopolists. with some (15) having inlfoduced l PPs ( Besilnt-
Jones 2006:23 -24). 
T wo main points arc wurth making ill conclusion. Fi rst, in her assessment o f p() wer sector 
re form, linn! ob~erves that no country that has introduced compl.' \ition has reverted tu a 
monopoly (2002 :5 ).47 1Iowever. the second point, is that in their SUTVI:Y of Brazi l, Chilla, india, 
Mc,~ko and So uth Afri ca. Victor and He ll er note thnt full impkml.'llt:lli on o f tbe textbook 
refo rm m(){kl is I!ot evident in anyone of the countrie~, wilidl il re notewonhy lor having the 
biggest power systems within their respective r~giolls as we ll a~ among th;: Ilws t rapid growth 
ill electr ici ty dema nd in th e world (2007 :xv, 25 6). Ae5allt -JollO:~ s reillrorees tilis poi nt a~ he 
nok s that on ly about 20 developing countries IJ<IVc introduced who lesa lc COIIII><: tltioa and Ihat 
re tail competit ion is negligible (2006:22; 200i). In abundanco.!, ho\\c \c r, <'Ire vert ically 
in tegrated monopolies as we ll :IS such monopolies with IPPs (see A & B in T able 2.2). The 
model lo r power s(:c to r re fo rm, although widdy pl opagatc:d lhroughuut devdopillg cnull tries, 
was, in the end, on ly taken up in part_ 
n This point IS also made by tlacon and Hcsant-Joncs (2{)(J2: IS) who note in conclucilng that despite 
macroeconomic shock that impacted unfavourably, particularly on IPPs. the liberalilation programme 
has not ~en reversed or undone. 
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2.6 New imperative for FDI at the inception of power sector reforms 
Thus far, it has been shown how IPPs were part of a much larger model of power sector 
reform; ultimately, however, the projects came to be among the most visible vestiges of the 
reform model as other pieces were either unsuccessfully implemented or not implemented at 
all. This section contextualizes IPPs within foreign direct investment by examining one small 
part of the investment literature, viz. the theory of the obsolescing bargain, to further elucidate 
how and why IPPs were shaped, which is expected to shed further light on the analysis of such 
projects in Africa. 
As previously discussed, cash-strapped utilities characterized many ESls across 
developing countries, at the inception of power sector reforms. This condition was the result of 
myriad factors, detailed in section 2.4.1, including decades of below cost tariffs, which were 
themselves partly the result of development policies in which provision of electricity was 
considered a public good (World Bank 1993a:32). The lack of investment capital was not, 
however, unique to utilities, but, it may be argued, is among the defining features of developing 
countries.48 Thus not only were the coffers of the utilities largely empty (and often indebted), 
but other sources of both public and private fmancing were not available. 
Meanwhile, the investment needs for the power sector were and continue to be huge. 
Developing countries need approximately US$5.2 trillion new investment to meet the projected 
increase in electricity demand and to replace old infrastructure between 2002 and 2030 
(International Energy Agency 2004: 191).49 In 1990, it was estimated that required capital 
expenditure for power expansion programmes for developing countries in the 1990s would 
amount to approximately US$1 trillion (in 1989 US dollar terms), with the majority of the 
investment (60 per cent) needed for generation. Asia was expected to require over 60 per cent 
of the investment, followed by Latin America (20 per cent), Middle East and North Africa (16 
per cent) and Africa a mere 2 per cent (Moore and Smith 1990:i,12).50 
48 The most widespread definition for developing countries is based on income per capita, with the most 
frequently cited source the World Bank's index, based on gross national income (GNI), which groups 
countries as low income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and high-income, with all, save 
the high-income countries, considered 'developing countries'. Another recognized means for judging 
developing countries is based on their international indebtedness (Todaro and Smith 2003:34; World 
Bank 2006a), with 22 of the 42 severely indebted countries as of 2003 in the African continent (World 
Bank 2005a:262-4). Severely indebted is defined by ''the "present value of debt service [of a country 
being] greater than 220 per cent of exports or 80 per cent of GNI," (World Bank 2005a:265). 
49 Projected investment figures do not assume any large increases in access levels, as discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter three. 
50 These figures were based on growth rates and system expansion plans, developed by the electric 
utilities in the LDCs, generally with the approval of governments. Some adjustments were made by the 
authors, however, still, "in general, the forecast is probably too high, because it does not take into 
account the limited availability of funds for the power expansion plans in some countries," (Moore and 
Smith 1990:2). 
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Although in the decades leading up to the 1990s, development finance institutions had 
provided significant funding to address financing shortages,51 the emerging consensus, as 
described in the previous section, was that the private sector could more effectively do the job 
of building and operating power plants. Thus concessionary lending for the ESI, while not 
stopped, was reduced, certain conditions were extended that attempted to integrate 
commercialization and private participation, and (more) space was made for the private sector 
to step in.52 Thus the imperative for FDI was clear. 
While the investment need is great, the experience of IPPs has also been mixed. As 
previously noted, investment levels peaked and have since declined. Many IPP contracts have 
also faced severe stress. Why? Does the literature and theory of FDI help explain this 
experience? 
2.6.1 The obsolescing bargain (within FDI) 
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct an extensive review of the FDI 
literature, what is undertaken is a review of the theory of the obsolescing bargain, which forms 
part of the FDI literature and on which the Stanford PESD IPP study drew in its analysis to 
evaluate IPP experiences across developing regions (Victor, Heller et al. 2004:15; 2006a:127-
9,189,219). It should be noted at the outset, however, that the PESD analysis also drew on a 
wide series of additional ideas, which will be treated in greater detail, following this discussion 
of the obsolescing bargain. 
By way of background, the obsolescing bargain was coined by Raymond Vernon, in 
Sovereignty at Bay, to help explain how governments (both industrialized and developing) and 
multinational corporations interfaced (Vernon 1971:53).53 Vernon wrote at a particularly 
sensitive time. Between 1956 and 1972, just less than 25 per cent of the foreign capital stock in 
51 As one example, highlighted in section 2.4.2, in the 1980s, the World Bank funded approximately 7 
per cent of total power investments in developing countries (World Bank 1993a:34). 
52 In commenting on the estimates of approximately US$l trillion and 385,000 MW, Adamantiades, 
Besant-Jones and Hoskote wrote in 1995, ''the vast financial demand for investments in electricity 
supply in Des [developing countries] has major implications for macroeconomic policies as well as for 
power sector financing, including from multilateral lending institutions such as the World Bank 
(Adamantiades, Besant-Jones et al. 1995:2), italics added by author. As noted previously (section 1.1), 
although multilateral funding agencies largely withdrew from state-sponsored projects, they continued to 
playa critical role through providing technical assistance as well as funding privately-led deals, such as 
Songas. 
53 Although obsolescing bargain has become synonymous with Vernon and Sovereignty at Bay, the idea 
was one of many presented in the 1971 book. The thrust of the book was not to layout the obsolescing 
bargain but rather to document the spread of multinational corporations (particularly USA-based) and 
describe how multinationals (often backed by their own sovereign states) with mUltiple jurisdictions are 
not on equal terms with the allegedly sovereign states in which their subsidiaries do business. Vernon, 
reflecting on how the book had been misread/remembered, wrote in 1981, " ... 1 am brought back to what 
I regard as the central question. How do the sovereign states propose to deal with the fact that so many of 
their enterprises are conduits through which other sovereigns exert their influence?" -a question that 
appears to be in line with this thesis' focus on development and investment outcomes (Vernon 
1981:529). 
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developing countries was nationalized, with compensation provided for about 40 per cent of 
such stock. The most targeted sectors were mining, agriculture and public utilities (Williams 
1975:267,270,272).54 Vernon's idea, which was based on experiences in raw material 
extraction, particularly the global copper trade, is that at the inception of a large foreign 
investment in a developing country, the scale is tipped in favour of the investor, who brings 
much needed capital, technology and skill. Vernon clearly differentiates how scenarios differ in 
developing countries and industrialized countries, where he argues there is less imbalance at 
contract signing as the industrialized host country does not need to make as many concessions 
(as the developing country) to attract investors and assuage risks (1971:55). Once, however, the 
investment has been made, debt has been repaid, and the (developing) host country has 
increased its own skill and understanding of the trade, resistance may begin to build, especially 
with regard to any dividends paid out to shareholders. At this time, the original bargain may 
become obsolete and risk of expropriation of income and assets increased.55 
The obsolescing bargain has been cited consistently since it was first used by Vernon in 
1971 to explain potential tension in foreign direct investment. 56 Furthermore, the theory of the 
obsolescing bargain has long since been brought to bear to the analysis of large infrastructure 
projects, including IPPs, which have large fixed capital components that could not easily be 
moved (Wells and Gleason 1995:52}-with the Stanford PESD IPP study, discussed in detail 
below, among the most recent examples. 57 
There were several conclusions that stemmed from the obsolescing bargain. One such 
conclusion, as articulated by Levy and Spiller in analyzing telecommunications regulation, as 
cited by Stanford PESD, is that private ownership may be safeguarded through "inflexible 
regulatory regimes" that constrain "arbitrary administrative action" (1994:202,241). At the 
heart of Levy and Spiller's analysis was the recommendation for a regulatory governance 
structure that limited such arbitrary action, but also extended a series of regulatory incentives to 
reward good performance (241), enshrined in an iron clad PP A. 58 
54 Kobrin's analysis details developments between 1960 and 1976, and finds an increase of divestments 
overtime with the majority occurring between 1970-1976 and reflecting among other things the 
divestiture in petroleum-related activities (1980:77,79). 
55 There are parallels between Vernon's obsolescing bargain and 'asset specificity' as defined by Oliver 
E. Williamson to describe "bilateral dependency by reason of investments in transaction specific 
investments" (Williamson O. E. per com 2007). Neither author appears to acknowledge the relationship, 
however, in print with asset specificity formally defined in 1976 in William's, with prior mention dating 
back to 1971 (Williamson 1971; Williamson 1976). 
56 The academic database Journal Storage (JSTOR) includes over 50 articles with references to 'Vernon' 
and 'obsolescing bargain' between 1976 and 2003 with references approximately equally dispersed over 
two and a half decades. 
57 Three recent books which include reference to the obsolescing bargain, specifically in the context of 
analyzing infrastructure investments, are: Victor and Heller (2007:10), Moran (2006:78-79, 116), and 
Wells (2007: 162). 
58 An important caveat, albeit largely overlooked in actual practice, is made for countries with 
insufficient institutional capacity (to enact such regimes), where it is suggested that privatization 
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Yet another possibility, as documented in Wells, and also noted in the Stanford PESD IPP 
study, is that a spate of "new protections" were developed in the 1980s, including more robust 
political risk insurance (PRJ), and an international system of arbitration backed by bilateral 
investment treaties and regional trade agreements (Woodhouse 2006a:130-1; Silverthorne 
2007; Wells and Ahmed 2007:5-6). Although in existence since the post-World War II period, 
the coverage of PRJ providers have grown significantly since then, along with the number of 
such providers. Presently PRJ providers number over 80, mainly led by national export credit 
agencies, most notably the Japan Bank for International Cooperation OBIC) as well as a 
number of private insurers such as Lloyd's and AIG, and the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation of the United States (OPIC) (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 2007; 
Wells and Ahmed 2007:5). More recently, multilateral development institutions, including the 
World Bank Group (via the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MIGA), ADB, and 
IADB have also introduced forms of PRJ, with the standard product, guarantees for loans and 
equity investments from currency convertibility and transfer risk, full or partial expropriation 
of assets as well as damage or loss of income due to politically related developments including 
war (Razavi 1996:133; Sinclair 2007).59 Another more recent product to safeguard investments 
are partial risk guarantees (PRG), which in the case of the World Bank's product, must be 
backed by a counter guarantee by the government, protects private lenders from the risk of a 
public entity failing to fulfill certain obligations it has undertaken, and may be tailored to deal 
with any or all of the following, including: tariffs, regulatory risk, collection risk, arbitration, 
change in law, convertibility, transferability and subsidy payments (Sinclair 2007:37-36). The 
main distinction between PRJ and PRG is that the former is concerned primarily with 
politically based risks while the latter is generally focused on commercial risks (albeit 
commercial risk that are affected by government action) and may be more easily geared to one 
specific risk. 
Still other possibilities were joint venture partnerships including with local firms as well 
as technological selection. Each of these protections was expected to reduce the risk that the 
contract would unravel (and if it did unravel, firms would not experience the same losses as 
they did in the 1960s and 1970s). 
2.6.2 Obsolescing bargain and IPPs 
As noted previously, it is the Stanford PESD study, which has brought the concept of 
obsolescing bargain to bear directly on the IPP experience, most recently and arguably with the 
programmes that distribute share ownership to large parts of the population may be a better alternative 
for precluding possible conflict (Levy and Spiller 1994:241). 
S9 It should be noted that IDB provide coverage against neither expropriation nor political violence; 
furthermore, the activity of these organizations in this area is limited. 
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greatest depth.60 What PESD documents is that for IPPs throughout the 1990s among the most 
common responses to the possibility of the obsolescing bargain was to create increasingly 
detailed and stringent contracts between government and investor as well as arrange significant 
securities (such as escrow accounts and liquidity facilities) and credit enhancements (such as 
partial risk guarantees, sovereign guarantees and political risk insurance). Project partners were 
also selected with a view to warding off any encroachment by the host country government, 
and, should conflicts escalate, international arbitration was set up (Woodhouse 2006a: 131). 
PESD termed this approach 'risk engineering' (Woodhouse 2006a:125,151). 
What were the results of the Stanford PESD review of more than thirty projects across 
thirteen developing countries? There appear to be mixed outcomes recorded in the majority of 
projects. Does this in turn mean that the obsolescing bargain did not occur across the entire 
sample? Were the risk engineering strategies outlined above sufficient to counteract the 
encroachment of the state in most of the cases? 
On the one hand, the Stanford PESD IPP study found evidence for the obsolescing bargain 
in Argentina, China and India. To consider one such example, Argentina, which saw its 
currency devalue by 200 per cent in 2001-2, has evidenced what might be termed a variation of 
obsolescing bargain, with the freezing of tariffs and the conversion of payments into pesos 
(Nunez-Luna and Woodhouse 2005:2,12,19; Woodhouse 2006a:153). On the other hand, in 
Egypt, Malaysia and Thailand, which all experienced significant devaluations (of 50 per cent, 
60 per cent and 50 per cent respectively in 2002-3 and 1997-8), the Stanford PESD IPP study 
reported that the obsolescing bargain did not hold significant explanatory power in explaining 
outcomes.61 
Furthermore, contrary to expectation, the Stanford PESD IPP study found that the 
abovementioned risk engineering strategies, were not sufficient in warding off the obsolescing 
bargain where it has been evidenced. Among the most high profile IPPs, which had arguaqly 
some of the most robust risk engineering was India's Dabhol Power Company (DPC). Hailed 
as the largest foreign direct investment by 1993 in India, DPC, a 2015 MW plant, had all the 
safeguards that would prevent obsolescing bargain. The deal was backed by a 20 year PPA, 
with tariffs indexed to Indian inflation. Both the Government of Maharashtra and the Central 
Government provided guarantees should the utility (MSEB) default on payment (Gratwick 
2002:4-5). An escrow account based on cash collections from other MSEB regions was also 
established. The World Bank, while not a partner, per se, had been instrumental in bringing 
about what was perceived to be a more balanced agreement through its strong disapproval of 
60 As with Vernon, however (see footnote 53), the findings of the PESD work (Woodhouse 2006a) 
should not be reduced to one theme. The work, which, as noted in footnote 9, spanned over two years 
and was reported in more than a dozen case studies, had a larger approach of which the obsolescing 
bargain was only part. 
61 Other potential explanations, beyond the obsolescing bargain, are the subject of section 2.7.2. 
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initial contract terms (Gratwick 2002:4,9; Lamb 2006:50). Finally, provisions for international 
arbitration were established. Despite these myriad safeguards, the original bargain did 
obsolesce and investors found themselves without the payment streams they anticipated.62 
Thus Stanford PESD found that while the obsolescing bargain does not explain outcomes 
across the entire pool of projects, and that the risk engineering strategies were often not 
effective, it does help to describe the context in which certain projects and countries respond to 
stresses (Woodhouse 2006c:10). In the words of the primary author, "projects remain 
vulnerable to the obsolescing bargain, but many ... other independent variables [have been] 
more directly traceable to observed variation in outcomes" (Woodhouse E. J. per com 2007). 
With the African sample characterized in part by a relatively weaker investment climate and 
with a substantial number of IPPs undergoing some form of contract change, the obsolescing 
bargain may hold explanatory power here as well. 
2.7 Towards an analytical framework for understanding IPP outcomes 
Two of the larger contexts in which IPPs developed have been sketched thus far, together 
with bodies of relevant literature and theory. Not only do these theoretical contexts point to 
critical issues to be taken up in the review of empirical data, but they also, as previously 
indicated, may be revised and embellished, based on the empirical evidence unearthed by this 
thesis. With this backdrop, it is now time to tum to the analytic framework used to evaluate the 
IPP experience, which will be followed by an in-depth treatment of the experience in several 
African countries. This framework, which seeks to enhance the understanding of development 
and investment outcomes in African IPPs and ultimately improve sustainability in future 
projects, builds on an existing body of literature on IPPs, described immediately below. 
2.7.1 IPPs reviewed 
Substantial reviews of independent power projects have been conducted in recent years. 
Rather than summarizing these reviews in detail, the section below extracts key lessons and 
identifies critical factors that help to explain outcomes. 
In the previously cited work, Regulation, Deregulation or Reregulation--What Is Needed 
in the LDCs Power Sector, the authors cautioned against the applicability of IPPs for less 
developed countries, given long, inflexible contracts, which demand a high premium for 
investors (World Bank 1990:70). A subsequent, though less severe, warning appeared in the 
World Bank's 1993 electric sector power policy. In reflecting on the experiences of India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey (among the earliest developing countries to introduce large-
62 This section also draws on the analysis ofIPPs presented by Thomas C Heller on October 25,2005 at 
the Management Programme in Infrastructure Reform & Regulation course, "Independent Power 
Producers: Frontiers in International and African Experience," at the University of Cape Town's 
Graduate School of Business. 
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scale IPPs), the World Bank indicated that country governments have rushed after large and 
risky projects, rather than approaching such new investments slowly through small-scale 
ventures, which is the preferred approach. Further difficulty has resulted due to the failure "to 
address fundamental problems of governance, specify a clear legal and contractual framework, 
put in place an arm's-length transparent regulatory structure, or allow commercially-based 
tariffs that reflect real costs" (World Bank 1993a:51-52). Thus, although IPPs were often taken 
up as a quick and easy reform step,1:heir ultimate success was contingent on a host of other 
factors. 
There has been little change in the consensus about the conditions that may yield 
favourable IPPs results. Key elements noted in the mid-1990s, and reiterated over the decade, 
may be broken roughly into two categories: the investment environment and the project itself. 
In terms of the investment environment, paramount is a clear political commitment including 
coordination among ministries (World Bank 1993a:52; World Bank and USAID 1994:5; 
Hoskote 1995:10). Ideally, this translates into a clear framew rk for policy making and 
subsequently, provided there is sufficient capacity, clear policies, including an independent 
regulatory mechanism that results in predictable tariffs and hence revenue that will service debt 
and reward equity (APEC Energy Working Group 1997:11,16; Bacon and Besant-Jones 
2002:15; Lamech and Saeed 2003:9; Fraser 2005:14).63 Also widely noted in terms of 
improving the probability of success for IPPs is a commercially run sector with cost-reflective 
tariffs and effective billing and revenue collection (Hoskote 1995:2; APEC Energy Working 
Group 1997:12; Lamech and Saeed 2003:9-10). 
At the project level, conditions that may lead to favourable outcomes include smaller scale 
projects, which are potentially less visible; that is, the impacts of higher prices for new IPP 
investments may be more readily absorbed (World Bank 1993a:51; Hoskote 1995:10; Fraser 
2005:13-14). A well-managed competitive bidding process has been generally noted to h~lp 
avoid corruption and result in lower costs (World Bank and USAID 1994:36,44; Hoskote 
1995:3; APEC Energy Working Group 1997:19; Asian Development Bank 2000:71-2).64 
63 A critical aspect for investors in the utility sector, cited by Lamech and Saeed is the "independence of 
regulatory institution[s] and processes from arbitrary government interference" (2003). A second recent 
study reinforces these findings, ranking "regulatory uncertainty" as among the greatest concerns of 
investors in the utility sector (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005:6). A third study reports that "80% of their 
respondents said that political and regulatory factors are inhibiting the ability of the sector to respond to 
the immense change challenge ahead," (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2006:9). 
64 After surveying IPPs throughout South Asia, a recent study found that there was no conclusive 
evidence for lower cost PPAs resulting from competitive bids (rather than selective bidding). The study 
did, however, note that, "in many instances competitive procurements can lead to lower prices". This 
view is supported by the theory of competition for the market. There may also be methodologies for non-
competitive procurement that are transparent and that lead to low price outcomes. It is reported that in 
the Chinese IPP programme, the government representatives used an effective negotiating process to 
reduce both the equity returns and the costs associated with their IPP plants," (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
Emerging Markets Ltd. and Advanced Engineering Associates International 2003:24). Drawing on the 
Deloitte work, the Stanford PESD IPP study as well as independent analysis, another recent study 
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Robust and transparent power purchase agreements as well as additional revenue security 
measures, such as escrow accounts, and credit enhancements such as sovereign guarantees have 
been outlined as best practices (World Bank and USAID 1994:22; Hoskote 1995:9-10; 
International Finance Corporation 1996:34). In addition, the benefits of various mechanisms to 
deal with potential currency mismatches between financing and revenue streams, for example 
hard-currency denominated power purchase agreements (PPAs), or alternatively the 
involvement of local capital is mentioned in the review of projects (Hoskote 1995: 11). Also 
cited is the role of strong local management in contributing to project successes and the 
presence oflocal capital (International Finance Corporation 1996:34).65 
Emphasis on the importance of the power purchase agreement, outlining the relationship 
between the investment environmentlhost country and the project, has been extensive. Setting 
the right terms and conditions has been recognized as among the most critical aspects of 
developing, operating and maintaining IPPs successfully, including determining the initial 
ownership structure (i.e. whether the plant will ultimately be a build own operate (BOO), build 
own operate transfer (BOOT) or a build operate transfer (BOT» (Sader 1999:12; Asian 
Development Bank 2000:72,75). Key elements identified within the PPA include the obligation 
of the project sponsor to provide a set capacity and availability as well as the obligation of the 
off-taker to pay a set amount for such capacity, generally regardless of whether the capacity is 
used or not, for the duration of the contract, and energy charges which allow appropriate pass 
through of fuel costs (APEC Energy Working Group 1997:13-14; Marais 2006:3). This 
contractual agreement minimizes market risk for the project sponsor and helps to ensure 
availability for the off-taker, but also comes with the risk of over-capacity and high charges 
should the project's power not be demanded, or the ESI moves toward wholesale competition 
(Woolf and Halpern 2001:6). The way in which plants are dispatched, metering, 
interconnection, insurance, force majeure, transfer of assets (in the case of BOOT), contract 
termination, change of law provisions, refinancing arrangements, dispute resolution are all 
generally stipulated as well (World Bank and USAID 1994:88-92; International Finance 
Corporation 1996: 118-126). 
Increasingly, emphasis is being placed on making PPAs into more sustainable documents, 
by considering special provisions related to the operational, fmancial, regulatory and legal 
focusing exclusively on CCGT IPPs in eight countries (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, The Philippines, Thailand and Turkey) goes one step further. The author demonstrates that the 
stated capital costs of competitively bid projects is generally 40 to 60 per cent lower than those via direct 
negotiation (Phadke 2007:11,24). 
65 It should be noted that with regard to the International Finance Corporation' (IFC) lessons learned 
cited above, they apply generally to IFC's portfolio of infrastructure investments in the mid-1990s, 
however, power generation accounted for almost 50 per cent of the portfolio in 1996-greater than any 
of the other eight infrastructure sectors (International Finance Corporation 1996:35). 
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aspects of the contract. The overarching goal is for the contract to provide security to the seller 
without pitting buyer and seller against one another, given market dynamics and unanticipated 
events and circumstances. Much of the discussion focuses on building more incentives and 
penalties into contracts, including, for instance in the case of providing additional power 
(Woolf 2005: 12 ). Buy-out provisions are also a means to reduce the impact of cheaper power, 
should it become available (Woolf and Halpern 2001 :21; Woolf 2005: 17). Sharing the gains of 
refinancing (between buyer and seller) is another possible means to increasingly sustainability. 
In each of these cases, however, the issue must be clearly specified in the PPA at contract 
signing. Even then, many shareholders and debt-holders alike may not agree to such 
sustainability provisions if they sense a potential threat to their payment streams (Sheppard R. 
per com 2006). 
Among changes related to assessments of IPPs over the decade is the treatment of 
macroeconomic shock, which impacted significantly on IPPs, particularly in East Asia after the 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1998. Best practices have subsequently developed to include more 
mitigation measures to deal with currency devaluation, including seeking increased local 
capital, which although emphasized at the beginning of the decade was not considered essential 
(Matsukawa, Sheppard et al. 2003). 
2.7.2 The Stanford PESD IPP study 
The recent Stanford PESD IPP study, cited repeatedly in the Introduction and throughout 
Chapter two in the context of the obsolescing bargain, has significantly advanced the 
understanding of the causes related to IPP successes and failures. Selecting a wide range of 
country and project experiences, the Stanford PESD IPP study set out to identify explanatory 
variables that determined project successes and failures as well as identify key lessons for 
investors and host country governments alike (Victor, Heller et al. 2004; Woodhouse 2006a). 
Through literature reviews as well as in-depth interviews carried out by researchers, the 
study identified five hypotheses, which could potentially serve as broad explanations for 
outcomes, viz. the obsolescing bargain, the investment climate, the electricity market, project 
management and exogenous events and contagion (Victor, Heller et al. 2004:15-22,52-58). In 
terms of the obsolescing bargain, as previously discussed, Stanford PESD sought to ascertain 
whether original deals became unstuck once investments were made or whether a series of 
strategies, including iron clad PPAs, technological selection and joint investment helped 
mitigate the effects of encroachment by the host country government. With regard to the 
investment climate, the second hypothesis, here the study was interested in evaluating the 
extent to which the investment climate, as defined by the legal context, the state of public 
finance, fmancial markets and FDI experience, among others, was the determining element in 
outcomes. The third hypothesis looked at the way in which the electricity market, characterized 
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by its (attention to or lack of) IPP framework, estimated demand, independent regulator and 
payment systems, impacted on outcomes. Project management, the fourth hypothesis, inquired 
whether the ways deals were fIrst negotiated and subsequently managed, both from an 
operational and fInancial perspective, provided the key to understanding variation in project 
outcomes. Finally, the last hypothesis, exogenous events and contagion, posited that events, 
such as the Asian Financial Crisis, were the chief determinant of results. 
The analytical framework did not stop there. Rather, a series of factors, which were 
grouped into country level and project level factors, were linked to each of the hypotheses. It is 
important to note from the outset that there was considerable overlap between the hypotheses 
and the factors; however, the purpose of the two was different. It was expected that one or 
more of the hypotheses held the grand explanatory power for outcomes while the factors were 
fIrst used to select the cases and subsequently as a means for testing the validity of the different 
hypotheses. Country level factors comprised: the macroeconomic context, political and social 
context, legal and regulatory framework, electricity market and fuel markets (Victor, Heller et 
al. 2004:32-4; Woodhouse 2006a:139). Project level factors comprised: investor composition, 
IPP programme, fInancial arrangements, fuel and technology choice, and operations and 
maintenance (Victor, Heller et al. 2004:41-3; Woodhouse 2006a:139). In addition, the global 
industry downturn was added to the list of factors as impacting outcomes. 
As indicated above, the universe of IPPs in developing countries was identifIed and 
countries (with IPPs) were selected based on the variation that they demonstrated with regard 
to the country level factors. 
For instance, at the inception of the fIrst IPPs, Poland's incumbent fuel was coal while 
Brazil's was hydroelectricity (Victor, Heller et al. 2004:36,40). Investors in Mexico were 
shielded from macroeconomic shock while those in Argentina were directly exposed to it 
(Victor, Heller et al. 2004:36-37). Each of the other countries-China, India, Malaysia, 
Mexico, The Philippines, Thailand and Turkey-displayed an equally wide range of 
characteristics, with regard to the country level factors. After this initial country selection, 
projects in each of these countries were identifIed for in-depth analysis based on the variation 
that they demonstrated across the series of project level factors (Victor, Heller et al. 2004:32-
34,41-43; Woodhouse 2006a: 13 8-9). The project pool eventually came to contain 13 
developing countries and 34 projects. 
After two years of research, which hypotheses emerged as the key to understanding the 
variation in development and investment outcomes for IPPs? As discussed in section 2.6.2, the 
obsolescing bargain and the associated risk engineering instruments used to ward off the 
obsolescing bargain were helpful in explaining many contexts, but did not predict outcomes 
across the entire pool. Detailed examination of the investment climate hypothesis led to several 
interesting insights, including the fact that project developers did not avoid countries with 
56 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
perceived corrupt business environments, and that reliance on sovereign guarantees in such 
environments was nearly universal (Woodhouse 2006a: 156). This analysis, like that of the 
obsolescing bargain did not, however, yield a grand explanation for the variation in outcomes 
seen across the project pool. 
An in-depth review of exogenous shocks and contagion confirmed that this hypothesis 
indeed explained many outcomes of IPPs, particularly those in Argentina (as previously noted) 
and Indonesia, which was also a victim of· severe macroeconomic shock and currency 
devaluation. However, as discussed earlier in the context of the obsolescing bargain, some IPPs 
in countries that experienced significant exogenous shocks, were, however, protected-notably 
those in Thailand (Woodhouse 2006a:152-154). Again, as with the other hypotheses, 
exogenous shocks and contagion, while helping to clarify a range of particular experiences, in 
the final analysis did not offer an explanation for all projects reviewed. 
With regard to the electricity market, although this hypothesis ultimately proved lacking in 
explaining outcomes for the group of projects, Stanford PESD provided a particularly 
important discussion of the new market and new firms, which emerged from power sector 
reform (Woodhouse 2006a:21 0_214).66 As reform has only been piecemeal in its 
implementation, it has led to the creation of organizations and interests that are partial to a new 
equilibrium. The study terms this new equilibrium a hybrid/dual market, which is a 
combination of aspects of a state-centred and market-centred electric power systems, 
(Woodhouse 2006a:210-214; Victor and Heller 2007:260). Within this dual market, it is "the 
dual firm" characterized by political connections and commercial practices, which thrives, and 
which in the end itself may impede further reform a la standard model. 
Thus, the four hypotheses noted above were significant, but ultimately limited in their 
explanatory power. It was only project management, later termed strategic management, that 
emerged as yielding explanatory power across the pool (2006a:126,172,185,212). Strategic 
management was contrasted with risk-engineering, which had often not held in the face of 
adversity. The most successful IPPs from both a development and investment perspective, as 
found by the Stanford PESD IPP study, were those in Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, The 
Philippines and Thailand (Woodhouse 2006a; Woodhouse 2006b). Characteristics of the most 
successful projects are summarized as falling into three different categories: 1) project selection 
and cost, 2) local partnerships, and 3) project governance (Woodhouse 2006c:13). 
For example, project selection, namely internationally competitive bids, was instrumental 
in helping to reduce tariffs and increase transparency, which in tum helped projects weather the 
storm of macroeconomic shock, particularly in Egypt and Thailand. Local partnerships, evident 
in more than half of the project's sample (and virtually all projects in Malaysia), have been 
66 This discussion is expanded in Victor and Heller (2007). 
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found to be especially valuable in mitigating dispatch risk and managing renegotiations 
(Woodhouse 2006a: 146-7,193-4; Woodhouse 2006b:20). 
The last item, 'project governance', pertains to how within often tight project-fmanced 
agreements, stakeholders (primarily governments, through centrally controlled agencies and/or 
departments with significant resources at their disposal) were able to make concessions, which 
ultimately eased project stresses and led to more mutually beneficial outcomes (Woodhouse 
2006a:203,206; Woodhouse 2006c:15). Prime examples are IPPs in Thailand and The 
Philippines. Mexico's experience also comes to mind here with US dollar denominated 
liabilities associated with IPPs kept off the government's balance sheet, identified as non-bank 
private sector borrowing via the Pidiregas scheme (Woodhouse 2006a: 147 -8). Although the 
sustainability of this scheme is being called into question, it went a long way in attracting and 
cementing IPP investment in Mexico by providing (the appearance of) a secure investment 
environment. 
To reiterate, it was the strategic management of projects, particularly when faced with 
stresses, to which success may be linked. The emphasis on strategic management also helps 
explain why, although 21 of the 34 projects experienced some form ofrenegotiation, only four 
out of the 34 are perceived to have resulted in negative investment outcomes (Woodhouse 
2006b; Woodhouse 2006c: 1 0).67 Within this context, Orr describes how the Stanford PESD IPP 
study argued that every attempt should be made to create more flexibility with regard to 
contracts, albeit accepting that risks need to be adequately assigned (2006:20-21). This is not 
necessarily a plea to create more flexible contracts, which Stanford's PESD recognizes as not 
viable to date, but more flexible counterparties and ultimately more 'political good will' to 
manage stresses when they (inevitably) do arise (Woodhouse 2006c:21-22). 
As detailed throughout this section, Stanford PESD made a significant contribution to the 
understanding ofIPPs across developing regions. There are, however, three main shortcomings 
identified by this author.68 First, although claims were made to focus on the development and 
the investment outcomes, there was not a systematic link between hypotheses, factors and 
outcomes throughout the study. In the 2005 interim report, scant attention was paid to 
development outcomes, and investment outcomes were only discussed on the margin 
(Woodhouse 2005). In the final study, published a year later, the treatment of development and 
investment outcomes re-emerged, primarily in the synopses of each of the countries, but it is 
67 The four projects reported to have resulted in negative investment outcomes are: China's Miezhouwan, 
a group of five projects referred to as the Tamil Nadu IPPs, the Philippines' Cavite and Poland's Elcho 
(Woodhouse 2006b:ll,17,25,27). In addition Tanzania's IPTL was reported as having "mixed/negative 
outcomes" (Woodhouse 2006b:27). 
68 A fourth point, of lesser importance, is the fact that 'strategic management' and 'risk engineering', 
although the cornerstone of the final analysis are nowhere to be found in either the Methodology or in 
the Interim Report (Victor, Heller et al. 2004; Woodhouse 2005). Of course both terms may be related to 
"project management" as widely discussed in the early reports, however, the final analysis does not 
make this progression clear. 
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overshadowed by the discussion of risk engineering and strategic management. Although a 
companion note was produced by Stanford PESD detailing the development and investment 
outcomes for each project, no such work mapped development and investment outcomes to the 
factors and hypotheses, across the pool (Woodhouse 2006b). 69 
Secondly, as indicated above, there was considerable overlap between the hypotheses and 
the factors. For example, the electricity market was both a hypothesis and a country level 
factor, despite the fact that the county level and project level factors were designed to test the 
hypotheses. Such overlap has hampered the analysis in proving the validity of its hypotheses, 
and, as related in the first point above, connecting hypotheses to factors to outcomes and back 
to hypotheses again. 
Finally, insufficient attention was paid to the nuances of the obsolescing bargain. 
According to PESD, the majority of projects saw a change to the original contract. Due to the 
fact that the bulk of such changes were deemed relatively positive by investors, the conclusion 
reached by the study was that the obsolescing bargain was not a chief determinant of outcomes. 
In contrast, this thesis would argue that the obsolescing bargain is in evidence in virtually every 
such case. Even if creeping expropriation is curbed by investors, the relatively positive results 
are less positive than what would have originally been achieved had there been no obsolescing 
of the bargain. 
2.7.3 A new paradigm for understanding IPPs in Africa 
In constructing its own analytical framework to evaluate the IPP experience in Africa, this 
thesis has drawn on the wealth of power sector reform literature, the theory of the obsolescing 
bargain and earlier IPP studies, most notably Stanford PESD. This thesis used the first two 
bodies of literature, namely power sector reform and the obsolescing bargain, to frame the 
context in which African IPPs took root.70 The IPP literature, primarily the Stanford PESD IPP 
study, was the starting point for the actual analysis of projects. At the same time, having 
identified three main shortcomings above, this thesis jettisoned Stanford PESD's five 
hypotheses and instead sought to create a direct link between factors and development and 
investment outcomes. 
69 Woodhouse (2006b) describes how 13 of the projects evaluated have been found to have positive 
development outcomes, twelve have had mixed development outcomes and only six have had negative 
outcomes. It is not, however, a zero-sum game, i.e. development outcomes at the expense of investment 
outcomes or vice versa as the author finds that investment outcomes across the sample have been largely 
positive, with 20 of the 31 projects recording investment success, six said to have mixed outcomes and 
only five projects noted as having negative outcomes. 
70 Although distinct from the dynamic ofIPPs and PPAs discussed in this thesis, it should be noted that 
Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmyer (2007) provide insights on how investors manage risks 
with regard to sovereign debt and sovereign defaults, which may be helpful in advancing thinking and 
strategizing about the obsolescing bargain as well. 
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Through empirical work in several African countries, this thesis refined the list of factors, 
first identified by Stanford PESD, and identified a suite of exogenous stresses, namely 
macroeconomic shock and currency devaluation, drought, civil strife and (alleged) corruption. 
Important characteristics reflected in the sample of African IPPs that came to be encompassed 
by the analytical framework (both the elements and stresses) include: the important role of civil 
unrest, especially seen in Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire; the prominence of the World Bank in 
shaping electricity sector policy; the role of back-up generators and the relatively less attractive 
investment climate. Rather than focusing on explaining variation in IPP outcomes, which was 
the main thrust of the Stanford PESD IPP work, this thesis focused its inquiry into whether 
balancing development and investment outcomes ultimately leads to more sustainable projects 
and if so what elements contribute to such a balancing act.71 
The question asked is not only whether the specific IPP project will endure, but also if 
such projects are replicated, will outcomes continue to be sustainable. In other words, what are 
the means to both successful development outcomes and successful investment outcomes for 
the sector and myriad stakeholders, over the long-term, taking into consideration the suite of 
exogenous stresses that inevitably occur? It should be emphasized here that not only were 
Stanford PESD's hypotheses jettisoned, but also an attempt to identify one overriding 
explanation for outcomes, across the pool of projects. 
The remainder of this section seeks to describe the main elements, identified through 
empirical work, which will be evaluated in subsequent Chapters for their possible contribution 
to more successful and ultimately sustainable outcomes. Elements are grouped roughly into 
those that fall within the country purview and those that fall within the project purview, namely 
areas over which either one or the other has a greater degree of control. 
What is the role of a favourable investment climate in determining development and 
investment outcomes for IPPs in Africa? A favourable investment climate is generally defined 
by the following characteristics, among others: macroeconomic policies are perceived as stable; 
the country has a good repayment record and therefore an investment grade rating from one of 
the major credit agencies; and the legal system not only is recognized for its general ability to 
uphold laws, but more specifically to (justly) support the enforcement of contracts, as well as 
allow space, including via international tribunals, for arbitration. Such a climate may provide 
more than one investment opportunity to investors and will generally call for less (costly) risk 
mitigation strategies, which in turn results in a lower cost of capital and more competitive 
prices-which feed directly into positive development and investment outcomes. 
How does a clear policy framework impact both host country stakeholders and project 
sponsors? In such a framework, the electricity market structure and the roles and terms for 
71 See Introduction and footnote 7 for the definition of sustainability adopted by this thesis. 
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private and public sector investments generally are clearly spelled out, which in the context of 
African ESIs means with regard to a single buyer model (as there is no evidence, yet, of 
wholesale competition on the continent). Reform-minded champions may be at the helm, and 
have a short, mid and long-term view that sees IPPs within a broader vision of reform. Not only 
may these champions sit at the helm and provide vision, but they also may lead and implement 
the framework. The key appears to lie in long-term and strong government engagement, 
without arbitrary (government) interference with the process, which has long been noted to 
hamper the development of projects. 
What is the relationship among clear, consistent and fair regulatory oversight and 
development and investment outcomes? Although part of the abovementioned framework, this 
element is recognized in its own right, due to its potential importance, and defined by 
transparent and predictable licensing, as well as a tariff framework that is cost-reflective and 
therefore ensures revenue sufficiency. Investor confidence should improve with such oversight 
as should the protection of consumers, together with the performance of both private and public 
assets. 
Intricately linked to the two previously mentioned lements is coherent power sector 
planning, especially in the context of a hybrid market, with both public and private players. 
Ideally, planning is clearly vested with one agency, which is appropriately skilled, resourced 
and empowered to carry out its job, including adopting an energy security standard. 
Duplication of roles and functions is not evidenced. Furthermore, power sector planning fairly 
allocates new build opportunities, taking into consideration the hybrid market, namely the fact 
that public and private stakeholders participate (generally with, among other things, different 
costs of capital). Such coherent power sector planning ensures that built-in contingencies 
eliminate and/or significantly reduce emergency power and black-outs. How has this element 
contributed to outcomes in African IPPs? 
Do competitive bidding practices, long recognized as a sine qua non, in terms of best 
practices, lead to more positive development and investment outcomes? This thesis explores 
the relationship between ICBs and outcomes, viz. the belief that competitive bidding may result 
in prices that are lower than those that are selectively bid. 
Abundant, low cost fuel may go a long way in contributing to successful outcomes as it 
often means that the fuel charge of IPPs may be comparable (or even less than) existing, state-
owned plants, making overall charges less contentious. Furthermore, secure fuel contracts 
safeguard the terms for the duration of the PPA, reducing risks for investors and off-taker alike. 
Whether these dicta hold in the African cases examined here is explored in this thesis. 
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What is the link among favourable equity partners and development and investment 
outcomes for African IPPS?72 A favourable equity partner is defined here as local 
capital/partner contribution to reduce foreign exchange exposure and potentially help navigate 
host-country investment terrain. It may also refer to a new kind of investor with origins in other 
emerging economies or a firm, which, in addition to a commercial imperative, has a broad 
development mandate. Having significant and sustained risk appetite for the project, rather than 
a fleeting interest in a new emerging market appears to lead to more sustainable development 
and investment outcomes-as does prior experience in similar projects. In many cases, 
involvement of a development finance institution has proven to help balance and sustain deals. 
Finally, of significance, is the perception of a fair/reasonable return on equity (ROE) by the 
wide range of stakeholders, which is often linked to the four abovementioned points (local 
capital, risk appetite, prior experience and DFI involvement) as well as the host of country 
level elements already discussed. 
While favourable equity partners may go a long way in contributing to balanced 
outcomes, favourable debt arrangements may also be of critical importance-and equally 
related to the country level elements discussed. Ideally, local financing helps reduce exposure 
to foreign exchange fluctuations. Beyond that, additional sources of international, low cost 
financing help keep charges moderate. Much of this low cost financing (local or international) 
depends on the risk premium demanded by financiers or capped by the off-taker matching the 
actual country and project risk (rather than perceived heightened risk). The presence of 
development finance institution, including export credit agencies, might also engender more 
stability and blunt opportunistic attempts at renegotiation or appropriation. Lastly, although the 
issue is debated, some flexibility in terms and conditions, including possibly sharing 
refinancing gains, may ultimately help in the balancing act of outcomes, as indicated in section 
2.7.1. 
How does an adequate and secure revenue stream from the off-taker to service debt and 
reward equity contribute to successful outcomes for IPPs in Africa? This element is generally 
defined by several components, namely: the financial viability of the off-taker (through sound 
commercial practices in metering, billing and collections practices) helps set the conditions for 
such an exchange. Assurances for timely and complete payment, enshrined in the PPA, by the 
utiliOty also contribute. Robust PPAs outline capacity and payment as well as dispatch, fuel 
72 Although favourable equity and debt arrangements as well as risk mitigation measures with the off-
taker, fuel supplier and other stakeholders have been classified below as project issues, these elements 
may relate to the host country as well, considering host country stakeholders are often involved in at 
least one if not several of these dynamics. Of the elements below, only one may seen be seen as 
exclusively within the purview of the project sponsor, namely positive technical performance. 
Nonetheless, these are all areas where the project sponsor seeks to mitigate risks, either through 
contracts, or the management of relationships, or both. 
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metering, interconnection, insurance, force majeure, transfer, termination, change of law 
provisions, refmancing arrangements, and dispute resolution, among others. Safeguarding the 
PPA with security arrangements (viz. escrow accounts and liquidity facilities), has also proven 
to maintain such revenue streams, attract favourable equity partners and bring down the cost of 
capital. 
Credit enhancement and other risk management and mitigation measures may include 
sovereign guarantees, political risk insurance, and partial risk guarantees as well as provision 
for international arbitration (which may go beyond the dispute resolution provisions specified 
in the PPA, see above). Sovereign guarantees, provided by the state to the project sponsor, 
generally back the full value of the PP A, viz. should the off-take default then the government 
will step in and take over the PPA obligations. Political risk insurance and partial risk 
guarantees, which as described previously (section 2.6.1), form part of the new protections, 
drawn on by investors. Increasingly, political risk insurance is being considered for the sub-
sovereign level to match the exact risk profile of stakeholders (Sinclair 2007:3,10).73 
In addition, projects that record positive technical performance (including high 
availability) may be less likely to face public scrutiny than those that do not, which may 
therefore impact on outcomes. Finally, ongoing strategic management of projects has proven 
instrumental as projects inevitably face unexpected hurdles, a response for which may not be 
spelled out in any of the existing agreements. Such strategic management may involve building 
relationships, including through local equity partners, dedicated budgets for development 
projects within the country, and even refinancing (as previously indicated under favourable 
debt arrangements above). Effective strategic management may also involve a willing partner, 
in the form of the host country government; thus it is not the sponsor alone, but rather a 
dialogue between sponsor and the off-taker and/or other government entities that enhance such 
management. 
73 It should be noted that although credit enhancements and risk management measures have the 
potential to lower the cost of capital, these measures also introduce the possibility of moral hazard, 
namely that the existence of a safety net increases the risk of default and/or political interference. In that 
sense, these measures may not always contribute to the success of projects. 
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Chapter 3 
Africa overview 
This thesis situates its empirical work and employs its analytical framework in Africa_ 
Thr:rd orc, this thesis now turns to Afri l~a : to re \'icw the conlincm's J ,,; \-c lopmcnt slalu5, 
including a brief discussion of FDI and the invcsl:lIcnt climate; h) discuss natural resource 
I:: nJo wrnenls (liS they relale particularly to tht: po\\er seclor); to give an oVervi!;:w of Atrican 
E51 Ch:lf3ctc ristics, and finally to provide a sketch of pri vatI! participation act ivi ty, including 
[PPs. The data n;portcd in this ~ection is primarily the moSt up-to-date ava ilnble (i.c. 
llppro.'(. illlatc ly 10 2(05). wilh the uvcrarching goal bcin~ to paint a genera l picture of present 
conditiuns to betler understand IPP OUICOIllCS. 7~ 
3. 1 Dl'Hlopmcnl s ta tu s: Africa 
3. 1.1 Economic a mi social development 
While there is extraordinary di .... ersity across the 53 counlrit:s (and ne:arly 900 m illion 
peQp l ~. re-presenting about 14 p~r c~m of the ,""orld's popub li on) Ihat make: up the Afr ican 
com inenl, III h:nns o r assess ing Ihe economic ,md social dc:vt'"l np:nclit SI:ltUS, the cont incnt may 
he roughly grouped into North A fr ica and Sub-Sahamn A fr ica (SSA). runhennnre, il is o ften 
use fu l to scp;u-ale the rela tively lIlOTC dcveloped country of South Africa (RSA) from SSA. 
The gross national income (GNI) per capita for North Africa (at USSI.700),' falls into the 
broader Ci ltcgory of low and middle income countrit:s and is s light ly hener than the average lor 
East As ia ;}nd Pacific (World Rank 2005a:24; World Bank 2005b:33). A ctlnSidera l:lk contrast 
is scc n ill data for SSA (excluding RSA). 76 which records th~' lowest GNI per capita of all 
rc~ions in the wor ld at nn ,average ofUS$342 (World Bank 200 5a:24). Furthcrmorc. unlike any 
other region. ONI pef capita in SSA (again, excluding R SA) has hccn lhllillg, as population 
growth has outpaced econom ic growth (World Bank 2005b:J3).'" Not 0111y has the number of 
cxt l"c llwly poor doubled s ince 198 1 to 313 million in Sub-S<lhar,1Il Afr ica, th o:: rdativo:: c:conomic 
cond ition h.'ls al so deteriorat(,d as t:videnced by the following: si nce 198 1, thc averagc daily 
N More detailccl \\ork is. however. pr\"Sentoo rur Eg)"pL Kenya and Tanzania in Ch<l lltcr four through six. 
71 031.1 is t><lsed on the Warld Bank's Atlas mt:thod, .... hich employ-.; a threc year movIng :m:rage 
convers ion ract(lr, adj usted r (If price. 1u reduce f1u ctU4Uions in the exchange rate. 
1(, The data for South Africa (RSA) will be presented independently fOf a number of indicators. Although 
demOnStroli ing extreme income inequal ity, RSA b::-:<sIS an average per capila income or US$2,900 
(equ ivalent 10 USS IO, 1.30 in t(mll~ nf purch ;j~illg pow~ r pariIY). which exceeds the :l \·cr.lge o r middle 
inco)me countr ies (WOrld Bank 200501:24; W('rld Bank 2005b:JJ ). Unless othcrwise ~pccified in the text, 
however. figLlre s rOr Sub-Saharan Africa include RSA. 
» Between 197.5 and \984, <lveragt: annual GNI was reported a.o; U35420; this dropped \0 US5J.54 
between I 9!t5 and 19Q4 and finally \0 USS309 between 19Q5 antl 2!)O] (World Bank 2005b:33). 
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income o r those people subsisting on less than o lle US do llar pcr day has d ropped from 64 US 
cenlS 1060 US CCnlS (World Bank 2005a:3-4), 7& 
Fi:,:un: 3. 1: GI)I~ pcr capil:' :1cross develuping rcginns 1990· 2005 (in cunsta nl l000 (jSS) 
·1500 
4000 
3500 
30UO - Average GDP pcrcapit(l in SSA between 1985-
~ 25UO 
!3 2000 
1994 :US$516_ bctw~en 1995-20U4 : US$5 J 1 ~ 
~ . ~~ 
-~~_~ ___ 11'_~ 
1500 -
1000 
50n 
" 
Source; compiled by author, based on World Development Ind icators {Wl.)lj (World l3a f!k 2oo7g) 
N<1 les: GDP Gross domestic product: EAP: East Asia & P::ci l i ~ ; LAC : Latin America and Calibbean, 
SSA: Sub·Sahlran Africa; ECA: Europe & Cer,(T;l1 Asia: SA: South Asi a. Nonh Afnca has been 
excluded due to the flet that data is only ava ilab le after 1 9<J~ It shoul':: be 1I ("I le, howevl,:f, betwecn 1999 
amI 2005, ~vcr::l ge per capita GOP was U5$2,000 as rcport!.'{! in WDI 
T he trends high lighted above arc reflceted across a numb(,;T uf social dewlopment 
indicators. North Africa has seen its infant mortality rates drop by more than half to 31 pcr 
101m births betw.:.:n 1990 lllld 2003 (World Bank 200 5h :313) . In l;Ulll rHst , nlthough infant 
mo rtality has fall c n in SSA s ince 1990. it is .,ti ll the developi ng region with the highest such 
rates (at j ust ove r 100 deaths per 1,000 births) (World flank 2005a : 11; World Hank 
20051:1 :313).7<) S uu-Saharan Africa also rccords the highest mortality rates of a ll develo ping 
rcgillils fur child ren under fivc years o f age, al 17 1 death~ per 1,000 c h ild ren ( Wo rld Han k 
2005a:2 t1) . .o Unde rnoll rish ment is yet another rc\·ca ling indicato r, with SS" recognized as the 
111 tn canlr:lst , throughout the re,;t o f the developing world, the ;!verage dally iliCOIllC o r those liv ing O:J 
k ss than one do llar per d:!y has risen from n u s cen t.<. 1(1 83 US ccn15 (World Balik 2005a:4)_ 
n South Asia is sccond to Sub-Sah,lrnn Africa in terms or juran: ~t)i1a l i I Y, but rccor'::s JUSI over iO 
dea ths pcr I _000 bi rths ( World Uank 2005a: I I). 
110 Although a Sep;!ral': ClSe was llIadc tbr $(>uth AlriCi! 'S GN I per c:lpitt!: , III terms of infant mona1i lY, Ihe 
c0un!ry h'l" 110t scored as wel l. Ii is among (he few Afr ican countries to.sec infant Illl>rulity rise between 
199u ~ Ild 2U03 (Irom 45 !o 53) (World Bank 2005\):313 ), Onc additIOnal point sh(lIl ld be made in this 
e0ntC:liI, alt hough ].I I VI AIDS is the C:luse of nearly 2 .5 million deaths in Sub-Sa haran Africa, since 1990 
(more than in any other developing region), it is malaria that is the "Ieaei:"!!! killer'" if! Africa, with nearly 
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lkvc10ping region with the highest incidt:: nce as we ll as th<: only such region to see rates rise 
since 1990 (to w<:11 ovt::r 30 per cent of the population) (World Bank 2005a:5), In addition. 
although minor progress may be noted, Suh-Saharan Africa, togdher with South Asia, rank 
among those dt::veioping regions with the most limited access to improved sanitation facilities, 
with SllCh access for just over one third of the population (World Bank 2005a:32; World Bank 
2005b:317). 
In accessing these and other economic <lnd soci,l l development indicators against the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) ,81 Sub-Saharan /\frica, in contrast to a[1 other 
developing regions, appears to have the fewest number of countries that have already achieved 
the (MDO) poverty reduction targd (viz. halving the proportion o f people living Oil less than 
US$ 1 dollar) (\Vorld Bank 2006a:3). Also noteworthy is the region of SSA 's status with regard 
to the second MOO goa! of ensuring primary school for all children by 2015; here, Sub-
Saharan Africa records the greakst perccntagt of countries of all developing regions tllat are 
"seriously off track" in achieving the goal (World Hank 2006a:4-5). For the remaining six 
MDGs, SSA lags behind, including in its record with disease; malaria, mY/AIDS, and 
tuberculosis arc all on the rise rather tban nearing the goal of halting the spread {If such 
epidemics (World Bank 2006a: 12-13). 
Thus, relative and absolute pov<:rty continue to undermine social and economic 
development on the continent (with notable exceptions across Nurth Africa and in other 
pock<:ts including parts of SOllth t\ frica) , dcspite s ignificant efforts to the contrary. A lthough an 
in-depth evaluation of such poverty is outside the realm of this thesis, a basic understanding is 
crucial for two rea~ons , which represent a conundrum of sorts. On the one hand, tbe investment 
needs arc llugc.&! On the other hand, there is limited public funding including concessionary 
loans, and foreign, private investors arc often wary to put their money in projects given the 
level of underd<:velopment anu associated risk. 
a mi Ilion people, mostly children, dying as a result of malaria each y ear in Suh-Sahnran Africa (\I/orld 
Bank 2006a: 12- t 3). 
~ I The MlXi~. among the most frequently used metrics for charti:1g economic and social development 
pmgress, outline eight goals 10 be acbieved between t,)90 and 20 15 relnted to improvements in the 
rollowing areas: poverty and hunger; universal primary education; gender equality and t~male 
empowerment; child mortality; maternal health: the spread of disease (T-BV/Aids and malaria); 
environmental sustainability and enhancing a globOiI partnership fo r deve :opment (United Nations 2005). 
i l Estache put'i the totOiI expenditure across all infrastructure (electricity, telecommunications, roads, rail , 
water and sanitation) to be 9 per cent of GDP between 2005 and 2015 to meet the MOGs (Estachc 
2005:15). Fay and Yepes in estimating invest men t needs <Icross infrastructure bctwel.::1 2005 and 20 10 
(not specifically with MDG targets in mind) came to a figure ofUS$25 ,912 million or nearly 6 per cent 
of GDP (Fay and Yepes 2003: 11). 
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3 . 1.2 rl)r :Intltill' investment climate 
Wh:u is the record o f investment and why" At fir..1 gbn.::e, the Figure imm~dia lcly below. 
which records A ft ican FOI, includ ing a sus ta ined increase for Sub-Saha ran A frica. d ocs. nOI apllCar 
10 square wilh the discussion abo ... e . namely fore ign p rivate imcstors a rc war) \0 tread on African 
so il . 
Figure 3.2: Africa FOl, net inflow, balanct of p:I)'IIlCllts 
100% 
90% 
20"/0 
0% 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 i99S 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Source: cllnlpiled by author. b,Ised on WDl (World B:J.nk 2007e) 
A lthOlLgh g ro wth lIlay be noted for the cO!ltinent , it is important to recognizc that For In 
A fri ca avcrages j ust 2 per cent u f world totals for FD I between 1990 a nd 200t1 (Worid Bank 
200 7!,). despi k Ihe continent having 14 per cent of the w(l rld '~ pnpII\.1tiun IIlld 20 per cenl of its 
land mass. The need fo r additional fundin g in .... irtually evay seCIO(- frorn health 10 electric 
power generat ion, as e ll1pha~ i :ted througho ut sections 3.1. I- is acule, however. the inv<:s tm~nt 
cl lrl lflt e ke..:ps m;my woul.l·bc fin ancie rs at hay. A lthough a wide range of indicators seek to 
r<:port on th..: in vestment climate in Africa, this section briefly proti k'S j ust onc of the ma in 
indicators, hd ow. :-.sol only is coverage lim ited o f many of the major ind icators;1J a detailed 
discussion o f ),o uc h fa cts is a lso beyond Ihe scope or lhis thesi)'. 
¥) Conside. (or example [he Inves tment Clim;:!te Surveys as rcponed in wnl (WOI ld Bank 2006a:270-
272). Senior m'lllag~ rs art! asked to repon 011 Inc txtcnl [0 whIch policy uncertainty, con upl um. ~ourts. 
crinK·. regulation ami tali administ ration, finance, ! Ie~ trk ity and labo' lr are considered maj or wn.str~1 1I 1s 
to doing business. Oli ly lJ countries throughout North A lr i ~a and Suj}.Suharan Africa an:: included. and 
notably ahsent urc Cote d' ivoire, Ghana and Tunisia, which form part of this thesi s' :malys is. 
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3.1.3 Credit ratings 
Among the most widespread metrics for judging a country's investment climate are 
international credit ratings, which assess the likelihood that an entity (sovereign, bank or 
corporate) will repay its foreign currency or local currency financial obligations in a timely 
manner. Both short and long-term, foreign currency and local currency ratings are 
internationally comparable assessments. The leading rating agencies, Moody's Investors 
Service, Standard & Poor's & Fitch, assign ratings when a bond is first issued, and that rating 
helps determine how high the bond's interest rate will be. If the agencies assign a high rating, 
that means there is little risk of default, so the issuer can obtain a lower interest rate.84 
It is the paucity of investment grade ratings that is the most striking feature of Africa. In 
North Africa, only Tunisia presently has an investment grade rating (Chambers 2007; 
Sovereign Ratings Summary May 2 2007). Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, four countries have 
attained such ranking: Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa. Morocco and Egypt, 
are, however, as noted above, considered to have relatively better investment climates and 
record just one notch below investment grade (BB+), followed by Lesotho and Nigeria (BB-) 
(Nigeria launches power privatization sales pitch 2006; Sheppard 2006; Sheppard, Klaudy et 
al. 2006; Chambers 2007; Sheppard R. per com 2007). In addition, 15 other Sub-Saharan 
African countries have received a speculative grade rating from at least one of the major rating 
agencies, namely: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, and Uganda. 
It should be noted that there is considerable progress to report on the ratings front, 
considering the fact that in the last two years, five Sub-Saharan African countries (Kenya, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda and the Seychelles) have all received ratings from the major 
agencies, for the first time. However, the persistent dearth of investment grade ratings is a 
signal for most investors not to approach. When they do approach, are the terms and conditions 
demanded beyond the reach of host country governments-a question to which this thesis will 
return to in evaluating the IPP outcomes including the role of the obsolescing bargain in its 
assessment of the three case studies. 
84 Each of the major agencies differs slightly in their ranking of long-term credit ratings (short-term are 
not provided below): 
Moodv's ratings: from highest to lowest. Investment grade: Aaa, Aal, Aa2, Aa3, AI, A2, A3, Baal, 
Baa2, Baa3. Speculative grade: Bal, Ba2, Ba3, BI, B2, B3, Caal, Caa2, Caa3, Ca, Cl. 
S&P's ratings: from highest to lowest. Investment grade: AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB+, 
BBB, BBB-. Speculative grade: BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B-, CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC, D. 
Fitch's ratings (same as S&P): from highest to lowest. Investment grade: AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+, 
A, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB-. Speculative grade: BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B-, CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC, D. 
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3.2 African ESIs 
3.2.1 Power generation and resource endowments 
Despite the widespread poverty documented above, which is interlinked with FDI and the 
investment climate, the continent is endowed with significant natural resources, many of which 
fuel its electric power generation.85 This section briefly sketches Africa's coal, natural gas, 
hydropower and oil resources, together with electric power production and consumption 
patterns. 86 
Africa generated approximately 550 Terawatt hours (TWh) in 2005 or approximately 3 
per cent of the world's total electricity generation (BP 2006:39), despite containing one fifth of 
the land mass and nearly 15 per cent of the population, as previously referenced. More than 40 
per cent of this was generated in South Africa (BP 2006:39). The bulk of the remaining 
production was generated in North Africa. 
It is coal that contributes most significantly to Africa's power generation or about 50 per 
cent of total electric generation-70 per cent for Sub-Saharan Africa and approximately 7 per 
cent across North Africa (World Ballk 2005a:164; World Bank 2007e, compiled by author).87 
Explaining the disparity in usage is the fact that coal is found primarily in South Africa, which 
accounts for just over 5 per cent oftotal world coal reserves and the vast majority of coal found 
in both Africa and the Middle East, as of end-2005 (BP 2006:28).88 8~early mirroring 
reserves, actual production of coal from Africa amounts to just under 5 per cent of world totals, 
again with South Africa accounting for 4.8 per cent ofthe total (BP 2006:30).90 
85 It should be acknowledged that the resource curse or paradox of plenty as mapped by Terry Lynn Karl 
would not see poverty and resources at odds but rather a direct correlation between the two. For a 
detailed discussion see Karl and Gary (Karl and Gary 2004). 
86 Nuclear power production is minimal with South Africa's Koeberg station producing the only nuclear 
power on the continent; total consumption accounts for approximately 0.5 per cent of world nuclear 
consumption (United States Energy Information Agency 2005; BP 2006:33). 
87 An important exception to this breakdown in regional reSOurces is the coal-fired 10rfLasfar IPP, which 
increased Morocco's base load capacity by roughly 50 per cent. A more detailed discussion will be 
Eresented in section 3.4.l. 
8 As defined in BP's statistical review: this refers to proved reserves of coal (or other resources), namely 
"those quantities that geological and engineering information indicates with reasonable certainty can be 
recovered in the future from known deposits under existing economic and operating conditions," (BP 
2006:28). 
89 Zimbabwe contains approximately 0.1 per cent of the world's total proven coal reserves and 'other 
Africa' approximately 0.1 per cent as well (BP 2006:28). 
90 As of 2002, South Africa was the world's third largest net coal exporter (United States Energy 
Information Agency 2005). 
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Figure 3.3 : C ontrihution to electric generat ion by fue l so urce, $ uh-$alwr:ln Africa and 
Nor th A fril'a 
Sub·Sahnran AIi'ica (2003) 
." 4% 
oil 
4% 
coal 
71% 
Source: compi led by lulhor, b~5ed on \VOl (2007e) 
NO:1h Africa (2003) 
oil 
15% 
---
"",' 
7% 
9% 
Nalllr;11 gns rtUlks second in terms of electric power generation for the continent at 
allproxi lllnlciy 2S pcr cent of lOla I electr icity generated: as \\itl1 conI. 11 wide disparity may be 
seen wilh presenf usage, wilh natural gas accounting for about 70 per cent of total generation 
f () f North Africa, and jus t ull.k r 5 per cent for SSA (World Dank 2006a:I 64 : W{Wld Bank 
2007e, compiled by author). Since 1990. North Afr ica h;!s wi tnessed growth of more than 200 
per cell t ill tcrms of e lec.tricit), gencmted hy natural gas (World B,mk 2006:.:). Natural gas 
reserves arc concentrated primari ly in North and West Africa, explaining the disparity in usage. 
name ly: Nigeria (5.2 T ril lion cubic feet, Tc f), A I~er la (4.6 Tel), I:'gypt ( 1.9 Tcf) and Libya (1.5 
Tcf), S igniticant nulural gas discovcries have, however, bee n made in SOlllhcrn Africa, in 
Muzambique, Namibia and Ango la, as well, wi th reserves of 4.5 Td, 2.2 Te f and 2.0 Tef, 
respcctivcly.9 1 Altogether, African gas reserves amount to approximately 15 Tcror aboul ~ per 
CClll of to tal, world proven rcserves (BP 2006: 1 7; Energy I nfom1l1tion Agency 2006; Energy 
Info rmation Agency 20(7). Natural gas prodm.:tioll docs not mimic the rcs(;rv..; profile exactly, 
with top prod ucers in descending order: Algc ria, Egypt, Ni geri3. find Libya, which together, 
with the rest of Afric(I combined, accOllnt for 6 per cent of thc totnl of world gas production at 
the end of :;005 {UP 2006:1 9). Im portant To note that, in COlltrast to conI, the continent 
COnsUlIlCS less than half o f what it produces (accountin g for oll ly 2.6 pcr cent of the world's 
natuml gas consumption) led by consumption in Egypt, Algeria and South Africa, which 
iIHl>orts f!'(,1Il Mozambiclue (BP 2006:22), rvlucil of the consu mpt ion profile cou ld, however, 
change wi th the growth cf natura l gas-fired po\\er p lan t~ in Nigeria as well as the development 
?, Although ;,:;omparatively less at 800 BIllion cu~:c ieel (Bel), d iscoveries of mlllwJ I gas are s:owly 
ch,lIlging the face of eledric power generation in Tao7anm, ,IS will b~ d i ~C ll S~ctllIl Chapter 6. Also of 
significanc.:: ill terms o r natural ga~ development in Sout hern Afr ie.1 is the Mozambique gas pipelme 
bringing g~ ~ from the Temane ano Panoe fie lds ill MOllm bilj llt IV SlIso l (in S()uth Africa) along a 537 
mite long pipeline, sim.:c 2004. 
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of the West African Gas Pipeline Project (W AGP), which will transports Nigerian natural gas 
to Benin, Togo and Ghana, and which could eventually be extended to Cote d'Ivoire and 
Senegal. The Kudu Gas Project, which involves harnessing off-shore gas for a 800 MW power 
plant, and which like the W AGP has been in the planning stages for several decades, could 
also, bring more gas into the Southern African consumption profile. Smaller projects like 
Tanzania's Songo Songo Gas-to-Electricity project, which will be discussed in-depth in 
Chapter six, have been instrumental in changing the demand profiles of individual countries. 
Hydropower is presently contributing nearly 20 per cent of electric generation for the 
continent-21 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa and about 10 per cent in North Africa (World 
Bank 2005a:164; World Bank 2007e, compiled by author). It is estimated that 95 per cent of 
Africa's technical hydropower potential remains unexploited (Aardt 2006). The technically 
exploitable capability is estimated at 1888 TWh/year or approximately 13 per cent of the 
world's total technically exploitable capability (World Energy Council· 2001). Installed 
capacity, at just over 20,000 MW, presently accounts for only about 3 per cent of total world 
installed capacity, despite the abundance of the resource (World Energy Council 2001), which 
points to low demand profile as well as the investment gap.92 In terms of hydropower that is 
presently exploited, it has been harnessed across Sub-Saharan Africa, with some of the largest 
installations (after Egypt) in: Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria, Zambia 
and Ghana (World Energy Council 2001). Furthermore, much of the technically exploitable 
capability cited above is located across these and other Sub-Saharan African states that lack 
natural gas, oil and coal resources. It should be noted that a number of the IPPs reviewed in 
detail in this thesis were developed with the immediate cause of alleviating electricity shortages 
due to drought (in largely hydro-based systems). Thus, reliance on hydropower goes a long 
way in explaining IPP outcomes across the continent. It should also be noted in this context 
that although the continent has not yet seen any large-scale hydro-powered IPPs, among the 
latest IPPs planned is Uganda's Bujagali, a 250 MW hydroelectric plant, with lead sponsor 
formerly the American-based AES and now Industrial Promotion Services (IPS), a subsidiary 
of Aga Khan's Fund for Economic Development (AKFED). 
Finally, this discussion ends with oil, which amounts to about 8 per cent in terms of 
electricity generation across Africa. North Africa has seen electricity generated by oil drop 
since 1990 (by 20 per cent) as natural gas becomes increasingly ubiquitous. Meanwhile, 
although only amounting to 4 per cent of total generation in SSA, it has grown by more than 
150 per cent since 1990 (World Bank 2006a:164; World Bank 2007e, compiled by author). 
Proven oil reserves, totaling approximately 115 thousand million barrels (as of the end of 
92 Consumption also amounts to approximately 3 per cent of the world's total (BP 2006:35), with limited 
amounts of power generated via hydropower through North African linkages with the Middle East, 
through an interconnector with Jordan. 
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2005), are concentrated in North and West Africa, primarily in Libya (40 thousand million 
barrels) and Nigeria (35 thousand million barrels), followed by Algeria, Angola, Sudan and 
Egypt (BP 2006:2).93 Actual production paints a similar picture, with the top producers 
presently, in descending order: Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Angola and Egypt (BP 2006:2,4). All 
told, however, as of end-2005, Africa's proven reserves are only about 10 per cent of world 
proven reserves and production accounts for approximately 12 per cent of total world 
production, with the continent as a whole, consuming just 3.5 per cent of total world 
production, led by consumption in Egypt, South Africa and Algeria (BP 2006:4,6).94 
3.2.2 Installed capacity and consumption patterns 
National electricity systems in African countries are small by international standards (with 
the exception of South Africa). 95 Installed capacity and per capita consumption are among the 
lowest across developing regions (World Bank 2007b). South Africa has a total nominal 
capacity of 42,000 MW,96 followed by Egypt with 22,500 MW, then both Nigeria and Morocco 
with 5,000 MW (Egyptian Electricity Holding Company 2004; International Atomic Energy 
Agency 2005; Eskom 2006).97 Thereafter countries taper off with Mali possessing a mere 280 
MW and Burkina Faso, 120 MW (International Atomic Energy Agency 2005). One important, 
more recent development has been the addition of emergency also termed temporary power, 
namely units that are rented generally for 1-2 years during a power shortage. Although units 
are generally no larger than 100 MW, given the small base of installed capacity, emergency 
power, has come to playa significant role in African ESIs in the past decade.98 99 
93 Other smaller producers include (in decreasing scale): Gabon, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville); 
Equatorial Guinea; Chad and Tunisia (BP 2006: 2). 
94 Michael Klare describes the increasing foreign interest in Africa's oil and gas resources as well as 
increased development and military aid as well as arm sales (Klare 2001:217-221). See also Karl and 
Gary (2004), as previously referenced. . 
95 Interconnections provide the opportunity to supplement supply, however, they are not discussed in 
depth here as most private power investments have been for domestic markets to date. 
96 The case of South Africa is noteworthy in this context. Although the country has had significant 
excess capacity for two decades, RSA is presently facing a tight supply/demand balance, which impacts 
on the rest of the Southern African region, which is interconnected through the Southern African Power 
Pool (SAPP) and to which Eskom is the primary supplier of power. Ten Southern African countries are 
linked through SAPP, namely South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A further two countries, Malawi 
and Tanzania, are part ofSAPP, but not linked. 
97 Important to note, however, in the case of Nigeria, only about 3,000 MW of the approximately 5,000 
MW installed are operational as 2007, due to age and maintenance of plants. 
98 Take for example Aggreko, one of the leading firms to provide such power in Africa, which after 10 
years is active in providing power plants in about 10 countries across the continent, including about 40 
per cent of Uganda's capacity as of 2006. It should be noted that if all forms of utility projects are 
considered, Aggreko's activity spans 21 countries across Africa (Aggreko 2006:21; Aitken S. per com 
2007). 
99 Although such power has been particularly critical in staving off the effects of reduced hydro electric 
capacity as a result of drought, it is understandably more expensive due to the short duration of the 
contracts. In most countries, these extra costs are subsidized, with the cost of such subsidies in Uganda 
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Electricity consumption averages approximately 554 kWh per capita per year. This figure 
masks a wide disparity: 900 kWh for North Africa and 457 kWh for Sub-Saharan Africa, with 
the average for SSA falling to 124 kWh if South Africa is excluded (World Bank 2005b:245). 
For a global comparison, annual average per capita consumption across developing countries is 
1,155 kWh (United Nations Development Programme 2006, table 22). This stands in sharp 
contrast to high income countries, which averaged 10,198 kWh (United Nations Development 
Programme 2006, table 22). Furthermore, if South Africa is excluded, SSA is the only region in 
which per capita consumption is actually falling. Due to its comparatively minute electricity 
markets, Africa has been easily passed over as a potential destination for IPP developers. 
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Figure 3.4 Electricity consumption per capita (kWh) 1992-2004 
• • 
1ft 
• • • • • 
• 
o +---'--''--'---T---r--.---.---r---.--.---.---'--~ 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Source: compiled by author, based on World Bank (2005b; 2007g) 
~LAC 
...... EAP 
-NA 
_SSA 
-SA 
_SSA-
RSA 
Note: Data for SSA-RSA only available between 1993 and 2002. Developing countries within the region 
of Europe and Central Asia (ECA) have been excluded from this graph with the average for ECA twice 
that of LAC. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, where 83 per cent of the African population lives, approximately 
one quarter of the population has access to electricity, and in some countries as little as 5 per 
cent of the population has access to electricity. There are presently 438 million people living in 
rural areas without electricity (as opposed to 109 million without electricity in urban areas) 
(International Energy Agency 2006:156). Rates in rural areas can be as low as 2 per cent, as 
seen in Tanzania (Marandu 2002). In Kenya, rural access rates are just 3.8 per cent (Kenya 
Ministry of Energy 2000). Electricity consumption is concentrated in urban areas among the 
between 2005 and 2011 to be roughly estimated as equivalent to the total cost of the 250 MW Bujagali 
hydropower project (Uganda 2007:4). 
75 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
11I idd l0,.\ alld upper cla<;scs. larg..:: r bus in.:;ss owners .md I h~ public sec lor ( Es lac h..: 2005:33.40). 
W hile a q u ic k survey may dee m Ihe 75 I>CT ce llt tlnscn 'cd {I:'. ' Ia l.:nl dO:: ll1und ' . Ihis demand is 
cnaraclcrized hy LIS poven y and oRc n locflIet.l gr..:.11 d is la:u:cs from any cI~l ri l: il)' 
in frastruc ture. i.c. il prcscnls m o re o f :1 pub lic policy d mllcngc Iilan:m invest ment o pportun ity. 
3.2.3 (,lUlllil )' nf SIIPI)I), :lIul the ES I 
Even for those who do hllvc access. p00r ((u,llit)' of stlpp ly i ~ IIu.": r ule. lIo ll 11c ~,...:~ption , in 
S ub-Sahamn A fri c3 ('101"lh Afr i.:;a is nOI I"Cnowned for any such pcrs i ~lcnt and widcspn:ad poor 
qualily) .!IIfI C lose to 100 per ccnt of larg.e businesses o perati ng ill N ige ria. Africa's m ost 
pupulou s (:Ollntry, have their own pow(:r supply due 10 thc unreliability o f e lectrici ty (Estache 
2 0U S:) I). rOI ' I'he ligllTes tolal a imosl 90 per o.: enl in Kenya, T<l Il ,wnia alld Ug;ll1da, ;llld .illst (Ivcr 
60 per CCllt in Erit rea, MOLnmbiquc and Zambia ( Estache 2005 :3 1). 
Fi~u l"e 3.5: 1'~I'~clI l:lge of businc.~ses thaI rely no twci t- II II J;:c l1cr:lt ion 
S I ~O 
• ~, I 00 +---------= 
u 0 so +-____ _ 
.< 
< 
6 0.60 
E 0 40 
~ 
'c: O.!O 
• 
-5 000 
. '00"0 
Source: Estache (200S :J !) 
Re~ idwllial c0n ~ UlllcTs a mI slllall businesses are less lik ..: l) to own bac k-up go.:ncrators and 
tho.:rcfo rc suiTer from poor quality supply mos t acutdy. Intervi0ws w ith s take ho lders in K(.mya 
cOll fi n no.:d the Iln ro.:l iahi lilY o f the gr id pow~r and the high COS I 10 indu~ lry. Kcnynn 
manu facluro.:r.:; ~ igllakd thai it was bell(:T to have e xpem ivc pow~' r than no power al a ll. 
In terms o f transm iss ion a nd distribulion (T&O) losses. w h ich is a mo ng Ihe m o-> l frequently 
c ile d ind icntor o f s u pply. Ihere appear.-. to he some d is parity in the eI:It:! . Worl,"! flank lig urt.'"S 
100 The Arnco Inrmstructu l\.· Cuuntry Diugnosl iI: S:mly I AICD) is ?rescntlY bei ng \U1denil ken and ted by 
Ih l.! World n :lllk. 10 bcnchm:n k I'er!orm:lncc, including ,he ele:::tncity sew")!. ;lcrOSS Ihe continent. AlCD 
indicates Ihal any slich comprchrnsive perrOnn:.ulCe <i:I.t~ i!i cur r~ntly U"::av:l;bb l ~ (AJrica InfrdSlrueture 
("ount ry Ui:l~nQslio; SIUJy 1007). 
101 Furthermore, no;arly 100 per .:el1l o f .s.:njnr managers acrol>S Indu~tr ies , surveyed in an inveslmeill 
<: Iilllate a ~scssmcnt. ind icated Ihal clC\:trid l)' is a r.l;:jor COnStrain: 10 doing hu~i llc.>s in the country 
( World Bank 201)6a:2 71 ) 
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record T&D loss!.'S of 12 per cent for SSA, in contrast to It; ptf" cent for Latin America, 26 per 
cenl for Soulh Ihia, and an average of2-1I>er cem fo r all 1o\\' income countries (20mb). Thus, 
the regi()tl ofSSA would al'lJ<:ar to be rdatively belleroff. In co ntrast, in its 14 counlry review 
of East and Southern African Slates, SAD-ELEC present.:. rota compikd by this author thaI 
reports T&D los~s across countries (non-wo;:ighh::d) a ... eraging I S per cenl (SAD-ELEC 
200fl:23). The prevalence of back-up generators as described above would also signal that 
reliability of supply i ~ far from adequate. 
Africa '~ quality of supply issues are a prodllet of a se~eral factors: system overload, 
decaying infrastructure. lack of investment (and in some cases, civil war and ~trife) which have 
spared neil her c ivilinns nor puhlie works. Unlike thos..: without access mcntioned above, the 
businesses wilh back-up generalors represent a more credibk ialeT1l demand for potential IPP 
dcvelopers as the eo~t ofsclf-generation exceeds US$OJO/kWh (JFC per com 2005). A further 
impediment 10 investment is inadequate transmission infra~truc ture , both within and between 
COUll tries, which further limits access to markets. 
3.2.4 Org:mi/ation urthe ESI, Tariffs anti funding 
"ow ar.: Africa's ESls structured and organiLed? As wilh ESb lIeros~ the globe, described 
in sect ion 2.1, Arrican ESls throughOl.ll both North and Sub-Saharan Africa have traditionally 
been organiled 3" vertically illlcgraled monopolies, wull ownership in the hand" of the stale 
(Nel lis 2005:9-11). Ovcr (he last t\\'o d~'Cadcs. power sector reform has been propagated 
throughout the continent, and there are signs of movemcnt toward corporatization and 
commerclllliLOHion (including via management cuntracts). IPPs have been introduced in about 
IS COlllltri..:S, and regulators have been established in approximately 20 countries, with efforts 
underw",y to set up such agencies in 12 more countries (Eberhard 2007' 1 S). 1 ~1 Howevcr, no 
African ESt hob yet to be fully unbundled (vcrticalJy and hori.lont:lily), nnd nowherc is (here 
evidence of ei ther wholesale or retail competition rBcsant-lOlles 2006:22; SI\D-ELEC 
2006:9),101 1Q.1 
10! Many of lilt:: newly crcatccl regu la tors have. however, come under fi :e for what h,1\'e b~en perceived 
as inconsistent and olten arbi trary nllings. thereby mcreasing rather than decreasing overall sector risk. 
as wllt be tr~atcd in gr~al..:r detail in So!Ction 7 ,J ,2 (Eh~rhard 2007: t ). 
In As refer'meed in footnote 96, SAPP indudes a small short-Ienn energy market (also known as STEM) 
and a hd3teral market. Volumes of ck"clIkity traded on STEM reached ft high o f 812 OWh m 2002 and 
since then h,,\',,: t.!..:clim:d, r..:cort.!ing a meft" 178 GWh in 2005, al1ftnUlcd mainly to the failur..: of 
M01.alllbit lliC lmd Zambia PdTtlc ipalmg due 10 n:habthull1on and rnainten:lIIce projo:cts (Southern African 
Power 1'0012006: 14). SArr',> bilalcra l contracts amou~lcd 10juSl over 10 TWh ;n 2002, and haw been 
increasing steadily 10 16 TWh in 200-1 and It} 1 Wb i:J.1005 (Sout:,em African Power PooI2006:14·1 5). 
l,j.! It shoulcl bc noted, ho"c\'er, \lMI evidence for pmlal unbundling IS fount.! in Kenya ant.! Uganda, 
\\hcre g~neratim\ has been separatcd from tr,lIl3mlssilln ane dl~lrlbu l i()n (ne~nt-Jones 20(622). 
Furthermore, m Namlbi" and SmJlh Africa, local governmelll is Involved In dl5101;lllt,on, and in Nigeria, 
thc Pnwer Holding CompJny of Nigeria (PHCN) has been nomhal!y unbundkd. however, !'lIeN still 
rnamtalrls a comdi nating role. 
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While there is a general tre illi toward commerci:l l i7~'l ion o f the industry, pressure to 
develop industry, poverty and soc ialist ideology have all helped to keep tariffs below cost 
(Ne llis 2005:9-11). Comprehensive data is not rc.ld ily nvailnble for the continent: instead 
included immediardy bC](lw is a comparison of tlIriff dl\ta for residential and indll~tria l 
CU~lOlllcrs (of 100 kilovolt ampere. kVa) from both Southern and East Africa from :2006 nnd 
1997. 
Figure 3.6 : lt esidclltbll lIml I "tius tri:!1 ( IOn k V:.l ,,,dl'fs 11)97 & 2006 SSA , nUlllin al \'alul'.'> 
14 Brcs97 o res06 o indus97 [J indu506 
12 
I. 
~ 
~ , 
'" 
" 
c 
• u 6 ~ 
:0 
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2 
• 
Source: compiled by author, b:ls<:d on SAD-ELEC, (1997: 1 0; 2006: 19) 
Notes: Average Nomina! SeHing Price - Domestic CU5tnmers Uti lities noted hdow. \O~ Absent from the 
1997 dala are three countries: K.:-nya. Uganda ;md ~ t a'Jrn j u 5 . \997 pro\'idcs data for Zaire (ddincd as 
Oenll)l;r<lti~' Republic of COli go (DKCJ since 1997) which 2006 does nt.t. 
Severa l points are worth noting. First. with the long-run mar;inal cost (LRMC, of powt'r 
III SSA estimated at between 6 and 8 US cents/kWh, sev~ral countries arc well uelow cost. 
namt'ly An!,;ola. and DRC (for r~~idcnliallariffs)J South Afrka (for iIldll~lriall1lrifrs), brllbia 
- -------
101 Fulllllility names are as ro llows: APC: I30lswana Power CClrporalion: CES: Central Electrici ty BOilrd, 
Mauritius; EDM: Ele<.:t ri\; iJade de M01.ambique ; EN E: Empresa Nacional de Eleclncid:ldc, Angol;l: 
ESCOtl,.\: EI~ctrici ty Supply Corporation of M~ lawi Ltd; Esk()m: E~kn m lIoldings, South Africa: KPLC: 
Kenya Power and Lighting Company Ltd: LEC: Lesothl' Electricity Corporallo;); Naml'(1 ..... cr: 
Narnl'owcr, NamIbia. SEB: Sw;uiland Elcctf:cit y Bo.1rd; TANESCQ- Tan7"'l[Iia U ectricity Supply 
Company Ltd; UMEME: UMEME Limited, lJg:mda. ZEOC. limol bw(' Ekctricil), Dist ribution 
Company; ZESCO: ZESCO Limited, Zambia (SAD,ELEC 20(6). 
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and Zimh:lb\\c. with tarin:s hovering between 2-4 US cennJk Wh (Unit<!d :'-lations Environment 
I' rogranmlc and United Nat ions Economic Cummissiun for Africa 2006:62). Second, since the 
1990s and thc ince ption of power SlXlor reform, there has neen an increa>.e in virtually all 
rcsidelllialtari ff:>. w ith increases ill industrial tariffs noted in ahout ha lf o f the Cfl1>CS. Across the 
sample, the average tariff fo r 1997 was about 5 US cents1kWh for residential users and 
approximatc ly 6 US cents/kWh for industrial users of 100 kVa, which is ju:o.t on the border of 
LR.\1C . 1112006, these tariffs amounted to an average of7.6 and 6 US cc nLv kWh for residential 
and industrial consumers, respect ive ly (1997:) 0; 2006: 19).00 
Although the evolution of tariffs may be inherently interesting, what is ~ignificant to this 
thesis. which docs not purport to rrovide an exhaustive tariIT review, is that at the start of 
re forms tlrirfs were often not covering even operational costs of the lar~ely st<lte-owned and 
opern tcd uti!itie~ (World Ban J... 1993a:20; Kornives. roster et al. 201)5:26). I\l~my RSls have 
operated Inrgcly o n handouts. Concessionary lending, as docurncl11 cd in Chapter two, helped 
the seelOr limp llong, but when soft loans were reduced in the ea rly JQ90s (or ticd to power 
sector reform). Africa ESls saw a new business model emer!!,e, which will t>e doc~mlented 
below, 
.\.3 Prh';llc parlicilmtion in infrastructure 
A !though thcre is little C\'illi:ncc for enocnnent o f the: standard model (despite it beinlo; held 
up as the 's t<lndard' and part of policy statement;; ill many developing coun tries). as discussed 
lhroughOUI Chapter two, there is nevertheless considerilb lc: evid~'nce for private st"e lor 
p .. "1rticipatiol1, including throughout Africa, promptcd by the necess ity of plugging the 
imcstlllcnt gap. This sectio n brieOy s\lmmaril.C~ trends of privute part ic ipution in 
infrastructure. across developing regions, focus ing on [P I! investments. in prep<lration for a 
l ar~er discussion of IPPs in Africa in sectioll 3.4. 
The World l3ank 's PPI Database, among the most comprehensive sources for tracking 
privatc sector investmcnt over the last two decades, prov ides a pi cture of such participation and 
inves t men1.~ (World R:lnk 2007e). I07 To eontextuali7..c within th e broader framcwork of 
infrastructure reforms, private participation in encrgy (defined as electricity as wcll a .. lI<1t ural 
gas. for which elcctricily reprcscnl:i 84 per cent of the II.c t ll1l1 total value o f projects) ha.~ ranked 
sccond to teleco mmunicat ions in l<!mlS of investment flows, fo llowed by tr<lusportalion and 
water. According to PI'L hetween 1990 and 2005, energy in\'e~ tlllcnts with private sector 
partici pation have occurred in 105 developlllg coullt ries, Ihmugh 1,307 projects, totall ing 
US$298.287 mill ion, with Lat in Amtrica and th <! Caribbean accoullting for the largest number 
! ... Although not recorded in Figure J.6 above, i ndu~triill users o f 2500 kV A are repm1ed in 20U6 as 
payint;: 011 Q\'cr:Jge Just slight)y le~ than the 100 kVA category !it approxImately 5 US cc rxs!kWh 
11)1 More comprehensive reviews of results are reponed in Kessides (2004) and l3esant-)()nes (2006· 30). 
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of projects (4GO) and Inc b rgcst chunk of jnvc"tment (USS I24, 124 million) and Sub-S;lharan 
Africa the least (w ith 69 projt!cls v:tluing US$7, \7 \ mi llion).wlI 
Ocr icted immediately bdow is a breakdown of projccts by type o f in\'CSlmcm . Important 
to tlo t..: is that although d ivest itures representee an unpre::cdentcd lJSS23,3 70 milliun in 1997 
(due ma inly to severa l d ivest itures of uti lities in Latin Amcri::a), by tar the most significant 
investment over the course of the past 15 ye<ln. has been in grcenlield investments, which 
I:trge ly represent invc~tmcnts in IPPs, fo r a total o f US$166,Q24 million. To put Ihis fi gure in 
contc.XI, in the 1990~ II' Ps represented about one tenth uf private FDl ill devdoping comm ies 
(Vietur, Helle r ct al. 2004 :2). 
Fig ure 3.7: I>rivat(" s("etor participation ill energy 
25000 Divestitures Total energy Investm ents (US$ 
million) 
20000 Concessions' 12,014 
/ lPPs Divestures. 120.034 Greenfield. 166.024 " 15000 ~ 
E / \ / ~ 3 10000 CUTICessi()ns 
5000 
1990 199 1 t9<ll lW3 1\l9.f 1995 lli% 1'Y'l7 I')<) ~ 199'J 2("100 2(~1\ 2002 2()(J ) 2004 200~ 
S() urc~ : aut hor's compilation based on 1'1'[ databnse, accessed March l. 2007 
Notc: 11\ aoditioll , Managelnent and L.ease Contracts (M&Lj have lead to increased private ~ .. ctor 
particip':llilm: hOwever. the vol ume is small at just 215 contracts over the 15 yt-or period . 
The year 1997, as alluded 10 in the introduction, is ci ted as the peak year for pri vate 
participat ion in I.'icel rlcily (Sader 1999: 15; Covindassamy, Oda el at. 2005: 1.4). Thereafter, th .. 
East As ia and Pac ific financ ial crises follo wed by (hI) Latin Arn.: r ican linallc ia l crisis together 
wi th Ihe collapse of Enron and its afiemlalh (namely a retreat of American and Eurupo:an-baSt:d 
investo rs back to the ir home markets) e:tused a sharp decl ine in privati) inve::.tmenl aeross 
developing regions (Cov indassamy, Oda e l al. 20U5:6; Woodhouse 2006a: 135). Thus. by the 
end of lhe decade, new inyestme nts in IPPs (to t<lke one examp l .. o f PPJ) were fe wer and 
1(4 D<.:t:lilcd anlly! is of PPI in electricity provided in Sader {I 999). Jamll$b (2002 :3-1 2) and Kessides 
(2004:167- 180). 
80 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
run her b~ twcen . In 1997, ove r 90 II'Ps reached financ ill ! closure, fnllowed by less than SO in 
1998 and approximate ly so in e /lch sub~qllent yellr (World Bank 2006c) . . In addil ion, 
approxinl3[c ly 30 of the 35 IPP contr3cts in the Philippines were rcncgotiflled (albeit mutually 
rcncgoti" lo.:d), and mosl cuntraclS had also ~n fCnegotiated in ·OmiI:Uld , Malaysia anti C hina. 
T here was evidence o f rc fusal to honour contrac15 ill China and India, as well as cancellation of 
conlr;,c lS in Indones ia and India (Wnodhou')C 20(63)-
Despite widcspread 1in"ncial crises and several high profile contract cancellations, a 
recent study rcports that remarkably fe w projects have ac tua lly undergonc stress. de1ined liS 
"e l c~tr ici ty projects that have heen terminated be fo re the ir term; arc under arbit ra tion ; are still 
ongoing, blll dec lared unsmisfaetory by either the [rlves ta rs. thc host government. or the 
Icndcrs; or went thro ugh a stress period, but were successfully wurkt!d out " (Cnvindassamy. 
Odn ct a1. 2005:19). Only" pcr CClit oflOtal PPI e lectri c ity proj ccts art! cntegori"lcd as having 
e."(pcrjcnc ~' d s llch s tress. Furthermore, of all PPT electric ity projects. IPP~ tend to be the least 
susceptible- with on ly 3 per cent of rpps noted as undergoing stress- whic h is credited to 
lung-term contrac ts tha t a rc 1101 subj t!ct to m:,rl."e t tluc tuat ioos and the relat ive protecTion that 
proj ec ts enjvy from polit ica l mach inations. as o;>posed to. for example, distribut iOn projects 
(Covindassmny, OUa cl a l. 2005:6 1). Furthermore, a lso noteworthy, is the recent, albeit 
modest. increase in ppr e lec tric il)" projects (Kerf ar,d Izaguirre 2007 : 1). I~ 
t-:o twithloln fl d ing the rise and ';.11 o f 1'1'1 ill dectric ity, PPI 3ct ivit y has been substant ial. 
The question. ho wever. is how substant ial? As pfCviously inJ icilted , the va lue o f the deals w ith 
privilte pnrticipnt ion in energy between 1990-200 5 wa.,> about U5$300 bi ll ion, wit h IP Ps 
al"lHm nt in)!. to about 55% of this total (Wor!d Bank 2007c) . Co ntras t this fig ure with the 
Ill tc rn,lti\)lWI Energy Agency 's estimate for new inveshncn t nee(h:d to lII e ~t Ihe projected 
inc rc[l ~e in e lectric ity demand [lml to replace old infrastrlletu re hl.: twe l.:l1 2002 and 2030, in 
dl,;ve loping CO llll tries , fKll ne!y US$S _2 trillion (International l~ ncrgy Age ncy 2004 : 191), i . ~ . the 
tMa l new greclllicl d investment over the past fifteen years an\() unt.~ tn jus t three per cent of the 
to ta l vnlue for tho next 30 yearsu n \Vhile seemingly subs tanti al. the investment Oows in the 
l:irger scheme have aetl1[1l1y b~en q uite minimal. 
I~ As noted in sectiuns 2.7.2. the Stanford PESD 11'1' study cor.eluded tl1:lt 2 1 0 : 34 projects were 
rellegoll3teJ . The discrepancy in fi ndings between the Stanford pESO 11'1' stody and Covindassamy's 
l' roj t.'Cls Under Stri!"SS l!Iay be eJ(plained hy scvcra l factor.~. Fj r~t . Covir.dOlssamy's wnrk, ha.~ed prinufll y 
on the 1-'1'1 database. i nclud~d planned proj ects, cancclled projects Md projects under e(lo.~t rllcllon . 
whereas the Stnnford I)ESD work cuo.~idered only eJ( isting IPi's. Scc()lId. the I'l-' l d:l1 (1b3Se also includes 
c3ptive plants that occasi(>nally sell po ..... er 10 the g!id, which arc outs ide Ihe scope of the Stanford PESD 
wOfk . Finally, although 21 of 34 projects .... cre renegot iated. Stanfn:d I'ESO rccon.ls ooly 'l out of 34 
projCCts (I _~ hnving had neg.1livc Oll!comi,:S. which altho,;:gh st ill larger than Cov i ndas~l!my ' s figure. are 
more comparabk with the definition of SU""e1> S employed in the World Bonk study. 
110 This projected invcstment figurc does not assume any large increases in access levels in contrast to 
the iiguT<'S pnwi ded ill B.q~che , cited earlier (£stachc 20115: I S) . 
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While Ihe figUfl!S, ci ted above, may bl! inlrins ically inlerc.<.lillg, of cril iC li l impurtantl! i!> 
how lind why tho:se projccts and investment ilows l ranslah.'d into change and thl! nalur..: o f Ihe 
change thai occurred, 
3.4 1I' l's ill i\ f"ir:l : an oycr yicw 
Approxi rnah::ly 4n fPl's have been devcfoped in Africa to date. With few except ions, they 
rcprC!oell1 only a fractiol) Or lOla[ gO:lIc rn tion capaci ty and have n]()stly complemcnted incumbcll t 
stntc-owm:d uti1ities. 111 In Ncvertheless. IPPs have been all importa nt sou rce of new 
investment in the power sector in a dozen African counties, c: i(!.h t of these countries (Cok 
d'[ vo irc, Egypt Ghana. Kenya, Morocco. Nigeria. Tanzania and Tuni sia) account for 80 per 
ce nt of installed 11'1' capacity. 
III Thc Intern;ltionul Energy Agency reports inswl:c:I -::3!lilcity for Africa at approximiltC"ly 112,UOO M W 
tiS o r 2004: with 11'1' insttl lk d cap:u: ity roughly equal 10 9,500 MW, lPPs ~re just less Ih~n 9 per cent of 
total inswlled capacity on Ihe eOnlinent ( Internmior.al Energy Agency 2006:527), It should. howeller, Dc 
noted th:J1 thc lEA tOla l in.~t a ll<'<l eapilcity fi );ure appears to be ill/ luled given dUll! on systems (as 
preS<: lIlcd in section 3.2.2): with no udd itionul source providing comprehensive data on Atr ican instatled 
caputity, the author has included the reference nonetheless_ 
112 Exccpl ion ~ arc Cote d ' iyoir..:. Tanzania and Morocco where IPPs pr('scntly contributc more than half 
o ra!) gcneration. 
82 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Fi~lIrt 3.8: Gr£cn fidd Il'l's ill AfricalU 
AlgHia (2): K;J!:r.lba. K~hffl TlJ: ' 
Morvcco (3): rr'''o"",,", J o,,fl,~ I'''' n n ,lkin , Radcs 
T:lhad .. b rl 
Culc J) ' h 'oirr (2): 
Widi Ciprel, Azi lo 
(; 1I (ln:l (I): 
Takorad l II 
Nigeria 
Barge, 
Okrai, 
A f:l m~ 
Angola 
( I) CJ,i"", -' 
Source: Oased on 1'1' 1 databasc as " ell as aUlhor 's compii:l tion 
13): Sidi Kri r, PM Said , 
(4) ' Wcstmon[, /Ih,,,; r,i;.; OrPower4, Tsavo 
Tan'u nia (4 ):Tanwat. \'. I) [I'T L, Songas. Mtwara 
fj M,,,,," i,, (4). "",, V"" 
;...; 'D~(p Riwf . FUEL, St Alibin 
NOIo..'S: (X) de5i!;f1'}(c.~ proje.:lS were cancelled : • design.l \CS projttts ;, re under constructi,)n; emcrgency 
powcr lUli lS il f C also not depk .... d 
Giwn these challenging conditions, how and w hy did IPPs take roOI (n all'l There was, a~ 
descr ibed in C hapter two, a general trend o f po wer sector refOTA1, d rive n in part by the DF ls, 
whic h pby a parl ic u l:lrJy la rge role in Africa The re was :lho a g tnWillg SC 11.~e within wuntries 
Ihal the private sector co uld inject muc h needed cash and energy Into the electricity sector. 
T hus, St3tcs so lici ted IP Ps ;lIld, as will be disc ussed below, o ffered !hem te rms and co nd itions 
to try to mi t igate some of the risks o utl ined a hove. T his section bricOy exp lores II Ie impetus for 
IPP dcve lopmcnt as we ll a s how projects ha ve unfo lded :lc ros" the ditTercnt regions, wi th a 
s pecial focu~ o n the expe riences o f Egypt, Morocco, Tun is ia, Kenya, Trll1zania, Cote d ' i voir~. 
( " d N ' . I)'; A I luna an Ige rla. n 
Table 3. 1. 1lS 
lis t o f the IPPs in these counlrics is pwv;tkd ifllllled;"Idy helow in 
11 The nI:lp dcplc led above is base.:! on 'he World Iknk's 1'1'1 cia:O! oose and rhe author's compilation : 
SC\'cral d lsctcp:ln;;ie.~ wiill the 1' 1' 1 dala should be noted. Soulh Alr,ca's Ik lh[ehem, a 4 ~lW h)dro 
(llcili l), is "i'! illc1uda L dUt: tn Ihe lact that it is en l)' 4\1W Of fr 0 1 per cenl oflhc country's i !l~lallcd 
cap.'lcity. Ghana's SII F Accr:l and O 'i3g)efo Barge a!~o kno\~n as Wes!crn !'O\\ Cf, ~ re also both excluded 
from the map as nei ther W:IS an IPP per this thesis' dCli nit ion (howc\'er. bo,h will be me::tioncd briefly In 
the le"I). Two Nigerian plallLS included in PPJ. Dadin and !IIonn. h.we also been e.{cludcd due 10 Ihe fact 
that the former flppcars to be a sla tc-~ponsorcd project and the se-.;ond project, COnlTW) [0 I'PI f"-:ports 
Ind icMiug that it is under construction, has not Occn tbal ized . 
II . Although Maurilius has four IPPs (which, at approximately 200 MW :;ornhilled, account for :lboilt 37 
per cent M installed capacity and a litt le le5.~ tha n 25 per cent ofprodll..:tion, 11.5 o f end.200S), the country 
has 110( bee-n inc lude;.! in this thesis' sample. pri mo.rily due I" the idi o~yncrasy of the cormads. The J ['[' s, 
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Table 3.1: Arl'ican IPP sample. ~ ... neral prfJ jett SIX'ci fir :ltio ns 
rcu;;-;Itry' '" r SiZl' ~! CO\! (USS FlIdf tycl ... CUllt(;l cl Cmllr:u:1 J'rojeCi lender 
~~cI (j\~L..!!.lillilln) h~ \' r 5 · COD 
[~\ )1 
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-- -
JO ' Natgas/open c ell.' BOU _L .sEI:H 27 ; 20 200U-2003 
K~ 
-" \,cst i;OiiI - - ! 46 I )j Ken)5enc/gas I 1300 7 1996-1997 conden~ate/gas , , , I 
Ibcr:;'i~~ - ,-
turbine (barge-mo:lIIted 
-,-~ -
l6 
" 
HFO/medium speed BOO 7, 15 1996-1997 
diesel cncine 
()rl'" ... er4 13 54 Geoth~rmal BOO 2. 1996-iooo .. 
Ts:uu 
" 
85 HFO!medium ')p~cd ROO 20 1995-2001 
-- -
--
diesel cn~lOe 
-
Tan7:miauu 
--
IPTL 100 120 I IrU! med ium speed BOO 2. I 1997-1998 
diesel cn'"';ne 
S"nr;:. ~ 1.0 3 1b Nal slo c-n cyde BOO 20 199-l-- 200..1 ; 
Mtw~r:l 12 ' _2 NaI£,asl gas-fired noo i~I- 1994-io~ 
i redDro~atin!': engi.ne , 
rcOtt' d ' h oir.; -~", 
T 
-C II'RF.l. .j 210 105.6 . Nateas fopen c 
-" 
BOOT 19 1993-1995 
-
-~ 
A/.i11> I 3]0 m Nalgas(o en ~ycle BO(YI 24 1996-2000 
GIt;!I);' 
1998-200'0-TlIkor;Hl,i -fi L _2201. l j 110 I--Light cmde oil/s ingle BOOr 2S 
cvcle 
which an: all cogeneration plants, provide power and s :~am to the c\.I\l l1lry's sugar mi lls Ihroughout the 
crop ~caso n. reducing their coniriblllion to the state·owned utili ty hy ah\.l111 30 per cent During this time. 
the shortfall in productiun is made up Ily seven COmifll)00l5 Power Prodv\,ers (U'l's). privately (Jwned by 
the sug:u !I11 11s. Wuh in~t;l lIet.l capa city of 40 MW, roughly equal to :h~ 11'1' shortfall, the CPPs also haw 
long-tcrm take or pay c(JnlTacls w ith Ihe stale (Bergeseo 2007 ; World 13ank 2007c). 
JU Sec Appeno.lix A fo r addIt ional data on IPPs. 
ll~ T he fi rst 6110 MW refer 10 an exisling faci lity; tbe green neld investment was an addill()f):l1680 M W . 
m Project costs included upgrade o f tilt: c0..11 receiving fae.li ly :Ind lIl frostruclUre fo r fransport ing coal 10 
ONE's Moham('dia plan! . 
III Project costs quoted in Euros at €45 .7. convcrted to USS on !\ugllst 24 :006 (€I = USS L28) 
119 Project costs o r SEEB. Songas (Tanzania) and Obai (Nigeria) Inckdc the gas infras(f ~clUre 
120 TanzullIa's TlInwat (d ~'pietcd on African IPP U1;l. P). :s a 2.5 M W h!Clllty, selling cxcess power into the 
gnd and therefore IS not included in this chan or in sunse'luenl discussions of the thesis 
III A long-term I' I'A for 20 years may he signed with TAN t.:SCO. 
In Invo,:stmcnt COSI €R7.Srn or 57.6 billion C I- A, with the (I\'crage J994 conversion of USS tu CFA. 
5<15 .100. 
III Th" inili;al project concept included sped iications to raisc capacity 10 .;20 M W 
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Ni"cria !S • 
-----
----
.. --"-.-- -- --A.:S llarge 270 240 Natgils l op:::! ;;ycle "00 20 (2 1991}·2001 
(h; ri!c-moun:ed) 03rl';) 
Ok l li 45. 462 N3t~asl combi;red q ·cI BOO 2' 200 1-2005 
~otcs : COD: commcrci31 opernlion d.1tC; m:tgas: niltural b'aS; IH'U: tluild. lTlll1S ICf, operate: liFO: heilvy 
fue l oil 
3.4,1 Nl)rth Africa: F.gyPt, \\10l"Occo and Tun isia 
A dist inguishing fl:ature or the North A frican experience is its illvestment climate which is 
signifi ':iJTllly bettcr than the rest of Sub·Saharan Arr ica (co mparable with co nditions in 
e mergi ng ee{)lltllnies in Latin Amorica and South East A s i;l ) and which inevitahly impacted 
r is k r;]tings. Ihe cost {) f capital and rrp contracl terms. Also of s ignilicunce wi th the North 
Afric.m pl fl nts is thaI they were generally tendered under intern tl1 ionu l co mpeti tive hids. and 
th;ll l'lants we re largdy gas-fired wi th two important exceptions in ,\II {) rocco, 
EK>11/:from 15 to J '2b 
Unable to linance plams from its OWI1 co ffers and faced wIth less intc rest by development 
li ntlncc instillll ions in the 1990s 10 provide lill<tllce for infras truc ture, Iht: (iovcrum[!nt of Egypt 
(GoE) turned to the priv:u e sec tor for new generation c<l pl.:: ity. It passed the requis ite 
legis l:l tio n ill I q96 to allow ror pri\'ate o wners hip or generation assets. The fo llowing year, new 
investments provis ions. induding sovereign gllarantees, a five year corporate t:l.,( e,'(cmpt ion, 
c urrency conversion, repatria tion of profits, and p rotectio n against nll tionalil.ation and 
expropr iatio n. were also adopted to create a clima te tha t wo uld attract in ves tors. The Egyptian 
EIC1.\triei ty Agency, later reorgani7.ed as Egypt ian E lectricity Hold ing C(lmpany (E F.I-IC),m was 
given the mandate to drive the IPP process forward. 
T Il!: II'P pl an advertised to investors included a fl te t of 15 proj ects, which would be 
phased in (lVe r several years. The tirst tender was for a 682. 5 MW gus- lired steam cycle plant, 
unde r iJ 20 year Build Own Operate Transfer contract. wi th EEl lC !lS the guaranteed off- laker, 
bac ked by the Central Bank of Egy pt. Fuel was to be prov ided by the state-owned Egyptian 
12' ' t he initial project concept included spec ificati ons to add a second pha~e of I 10 MW and eonven to 
combined l:ycle. howe"er, ta~k of fu nding ha~ limited Ih~ complelion of this phase. 
IlS In addi tion. as d iscussed in section 3.4 .3 below, Ni':;~'r ia c X!JCC!S to bring Afa m V l nd VI onlinc in 
2007. 
116 The !>umm:lry o f l~gYPI 'S [I' P cxpc rien~e presented he:c is oascd on fie ld ..... ork conductcd by 3U!hnr, 
with the Ul3Jor ~ou rcc;: being primary intCTviews wllh kcy sl3kcholdcrs III the industry As d iscussed in 
section 1.3.3 , ho we\'.:: r. due to sensitivity of dala, the names ol"stakeholde:s. who h3\1e oet"rl til<' primary 
source o f d:rtJ fOI this thesis, have largely bcx'n left o ul o f the d ~clL .. ~ i o(l , most SIJkcholdcrs 3re only 
i(klllilicd, if al all . by t"gani.r.alional .. !filiation ill th~ ICKI. In ccrt:un inslances, hOIl,'cver, where 
stllkehuld ... " h " V~ indic<lled there wi llillgn~s . c itatior.s dn includ:: n<lmcs and the dcsigruuion of 
"Rcrsotl31 correspondence". 
I 1 Esypti3n l::iectrieity Agency (EEA) was reorganized as thl;! Egypliln Ele~tr icity Holding Company 
(EE IIC) in 2000. through Law !64. The Egyptian Electrici ty TrilnSmi ~s i o ll Company (EETC) pay~ 
e"j"l.1 ~ it}' C!1.1I'gC-S 10 IPPs on bellal r of EEl-Ie. 
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gas firm (and the cost would be passed through to the Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company 
(EETC). Interest was high (fifty one firms applied for pre-qualification, 21 were initially pre-
qualified, with 11 selected to receive the tender and 9 actually bid), and GoE ultimately 
negotiated among the lowest tariffs for developing country IPPs at 2.54 US centslkWh. The 
second and third IPPs, 683 MW each and both gas-fired steam cycle, followed along nearly the 
same lines, with the major distinguishing feature of the latter two being that they were unable 
to secure domestic, US dollar denominated debt. Project finance, with limited recourse to 
parent companies, was arranged for all three deals. 
With 12 IPPs outstanding and considerable interest among the present IPP sponsors, 
namely InterGen, Edison and EDF, Egypt met an unexpected development that would 
ultimately change the course of private generation in the sector. At the end of 2002, the 
Egyptian pound lost nearly half of its value, which had the effect of doubling the local price of 
IPP charges (which were denominated in US dollars). Despite pressure to change contract 
terms, the three IPPs (Sidi Krir, Port Said and Suez) remained unaffected. What did, however, 
change was the future builds. The 12 outstanding plants were cancelled, and the government, 
instead, with the help of development fmance institutions, embarked on a publicly funded 
expansion. To date, the only new private power is being supplied by independent service 
providers (ISP), which offer both generation and distribution services to captive customers 
(primarily tourist resorts), but amount to only 1 per cent of installed capacity. A final 
development in Egypt's short IPP history is that, although not necessarily linked to the 
cancellation of the IPP programme, equity in all three IPPs has since changed hands, with 
InterGen and Edison selling their shares to Globeleq by mid-2005, and EDF selling its shares to 
Kuasa Power, a fully owned subsidiary of Tanjong Energy of Malaysia by early 2006. As 
Globeleq repositions itself as a developer of greenfield plants, it too has put its equity stake up 
for sale, with a conditional sale agreement completed in the second quarter of 2007 with a 
special purpose vehicle in which Tanjong Energy is also the leading shareholder.128 Much 
remains to be seen, but Tanjong has indicated that if policy frameworks are established, the 
firm might even consider venturing into bilateral contracts (without government guarantees or 
any long-term PPA with EEHC), which along with the country's ISPs, might move it one step 
closer to achieving wholesale competition. 
128 It should be noted that, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, Globeleq has put up its entire 
portfolio of assets for sale, as the firm seeks to reposition itself in developing new greenfield plants 
(rather than in taking over existing plant, as it did for the first few years since it was founded) (Africa: 
Globeleq re-thinks asset sale after disappointing offers 2007:7). Although a surprise to many outsiders, 
this development was always part of the firm's strategy, as Globeleq sought to plug the hole left by the 
exodus of many private investors following the downturn in the global power market in 2001-2002. 
While there has been much discussion of Globeleq 's sale of its worldwide portfolio, a decision has since 
been made by the firm not to sell of any of its Sub-Saharan assets due to the fact that "indicative bids 
received did not meet the value placed on those businesses by Globeleq and its shareholders," (Africa 
still just aflicker in the global M&A market 2007; Globeleq per com 2007). 
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Morocco: a local innovationl29 
Much of the same pressure, related to public funding constraints, seen in Egypt, was also 
at play in Morocco. The main difference in Morocco was the magnitude of the pressure: in the 
mid 1980's Morocco's public debt amounted to 110 per cent ofGDP (reduced to 60 per cent by 
the mid-1990s). 
In addition to helping to reduce the country's debt burden, the introduction of IPPs was 
expected to: free up funds for increased electricity access programmes, help meet growing 
electricity demand, contribute to diversification of fuel supply po assist in the benchmarking of 
state-owned plants, and finally bring about both efficiency gains and a reduction in tariffs. 
Although these aims were common among procurers of IPP power, Morocco's actual 
procurement plan was radical. Through its first IPP, Jorf Lasfar, a 1360 MW coal-fired plant, 
Morocco increased its base load capacity by roughly 50 per cent. l3l 
How Morocco achieved this revolution in its ESI through its first IPP may be seen as a 
result of a series of factors that will be explored in subsequent sections. At this stage, however, 
it is important to mention that the country, like Egypt, created a policy environment that clearly 
communicated its willingness to private investors. Legislation was passed to allow for 
concessions in the electricity sector in 1994 (albeit following a Build, Transfer, Operate (BTO) 
model to conform with existing Moroccan law). Equally important were the suite of investment 
incentives that were made available. As seen in Egypt, the project company was exempt from 
corporate tax for the first five years (followed by a 50 per cent reduction in years six through 
10). Customs duties and value added tax (VAT) exemptions were also extended. A sovereign 
guarantee was provided for early termination and foreign exchange risk for JorfLasfar and was 
backed by a World Bank guarantee as well. An international competitive bid was commenced 
by the government in October of 1994 to build two additional units at J orf Lasfar and operate 
the entire facility under a concessionary agreement for a period of 30 years. Three different . 
consortia submitted proposals: (1) Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) and Consumer Michigan 
Services (CMS); (2) ADS and General Electric (GE); and (3) Alstom, with the first consortium 
ultimately selected.132 
129 This section is based on Malgas, Gratwick and Eberhard (2007a). 
130 Significant headway had been made in terms of diversification since Morocco's independence in 
1956 when the country relied on hydropower for nearly 90 per cent of its generation. At the inception of 
IPP development in the country, coal and oil were the dominant fuel, followed by hydropower. 
131 Jorf Lasfar was a two part project: a brownfield (680 MW) and a greenfield (680 MW). Two other 
countries in Africa have had IPPs producing the majority of electricity. Cote d'Ivoire is also noteworthy 
for its capacity increase through IPP investments, with IPPs representing more than half of the country's 
installed capacity and production. Finally, although amounting to only one third of total installed 
capacity in Tanzania, Songas and IPTL, the country's two IPPs did, with recent droughts, contribute 
more than 50 per cent of total generation. 
132 It is important to note, however, that both CMS and ABB have (since 2007) sold their equity to the 
Abu Dhabi National Energy Company, also known as TAQA. 
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Similar incentives would be extended for Morocco's second and third IPPs (excluding the 
World Bank guarantee), which like Jorf Lasfar were record setters. Compagnie Eolienne de 
Detroit (CED), the second IPP, was the fIrst privately funded wind project in Africa, which 
would contribute 50 MW to the grid; Energie Electrique de Tahaddart (EET), the third IPP, 
was the country's fIrst gas-fIred combined cycled plant, at 384 MW, with debt provided 
entirely by domestic sources. The resulting cost of power is seen as attractive, as confIrmed by 
public and private stakeholders, however the actual tariff for IPPs remains confIdential, with 
the one exception of CED, at €3.9-5.9 cents per kWh (German Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Report 2002). Finally, it is worth noting that all three projects, 
like those in Egypt, were structured as limited recourse project fInance deals. 
Although the three IPPs are seen as success stories, untroubled by any macroeconomic 
shocks to date,133 state involvement in the power sector remains (as originally envisaged by the 
government at the inception of the IPP programme). The government, through the state-owned 
utility (ONE), took a sizeable stake in the latest IPP Tahaddart (with nearly 50 ·per cent of the 
equity share) as it wanted to be involved in influencing the project and fInance arrangements 
and thereby ensuring the best possible deal.134 The next two wind farms, amounting to a total 
of about 400 MW, are expected to be owned and operated by the public sector. ONE is also 
launching a 472 MW hybrid power project, with 20 MW power by solar power and 452 by 
natural gas. Furthermore, feasibility studies are also being conducted by the state to explore the 
development of nuclear power. Amidst this state-led activity, there is, however, one IPP, for 
which competition is proving tough. Twenty fIrms have pre-qualifIed as of early 2007 to 
develop by 2011 a 1,320 MW coal-fIred BOOT with a long-term (30 year) PPA with ONE. 
Thus Morocco's story is successful, but it does not clearly illustrate complete acceptance of 
private generation as the way forward. In fact, the success of the proposed new hybrid market, 
where large customers will choose their supplier and smaller customers will buy at a fIxed 
tariff, depends on an optimal mix of IPPs and state-owned generation. Finally, it is worth 
noting that the drivers for IPPs are not as strong as at the beginning of the IPP programme: 
Morocco's external debt situation has ameliorated signifIcantly and access rates have 
improved. 
133 Morocco has been untroubled by macroeconomic shock, however, it has also had a more proactive 
monetary policy to ward off the effects of macroeconomic shock with the dirham pegged to basket of 
currencies dominated by the Euro, which has had a stabilising effect on repayments due to the exchange 
rate remaining relatively stable since the first IPP was developed. 
134 Initially ONE was a minority stakeholder and only took 20 per cent of the equity. When one of the 
original sponsors, EDF, left, the state utility assumed a bigger stake (namely 48 per cent). 
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Tunisia: investment successes and conundrums135 
Of the three North African countries, Tunisia may be said to have had the best investment 
profile at the start of its IPP programme (with investment grade ratings with S&P, Moody's and 
Fitch), which had a clear impact on its ability to attract bids and cement favourable deals from 
the perspective of the host country. It is, however, also the only country in the North African 
pool of cases that, for reasons explained later, ran a selective bid (in addition to one 
international competitive bid) process. 
With economic liberalization (rather than unavailability of public funds) the pnmary 
motivating force, Tunisia enacted the requisite legislation providing for private participation in 
generation in 1996. This paved the way for an ICB organized by the state utility, Societe 
Tunisienne d'Electricite et du Gaz (STEG), in 1997 for a 471 MW gas-fired combined cycle 
plant. Seventeen firms responded to the RFP, from which the consortium of Public Service 
Enterprise Group (PSEG), Marubeni and Sithe was selected, for providing the lowest price per 
MW.136 As seen in both Egypt and Morocco, incentives for the sponsor included a five year tax 
holiday. Also provided to sponsors of Rades II, the project company, was an exemption on 
V AT and customs duties for all imported equipment that could not be sourced locally prior to 
COD, as well as a government commitment for the completion of permit applications. 
Similar to most of the Moroccan plants, investors in Rades II did not require a government 
guarantee, a fact which undoubtedly reflects on the sound investment climate. Also noteworthy 
was how Tunisia structured the capacity charges. STEG negotiated that payments be tied to a 
basket of currencies (roughly 60/40 split between Euros and US dollars) to mitigate the impact 
of future devaluations. 137 The payment negotiation was a direct response to earlier experiences 
in the 1980s, when the state utility financed another plant (Rades A) with loans denominated in 
Japanese Yen, which increased its value three-fold relative to the dinar and led to a major cash 
crunch for STEG. Neither the currency denomination nor the lack of guarantee biased the 
outcomes for Tunisia as the country was able to secure an investment cost for Rades II of 
US$554 per kW installed (comparable to the price of IPPs in Egypt, despite the fact that the 
CCGT technology is more costly to procure). 
Tunisia's second IPP has not been nearly as smooth in its development. Unlike Rades II, 
the second plant, also known as Societe d'Electricite d'EI Biban (SEEB) was an outgrowth of a 
government policy, enshrined in the 1999 Hydrocarbons law, to attract foreign companies to 
135 This section is based on Malgas, Gratwick and Eberhard (2007b), with, as indicated previously in 
section 1.3 .2, the author of this thesis a co-author of the piece. 
136 Sithe exited the project during the development phase, and the shareholding was split 60/40 between 
PSEG and Marubeni. 
137 Apart from STEG's efforts at minimising foreign currency risks, the Central Bank of Tunisia has 
made preserving the value of the currency with respect to its major trading partners a major priority. The 
Tunisian dinar has devalued only by roughly an average of 3.5 per cent per year with respect to the US$ 
over the 10 year period from 1993-2002, making it one of the most stable currencies on the continent of 
Africa. 
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explore oil and gas. Under this framework, the SEEB plant (a 27 MW open cycle gas-fired 
unit) was selectively tendered, as mentioned previously, in contrast to all other IPPs discussed 
thus far in North Africa, with CME serving as the initial project sponsor, together with 
Centurion Energy and Caterpillar Power Ventures. Project incentives included the five year tax 
holiday, now characteristic in the project pool, which facilitated in reducing the debt payback 
period to five years. Problems began to arise in 2004, a year after COD, when gas for the plant 
was contaminated, which had the effect of damaging SEEB's ejectors and hence adversely 
impacting the plant's performance. Approximately one year later, water entered the gas well, 
and gas could no longer be extracted. Captive to one gas well, SEEB has been out of operation 
from August 2005 until the present. During this time, no money has exchanged hands between 
STEG and SEEB. 
The SEEB plant is not alone in its challenge to secure fuel quality and security of supply. 
In 2003, BG Group and the Government of Tunisia entered into a MoU for the development of 
the Barca project, a 500 MW combined cycle gas plant. One year later, however, negotiations 
with BG stopped due to concerns about the security of gas supply for the project. STEG has 
since been charged with developing the plant, albeit with a different fuel sourcing arrangement. 
A greater success story for IPPs lies with Tunisia's wind power developments; about 100 MW 
of privately constructed wind power is expected to come online in 2007, followed by another 
200 MW between 2008 and 2011. Finally, although contingent on an interconnection with 
Europe, STEG has indicated that it will invite tenders for EI Haouariam, a 1,200 MW CCGT 
IPP in 2007, with approximately two-thirds the capacity earmarked for Italy. Although Tunisia 
appears to be active in pursuing IPPs, like Morocco, state-led talks to develop nuclear power 
for electricity are also underway, with security of supply cited as the reasons behind both 
nuclear power and state involvement. 
3.4.2 East Africa: Kenya and Tanzania 
There are striking contrasts between the experiences in North Africa and those in East 
Africa, mostly related to the investment climate. But there are also notable similarities such as 
the push for fuel diversification and the host of investor incentives. 
Kenya: two different waves138 
Kenya stands out in this sample as the only country against which there was an aid 
embargo at the inception ofIPPs. Therefore, while in other countries development agencies had 
signalled their unwillingness to fund infrastructure projects, in the case of Kenya there was a 
138 The summary of Kenya's IPP experience presented here is based on field work conducted by author, 
with the major source being primary interviews with key stakeholders in the industry. See section 1.3.3 
for further explanation of referencing. 
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general no- funding policy across all sectors until the country enacted a series of political 
reforms. This embargo had the effect of sending the signal to potential investors that Kenya 
was not a favourable place to do business. 
Nonetheless, investors did come, shortly after the passage in 1996 of legislation opening 
the sector to private firms, and Kenya represents among'the earliest African countries to have 
IPPs reach commercial operation. Investors were offered custom exemptions and tax holidays 
until commissioning, similar to other FDI in Kenya, together with full repatriation of profits. In 
1997, Westmont, a gas turbine plant burning kerosene and gas condensate, and Iberafrica, a 
medium speed diesel engine plant burning HFO (both under 50 MW) began providing power to 
the majority state-owned transmission and distribution utility, Kenya Power and Light 
Company (KPLC). Although less costly than the emergency power that the state would 
procure several years later to reduce the impact of drought, this first wave of IPP power did not 
come cheap.139 The investment climate alone is not to blame, however, with selective tendering 
(rather than open international competitive bidding) followed and prices alleged to have been 
inflated by corruption as well. 
Lessons from this first wave were quickly learned. The second round of IPPs (which 
comprise a 12 MW geothermal plant, OrPower4, and a 75 MW medium speed diesel engine 
plant, Tsavo) involved international competitive bidding, and contracts were ultimately 
approved by the newly established independent regulator. Kenya's Electricity Regulatory 
Board (ERB) was also instrumental in helping to reduce tariffs negotiated in a subsequent PPA 
between Iberafrica and KPLC. Although it remains unclear whether the same outcome could 
have been achieved had Kenya's regulator been sited within a ministry, the independent status 
of ERB has helped to make the body's actions ultimately less subject to controversy as the 
regulator appears to be at arms length from investor and host country government alike, i.e. 
both major stakeholders in the IPPs. 
This shift between the first set of IPPs and the second, however, has not meant that it has 
been entirely smooth sailing. Compared to hydroelectric plants, owned and operated by Kenya 
Generating Company Limited (KenGen), the state-owned generator, IPPs appear expensive, 
and with persistent drought and increased reliance on IPPs, the second wave of IPPs have come 
under public pressure for capacity charge reductions as well. The International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), although part of the aid embargo during the 1990s, has since played a 
critical role in terms of helping the Tsavo project company, in which it holds equity, to resist 
pressure to renegotiate contract terms. Also of significance has been the role of the 
development-minded IPS and local partner KPLC Pension Fund in helping to mitigate local 
pressure for Tsavo and Iberafrica, respectively. 
139 Iberafrica, which has been benchmarked against IPPs in developing countries of similar size and 
technology proves to be among the most costly at US$1,161 per kilowatt installed. 
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Kenya's generation future appears to have both more public and private generation 
investments in store: 100 MW in emergency power has been procured under a 12 month 
contract with Aggreko; a new 70 MW gas turbine will be built by KenGen, and a new diesel 
generator of 80 MW is expected from the private sector. Both the projects have, however, 
encountered delays for diverse reasons, including, in the case of the 80 MW IPP, the final 
award being disputed by one of the bidders in the ICB. 
Tanzania: overcapacity and under-capacity140 
Although no aid embargo existed in Tanzania at the time of its first IPPs, the country was 
still suffering from a poor investment climate. Emerging from a command economy, there was 
little explicit protection against nationalization, the currency was not convertible, and firms 
were unable to repatriate profitS.141 In the country cases summarized until now, there has been a 
repeated emphasis on the dwindling role of fmance provided by DFls at the inception of the 
IPP developments. 142 In the case of Tanzania, however, a slightly different model is in evidence 
with the World Bank, Sida, and EIB playing an important role in facilitating these new 
investments, given the abovementioned conditions.143 
Private sector involvement was sought for the development of Tanzania's gas reserves 
together with a power expansion at Ubungo and gas sales to third parties in the early 1990s, on 
the heels of legislation opening up the sector to private firms. This project, known as Songo 
Songo gas-to-electricity, was advertised to 16 firms and ultimately undertaken by a consortium 
led by TransCanada. It was expected that the gas-fired open cycle 60 MW expansion would be 
up and running within less than a year, despite the hefty infrastructure development (not to 
mention financial support) required. By 1995, however, with work on Songo Songo 
outstanding, a second deal was struck by government for 100 MW of diesel engines, known as 
Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL), under a 20 year PPA. 
At the time, Tanzania could absorb power from one plant, but certainly not two. Why then 
was the second deal reached? The impetus for IPTL may be attributed to a host of factors, 
including alleged corruption. Paramount among these factors is poor power sector planning and 
coordination. What ensued in the aftermath of the IPTL deal was a lengthy attempt at 
140 The summary of Tanzania's IPP experience presented here is based on field work conducted by 
author, with the major source being primary interviews with key stakeholders in the industry. See section 
1.3.3 for an explanation of referencing. 
141 The following terms would, however, eventually be extended to investors in the power sector: a five 
year tax holiday, customs exemptions, full repatriation of profits, protection against nationalization and 
currency conversion via a pass-through to bulk purchasers of power in the following month. 
142 Technical assistance was often still made available; and there are cases where lenders did syndicate 
loans, take equity; and even provide debt. 
143 Several small self-producers also sell power to TANESCO, including Tanwat (2.5 MW), Kiwira Coal 
Mine (6.0 MW}-which were the first two IPPs---and Kilombero Sugar (2.5 MW). They sell only small 
amounts of excess power, and thus are not treated within the scope ofthis thesis. 
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cancellation and renegotiation of this second plant as well as temporary postponement of 
Songo Songo, led by the World Bank. Thus by the end of the 1990s, rather than having two 
IPPs in operation, the country had none. 
IPTL would eventually emerge in 2001 from an international arbitration settlement, at the 
World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, with nearly US$25 
million shaved off its investment costs, representing a reduction of about 15 per cent. By that 
time, demand in Tanzania had picked up and capacity from both IPTL and Songo Songo were 
needed. The two plants, which reached COD in 2002 and 2004, respectively, would soon help 
the country to avert load shedding, but at a steep cost, as seen in Kenya as well. In 2005, costs 
for the IPPs absorbed 69 per cent ofTANESCO's, the state-owned utility, total revenue, while 
contributing 45 per cent ofthe total power generated. Of these, IPTL's charges weighed more 
heavily: the plant represented 37 per cent of total IPP generation but 62 per cent of total IPP 
charges. Although seemingly inconceivable, in 2006, IPP production amounted to 55 per cent 
of generation, but charges amounted to 96 per cent of TANESCO's revenues, due to a 
significant drop in TANESCO's revenues as well as increases in the price of HFO (Ghanadan 
and Eberhard 2007:33). 
Presently the government is stepping in to help bail out the ailing utility. Plans for future 
IPPs include 200 MW from Kiwira Coal & Power, to be fuelled by indigenous coal, with units 
originally due online in December 2006, June 2007 and December 2007-however, with 
Kiwira unable to raise finance for the 135 kilometre (km) transmission line, the project is 
presently delayed. One hundred MW from Richmond Development Corporation, which had no 
prior experience in developing power project, slated for September 2006, was delayed as well, 
although 20 MW is finally up and running after the Government of Tanzania provided funds to 
transport generators. 144 Neither of these projects, nor developments related to the Mnazi Bay 
Gas to Electricity project (presently supplying 12MW) was competitively procured. 
Meanwhile, since the end of 2006, 40 MW of emergency power have been commissioned from 
a subsidiary of Alstom and another 40 MW from Aggreko. 
3.4.3 West Africa: Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria145 
In West Africa, two of the countries included in this overview (Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria) 
have experienced civil strife, however, with different impacts on their IPPs. Ghana has been 
free of civil strife, but plagued by persistent drought, and several parallels may be seen with 
Kenya and Tanzania, as described above. 
144 This project has since been sold to Dowans Holdings, based in the United Arab Emirates. 
145 As previously indicated, in section 1.3.2, the Nigeria material included in this thesis is based on an as 
of yet unpublished survey of Nigerian IPPs, which was conducted by the author of this thesis in 
collaboration with researchers at the Centre for Energy Research and Development at Obafemi Awolowo 
University in IIe-Ife, Nigeria in 2006. Additional interviews have since been completed by the author of 
this thesis for 2007 data. 
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Cote d'[voire I46 
The story of Cote d'Ivoire, where IPPs provide more than half of the country's generating 
capacity, is noteworthy for a number of reasons. Compagnie Ivoirienne de Production d' 
Electricite (CIPREL), a 210 MW open cycle plant fired by domestically produced natural gas, 
was among the first IPPs to come online in Africa. With major shares held by Saur Group and 
EDF, this IPP started producing power in 1994. At the time, Cote d'Ivoire's investment climate 
was considered among the best in the region, with GDP growth at 7.7 per cent per annum. This 
relatively favourable investment climate would help attract bids for the second IPP, Azito, 
during its international competitive bid in 1996.147 Ultimately a consortium composed of 
Cinergy, ABB, IPS and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC)148 was selected 
to develop the plant, with the deal safeguarded by a sovereign guarantee (as well as a partial 
risk guarantee from the World Bank's International Development Association, IDA). In 2000, 
when Azito, a 330 MW gas-fired open cycle plant, came online, it represented the largest IPP 
in the West Africa (since surpassed by the Okpai plant in Nigeria). Both plants have been 
instrumental in helping the country to avert the consequences of drought in a largely hydro-
denominated sector. 
Within months of Azito's PPA being signed (and shortly before project completion), the 
country was subject to a political coup. Since 1999, lengthy periods of civil unrest have been 
punctuated only briefly by moments of peace.149 During this time of civil unrest, revenues of 
the national utility, Compagnie Ivoirienne d'Electricite (CIE), have been reduced by 
approximately 15 per cent/50 which has had a direct impact on the state's ability to invest in 
new, and much needed, electricity infrastructure. Although revenues have fallen, there has, 
however, been no impact on the IPPs-neither damage to the plants nor suspension of PPA 
payments has occurred. 
146 The material for this section is based on a forthcoming survey led by Malgas on Cote d'Ivoire's IPP 
experience (2007c). As in the case of the Morocco and Tunisia studies referenced above, the author of 
this thesis is a co-author of the work, together with Anton Eberhard. 
147 Also noteworthy is that, with the exception of Kenya's IPPs, CIPREL and Azito are the only projects 
in this survey that were not granted extended tax holidays, which may be due to a suite of different 
factors including the fact that the return on investment ultimately reflected the single largest investment 
incentive together with the fact that these were among the first IPPs with a set framework as of yet 
undeveloped. 
148 Most of CDC's equity shares in projects were replaced by Globeleq, which was spun off of the CDC 
Group in 2002 and was established to invest in power projects in Africa, the Americas and Asia. CDC 
also invested in Tanwat, Tanzania's first IPP, which has not been included in this analysis as it was 
largely a captive plant producing 2.5MW and only selling excess power to the grid. It should, however, 
be noted here that Globeleq remains entirely owned by CDC. 
149 As of 2007, peace appears to be here to stay, with a democratic election on the horizon (expected in 
2007). 
150 The 15 per cent reduction in revenues are due to civil unrest, with electricity customers in the north 
encouraged to default on payments (and at the same time threatening CIE of serious consequences 
should power supply be interrupted) as a means to seek favour and bolster political support 
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In addition, the country has seen a significant currency devaluation. Although planned, 
the devaluation occurred just after the signing of the first PPA with CIPREL, which could have 
but ultimately did not impact on the US dollar denominated charges. 
One of the ways that CIE has been able to honour its IPP payments, despite the drop in 
revenues and currency devaluation, is through additional foreign exchange gained by the export 
of power to Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Togo. Thus, even amidst the civil unrest, 
Cote d'Ivoire has continued to define itself as a major power hub for the region. 
New generation capacity is now presently needed, to meet domestic demand as well as 
Cote d'Ivoire's growing foreign market. As noted above, the state's coffers are not able to 
finance new investments due primarily to a drop in revenue during the period of civil unrest. 
Thus, the government151 has turned to owners of Azito and CIPREL to sponsor the next new 
large investment. As of. mid-2007, no deals have been arranged, but several points are worth 
reporting. First the sponsors of the first two IPPs and potentially the next one are no longer 
exactly those of the mid-1990s, with EDF having sold its shares in CIPREL (amounting to 
approximately 35 per cent)152 to Saur Group together with all smaller investors (amounting to 
approximately 12 per cent). Globeleq, which assumed CDC's shares in 2002 and among the 
investors in Azito, considered selling its shares in the plant, in line with its new strategy of 
concentrating on greenfield investments in 2006, as previously mentioned (in footnote 128); 
however, a decision has since been taken to hold on to the asset (Globeleq per com 2007). In 
contrast to EDF's exit and Globeleq's attempted exit, IPS, has indicated its interest in 
developing the last phase of Azito. With Cote d'Ivoire's unprecedented past, it remains unclear 
what the next record-breaking development will be exactly. 
Ghana153 
Although not affected by civil unrest, Ghana's IPP story is a turbulent one. The country 
has just one operating IPP, Takoradi II, but there have been several attempts to launch 
additional projects. While all attempts have come to nought, due to the fact that such failures 
inevitably impact on the investment climate and the perception by stakeholders, they will be 
discussed briefly below. 
In 1998, amidst drought conditions, the Ghanaian National Petroleum Corporation 
(GNPC) spearheaded a project, which was intended to facilitate private participation in the ESL 
151 It should be noted that CIE has no mandate to contract new investment, which is undertaken by the 
government via the Ministry, due to the existing management contract. The utility entered into a 
concession contract in 1990 with the French firm Bouygues, which expired in 2005. A second contract 
has since been agreed upon until 2020. Although the Ministry has indicated that it intends drafting a plan 
for the way forward before the expiry of the current contract, there are no near-term plans to unbundle 
and/or privatize the sector. 
152 EDF has however remained involved in CIPREL a technical management consulting capacity. 
153 The material for this section is based on a forthcoming survey led by Malgas on Ghana's IPP 
experience (Malgas, Gratwick et al. 2007d). 
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GNPC bought a 125 MW barge-mounted generator from Italy's Ansaldo Energy, as part of a 
plan to harness recently discovered off-shore gas reserves. ICB procedures were not followed 
and the project, which has come to be known as Osagyefo Barge has been shrouded in 
controversy. Although almost a decade has passed since the project was closed, not one 
kilowatt has been generated, and like Kenya's Westmont plant, it sits idle even as the country 
suffers from severe power cuts. The main stumbling block has been the fuel source: GNPC has 
been unable to convince either the Government of Ghana or any private investors to build the 
requisite gas infrastructure. Presently on the cards is a plan to bring the plant onshore to 
Effassu and tap into the West Africa Gas Pipeline, however, the site that has been earmarked 
for Osagyefo Barge is not connected to the pipeline. With no investors willing to fund a 
connection, prospects for the plant look bleak. 
SIIF Accra, although initially billed as an emergency power project, with a 36 month 
contract with the government, was keen to establish a longer-term presence in the country. 
Developers, Cummins and Wartsila, thus expected to extend their contract after the third year, 
i.e. SIIF Accra appears to straddle the definition between emergency power and IPP. The 39 
MW steam-cycle diesel generator was negotiated during the drought of 1998. After the contract 
had been signed and with construction underway, drought conditions reversed due to heavy 
rainfall, making SIIF Accra's promised power unnecessary. When the plant reached 
completion at the end of 2000, the firm began to submit invoices, reflecting the agreed capacity 
charges, to the government. No payments were made, however. Subsequently, the new 
government that came to power in January 2001 responded by insisting that SIIF Accra should 
have discontinued construction once it was evident that the hydrological conditions had 
reversed. SIIF in turn continued to demand payment. Reconciliation was attempted, but the 
parties were not able to agree to a settlement. Meanwhile, Cummins and Wartsila shipped the 
39 MW unit to Benin where it has provided power. Subsequently, SIIF sought international 
arbitration. As ofmid-2007, there has been no resolution reached by the parties. 154 
There is, however, as mentioned at the outset, one standing, operating IPP (a 220 MW 
single cycle plant powered by light crude oil), which like those plants in Cote d'Ivoire and 
Tanzania has provided much needed power to Ghana's ESI. The plant was developed by CMS 
(90 per cent), with remaining equity held by Volta River Authority (VRA), the state utility. 155 
Initially it was intended that the plant would be built in two phases, first 220 MW single cycle, 
154 There have, however, been a number of emergency power plants, which did successfully produce 
power--30 MW provided via an 18 month contract by Aggreko and 30 MW provided by Cummins for 24 
months, starting from June and September 1998, respectively. As indicated in Chapter 1, detailed 
treatment of such plants is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
155 Apart from the one IPP, Ghana's ESI is dominated by VRA, which owns all of the hydro generation 
and one thermal plant (Takoradi I). VRA also maintains a monopoly over transmission and distribution 
with the exception of the northern areas of the country, where the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), 
also a publicly-owned company, provides transmission and distribution services. 
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followed by 110 MW combined (steam) cycle. One of the stumbling blocks in developing this 
second phase, as cited by investors, has been the lack of government guarantees (which were, 
however, granted in the first phase of Takoradi II). Government guarantees do not, however, to 
be forthcoming, and the government of Ghana has indicated that the EPC costs are too high. 
There is a possibility that the recent change in ownership, with CMS selling its shares in 2007 
to TAQA, the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company, may help jumpstart this pending second 
phase. 
Meanwhile, several other investors, including CENPower, have offered to provide up to 
360 MW of gas-fired generation to the country, as well as a consortium of mining firms 
(Anglo Gold Ashanti, Newmont Mining, Golden Star Resources and Gold Fields), whose 
businesses have been seriously impacted by persistent power cuts. The mining consortium's 80 
MW plant, which will feed power into the grid, is due online in July 2007 (Ghana wobbles as 
power deficit bites economy 2007). 
Nigeria 
Nigeria, the last country in this overview, is a fitting place to end the discussion as it is 
presently embarking on a full-scale overhaul of its power sector and therefore has the potential 
to learn the most from the previous countries' experiences profiled in this Chapter. The present 
plans for power sector reform are underway and involve vertical and horizontal unbundling and 
selling off all of the state's generation and distribution assets (six generation companies and 
eleven distribution companies), previously National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), which 
were reorganized under the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) in 2005. 
The recent flurry of activity is part of a longer history of reform, with legislation passed in 
1998 allowing private participation in the generation sector. The first IPP, sponsored by Enron, 
emerged amidst the emergency power situation of 1999 when just over a third ofthe country's 
total capacity was in operation and load shedding was becoming increasingly widespread. 
Initially, stakeholders, namely Enron, NEPA and the Lagos State government agreed to a 90 
MW barge-mounted diesel plant to be run on liquid fuel, which would then be followed by a 
permanent facility comprising a 560 MW plant, using open cycle gas turbines (OCGT), both 
under a common PP A. International competitive bidding practices were overlooked, and the 
deal was negotiated within months, with the expectation that the first plant would be on-stream 
by December 1999. 
Due to public pressure, however, this initial deal was modified, and renegotiations would 
carry on for twelve months through 2000. Major objections were raised: the lack of transparent 
and competitive bidding; the type of fuel to be used, the fact that the plant would not be 
penalized for poor performance; that the project company would receive excessive contract 
termination payments; and that payments would bankrupt the state and national utilities. 
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Amidst the renegotiation, the original plan for the land-based 560 MW plant was 
shelved.156 The major items to be renegotiated involved increasing the initial plant from 90 
MW to 270 MW (9 units of 30 MW each) and changing the fuel from liquid fuel to natural gas, 
both of which had the effect of reducing the capacity charge to approximately 
US$19.00lkW/month, and a final investment cost of US$240 million. It was agreed that the 
capacity charge would be flat, for the 13.25 year duration of the contract, and that it would be 
indexed to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of the OECD. Furthermore, capacity charges would 
be payable in dollars. There was to be no separate fuel supply agreement between the sponsor 
and the fuel supplier; instead, fuel was to be provided by NEPAlPHCN, which would contract 
it directly from the Nigerian Gas Company. As a final security measure, the PPA was to be 
backed by a sovereign guarantee. By the end of the renegotiations, ownership had changed 
hands, with AES acquiring 30 per cent of this facility in September 2000 and increasing its 
ownership to 95 per cent in December 2000. Yinka Folawiyo Power Limited (YFP), the local 
partner, purchased the remaining 5 per cent equity share ofthe plant. 
Although agreement was reached and the plant has been online since 2001, PHCN has 
fallen behind in capacity payments (which are still publicly perceived to be high by the public). 
In addition, the government has yet to issue the tax exemption certificate, with causes linked to 
the perceived high capacity charges. Presently, negotiations are underway between sponsors 
and the regulator for further reductions to the capacity charges and agreements related to 
overall performance. Yet another recent stumbling block has been the fuel supply, with civil 
unrest in the Niger Delta leading to damage to the pipeline supplying AES Barge Limited. 
The second IPP, like that in Tunisia, grew out of an additional reform mandate-namely 
for oil companies operating in Nigeria to harness previously stranded (in this case flared) gas 
for power. Investment incentives extended to sponsors are the same as for all upstream gas 
projects and include protection against nationalization and expropriation, and full repatriatio~ 
of profits. Also known as Okpai, this 300 MW combined cycle plant is operated by Nigerian 
Agip Oil Company (NAOC), with majority ownership by Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (60 per cent), followed by NAOC (20 per cent) and Phillips Oil Company (20 per 
cent). 
The project financing was done entirely via the balance sheets of the joint venture 
partners. Construction costs of the plant also included complete gas facilities from its own 
oilfields and a new 330 kilovolt (kV) transmission line to evacuate power from the plant to the 
grid. Fuel risk was borne 100 per cent by the joint venture (N) partners with the fuel cost 
embedded in the US$0.022lkWh energy charge. The energy charge and the capacity charge (at 
approximately US$13.00lkW-Month) are without adjustment other than for inflation using 
156 The plan for the 560 MW plant was shelved by Enron, but not abandoned, with development expected 
to follow after the first phase of the project. 
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OECD CPI. The plant has also come under fire for its higher than expected final investment 
costs. Parties are presently seeking to resolve the dispute directly (i.e. out of court) and 
meanwhile, the plant, which came on stream in 2005, is producing power but, due to the 
dispute, full payment is not being made by PRCN. Therefore, as originally agreed to in the 
PPA, the plant will not amortize after five years. 157 
Although recently hailed as "a beautiful bride", with the President's economic advisor 
urging that ''today not tomorrow" [is] the time to invest in Nigeria," 158 the country has a 
muddied track record when it comes to IPPs. Still, an additional IPP is due online, in 2007 
(Games 2006). Negotiations started in 2001 with Shell Petroleum for the third IPP, which 
involves a brownfield and greenfield investment namely: refurbishment of the existing 270 
MW (Afam V) under an acquire operate own contract and the addition of 630MW (Afam Vn 
under a BOO arrangement. The project has, however, been delayed due to the civil unrest in 
the Niger Delta.159 Furthermore, more IPPs may be in the pipeline, including possibly a coal-
fired plant at Enugue or Benue State, a new hydro facilities at Mambilla or Zungeru as well as 
sale and expansion of the state-led Ibom project, particularly as the state aims to treble its 
capacity by the end of 2010 (from 5,198 MW at present to 15, 853 MW). Furthermore, four 
Nigerian firms (Farm Electric, Supertek, ICS and Eithope) have all been licensed to build 
power plants as of August 2006 with the expectation that power will start coming on line from 
these firms within the next four to five years, funded in part through domestic sources. With a 
regulator established since 2005, it is unclear the extent to which new and existing deals will be 
affected. 
In May 2005, the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) was established; 
ostensibly independent from government with an independent source of funding, NERC has 
decision-making powers on key aspects of the ESI, such as approval of capacity expansion 
plans and oversight of quality of service. NERC is also charged with issuing licenses ~o 
companies operating in the sector and expected to regulate wholesale and retail electricity 
tariffs and prices. NERC's interface with the IPPs is still being mapped and tested. In the 
meantime, a special purpose entity (SPE) has been created as an interim arrangement post-
157 Interesting to note that there have been several IPPs sponsored by oil companies throughout South 
East Asia. Evidence gleaned by PESD researchers indicates that often such companies see IPPs as a 
means of marketing their primary product, namely oil, and have been more flexible in terms of 
negotiations related to power investments. 
158 In January 2006, Nigeria received its first ever rating from Fitch Ratings, a BB- (3 notches below 
investment grade), followed by a comparable rating from Standard & Poor's (Nigeria launches power 
privatization sales pitch 2006). 
159 Although widely discussed in the media as IPPs, neither the 150 MW Omoku gas-fired, single cycle 
plant, nor the 180 MW Ibom gas-fired open cycle plant, both brought online in 2007 are IPPs following 
the definition of this thesis. The plants were not funded by PReN, the state utility, but there was no 
private money per se as they were 'independently' financed by state governments (Rivers State 
Government and Akwa Ibom State Government). As of end-2006, however, Globeleq is "pursuing" 
investment in the Ibom project, which would include both investment in the existing capacity and an 
addition of up to 500 MW (Globeleq 2006:7). 
99 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
unbundling with the mandate to take over some of NEPAlPHCN's liabilities, including the 
AES, Okpai and Afam contracts. This is intended to help ensure that unwarranted liabilities are 
not passed on to the transmission company. 
It should be reiterated in closing that these brief country summaries (including of Cote 
d'lvoire, Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia and Nigeria) have been provided to illustrate the range of 
IPP experiences across the continent. Although each one may offer invaluable insights into 
IPP developments, it is to an in-depth evaluation of Egypt that this thesis now turns, followed 
by one for Kenya and Tanzania. Each of these countries will, however, be revisited in Chapter 
seven. 
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Chapter 4 
Egyptian IPPs 
4.1 Introduction: the funding dilemma 
The 1990s ushered in a major change for Egyptian infrastructure projects. Prior to this 
period, Egypt relied primarily on government funding together with soft loans from multi- and 
bi-Iateral agencies to build and operate the country's roads, sewers and power plants.160 By the 
beginning of the decade, however, according to stakeholders at Egypt's Ministry of Electricity 
and Energy (MoEE), a consensus was growing among donors, which advocated that the private 
sector, not the public sector, should take the lead in financing and operating infrastructure 
projects. What existed of limited public sector funding should primarily target social sectors, 
such as health and education. The World Bank, among Egypt's foreign funders, championed 
this new change in resource allocation, backing a general exit from infrastructure and reserving 
loans only if a commitment was demonstrated to reform the power sectors by introducing 
commercial practices, including by liberalizing prices, and competition. The arguments 
conveyed to Egypt were largely those spelled out in the 1993 World Bank Electricity policy 
document (as detailed in section 2.4.2) (Egyptian Electricity Holding Company per com 
2005).161 
With the loan conditions deemed politically unfeasible, however, and limited public 
funding available (from either Egypt's own funds or other donors) Egypt opted for private 
sector participation in its generation sector in the mid-1990s. Subsequently, between 1996 and 
2003, the private sector contributed an addition of approximately 2,000 MW in power, in the 
form of three gas-fired steam generators, accounting for about 10 per cent of the country's 
installed capacity. Power purchase agreements with a duration of 20 years were signed with the 
state utility, and debt financing was provided by both local and foreign banks as well- as 
institutional investors and multilateral development institutions. 
The Egyptian IPP experience is interesting in a number of respects. While the original 
deals have held and the three gas-fired IPPs continue to provide reliable and affordable 
electricity, neither the original sponsors, nor the government, are keen to develop further IPPs 
along the same terms and conditions. Power provided by IPPs is still competitively priced by 
international standards (largely due to cheap state-supplied gas), but a major devaluation of the 
currency doubled the local cost of power purchases under the US dollar denominated contracts. 
In the aftermath of the devaluation and with concessionary funding now more abundant, the 
160 The public funding of infrastructure projects was the norm for Egypt until the 1990s, however the 
country did have experience with private sector funding. The Suez Canal was a build operate transfer 
(BOT) project, originating in the second part of the 19th century. 
161 It should be noted, however, that no official document would be signed outlining any course of action 
or conditions, between the World Bank and Egypt. 
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Government of Egypt has charged the state-owned power utility with procunng further 
generation capacity, supported by DFIs. In the meantime, the original project sponsors in the 
three IPP projects have departed, and new equity partners have stepped in. Since 2004, the 
country has also launched its liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry, and after just two years 
Egypt ranked as the sixth largest LNG exporter in the world. With reserves less plentiful than 
originally expected, however, presently (mid-2007) a debate rages at the government level and 
ruling party level about how best to allocate natural gas reserves, which could ultimately 
impact on availability of gas for power as well as investment priorities. Interesting questions 
arise as to why and how the IPP investments have survived and what the future prospects are 
for private IPPs in Egypt and other African countries. 
The first part of the Chapter provides a brief overview of the electricity sector including 
reforms undertaken to date related to IPPs. The second part involves an analysis of the 
development and investment outcomes (namely the extent to which the country and the 
investors benefited from the projects and whether such projects may be replicated in the future) 
as well as the major factors that led to such outcomes. Approximately two dozen interviews 
were conducted with about 20 stakeholders in January, February, August, November and 
December 2005 in Cairo, Washington D.C. and via teleconference in New York. Interviews 
were followed by email correspondence to clarify discussion points, with the last review of 
data conducted in May 2007, including with new stakeholders in Kuala Lumpur. Stakeholder 
interviews included present and former directors and managers at AI-Ahly for Development & 
Investment, Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies, Egyptian Electricity Holding Company, 
Egyptian Regulatory Authority (ERA), Electricite de France, Globeleq, the International 
Finance Corporation, Poten & Partners, Tanjong Public Limited Company, the World Bank 
and local Egyptian banks. Due to sensitivity of data, the names of stakeholders, who have been 
the primary source of data for this thesis, have largely been left out of the discussion; most 
stakeholders are only identified, if at all, by organizational affiliation in the text. As a result, 
much of the data, which forms the basis of this Chapter, is not cited. In certain instances, 
however, where stakeholders have indicated their willingness, citations do include names and 
the deSignation of "per com" for personal communication. 
4.2 Egypt's electricity sector: past and present 
4.2.1 Sector reforms that made the IPPs, and some that didn't 
Efforts to reform the Egyptian ESI originated as early as 1964, when the national utility 
was unbundled and eight distribution companies were formed. This arrangement remained until 
1992, when the distribution companies were transferred from the Egyptian Electricity 
Authority (EEA), under the auspices of the Ministry of Electricity and Energy (MoEE), to the 
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Ministry of Public Enterprises, with the aim of further corporatizing the entities. By 1998, with 
little progress achieved, a decision was taken by the MoEE to transfer the entities back to the 
EEA, then re-bundle the distribution and generating entities into seven subsidiary, state 
monopolies (still under the control of the EEA)-an activity charged by some observers as 
counter to reform. 
With the backdrop of the re-bundling of state utilities, privatisation efforts were slowly 
taking hold. In 1996, Law 100 was issued which specified: "local and foreign investors may be 
granted public utility concessions allowing them to build, operate and maintain power 
generation stations" (Republic of Egypt People's Assembly 1996). In 1997, a new investment 
law was introduced, which spelled out a number of investor incentives including government 
guarantees to secure projects. 
At the time, the sector was averaging peak demand growth of 7.6 per cent per annum and 
increasingly dominated by natural gas as the primary fuel for power generation. In 1980 the 
share of gas amounted to only 20 per cent, with hydro accounting for 51 per cent, and oil 
making up the balance; by 1990, 40 per cent of the production mix was natural gas and only 24 
per cent was hydro. As of 2004, natural gas dependence approached 80 per cent (Energy 
Information Agency 2004; World Bank 2006b). 162 
Following the issuance of Law 100, IPP bids for a series of gas-fired steam generators 
were tendered and subsequently awarded in 1998 and 1999 (discussed in detail in section 
4.2.3). At the same time, shares of the seven state monopolies were prepared to be offered on 
the Egyptian Stock Exchange, but with little interest by investors, this plan was never realized 
(Janet Matthews Information Services 2000). 
The last major stage of reform was the reorganization of the EEA into the Egyptian 
Electricity Holding Company (EEHC) in 2000, through Law 164. Selected personnel at EEHC 
consider this change from EEA to EEHC to be corporatization, in part because EEHC is n<?w 
expected to finance its own projects. The change also involved the unbundling of the seven 
vertically integrated subsidiaries and the subsequent separation of generation, transmission and 
distribution (Egypt Restructures: may sell shares and assets but blows IPP program 2001; 
Galal 2001). Each generation and distribution subsidiary was established as a separate 
corporate entity with its own board and external reporting. An internal pool was created for 
bidding in power, although ex-post price adjustments in the pool substantially undercut the 
potentially positive incentive effects. 
162 It is anticipated that the gas share will continue to rise as oil-fired plants are converted to gas, for 
which proven reserves currently measure 69.5 trillion cubic feet (Tct). However, as will be discussed in 
section 4.3.2, presently the allocation of reserves is being debated, which may in tum impact on electric 
generation. (Centre International d'Information sur Ie Gaz Naturel et tous Hydrocarbures Gazeux 2006; 
Schewe 2006; Egypt Staff2007). 
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The corporatization of EEHC was intended as a step to prepare shares for privatisation, 
however, as of early 2007, this process has not yet begun (and it does not look likely to happen 
in the near future). Through EEHC, the government still controls close to 90 per cent of all 
generation capacity and maintains a monopoly over transmission and distribution. Cross-
subsidization is rife. Finally, corporate governance regimes have not been strong and are 
characterized by significant involvement of the MoEE, who chairs the EEHC, in the operating 
decisions of the agency's subsidiaries. 
It is important to note that the reforms described above took place in the absence of an 
independent regulator. Despite the issuance of a presidential decree to institute a regulator as 
early as 1997, no progress was made. A second such decree was issued in 2000. Thereafter, a 
board of directors was formed and a managing director appointed in May 2001. Staffing of 
ERA, with a grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
began in January 2002.163 Thus, the regulator came into force only after the IPP PPAs had been 
concluded and changes to EEAlEEHC had taken place as well, diverging from the steps of the 
standard model (as laid out in section 2.4.3), where the regulator is introduced before the 
introduction of IPPs. 
ERA's founding document has, among other things, clear references to lawful competition 
(Egyptian Presidential Decree 2000: Article III). In keeping with one of its original mandates, 
therefore, ERA's main goal, in terms of future ESI reforms, is to create conditions where 
bilateral contracts between producer and consumer are the norm, and third party access to the 
transmission system is allowed. In an ideal arrangement, according to ERA, IPPs would 
compete in the market as well (unlike at present with 20 year PPAs with EEHC). ERA has 
recommended that 70 industrial/commercial users, which consume a significant portion of the 
total electricity in the country, source 20 per cent of their annual incremental increase in 
demand from bilateral contracts with the IPPs, thereby phasing in a new regime. l64 The details 
of such arrangements have not been spelled out to the public; needless to say, for such 
arrangements to be financeable, it would be necessary to craft agreements related to pricing, 
guarantees, damages and other key issues with extreme care, and contracts would be markedly 
different from those for existing IPPs. 
To date, the Minister of Electricity and Energy has been reluctant to accept any such plan, 
arguing that neither the market nor the end user is sufficiently prepared for such an 
arrangement. While not official policy, it should, however, be noted that prices for large 
industrial consumers (those with transmission connections greater than 66 kV) have been 
163 As of2007, the organization consisted of approximately 50 full-time staff. Its annual operating budget 
is estimated at approximately US$900,000, with operating funds provided exclusively via licensing fees. 
164 One other possibility to introduce gradual sector reform, according to ERA, is that the natural gas 
utilities develop their own generation companies, which could then sell electricity to the large industrials 
together with the necessary gas feed. As with the previous proposition, details are not publicly available. 
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increasing, with the blessings of the MoEE. Furthermore, although also not an official policy, 
the government, via the MoEE, has been limiting electricity and gas supply to large industrial 
consumers, indicating that such consumers, which make up about 80 customers and 
approximately 23 per cent of current consumption, should negotiate/build their own supply. 
Some firms have responded by leaving, others by starting to put up their own plants and/or 
negotiating contracts with ISPs; still others are simply waiting for the official policy. This 
change is viewed as a transition to wholesale market competition. Meanwhile, official policy is 
In the making, with efforts to discuss a policy document slated for end-2007. 
Furthermore, as of 2007, six ISPs have been licensed by ERA to provide generation and 
distribution services.165 The ISPs identify their own customers, which are primarily in tourist 
areas along the Red Sea and Sinai, have no government guarantees, and also work 
independently of EEHC. Contracts are approximately one year in duration, with provision for 
renewal, i.e. no long-term contracts like Egypt's IPPs. Although the total installed capacity of 
the ISPs is only approximately 300 MW, or about 1 per cent of the country's installed capacity, 
the firms are expanding their activities, including most notably Global Energy, which was 
awarded a concession in 2006 to provide distribution services in Cairo, and could potentially 
pave the way for more private sector participation in the market. 
EEHC cites the following reform goals for the future: the establishment of an independent 
transmission systems operator (TSO), which would promote wholesale competition; the 
commercialization of electricity distribution companies through re-engineering their business 
practices; and retail tariffs to cover costs by 2009. Work is underway on all of the three goals, 
with the establishment of the TSO slated for mid-2008 (originally for mid-2007). The TSO is 
expected to reside in EEHC for the first year of its operation, then be spun off from EEHC, but 
remain government owned. Furthermore, under consideration is a fund administered by EEHC 
directly to distribution companies to help eliminate cross subsidization and improye 
transparency of accounts. Finally, retail tariffs are already (slowly) on the rise, with annual 
increases of 5 per cent implemented since 2005, as will be discussed in greater detail below. 
4.2.2 Snapshot ofthe current Egyptian ESI: results of the reforms 
Figure 1 below is an outline of the current ESI. As of mid 2007, the Egyptian ESI consists 
of: six generation utilities; nine distribution utilities; and one transmission company. All of 
these entities are state-owned and fall under the direct management of the EEHC. 
165 The six ISP are as follows: Sendeian Company for Paper Industry, Alexandria Carbon Black, 
National Electricity Technology Company, Mirage Company, Om EI Goreifat Company and Global 
Energy Company. Investors are primarily Egyptian and Jordanian, with one partnership currently under 
consideration, the Egyptian Chinese Joint Venture, which could introduce still more diversity into the 
supply mix. 
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In addition there exist: one wind generating company, which falls under the direction of the 
New Renewal Energy Authority within the MoEE; three independent power projects, one 
owned by Globeleq (since December 2004, but developed and operated by InterGen and 
Edison prior to that) and two by Kuasa Nusajaya, a wholly owned subsidiary of the privately-
owned Malaysian firm Tanjong Energy (since March 2006, but developed and operated by 
EDF prior to that). As alluded to in section 3.4.1, in May 2007, Globeleq entered into a 
conditional share purchase agreement (SPA) with Pendekar Energy Limited (PEL), a joint 
venture between Tanjong Energy and the Saudi Arabian fIrm Al Jomaih for all shares in the 
Sidi Krir, with deal closure expected within six months time-a subject that will be further 
probed in section 4.3.3 below.166 In addition, as discussed above, several ISPs involved in both 
generation and distribution primarily at tourist resorts provide power. As of 2000, 94 per cent 
of the Egyptian population had access to electricity. 
Figure 4.1: Egypt Electricity Supply Industry 
3 large 
Cairo East West Middle Upper Hydro Wind 
IPPs (Sidi 
Krir, Port 
Delta Delta Delta Egypt Plants Genco Said & 
(MaEE) Suez) 
I Exports I 1 
Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company (EEHC) 
+ 
North South North South Canal El Middle Upper Alexan 
Cairo Cairo Delta Delta Behra Egypt Egypt dria 
+ ~ ____________________________ c_us_t_am __ er_s ____________________________ ~1 . 
Note: not depicted in the Figure above are the 6 small private producers (ISP) that include generation 
and distribution. 
Total installed capacity amounts to approximately 22,500 MW as ofmid-2007, (with peak 
load demand of about 18,000 MW).167 More than forty grid connected plants account for the 
166 This SPA includes all of Globeleq's Asian assets as well, namely six additional power plants in 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which with Sidi Krir, total 1,810 MW in terms of their gross 
installed capacity (CIMB Investment Bank Berhad 2007:14). The deal is contingent on: the approval of 
Tanjong's shareholders (with an extraordinary general meeting to be convened by August 31, 2007); the 
agreement of the lenders in each of the seven plants; and, the agreement of the Bermuda Monetary 
Authority, due to the fact that Globeleq was incorporated in Bermuda, in 2003 (CIMB Investment Bank 
Berhad 2007:3). 
167 EEHC indicates that the use of installed capacity fluctuates significantly over the year, with capacities 
of the hydro plants (particularly High Dam, Aswan Dam 1 & 2 and Esna) decreasing during the period of 
minimum irrigation discharge; other plants are constrained during the hot summer months. 
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bulk of supply; furthermore approximately six off-grid plants, owned and operated by the ISPs, 
discussed above, with total installed capacity of 300 MW, make up the balance. Transmission 
and distribution losses across the network averaged 12 per cent in the period 1990-2001, with 
almost no variation. 
EEHC has just concluded its Fast Track Power Generation Programme, which added an 
additional 4,500 MW of combined cycle gas plants at four different sites to the grid in between 
2002 and 2007. The new builds are helping to absorb the approximate 7.5 per cent increase in 
demand per year during the same period. An additional 8,375 MW of capacity is in the 
works,168 half of which are expected to be combined cycle and the other half steam, at 11 
different sites for the period 2007-2012 when annual demand growth is projected at 6.6 per 
cent (Egyptian Electricity Holding Company 2003; Egyptian Electricity Holding Company 
2004). 
ERA has licensed all twenty-seven entities listed in Figure 4.1 (however licensing of the 
IPPs was concluded only in 2004 after project developers had ascertained that there would be 
no violation of their PPAs). ERA's mandate specifically states that the Agency must: 
Regulate, supervise and control all matters related to the electric power activities [in 
generation, transmission, distribution and consumption] to ensure availability and 
continuity of supply so as to satisfy demand for the various aspects of usage at the most 
equitable prices, taking into consideration environmental protection, the interests of the 
electric power consumers, as well as the interest of the producers, transmitters and 
distributors. The Agency aims also at preparing for lawful competition in the field of 
electricity generation, transmission and distribution, and avoiding any monopolization 
within the Electric Utility (Egyptian Presidential Decree 2000, article II). 
ERA's main limitations are two-fold: the Agency has no tariff setting power and i~ is 
chaired by the Minister of Electricity and Energy, which ultimately compromises the Agency's 
independence in regulating the sector. Should current tariffs be adjusted, the change would 
originate from the EEHC in consultation with the MoEE. ERA is, however, currently 
developing performance indicators that could serve as a proxy for tariff adjustments in the near 
term, with better performing utilities rewarded by reduced license fees. 
Electricity tariffs for residential consumers in Egypt have been highly subsidised. 
According to figures published by EEHC and ERA (in 2006), average residential electricity 
tariffs amount to US$0.037/kWh while average commercial rates are US$0.066/kWh, based on 
(US$l = 5.74 Egypt pounds (LE), 5/31107). Although on the decline, the persistent subsidy 
168 As ofmid-2007, the roll-out of these new capacity additions appears to be on schedule. 
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throughout the past decade could help explain the strong growth in residential demand, which 
accounts for approximately half of all end-use consumption. 
Between 1992 and 2004, there were no changes to the tariffs. Then in October 2004, the 
Cabinet of Ministers approved annual nominal tariff increases of approximately five per cent 
per annum for the next five years, with the aim of covering costs by 2009 (a stated EEHC 
reform goal, as previously mentioned). It should be noted that such increases were enacted in 
both 2005 and 2006. In 2010, a further evaluation is expected to ascertain whether additional 
adjustments are necessary.169 This time line may not, however, be moving sufficiently swiftly or 
convincingly. As part of a loan package for the El Tebbin gas-fired power station (discussed in 
the next section), the World Bank has included a technical assistance component, specifically 
to address financial performance and pricing structure in the sector (Egypt: World Bank agrees 
El Tebbin support 2006:3). 
4.2.3 IPP frameworks, old and new 
Egypt's first IPP framework, discussed in detail below, yielded three generation facilities 
for a total of 2,048 MW. Table 1 provides some project specifics. Despite a large currency 
devaluation, there have been no renegotiations of contract terms, but there has been high equity 
tumover.170 As noted by numerous stakeholders, it is unlikely that the current framework will 
be replicated in the future should Egypt opt for additional IPPs. Instead a new framework is 
evolving to accommodate future developments. 
169 Assuming that the price of domestic gas used as fuel for the power plants remains under-priced, 
however, economic costs will remain only partially reflected. The exact level of under-pricing remains 
unknown by EEHC and other agencies as there is not one export price against which the domestic price 
can be compared. 
170 Other than the equity turnover, discussed in 4.2.2, the only changes that have occurred to date are 
related to the payment of local operating and maintenance costs, however, the PPAs contained a 
mechanism to escalate these costs and therefore the change does not constitute a renegotiation per se. 
108 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Table ~ , t; IPJ> projec1 ,~ p«ifi c" 
" 
ruin 'h Sill' Cost S pel' Fuel! COlJtr:\CI . "'--. . -C onl ":'H'1 Project , 
( ;\1 \V) (USS kWh eyek .ypc Y\'ars It llller-
"~~Ii~~) , I'nojHI n; DIE (1 )('ralion 
. . 
Si di Krir 682.5 413 ,9 606.45 Na:lIml BOOT 2. 1996·2002 
(n/fl7) ga~SleaUl 
CHic 
1'1 S:\ill 683,0 340.0 497.&1) 
I 
Na:lIrJI BOOT 2. 1998-2002 1 I ", (25/75) ga!JS.~am 
C cll: 
-Suet. 683.0 33 8.0 4').f.8i ""alural 1300T 2. 1998-2(0) 
(25/75) , j!~s1S1cam 
eve!.: T,) i;~~ J - ... , 2,048.5 [,091.9 . - - . . 
_ .. _ .. _ .. • 
.... 
Note: DiE, dent/equity ratio 
T"c.rir~·t 11'1' frrlllu! work 
Th~ MoEE charged the EEA and later its successor, the EEl Ie, with h:"Jing the I PP 
proccs ... , .. illeit in constant consultation w ith MoEE. In 1994 , the EEA begiln ~villua t ing IPP 
,l greemellts, induding thos{' of Pakistan, T urkey and Ghana. The World Bank and USA IJ )'s 
Subrlli.~sion and Evaluation of Proposals lor Private Power Generation Projects in Developing 
Countries W:lS scrutilliud (World Bank and l;SA ID 1994). NUlIlerous seminars were 
conduded on the suhjecl. In 1996, the EEA h jrdl a consort ium of USA-ba~c;d consuhal1 is h om 
Sargcnl & Lundy. Arthur Andersen and the law fi rm Mc Derlllolt. Will and Emery to help 
manage the IPI' Ilrocc.,,-~.l71 During th is carly ~riod, th:.: Ulilit}' wa~ Olpproachcd by Enron, 
wh idl offacd un IIn so licited bid to develop th e country's II'Ps. T he I·.EA re fused the o ffer, 
opting instead to conduct a seri es of compctit iv<:, international bids. which involved four 
dis tinct rhn~('s, nrlrnely: pre-q ual ificrltion and short-l ist ~d~c tion ; preparati on of the request for 
pm l'0s:t ls; cv:tluation and se lection of th e best bidder; and negotia liotl ,md c.,<cc utioll of project 
agree ments (Egyptian Electricity Authority 2000). 
The 1997 Investment Law, ment ioned in the previous section, provided dcve lopers with a 
number ( I f ~dd itional key fca1tm:s: tax exemption (for the fir«t Ii vc years), currency conversion, 
full repatrilltion of profi ts as well as protenio ll against M tional i7..at ion and expropriation 
(Egyptian Law No. 11/ 1997; T homason 20U4). 
171 Prcvinusly [lrojcct costs " cre eslimaled ilt USS4I7 .S, hnwever, following negotiatiuns ... ilh Egyptian 
customs authori ties COSts ... erc redlll.:oo W USS4 13.9. 
In It is ... on h noting Ihal all three organiza:ioM. headqu:tncred in the !;SA, ha .... e been im'Olvcd in t;S,\ 
clcctricil) r!,' '-' \I'm programm!,'s, a locit wilh s(Jme or III: USA consult ing work occurr ing at Ih!,' sam!,' time 
mlher lhan preceding Ihe Eg)-plian reforms; Illt:rdorc Ihere is little: evidence to SIiPPOr! Ihe fact thaI 
rdorlll mod!,'ls that were Llsed in Ihe USA were subsequently exported abroad by consu l lanl~ (Sargent & 
Lundy per com 2007) (M cDermott Will and Emery 2(07). 
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Tah le .. 1.2: Key lI 'l·l'rfJyi.~ iu" s., fnllncW(lrk 1 
I. 
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for capacity r"ctur u f 65% (Sid i Krir), 70% (port Said 
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) . energy 
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he I UNL'lTRAL A rb i lr~ lj o n niles. in Cai ro. or if rartks rctjuc\L 
at ') 
More limn 50 lirllls (includ ing project dc"clupers and cquipmc nl suppliers) applied 10 pre-
qualify for Sid i Krir and a large number o f fIrms \\ ere retained fo r the aclual tender, which 
ensured that the competition was intense (Secor,d thoughts on nOT projects 200 1). Even 
withollt an indcp.;ndclII rcgul.uor overseeing Ihe tendering. I~gypt was ahle to st.'Curc what ha" 
becn characterised as among thc lowest electr icity prices fu r developing c.oUIl(1)' IPPs at 
USSO.02 54 per kW h fro m Jnler{j.:::n and Edison, the pro.icct de\"eloJX!rs for the first IPP. Th is 
low tarill is partly allribut:lble to the low gas price but also to the develupers percept ions about 
a thvuur3ble investment cl imate, no currency risk in the proje<.:1 and perceived Ill1lg-term 
oppnrtullities to huilt up a portfolio of generation assets (Egypti;tn Electricity Authority 2000; 
Egyptian GIIS Prices 2005). 01her signific ~11l1 features of the project included the large amollnt 
of loelll debt. a lbeit in do llar denom inated terms. 
Port Said !lnd Sucz. Egypt 's second and third IPPs, were achieved along vinualJy the sallie 
t ill~S, although somewhat faster. with the same ';\;1 of cond itions extended by the government. 
Tenders werc cU11Ip:trahle fur two pl<lnts at approximately 683 MW each. which were awarded 
to EOf in 1999. The mai ll di fferences between the two sets o f projects ( i.e. Sidi Krir on the onc 
hand alld J'ort S:lid and Suez on thc other) lpply to the financi :1g Mf3 ngemellts, elaborated on 
in the next section. 
After just two years of oJ>eration by JnlcrGen and Edison :lud aboul the s:lm .... by EOF (i .e. 
a J Oth o f the 20 year .,VA). these firms opted to sell their a~ct'.> . IlllcrGcl\ !oold it;, 60 per ccnt 
sllurc to Glohclcq in Dccember 2004 ; Edison fol!ow~ suit in \'fuy 2U05 . In Aug!..! :>t 2005, E DF 
entered int o ~ .'l:c lu:>ivc negotiat ions with Tanjong Public Li miTed Company, :l Malays i all~based 
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gaming and power company. Negotiations were reported as concluded in December 2005; and 
as of March 2006 all EDF subsidiaries were sold to Kuasa Nusajayas (a subsidiary of Tanjong, 
for which the only assets are Port Said and Suez). Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) 
allegedly made an unsuccessful bid for the plants. Despite this notable equity turnover, there 
has been no change made to the PP As to date. 
The second IPP framework 
A second IPP framework has been evolving since 2000 and currently includes a series of 
new provisions for IPPs, namely: all foreign currency must be obtained from abroad, rather 
than being sourced from domestic banks; local designers, contractors and manufacturers must 
contribute substantially to the execution of the projects; and local costs must be paid in local 
currency.173 In addition, the bids that have both a larger equity-fmancing stake and a larger 
local investment component will be favoured. 174 Finally, project developers must bring their 
own customers with them, i.e. EEHC will not be the sole buyer. 
These new provisions represent a significant change in developer risks, including 
financing and off-take arrangements, with the state recognising more fully the costs of the 
foreign private sector, especially those associated with the recent currency devaluation. To 
date, however, no new IPP projects have been undertaken within this second regime, other than 
the ISPs referenced in section 4.21.175 From a developer perspective, the new terms may be 
viewed as less attractive than those applied to the initial three IPPs and, hence, the lack of 
interest is understandable.176 
The state (through the EEHC) has now once again taken the lead role in the expansion of 
the power system. All 4,500 MW required for the recently completed five year plan (2002-
2007) has been financed by multilateral and bilateral development institutions. Approximately 
one third of project costs are domestic and the foreign portion is significantly less expensi~e 
than that negotiated through commercial banks as seen with the first round of IPPs. For the 
next five year plan (2007-2012), 50 per cent is already covered by concessionary funding 
including from the European Investment Bank, Arab Fund for Social & Economic 
Development, Kuwaiti Fund, African Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, OPEC 
Fund and the World Bank, which as noted previously includes a technical assistance 
173 It is important to note in this context, however, that the first three IPPs utilised local labour, supported 
by only a small number of expatriate supervisors and maximised the use of local materials and 
equipment to minimize costs (selected correspondence with Globeleq, April 2005). 
174 There is no discussion, however, of the role of Egypt's local capital markets providing pound-
denominated financing. 
175 As of mid-2007, one aluminum plant is presently considering whether to build a 500 MW coal plant 
and feed excess supply to the grid, but no plans have been formalized. 
176 The returns achieved under the first round of IPP projects were already fairly modest, and a 
requirement to increase the amount of equity financing will certainly not improve on this situation. 
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component for fmancial performance and pricing reform in the ESI, together with energy 
efficiency. 177 
There is considerable doubt among existing IPP stakeholders that these publicly financed 
and operated plants will attain the same levels of efficiency as the IPPs, due to the fact that 
government plants often take longer to build and employ more staff. Even accounting for a 
reduction in efficiency, however, the soft loans may ultimately lead to cheaper power given the 
significantly cheaper financing. But is there sufficient public funding to meet all future power 
needs? The consensus among major stakeholders in the sector is that soft loans may actually be 
insufficient in the long-term, which begs the question of how the next IPP process will actually 
unfold, if at all. 
4.3. A balance achieved? 
The question raised repeatedly by this thesis is whether the sustainability of IPPs depends 
on development and investment outcomes remaining in balance. If returns to investors are 
inflated at the expense of host countries or if host countries win out at the expense of investors, 
will such IPP deals hold in the future? If balancing outcomes is the trick, what leads to such an 
equilibrium, particular given exogenous stresses? 
In Egypt, IPPs are providing reliable power, which is deemed among the lowest electricity 
price for IPPs across developing regions (negotiated at approximately 2.54 US centslkWh) 
(Egyptian Electricity Authority 2000:6). Development outcomes therefore appear to be 
positive. In terms of investment outcomes, returns on investments have been considered fair 
(although somewhat less than expected). However, none of the firms have grown their 
portfolios of assets. 
What do these development and investment outcomes in tum mean for the sustainability 
of the projects? Will quality, affordable power continue to be supplied with equity being 
reasonably rewarded and debt serviced into the future? While there is no evidence for 
expropriation of assets (creeping or outright), all the original project sponsors have left. The 
introduction of new sponsors has not, however, led to any change in the PPAs, which would 
indicate that outcomes are indeed sustainable. 
The following sections of this Chapter seek to unpack how such outcomes came about (by 
exploring exogenous stresses, followed by a detailed discussion of the elements that 
contributed to success, if at all, and how the sustainability of the projects discussed here relates 
177 In February 2006, the World Bank approved a US$260 million loan for Egypt's El Tebbin gas-fired 
power project. The project involves a 700 MW power plant made up of two 350 MW steam turbines and 
boilers using natural gas as fuel, expected online in 2009/10. The loan will meet more than half the 
estimated US$450 million cost of the project, with the majority of the remaining contribution coming 
from EEHC (Egypt: World Bank agrees El Tebbin support 2006). \ 
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to the broader ESI and power sector reform framework as well as the concept of obsolescing 
bargain. 
4.4 Exogenous stresses 
In the case of Egypt, neither drought nor civil unrest figured prominently in the country's 
IPP experience. Instead currency devaluation is considered the most significant exogenous 
shock. Since the signing of the PPAs for Sidi Krir, Port Said and Suez, the Egyptian pound has 
undergone a major devaluation, losing almost half of its value. At the time of PPA signing, 3.2 
Egyptian pounds were equal to one US dollar. By May 2003, this had reached 6 pounds (to 
US$I), hitting 6.3 pounds by November 2004. The Egyptian Electricity Transmission 
Company (EETC), which pays the capacity charges to the IPPs on behalf of EEHC, has 
therefore seen its monthly bill double in terms of Egyptian pound equivalency (compared to the 
dollar denominated capacity payments specified in the PPAs). 
Pressure to float the Egyptian pound came as early as 1992 from the World Bank and 
IMF. Egypt resisted these pressures for more than a decade, even as the pound became 
increasingly overvalued. Reasons cited for the resistance include the lack of political will and 
capacity of the former Prime Minister (a new Prime Minister was appointed in July 2004). In 
the black market, there was a particularly steep rise (i.e. from 4.50 Egyptian pounds = US$1 to 
7.50 pounds = US$I) in the year and a half before the float occurred, caused in part by 9111 
related recession. Finally, a decision to fl at the pound was made in end-January 2003, which 
sent shocks through the entire economy. It took almost another two years for government to 
adopt stabilizing measures, namely the introduction of the InterbanklUS dollar market, which 
it did in December 2004 (World Bank 2003a:8). 
While there is a general consensus among stakeholders involved with the IPPs-from the 
local banks to the project developers and utilities-that the pound was over-valued, the extent 
and speed of the devaluation surprised all. Furthermore, since the devaluation, the MoEE has 
backed away from its plans to develop a total of 15 IPPs, which it billed as Egypt's electricity 
future starting in 1998. This decision came as a partiCUlar surprise to project developers 
InterGen and EDF, which had their eyes set on more than one project. 
Although future developments have been aborted, despite the turn in events, there has 
been no formal renegotiation of existing IPP contracts. InterGeniGlobeleq did indicate that 
EEHC approached Sidi Krir management when Egypt was experiencing an acute scarcity of 
dollars to request payment in pounds to the maximum extent feasible, but that due to its dollar 
denominated debt the firm was unable to acquiesce. Minor changes, since the devaluation, are 
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limited to partial payment of the local operating and maintenance component (both fixed and 
varIable) in local currency, which amounts to approximately 4 per cent of the total charge.178 
With Sidi Krir, the change is an informal agreement between the project's general 
manager and EEHC.179 With Port Said and Suez, the agreement went through negotiations with 
IFC, but EDF was given the option to return to US dollar payments at any time, i.e. it was not 
contractually bound. It should be noted that the sale to Kuasa and potential sale to PEL have 
not changed these agreements. 
The devaluation has therefore had no appreciable effect, positively or negatively, on either 
InterGenlGlobeleq or EDF's investments, due to the fact that all PPAs were US dollar 
denominated, as per the specifications ofEEA's tenders. 
4.5 Country level factors 
An exploration into the country level factors that impacted on Egypt's IPP outcomes reads 
like a check list, with nearly all the items checked off. Evidence for a favourable investment 
climate? Yes. Proof for a clear policy framework? Yes. Signs of coherent power sector 
planning as well as ICB processes? Yes. Abundant low cost fuel apparent, together with the 
willingness of the government to share risks. The list then contains only two main items, which 
have not been deemed as contributing elements to success, which, along with the other factors 
will be discussed briefly below. 
Foreign direct investment trends in Egypt were generally on the rise when investors 
negotiated their PPAs, as seen in Figure 4.2 below. The country had an investment grade rating 
(ofBBB-) from major credit ratings as well (which would dip to one notch below investment 
grade in 2001). 
178 EEHC provided the following breakdown of the PPAs: 
Capital reimbursement rate: 100 per cent US$ denominated 
Fixed O&M: domestic O&M: currently paid partially in local currency; foreign O&M: US$ denominated 
Variable O&M: domestic O&M: currently paid partially in local currency; foreign O&M: US$ 
denominated 
179 It remains to be seen what will happen if and when the sale is finalized with PEL. 
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Not only were InterGen, Edison and EDF following a larger trend in FDI, the companies 
also had prior experience in Egypt. For InterGen, its shareholders (Shell and Bechtel) were 
both operating in Egypt. Bechtel especially had long-term involvement with the MoEE and was 
keen to land a large IPP construction contract. EDF had a long-term relationship with Egypt in 
terms of providing technical assistance. CDC, from which Globeleq was spun off in 2002, also 
had prior experience in the country. Each of these existing networks and relationships helped 
facilitate the investment decisions made by the firms. 
In addition to the above noted conditions, at the time ofIPP tendering, Egypt's investment 
climate was generally perceived by investors as positive, which went a long way in attracting 
and cementing bids. Among the advantageous features cited by potential investors were: 
political stability (and a pro-western orientation), an active capital market, an efficient banking 
system, the degree to which contracts were enforced, the relative absence of corruption, the 
availability of a well educated and productive labour force at reasonable rates and a growing 
economy with a focus on increasing the private sector's role. Country risk was perceived to be 
minimal, and all investment conditions appeared to be primed for further improvement. 180 
These factors, combined with the large natural gas discoveries, which will be discussed in 
greater detail below, offering a low cost fuel supply and a strong demand for electricity, made 
for particularly favourable investment prospects. Furthermore a total of 15 BOOT IPP 
developments were identified by the MoEE (all to be tendered via ICBs) including technology 
and site location as of 1998, which served to assure investors of the strong possibility for more 
than one project, thereby exploiting economies of scale. lSI 
180 It should be noted in its press release announcing the conditional sale agreement re: Sidi Krir in May 
2007, Tanjong indicated similar favourable conditions, as well as the passage of a recent tax code that 
reduces corporate income tax rates by 50 per cent, and efforts to modernise treasury cash management 
and budget classification (CIMB Investment Bank Berhad 2007:6-7). 
181 The plan to develop 15 IPPs has since been aborted, as discussed in section 3.4.1. 
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Of negligible importance to investors were the retail tariff subsidies. Allegedly, the 
absence of an independent regulator at the time also made no difference to investors as the 
projects were stand-alone deals with the Government of Egypt, with rights and obligations 
clearly set forth in the PPA and Central Bank Guarantee. Both InterGen and EDF have 
confirmed that such a guarantee was necessary for them. to enter the market. Lastly, the re-
bundling ofEEA's distribution and generation entities did not feature in investors' concerns. 
In sum, the inherent risk posed by the electricity sector and its delayed reform programme, was 
offset by the positively perceived investment climate, clear policy and planning framework and 
abundance of natural gas. 
4.5.1 Abundant low cost fuel: how long will it last? 
Although it has already been acknowledged that abundant low cost fuel was among the 
key pieces that helped attract and cement deals, given recent developments, the discussion of 
fuel deserves further attention. It should be noted at the outset that the fuel charge accounts for 
approximately 40 per cent of the total capacity charge (assuming approximately 75 per cent 
capacity factor) and has been instrumental in keeping charges low. The fuel relationship is 
governed by an agreement between Gasco, the national gas company, and the IPPs. Fuel costs 
are denominated in US dollars and are compensated to the project sponsors via a formula 
stipulated in the PPA. They are not a direct pass-through to the utility, i.e. project sponsors pay 
Gasco and are subsequently reimbursed by EEHC. 
The gas price th~t the generators182 pay appears to be non-economic (i.e. potential export 
prices are higher than those charged to the IPPs). The subsidy is roughly calculated as the 
average national selling price (of pipeline and LNG) minus the supply sector cost (which Gasco 
provides to all IPPs and EEHC own plants). 
Important developments are happening in the natural gas industry, however, which may 
impact future IPPs and possibly the three existing projects. First, the price of gas has been 
increasing. The current domestic gas rate, as of May 2007, is US$1.25 for 1,000 cubic feet 
(Mct). The price is determined by Egypt's Minister of Petroleum; thus price changes involve a 
ministerial decree. Since IPP project inception, several such decrees have been issued. Between 
2001 and March 2004, the price was $US 0.643 per Mcf. Then between March 2004 and 
September 2004 the price was raised to US$0.85 per Mcf. As of September 2004, it was raised 
a second time to US$1 per Mcf, and most recently by 25 per cent to US$1.25 per Mcf. 
Presently this increase in gas prices is absorbed wholly by EEHC, due to the pass through 
nature of the energy charge from IPPs to the utility, and the lack of a pass through provision to 
the consumers. Going forward, however, with potentially increasing gas prices, will EEHC be 
182 According to sources within EEHC as of February 2005, IPPs pay the same rate as EEHC's other 
plants. 
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able to absorb the full cost of gas? It is not inconceivable that existing IPPs could be pressured 
to adapt gas arrangements to provide for some greater level of flexibility, including moving 
away from a dollar denominated transaction. 
Increases in the gas price are largely a product ofthe increasing demand for Egypt's gas-
both from abroad and home. In terms of foreign demand, presently Egyptian gas is fuelling 
markets across North Africa, the Middle East and Europe with more developments on the 
horizon. 
• Jordan/pipeline: In 2003, the first part of the 10 billion cubic metres (Bcm) a year 
Arab gas pipeline was put in service, running from EI Arish in Egypt across the Gulf of 
Aqaba into Jordan. Jordan's Aqaba power station has been converted to burn Egyptian 
natural gas as of April 2004. The pipeline has also since been extended northward as far 
as Rehab (Jordan) and is presently supplying approximately 1 Bcrn/year. All new 
generation in Jordan in the medium term is to be gas-fired, which will translate into even 
greater demand for Egyptian gas (Egypt: Now Lebanon eyes interconnector 2005:3; 
Egypt: Jordan study sees greater linkages 2006:3). 
• Europe/LNG: As of 2006, Egypt ranked as the sixth largest LNG exporter in the world 
(after less than two years exporting LNG), a position it maintains in 2007 as well (Egypt 
Staff 2007). Egypt has two LNG facilities: Spanish Egyptian Gas Company (SEGAS) 
and Egyptian LNG (ELNG). SEGAS, a joint venture between Spain's Union Fenosa, 
Italy's ENI, the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company and Egyptian General 
Petroleum Corporation, is located at Damietta and has export capacity of 7.56 Bcrn/year. 
ELNG is a joint venture among the above-noted government entities and Malaysia's 
Petronas and British Gas (BG), with capacity of approximately 10 Bcrn/year. Egypt 
exported a total of 10.54 bcm of LNG in 2005 and is expected to reach full capacity .of 
17.2 Bcm in 2006 (Schewe 2006). 
• EJILLST/power: The planned interconnector among Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Libya, Syria, Turkey (EJlLLSn may also demand greater Egyptian gas and power 
supplies (Egypt: Jordan study sees greater linkages 2006:3). 
The country is also experiencing a sharp increase in domestic demand, most notably due 
to the growth of energy-intensive industries, largely for export, such as cement, which until 
recently have also benefited from the subsidy discussed above. This heightened demand led the 
government to issue a temporary moratorium on new industrial developments (which has since 
been removed) as a general allocation of gas is determined. Furthermore large industrial 
consumers (those with transmission connections in excess of 66 kV), amounting to 
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approximately 23 per cent of total national consumption, are seeing prices increase slowly; 
such consumers are being encouraged (albeit informally) to consider putting up their own 
power installations, as was previously mentioned in section 4.2.1. Although natural gas 
reserves are plentiful, they will not be able to sustain the forecasted activity of domestic 
electricity consumption, LNG export and industrial growth. A debate is presently raging at 
both the government level and the ruling party level about which sector should be the primary 
beneficiary and when. While 25 new cement factories and three new steel factories have (since 
the lifting of the moratorium) been licensed, pending are new LNG contracts as well as a plans 
to develop several aluminium smelters (England 2007). Meanwhile, under consideration by 
EEHC are the roles of nuclear power and wind energy. A new energy policy/strategy is 
expected by end-2007, which should lay down the natural gas allocation and the role of other 
energy sources. 
With this backdrop, it is possible that existing IPPs may see their own terms of trade under 
pressure. Furthermore, it is unlikely that any future IPPs will be able to negotiate similar terms. 
Sidi Krir, Port Said and Suez were all able to take advantage of the nascent gas market, which 
in just a few years has matured substantially. 
4.6 Project level factors that impacted IPPs 
The aforementioned currency devaluation and country level factors, including the now 
controversial nature of the Egypt's abundant low cost natural gas, go a long way in explaining 
both the development and investment outcomes for IPPs. These factors are not, however, the 
whole story. Of interest in this analysis is whether equity and debt arrangements were 
considerable favourable, as well as the extent to which revenue streams have been deemed both 
adequate and secure. What other risk management and mitigation measures safeguarded 
contracts (against the potential of the obsolescing bargain)? What about the technical 
performance of the three plants? Finally, how has strategic management and relationship 
building impacted on outcomes, if at all? 
Figure 4.3 below highlights the range of different contractual relationships in which 
Egypt's IPPs entered, which will be taken up in the discussion of the myriad project level 
factors below. 
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Figure 4.3: Egyptian IPPs and associated contractual relationships 
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4.6.1 Favourable equity arrangements 
Engaging local partners has been used by many firms as a means to mitigate country risk, 
with India and China representing among the most striking examples (Woodhouse 2006a:193-
198). Absent from any of the Egyptian IPPs, however, are local partners. Instead, these projects 
were developed exclusively by multinational firms: InterGen together with Edison (for Sidi 
Krir) and EDF (for Port Said and Suez).183 Important to note in this context is that the firms had 
considerable prior experience in Egypt, which may have served to mitigate perceived country 
risk. 
Multilateral development institutions were also absent, in terms of project equity, but 
figured prominently in EDF's debt for Port Said and Suez, which will be discussed in the 
subsequent section. This lack of equity involvement stands in strong contrast to other African 
IPP experiences, namely in Kenya and Tanzania where DFIs held significant equity shares in 
projects. Like local partners, this aspect does not appear to have strong explanatory power in 
terms of project outcomes, clearly reflecting a different investor perception of risks and 
rewards. 
A more significant aspect that appears to be shaping outcomes is the firms' commitment 
to the country and equity turnover, which mimics activity in power sectors throughout the 
developing world. Although both InterGen and EDF had prior involvement in Egypt, both 
183 EDF cited that Egyptian investment was part of the firm's strategy toward global expansion which 
started in 1995-6. At this time, EDF focused on obtaining either existing companies or developing new 
assets. As part of its strategy, EDF made an initial bid, with Alstom, for Sidi Krir but was outbid by 
InterGen (selected interviews with EDF personnel, January 2005). 
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firms have since sold their shares. InterGen's reason for selling its interest in Sidi Krir to 
Globeleq in 2004 was based on the fact that its shareholders (Bechtel and Shell) made a 
strategic decision to move out of the business of owning and operating private power facilities. 
For Bechtel this meant moving back to its core business of designing, engineering and building 
plants, but not operating and maintaining them, and for Shell, it meant focusing on the 
petroleum exploration and production business.184 Contrary to speculation from some 
stakeholders, the reason behind InterGen exiting Egypt was not a function of the firm 
prematurely recuperating its investment. Similarly, Edison has sold much of its global portfolio 
because of a decision to return to its core business in Italy. EDF also cites its plans of 
concentrating its investments in Europe. 
With the Sidi Krir sale motivated by a strategic decision taken by InterGen's shareholders, 
the firm is known to have compromised its expected investment returns in the plant. The Sidi 
Krir sale has been estimated at US$115 million (Egypt: Tanjong unveils $307m deal with EDF 
2005:3), against an original equity contribution ofUS$139.2 million. Thus the change in equity 
turnover has directly affected investment outcomes. The opposite may be the case with EDF, 
with the firm selling its equity in the two plants for a reported US$307 million, in contrast to 
the original equity contribution of US$21 0, however, there was no signal by stakeholders that 
investment returns were more or less favourable than expected (Egypt: Tanjong unveils $307m 
deal with EDF 2005:3). 
While Shell, Bechtel, Edison and EDF's interest in owning emerging market IPPs has 
dwindled, along with many European and USA-based firms, Globeleq's mission revolves 
around power projects in emerging markets, with one important qualifier. Although the firm 
benefited from the early exit of investors like InterGen and Edison by buying assets at a 
discount, it has since decided to sell Sidi Krir, reflecting not a pull-out from developing 
markets, but rather a plan to focus on actual greenfield development. "Globeleq's business plaJ? 
had contemplated since the beginning that we would acquire operating power assets during a 
period of time when those assets were available and undervalued by the market and, when 
market conditions shifted, devote more time and resources to greenfield development" 
(Globeleq per com 2007). Thus, according to the firm, the recent conditional sale to Pendekar 
Energy Limited is in keeping with its long-term strategy. 
Tanjong, the lead shareholder in PEL, and the exclusive shareholder in Kuasa, is on the 
cusp of owning Sidi Krir, Port Said and Suez, all large-scale IPP generation in Egypt. There is, 
however, more to this tale, as previously indicated. With Globeleq putting all of its existing 
plants on the market (with the exception of those in Sub-Saharan Africa, which did not attract 
184 As of 2005, InterGen had developed 20 assets worldwide (since 1995). Of its original 20, the firm 
sold off 11, retaining just nine. Furthermore, in 2005, InterGen was sold by its then owners, affiliates of 
Bechtel Corporation and Shell Generating 
Limited, to affiliates of AIG Highstar Capital II, LP and The Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan. 
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favourable indicative bids), Tanjong Energy and Globeleq have agreed to a conditional sale for 
Sidi Krir as well as all of the firm's Asian assets, which include six additional plants, for a total 
of 1,810 MW, valued at approximately US$493 million (Hin and Whitley 2007). When and if 
the sale is realized, Tanjong will have increased its generation portfolio by 25 per cent. What 
has motivated this privately owned firm, which is traded· on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(and controlled by T. Ananda Krishnan) to undertake such a major acquisition? With excess 
generation capacity in Malaysia at approximately 40 per cent, there is little room for the energy 
arm of the firm to groW.185 Thus seeking to position itself as a global provider of Operating and 
Maintenance (O&M) services and power generation assets, Tanjong Energy looked abroad and 
found EDF's offering followed by Globeleq's to match its aspirations. In 2005, it also bought 
up a generation and water desalination facility in the United Arab Emirates (Egypt: Tanjong 
unveils $307m deal with EDF 2005:3). 
PEL's minority shareholder, with 45 per cent, is of a slightly different breed. The Saudi 
Arabian-based Al Jomaih Automotive Company, a private limited company, incorporated in 
1996, focuses on the wholesale and retail trading of vehicles and auto parts (CIMB Investment 
Bank Berhad 2007:4). It is the largest General Motors dealer in the Middle East. Unlike the 
original developers in Egypt's IPP, Al Jomaih has no previous experience in power generation. 
While Al Jomaih's foray into North African and Asian electric generation is the subject of 
speculation, the investments, all with long-term PP As with state-owned utilities, represent a 
stable cash flow as well as an immediate income stream as plants are all in operation. Although 
Al Jomaih motives have yet to be fully unearthed, Tanjong has indicated that its partnering 
with Al Jomaih may be particularly useful as the firm contemplates further investments in the 
Kingdom (of Saudi Arabia). 
It should be noted in closing that government stakeholders indicate that this equity 
turnover has not bee  disruptive and that plants continue to provide an important benchmark .to 
the sector. 
4.6.2 Favourable debt arrangements 
Total project costs for each of the three IPP plants ranged between US$338 and US$413.9 
million (at an average of US$530/kW), with lower costs negotiated for each subsequent plant, 
to yield among the lowest IPP electricity prices in the developing world, as noted above. Of the 
US$413.9 million in project costs for Sidi Krir, approximately US$373 million accounted for 
the capital cost with about 10 per cent of the remaining being the financing costs of the plant (a 
similar breakdown is not available for EDF's IPPs). 
18SFor the fiscal year that ended 31 January 2007 (which does not reflect the PEL acquisition), Tanjong's 
power generation segment constituted: 74% of Tanjong's earnings per share and 69% of Tanjong's 
revenue (Tanjong Public Limited Company 2007:9-10). 
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The two sets of projects diverge in their financing, with the EDF plants more 
representative of IPP projects across Africa, given the involvement of a DFI. With project 
finance stipulated in the tender, equity accounted for about a third of the project costs: 33 per 
cent in Sidi Krir and approximately 28-29 per cent in Port Said and Suez.186 Table 3 
summarizes debt, both the source of the debt and the purpose to which it was allocated, where 
information is available, for the IPPs. 
In the case of Sidi Krir, the majority of project debt, approximately 60 per cent, was 
sourced from local Egyptian banks, but denominated in US dollars; the remainder came from a 
suite of international banks, with no DFI involvement. 
186 It should be noted that this level of equity participation is quite conservative (with more aggressive 
examples of only 25 per cent or 20 per cent equity seen in other IPP projects, particularly in lower risk 
markets such as Egypt). In this context, the proposed increase in equity participation in new projects 
appears potentially counterproductive as it may further reduce investors return on equity. 
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The difference in debt financing between the EDF and InterGeniGlobeleq plants is closely 
related to how the debt was denominated. Although sourced by local banks, the Sidi Krir local 
debt of US$164 million was denominated in US dollars. Reasons given for the US dollar 
denominated debt are four-fold: 
• the loans were available at comparable rates with other, international banks; 
• the difference in the interest rates in both currencies was in favour of US dollars; 
• IPP earnings were denominated in US dollars; and finally 
• using dollars, rather than Egyptian pounds, helped eliminate all currency risk 
premiums from the bidders' quoted tariff prices thereby leading the government to 
secure the lowest possible bids, but also shifting the currency risk to the government. 
While EDF was also eager to obtain local, Egyptian dollar denominated debt, the 
government did not make any such loans available (Egyptian-pound denominated debt was not 
acceptable to the firm for reasons related to currency risk). Allegedly dollars were still 
abundant in local Egyptian banks, but there was insufficient political will to mobilise these 
resources for power plant developments. 18? With European commercial banks reluctant to 
invest in what they deemed insufficiently environmental projects (i.e. plants were for gas-fired 
steam generators and not combined cycle), EDF turned to a multilateral, namely IFC to help 
secure additional debt.188 
IFC subsequently provided to EDF a US$90 million loan with a maturity of 19 years and 
arranged, together with Societe Generale and Barclays, a multi-million dollar syndication, with 
maturities of 19 and 17 years. Among the largest single holders of debt in Port Said and Suez is 
the USA-based insurance firm John Hancock with US$100 million lent.189 In contrast, for the 
Sidi Krir project, there was no need to engage a development finance institution to secure 
funding. Although Sidi Krir was the first IPP in Egypt, the local, US dollar denominated debt 
component provided the assurance that international banks needed to participate (Thomason 
2004). 
In sum, Sidi Krir was able to access competitively priced dollar denominated financing 
from local banks. EDF was provided with no such financing option, and as a result, EDF had to 
18? One recent indication from local bankers is that Egypt's local capital marketslbanks may be used for 
future investments planned for metro, roads and ports, but no plans are on the table to target these funds 
for the power sector, which is being financed largely by concessionary loans (personal correspondence 
March 2006). 
188 The same environmental issues were not, however, raised by European banks for the Sidi Krir project 
(selected correspondence with Globeleq, April 2005). 
189 The presence of an institutional investor in emerging market power projects is noteworthy. If 
replicated, such involvement could transform electricity developments given the size of institutional 
investors. 
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seek out a multilateral development institution (although it in tum did engage a significant 
institutional investor in the form of John Hancock). Following on EDF's experience, the next 
IPP framework clearly stipulates that all foreign currency must be sourced from abroad. This 
change in policy may imply a negative development outcome, which the Government of Egypt 
is now seeking to rectify .190 
4.6.3 Secure and adequate revenue streams and other risk management 
Just as the government may be seeking to alter the structure of financing for future IPPs, 
steps have been taken to ensure that no more PP As are signed with the same conditions as 
granted to the first three developers, as described in section 4.2.3, with the largest difference 
related to new IPPs being required to come up with their own off-takers to consume the power. 
The new IPP framework has not, however, had any impact on the existing PPAs-even despite 
the fact that capacity payments in Egyptian pound equivalency have doubled for the off-taker. 
The three PPAs signed by InterGenlEdison and EDF are similar in nature. The PPAs stipulate a 
BOOT project structure for all three IPPs. The rationale provided by EEHC for such a structure 
is that there was general public concern over ownership.191 The "T" or transfer component 
helped reduce political pressure, by assuring the public that after 20 years plants would be 
returned to the state. EEHC would then operate them for an additional 20 years (as plant life 
was estimated at 40 years). The Table immediately below presents the allocation of risks in the 
PPAs over the course of the development, construction and operation phases. The developers 
assume the majority of the risk during the first two stages, with the off-taker taking on the bulk 
of the risk in the operation stage. 
190 Project finance was arranged by Kuasa for both Port Said and Suez and would also be for Sidi Krir. 
191 It should be noted that despite considerable equity changes, there has been no alteration to the project 
structure. 
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The PPAs for Sidi Krir, Port Said and Suez were contingent on two additional agreements 
coming into effect, namely: the fuel supply agreements (discussed at length in section 3.2.4) 
and the Central Bank guarantees, which were signed directly between IPPs and Gasco and the 
Central Bank, respectively. With regards to the Central Bank guarantee, all fmancial 
obligations by the off-taker, namely EEHC, as specified in the PPA, are backed by a Central 
Bank guarantee. According to developers, these guarantees were a necessity given the 
immature IPP market in Egypt, as noted in the context of investor perception. 
4.6.4 Positive technical performance and strategic management 
The way in which different projects were managed did not appear to make a significant 
impact, although there are minor instances worth noting. Stakeholders at InterGen highlighted 
unforeseen circumstances related to investor risk assessment and project management, 
associated with a lower than expected return, i.e. 8-10 per cent rather than 15-18 per cent, 
initially expected. These circumstances comprise: unanticipated premium increases in the 
world insurance market; i.e. one year premiums for Sidi Krir were US$5.2 million instead of 
US$I.2 million as budgeted; unrealized estimated availability of higher calorie fuel, which did 
not materialize; and finally the firm was unable to take advantage of low interest rate 
environment (interest rates decreased after the signing of the PPA) due to the fact that 80 per 
cent ofthe debt was hedged. 
For EDF, Port Said and Suez have been relative investment successes with the company 
reporting that it made "modest profits" and ultimately met its profit targets (with the sale of its 
plants in March 2006), achieved in part through management of technological risk. 192 
4.7 Final outcomes and conclusions 
The IPP experience in Egypt appears to be positive: private investments were made in 
three substantial gas-fired plants that continue to deliver reliable and affordable power. While 
original project sponsors have departed, new investors have been willing to take equity. And 
despite a massive currency devaluation, dollar denominated PPAs have held, which has 
obviously been good for investors; less so for the off-taker, although cheaply sourced local gas 
has meant that PPAs are still competitively priced by international standards. It may be 
concluded that development outcomes (reliable and competitively priced power) have been in 
broad balance with investment outcomes (chiefly, adequate returns). 
The main elements contributing to success are multi-fold. Egypt (along with Morocco and 
Tunisia) is characterized in part by their relatively favourable investment climate, which has 
192 Although EDF interviewees were not able to report the project's target or actual ROE due to 
shareholder agreements, they did indicate that "[we] assume that [profit targets] match those of other IPP 
developers, but it is hard to say". It remains unclear, however, whether EDF, a public utility, would 
indeed have the same profit targets as other private IPP developers. 
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gone a long way in attracting FDI into the electricity sector. Although not presently investment 
grade, Egypt is just one notch below (at BB+) (Chambers 2007). One stakeholder cited the 
following features that contributed to an attractive investment climate, dating back to the first 
IPP tenders: 
... a proper business environment; political stability in the country and the region; the 
government's economic policy (monetary and fiscal policy); an active capital market; an 
efficient banking system; a stable inflation and exchange rate; the repatriation of profits; 
the degree of enforcement of contracts; the degree of corruption; the country's labour 
force and the availability of a well educated productive labour force at a reasonable cost; 
the expected demand for goods and services in the near future; the country's geographical 
location; the ability to export to other near by markets based on signed trade agreements 
with EU countries, Arab countries & African countries (Egypt exports excess electricity 
to Jordon); and finally the experience of other local and international investors. 
Reinforcing a favourable investment climate was Egypt's first IPP policy framework and 
planning, which was also notable for its investor-friendly approach. Both of these elements 
have in turn been linked to a successful international competitive bid process as well as 
favourable equity partners and favourable debt arrangements. Abundant low cost fuel and 
secure fuel arrangements have also helped pave the road to success, as have positive technical 
performance. The 2002-3 currency devaluation, among the most significant stresses to the 
country's macroeconomic state since the inception of the IPPs, has caused a change in the 
power sector reform programme but not altered any of the existing IPP contracts. There has 
also been no evidence of the obsolescing bargain or creeping expropriation, which is generally 
attributable in the case of Egypt to: robust and equitable contracting arrangements as well as 
strong local management and relationships-although equity turnover has been substantial. Of 
little significance throughout has been the role of the regulator, established shortly after the 
PP As for all three IPPs had been negotiated. 
Yet a closer examination of the IPP experience reveals a slightly more nuanced picture, as 
neither the original project sponsors, nor the government, consider future IPP investments 
(along the same conditions) in Egypt likely. Thus, existing projects appear to be sustainable, 
but not the overall framework. What then does this say about power sector reform? 
After its initial IPP experience, the Government of Egypt once again relies primarily on 
the national electricity utility (EEHC) to build new generation plants. This decision was 
-influenced in part by the unhappy experience of being exposed to foreign denominated 
financing which doubled local PPA costs as the currency collapsed, and partly because of the 
renewed availability of concessionary fmance from DFIs (albeit with conditions as seen in the 
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recent World Bank loan for the EI Tebbin gas-fired plant to address issues related to the 
utility's financial performance and pricing structure). It appears that the original decision to 
open its market to IPPs was largely a result of advice from multi-lateral agencies, such as the 
World Bank, who were withdrawing from infrastructure finance in the 1990s, and was not 
home-grown. International consultants, schooled in their own countries power sector reform 
programmes, may have reinforced this decision as well. While there has been no serious 
attempt by Egypt to renegotiate these PP As, or to expropriate IPP assets, the country has 
effectively shelved future IPP plans, following its first framework. The original plans to build 
15 BOOT projects that were advertised with site, technology and schedule, and were among the 
most attractive elements of the IPP market for InterGen and EDF in the late 1990s, no longer 
exist. Instead, new IPPs now face rules that require partial local currency denominated PP As 
that have to be concluded directly with large customers (thereby substantially increasing the 
commercial risks). EEHC is no longer interested in assuming such risks and instead, an attempt 
at a bilateral market and wholesale competition is in the making. 
Tanjong, which may soon own all of the large-scale IPPs in Egypt, has indicated that it 
would potentially be interested in such new IPP investm nts, provided there is a sufficiently 
robust policy framework (including favourable resolution of the current natural gas debate), as 
well as creditworthy off-takers. This stands in direct contrast to Globeleq and EDF, who, when 
asked whether they would entertain such investments, responded negatively. Thus a new 
equilibrium appears to be emerging with new market players. 
Unresolved, however, is the natural gas debate. As Egypt develops its gas export market 
via both LNG and pipeline, will low gas prices be available to future IPPs? If not, how will the 
next series of IPPs, now responsible for bringing their own customers, foreign currency (from 
abroad) and substantial domestic financing, be in a position to outbid government and take 
home a profit? Are the cards are stacked against future developers at least for the near-term? . 
Investors were originally willing to enter the Egyptian market because they perceived a 
favourable investment climate and a promising prospect of new IPP orders. They were also 
able to minimize risk through a Central Bank guarantee, a 20 year PPA with a single-buyer, 
EEHC, which also helped assuage any concerns that could have arisen with an immature 
regulatory environment. However, within a few years, the original project sponsors of Sidi 
Krir (InterGen and Edison) departed and the developer of Port Said and Port Suez (EDF) has 
sold its assets. Reasons for exiting probably relate more to their global retreat from emerging 
markets - although the above shift in policy by the Egyptian state has no doubt contributed to 
their decision. 
Had local currency financing been acceptable to investors, the Egyptian story may have 
had a very different ending. The devaluation would not have led to a doubling of capacity 
payments (in Egyptian pounds) and plans for additional IPPs may have been pursued. At the 
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same time, the more organic push for wholesale competition may also have been stunted. What 
remains to be seen, is whether policy shifts will once again occur to facilitate private 
investment in the power sector in Egypt to respond to growing needs for new capacity. 
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Chapter 5 
Kenyan IPPs 
5.1 Introduction: the IPP challenge 
In Kenya, as evidenced in Egypt, by the 1990s, the country had insufficient public funds 
to cover the costs of necessary power expansion. There are, however, important distinctions. 
First, a general aid embargo had been imposed on Kenya throughout the early and mid-1990s, 
for reasons linked to corruption and lack of advancement in the creation of a multi-party state, 
which affected all sectors, including power. Secondly, Kenya was already facing supply 
shortages. As a result, the conditions, one could argue, were considerably more extreme than 
those found in Egypt, and therefore consequently the impetus to move toward private 
participation, stronger. It was with this backdrop that Kenya procured its first two stop-gap 
IPPs with contracts of seven years. 
Toward the end of the 1990s, the aid embargo was lifting. Still, the country found itself 
with limited funding options, and subsequently signed up for what has been previously defined 
(in Chapter two) as the standard model for power sector reform. In 1997, a US$125 million 
loan package from the World Bank provided funds to add about 220 MW of geothermal and 
diesel capacity to the grid, but the loan was conditioned on: unbundling generation from 
transmission and distribution; the establishment of an independent regulator; tariff increases; 
and increased private participation in the sector, via IPPS.193 
This Chapter examines Kenya's experience with IPPs, which had a combined capacity of 
190 MW or over 15 per cent of the total installed capacity in the country. The IPPs have 
generally contributed more than 15 per cent of total generation, particularly in drought years. 
All IPPs signed PP As with the partially state-owned distribution and transmission firm Kenya 
Power and Lighting Company. Only three of the four IPPs are in operation as of 2006, as the 
second IPP, Westmont, did not negotiate another contract after its seven year PPA expired in 
2004. 
It should be noted at the outset, that although emergency power plants have played a 
significant role in Kenya's power supply in 2000/01 and then recently starting in 2006 again, 
these projects, which have short-term contracts (1 to 2 years) with the Ministry, are not 
considered traditional IPPs and therefore will not be analyzed in detail in the text. 194 
193 Total MW installed eventually came to 312 MW. Concessionary loans were also provided by EIB, 
Germany's Reconstruction Loan Corporation (KfW) and JBIC to undertake this programme of reform. 
The Government of Kenya contributed directly as well as through its state utilities. Actual disbursements 
did not, however, match initial commitments with the World Bank through an IDA credit providing the 
bulk of support ofUS$108 million or 55 per cent of the total package (World Bank 2005c:14). 
194]lants provided by Cummins, Deutz and Aggreko, totaling 105 MW, were rented for 1.5 years 
between 1999-2001 to plug the power shortage during the drought. Actual capacity installed was 99 MW 
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The first part of the Chapter provides a brief overview of the sector as it stands at present 
(mid-2007), and is followed by a discussion of the electricity sector reforms undertaken to date. 
Thereafter the discussion turns to a close look at the IPPs and the frameworks under which they 
were developed. Subsequently, a contrast of the performance among IPPs and state owned 
entities is provided. Finally, the Chapter seeks to shed light on how and why development and 
investment outcomes changed over time. What role for instance did the investment climate, the 
regulator, local partners, PPAs and security agreements play in this balancing act, as attempts 
were made to ward off, as clearly indicated by one project sponsor, the potential of the 
obsolescing bargain? While the power sector reform model provided the context for the IPPs 
and goes a long way in explaining what actually occurred in terms of the two different sets of 
plants, what were the other factors to shape outcomes, and what might be noted as contributing 
to success? 
Over 30 interviews were conducted with more than 20 stakeholders in January, February, 
August, November and December 2005 in Nairobi, Washington D.C. and via teleconference in 
Israel. Interviews were followed by email correspondence and follow-up calls to clarify 
discussion points, with the last review conducted in May 2007. Stakeholder interviews included 
present and former directors and managers at the Electricity Regulatory Board, Iberafrica, 
Industrial Promotion Services, International Finance Corporation, Kenya Generating Company 
Limited, Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited, Ministry of Energy (MoE), Ormat, and 
Tsavo Power Company, Wartsila, Westmont, and the World Bank. Due to sensitivity of data, 
the names of stak(!holders, who have been the primary source of data for this thesis, have 
largely been left out of the discussion; most stakeholders are only identified, if at all, by 
organizational affiliation in the text. As a result, much of the data, which forms the basis of this 
Chapter, is not cited. In certain instances, however, where stakeholders have indicated their 
willingness, citations do include names and the designation of "per com" for personal 
communication. 
5.2 Primary players in Kenya's ESI 
Among the most notable aspects of Kenya's ESI, particularly in contrast to the Egyptian 
case examined in Chapter four is its low access rates. According to the Kamfor Study, the latest 
as Deutz delivered 24 MW instead of the 30 MW contracted. A World Bank IDA credit of US$72 
million was made available to pay for these plants. Due to the fact that fuel was treated as a pass-through 
cost to consumers, however, end-users bore the bulk of the high operating costs, with government 
providing a subsidy only for the capacity charge. The overall high retail cost of the emergency power 
plants was a function of the fuel costs and the capacity charge: the fuel cost was high due to inland 
transportation costs and the capacity charge was high due to the short duration of contracts as well as the 
negative investor perception of Kenya's power sector (World Bank 2000).In April 2006, Aggreko 
returned to Kenya to provide 100 MW under a 12-month temporary power package (Kenya: Aggreko 
seals lOOMW supply deal with Nairobi 2006:4). 
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assessment carried out by the Ministry of Energy in 2000, 15 per cent of the Kenyan population 
has access to electricity, with access in urban areas measuring 47 per cent and that in rural 
areas a mere 3.8 per cent. 
As of 2007, the Kenyan ESI consists of five different generation companies, and one 
integrated transmission and distribution company-the'latter also acting as the counterparty in 
power purchase arrangements with the generating companies. Despite reforms and the 
introduction of IPPs, generation remains dominated by the majority state-owned Kenya 
Generating Company Limited, which accounts for approximately 80 per cent of all installed 
electric power generation capacity in Kenya (Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd 2006, p.68). 
The remaining four generation companies, which make up about 20 per cent of installed 
capacity, are the three independent power producers, with majority stakes owned respectively 
by Union Fenosa, Duke-IPS 195, and OrPower4, as well as one emergency power producer 
(EPP) , owned and operated by Aggreko. 196 KPLC, the transmission and distribution company 
is owned 48 per cent by the state, with shares traded on the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) 
since 1954 (SAD-ELEC 2004:17-18; Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd 2006). 
Previously, imports from the Uganda Electricity Transmission Company (UETCL) met 
just under about 4 per cent of Kenya's demand, however, with persistent supply shortages in 
Uganda, imports dropped considerably in 2005/6 to a quarter of a per cent (Kenya Power & 
Lighting Co. Ltd 2006, p.68).197 198 Finally, although representing less than one per cent oftotal 
installed capacity, it should be noted that the Rural Electrification Programme (REP), 
administered by KPLC and initiated in 1973, provides the balance, mainly in remote, isolated 
grids. 199 
195 Cinergy-IPS, the majority shareholder in Tsavo was a joint venture between Cinergy Global Power 
Inc and Industrial Promotion Services (Kenya) Ltd. As of May 2005, Duke Energy has bought Cinergy's 
stake. 
196 Although often referred to as another IPP, including in KPLC's financial statements, Mumias, a 
cogeneration unit, which is part of a sugar factory, sold electricity to the grid in 2000/1, 200112, and in 
200516, however, amounts are minimal with the installed capacity just 2MW and contribution to total 
production representing only 0.16 per cent of generation in 200516 (Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd 
2006, p.68). The factory is, however, presently considering increasing capacity to 35MW, which could 
~otentially make it a more significant player in the ESI. 
97 Uganda historically supplied Kenya during low load periods, especially after midnight, as Uganda has 
no reservoir regulation. During peak hours, Kenya has in turn supplied Uganda with 10 MW (selected 
correspondence from Ministry of Energy, April 2005). 
198 Since 2004/5, KPLC has also imported nominal amounts from TANESCO-O.3 GWh in 2004/2005 
and 0.4 GWh in 2005/2006 (Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd 2006:68). 
199 REP was bolstered by the Electric Power Act 1997, which established the Rural Electrification 
Programme Fund (REF). REF is supported by a 5 per cent levy on all electricity consumed. 
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Figure 5.1 KenGen and IPP contribution to generation 1999-2006 
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Figure 5.2: Kenya Electricity Supply Industry 
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The Ministry of Energy presently is responsible for formulating the sector policy to ensure 
efficient operation and growth, as well as preparing the least cost development plan, mobilizing 
investment funds and overseeing the rural electrification programme. The Electricity 
Regulatory Board, which is directed on policy measures by the Ministry of Energy, regulates 
the generation, transmission and distribution of electric power in Kenya. With the passage a 
new Energy Act in 2006, which is expected to come into force mid-2007, the ERB will be 
transformed into the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), which will regulate the entire 
energy sector (including petroleum). Other major changes include the licensing and appeals 
process, with the ERC to take over responsibility from the Ministry of Energy of issuing 
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licenses, and an energy tribunal to replace the current appeals process to the Minister. A final 
important change will be the creation of Rural Electrification Agency, which will also be part 
of the newly created ERC (Government of Kenya 2006:III:27(3),III:66-79,VI:I07-109). 
Otherwise, ERC's duties with regard to regulation of the electricity sector will remain the 
same, as described below: 
• Enforce environmental, health and safety regulations in the power sub-sector; 
• Investigate complaints made by parties with grievances over any matter required to be 
regulated under the Electric Power Act; 
• Ensure that there is genuine competition where this is expected; 
• Approve electric power purchase contracts and transmission and distribution service 
contracts between and among electric power producers, public electricity suppliers and 
large retail customers. Approval of the PPA involves ensuring that tariffs are as low as 
reasonably possible, investor returns are reasonable, and safety is guaranteed for. 
consumers 
• Set, review and adjust tariffs for all persons who transmit or distribute electrical 
energy, based on a rate-of-return methodology with the majority offuel costs and foreign 
exchange passed through to the consumer on a monthly basis, and 
• Investigate tariff structure even when no specific application for a tariff adjustment 
has been made. 
The last two tariff reviews occurred in August 1999 and May 2000200 during the power 
emergency caused by the drought situation. As specified in subsidiary legislation to the new 
Energy Act of 2006, tariffs are to be reviewed every three years. Adjustments for fuel and 
foreign exchange will, however, continue to be made on a monthly basis. It should be noted 
that by 1999 although average costs were increased from 30 per cent to about 100 per cent of 
long-run marginal cost, there is still significant cross subsidization. Household tariffs remain 
below the cost of service as a result of the general policy to promote affordability and offer a 
life-line rate (World Bank 200Sc:29,38).201 
To date government has never overturned an ERB decision. While the Board maintains a 
significant degree of autonomy, in the first six years of its operation, it had five different 
chairmen (all appointed by the President), which it has been alleged may have undermined the 
institutional memory and capacity of the organization. 
200 The 2000 change was simply a removal of off-peak tariffs due to the power rationing. 
201 Kenya's life-line tariff for the first 50 kWh of consumption applies to all domestic consumers. Efforts 
are currently underway by ERB to target this subsidy to the vulnerable members of society. Furthermore, 
Kenya maintains a uniform national tariff, i.e. no geographic differentiation, which avails a large subsidy 
to rural consumers. Efforts are underway to reduce cross-subsidies by industry. 
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5.3 The means and the ends: Power sector reforms and results 
5.3.1 Power sector reform a la standard model, almost 
Kenya's power sector reforms are inextricably linked to its relationship with multilateral 
and bilateral development institutions, most notably the World Bank, and a set of loan 
covenants. In this regard, there are sharp contrasts with the case of Egypt discussed previously, 
where, although such funding agencies played a role they were not, it could be argued, as 
influential. 
As alluded to in the Introduction of this Chapter, in 1997, an agreement would be signed 
with the World Bank that made financing for new power (a 75 MW diesel and 64 MW 
geothermal plant) contingent on: the establishment of a legal and regulatory framework, 
including the passage of an energy law and establishment of a regulator; the reform of the 
organization, management and financial structure of the power sub-sector companies, the 
separation of generation from transmission and distribution functions; and the promotion of 
private sector participation in management of operations as well as via approximately 140 MW 
of new generation provided by IPPs (World Bank 2005c:2; Kenyan Electricity Regulatory 
Board per com 2007).202 
Although discussions for this reform package commenced in 1988, activity related to the 
programme did not start until the mid-1990s, with fmancial closure for the loan fmally reached 
in 1997. Delays are attributed to lack of agreement on the actual reform steps as well as a 
general aid embargo that would limit funding across all sectors throughout much of the early 
1990s. It should be noted here, as f rst referenced in Chapter two in the case of Tanzania, 
international consultants, who were instrumental in power sector reforms undertaken 
particularly in the UK also played a key role in designing Kenya's reforms, with much of the 
work underwritten by World Bank funding (London Economics 1993; PB Power 2002; PB 
Power 2007; PB Power per com 2007; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007; World Bank 2007h).203 . 
Among the first steps taken in line with the power sector reform programme was the 
official liberalization of the electric generation sector in 1996. Although this step preceded 
financial closure of the World Bank deal, it was a necessary step to demonstrate the country's 
commitment to promote private sector participation and competition. From this time onward, it 
became government policy that all bids for generation facilities would be put out for 
competition, open to both public and private firms, i.e. the national generator would receive no 
preferential treatment. 
202 It should also be reiterated here (as noted in section 2.4.2) that although the World Bank did reduce its 
lending for power generation in the 1990s, the Bank did not withdraw from funding such investments 
entirely. 
203 London Economics first authored a tariff study for KPLC in 1993. In 2002, PB Power completed an 
additional tariff study for KPLC and KenGen. PriceWaterhouseCoopers was the author of study on the 
organizational restructuring of KPLC, which was initiated in 2001. 
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While the power sector reform programme, discussed above, included plans for both 
privately and publicly funded new generation plants, by 1996 power supply shortages were 
severe, due primarily to the fact that the hydro-dominated system was being undermined by 
drought. With financial closure not yet reached for any of the new capacity, KPLC issued 
selective tenders for two stop-gap IPPs, with tenders awarded to Westmont and Iberafrica. 
Thus, it is important to note that although these two plants were funded by the private sector, 
they were not the privately financed plants foreseen in the loan documentation, as will be 
discussed in detail in subsequent sections, and a theme that will also been seen in the case of 
Tanzania,zo4 
Reforms would continue with the passage of the Electric Power Act in 1997, which set in 
motion the unbundling of state utility in that same year. KenGen, which initially remained 
entirely in state hands, became responsible for all generation assets. KPLC assumed 
responsibility for all transmission and distribution assets and operations. It is also worth noting 
that KPLC was given the task to act as counterparty to PP A transactions with private power 
developers, despite the fact that KPLC's financial and technical operations were on the 
decline-with conditions further exacerbated from 1999-2001 drought, described below 
(World Bank 2005c:4,13,38). 
Shortly thereafter, a regulator was established, also through the 1997 Electric Power Act. 
It took another year for the ERB to start operations, which meant that the regulator came into 
effect only after the PP As with Westmont and Iberafrica had been negotiated. 
At long last, in 1998, the IPPs, as specified in the World Bank loan documentation, began 
to emerge. In that year, the PPA with OrPower4 to develop between 28 and 100 MW of 
geothermal power, was finally signed-marking the third IPP (after Westmont and Iberafrica). 
Within two years, the PPA for the fourth IPP, also specified in the loan documentation, to be 
developed by the Tsavo Power Company, sponsored by Cinergy-IPS, Wartsila, the IFC and 
CDC, was signed. Although the World Bank IDA credit did not directly contribute finance to 
these two IPPs, funding was provided to two UK-based consultancies to assist KPLC during 
the procurement of plants (World Bank 2005c:3,5). Finally, at the very end of the decade, with 
conditions largely fulfilled, work would commence on the publicly led plants: Kipevu I, a 
75MW diesel plant, an additional unit of 80 MW at the existing Gitaru hydro facility, and a 
64MW geothermal plant, Olkaria II. 
Just as the sector recovered from the impacts of the previous drought, in 1999 a second 
drought (which was characterized among the worst in five decades) threatened Kenya's supply. 
This in turn prompted the Ministry of Energy, with support from the World Bank via the 
Emergency Power Supply Project, to sign up three emergency diesel-fired power plants, which 
204 The World Bank did, however, provide nominal support to the Government of Kenya to assist in 
negotiating these two stop-gap plants. 
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as mentioned in the introduction are not treated in-depth due to the short duration of contracts, 
negotiated with the government, not KPLC (World Bank 2000).205 
Among the most significant impacts of the drought was that it required KPLC to seek out 
more costly thermal power options, which not only fmancially enfeebled the firm but also led 
to inflated prices for the consumer, as both foreign exchange and fuel costs were passed 
through in part. With IPPs associated with higher cost power, the drought led to a public outcry 
against private sector participation, which was seen to be taking advantage of a poor country in 
a dire situation. 
Allegations of corruption in the power sector, together with a call to reduce tariffs, gained 
momentum. The new government, which came to power in December 2002, on the heels of the 
drought and a drought-induced recession, pledged specifically to address ESI reform and 
reduce tariffs. Among its first measures, the National Rainbow Coalition charged the Nyanja 
commission with investigating alleged corruption in the electricity and petroleum sectors. By 
December 2003, the Nyanja report was issued, indicting personnel in KPLC, Westmont and 
Iberafrica for corruption and flawed PPAs (Kenya Risk: Infrastructure Risk 2004). The Nyanja 
findings have not, however, led to significant changes in the sector, with the integrity of the 
commission itself being questioned along with the thoroughness of its investigation.206 While 
the Nyanja findings have been marginalized, ERB contends that its efforts to maintain tariffs 
"as low as reasonably possible" have been ongoing-before, during and after the commission's 
investigation, as per the Board's duties. 
5.3.2 Recovery and the next set of reforms 
Developments have continued to unfold, which are slowly changing the face of Kenya's 
ESI, primarily by introducing more private participation and building existing capacity and 
institutions. While the World Bank and several other development agencies continue to play an 
active role in both shaping and funding sector policy, there has been considerably more 
ownership of the process and the outputs by the Government of Kenya, KPLC and KenGen. 
In May 2006, KenGen together with the government led an initial private offering (IPO) 
for 30 per cent of KenGen's share on the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) in May 2006. The 
deal raised approximately US$108 million for the state utility, with shares oversubscribed by 
four times what was offered (Kenya: KenGen shares fly on Nairobi stock market debut 2006). 
205 It was estimated by the W orId Bank that without the emergency power facilities, losses to the 
economy would amount to US$400 million or about 4 per cent of GDP over the period of a nine-month 
s£an, with costs for emergency power facilities estimated at US$110 million (World Bank 2000:12). 
2 Repeated attempts to obtain a copy of the Nyanja report were made through a range of stakeholders 
including at the MoE, ERB, KPLC, KenGen and each of the IPPs, but the report proved unavailable for 
public consumption. 
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A further of 19 per cent of KenGen is presently being considered for public sale?07 Unlike 
many of the previous reforms, this development neither was a condition of any lending 
agreement nor facilitated by concessionary loans. 
Just two months later, in July 2006, KPLC commenced a two year management contract 
with Manitoba Hydro, which was intended to help the utility 'recover' from the aftermath of 
the drought and possibly prepare it for further privatization. 208 In contrast to KenGen's IPO, 
concessionary loans have facilitated this activity, through the Energy Sector Recovery Project 
(ESRP), which is being led by the World Bank, however, with significant participation also on 
the part of the European Investment Bank, the Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD) and 
the Nordic Development Fund.209 In addition, the ESRP is providing funding for the separation 
of transmission and distribution, and the establishment of a national transmission company. 
Although originally slated for end-2006, the establishment of such a transco will only be 
undertaken after a study is conducted-the consultants for which, as of June 2007, have yet to 
be hired (World Bank 2004c:3,38).210 
As for new generation capacity, apart from emergency power procured in 2006 under 12 
month contracts as indicated earlier, and additional geothermal capacity to be provided by 
OrPower4, the primary developments are a 70 MW gas turbine, to be built by KenGen and an 
80 MW diesel generator to be built by the private sector. Although the KenGen plant was 
expected online at the end of 2006 and the IPP by September 2007, both projects have been 
delayed.211 While delays have been encountered, it is not the result, this time, of failure to 
207 Stakeholders in the government have indicated that it is too early (as of June 2007) to characterize the 
impact of the KenGen's sale on the electricity market, although proceeds from the sale have been used to 
help finance the emergency power procured by the government in 2006. It should also be noted that 
stakeholders in Kenya's existing IPPs have indicated that they have felt no impact from the sale, to date. 
208 By 2003, in the aftermath of the drought, with KPLC's financial performance on the decline, the 
government intervened by reducing KenGen's bulk supply tariff as well as providing relief for interest 
on outstanding debt by converting considerable debt into equity. More specifically, KenGen has reduced· 
its selling price by 25 per cent from Ksh 2.36 per unit (as set in August 1999) to Ksh 1.76 (as agreed in 
July 2003 with KPLC). KenGen also converted Ksh 12.3 billion in debt owed by KPLC into equity in 
September 2003. 
209 It should, however, be noted that some stakeholders within the government question the need for such 
a management contract with KPLC previously under a performance contract and limited political 
interference since the inauguration of the government in 2002. On the other hand, several IPP developers 
indicated that there was a marked change in: the growth! expansion of customer base, success of rural 
electrification programme, reduction of outages and reduction in T &D losses. 
210 The Energy Sector Recovery Project is an US$80 million credit provided by the World Bank's IDA, 
with additional support from the EIB (US$75 million), Agence Francaise de Developpemertt (US$25 
million) and the Nordic Development Fund (US$12 million). In addition to helping to facilitate the 
management contract, the credit includes the following projects: institutional capacity building within 
both the Ministry of Energy and the regulator; several engineering studies related to the upgrading of 
plants as well as the establishment of a publicly-owned Geothermal Development Company; an 
extension for the Olkaria II plant, and a significant distribution upgrade, which comprises the bulk of the 
credit (World Bank 2004c:8-11). 
211 An ICB was conducted for the 80 MW diesel generator (Rabai), and the bid was awarded to 
Burmeister & Wain Scandanavian Contractor, but was contested by Simba Energy (one of the bidders). 
The case was dismissed by the procurement board, but Simba has since taken its case to the High Court, 
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comply with reform conditions, as, like the IPO, none of these plants is tied to a larger reform 
package. Finally, the long awaited second phase of Sondu Miriu, a 60 MW publicly financed 
hydropower plant, primarily via concessionary funds from JBIC, is expected in November 
2007. Initially Sondu was planned for the early 1990s but was abandoned during the aid 
embargo and amidst heightened environmental concerns. 
Joint ventures with the state utility are under consideration as well. Furthermore, the 
governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have publicly committed to interconnection of 
the East-Africa region. An important element in this plan is the construction of a 220kV 
interconnector between Nairobi and Arusha in Tanzania, with support from the African 
Development Bank, among other funding agencies. While there is independent merit in an 
inter-connected East-African power system, significant gains can only be expected as soon as 
East-Africa is connected to the much larger Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) system, 
through the envisaged construction of an interconnector between Tanzania and Zambia. 
Realization of these interconnector projects could have major impacts on realization of 
potential future IPP projects in Kenya, as IPPs could potentially see more competition. 
The Table immediately below highlights the myriad developments in the sector related to 
Kenya's power sector reform and IPP developments. 
which in turn has meant that the project is at a standstill. In terms of KenGen's new 70 MW capacity, 
the plant has faced delays due to the fact that the Iranian-based contractor has not been able to import 
equipment from USA-based General Motors due to trade embargos. 
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l ' ahll' S.I: Kenya dc('tricity Sl.'ctur drYc\opnH'lIb 
;, 
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" 
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a(](]ed additional" later; linn indicated !hat it 
eould provid.: up to.lS MW rollu\~ing a reswfl;C a,,:tc))mcnl, i!)sulflirg gu"crnmcnl 
,-
with 
Parliament and a new Fncrgy btl), .1mcndmg 1997 
would intr0tiuce a nUnliJer of changes. includ ing 
power f a 
5.4 Tbe IPP results 
Kenya's fo ur (PPs wer~ d~vdopt'(1 in ~o di~tinct framcworks. Dt:lails or the plants and 
thcir corresponding framcworks are the subjeCl of tills and subsequent sections.. 
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Table 5.2: Kenya 's IPPs 
(o~t (I J ~'§ 
a.illioa) 
I, 
20 
, 
t"ader-
Pruj«t 
As p~\'iously noted. the first IPP developmcnts occurred on the hcel~ of the 1996 pol icy 
ref(lr11l and the emerging legislalion (pa~sed in 1(97) openillg up the gcnerfttiOIl sector to 
priv1lle investm ent. With power riemllnd increasing, hydrological ~'onditj()ns weakening and 
insufficient public funds 10 build power pbnts, KPLC ordered two stop-gap IPPs in 1996. The 
!'1'As s tipubted seven year contracts for two plants: a 46 MW b.:lrge·mou nted kerosene burning 
g.:ls turbine plant and .:144 MW medium speed d iesel generator plant, burning low sulpher fue l 
oil. Fil\ccli firms bid for these plant'! in what has Dcell characlcri7..ed as a selective illtcrnational 
Il!ndcr. i.e. with specific firms invited to bid. O f the 15 firms, WeSlI\lOnt. a Malaysian 
consort ium, and [!>emfrica, with majority shares owned by Spain's Union Fenosa, submined 
the lowe~ t bids and subsequc ntly secured the contraclS. Plants w~re commissioned I cs~ than a 
year later helping to plug the power shortage. [I was here that the first tPp framewo rk began 
and I!nded . as all subscqul! lll plants would be de\ eloped under differen t conditions. 
The ~econd [PP framework, interlinked with the World Bank led Energy Sector Reform 
and Power Development Project, began to matcrialilc in 1998 (although lenders for pl ants were 
cOlls idered :15 early as 1995). OrPower4, owned 100 per ct:nl by Ormal, a USA- Israe li lirm , 
signed a PPA (in 1998) to develop up to 100 MW ofgeorhermal power. OrPowcr4, through its 
OWII fl: sourcc nssessnH:nl5, subse<Juently detennined that there were 58 MW of proven 
geothermal reserves, which could support a 48 MW plant. It was agreed by stakeholders Ihat 
dc vdopmcllt would happen in two phases: first 8 MW would b..' brought online, based on 
existing \\ells, fo llowed by 40 ~1W. The actu.11 development. hO\~c \' ... r. has cl ivc rgt.:d 
s igniticllnt ly. During the droughHmluced power <:risis. s tarting in 1999, KPLC re~ lu ",sled that 
til The OrPow\, r4 plant, which b owned and operated by Orilla!. IS a l~ cummon ly refl'fred [0 as Olkaria 
II I. FOT the sal e of ct<lrily. tht: author u~es 'OrPow<'-r4 · thrnughuut th j ~ Chapler :lIId other Chaplt:rs 
213 T he Tsavo pkUlt, which i! owned and operated hy T5'IVO '>ower CO ~:1 P :lOy is alsu commonly re ferred 
10 as K!llevu II. For Ihe ~ilke of clarity, the author uses 'T~a ~'o' throughout this Chapter ami other 
Chapters. 
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Orrow~r4 bring all addi tiona l 4 MW online. which thc fi rm d id, upon thc s igning o f a 
supplemental PPA. Thereafte r no fu rther deve!opmcnt (uf the outstand ing 36 .\1 W) occurred. It 
was ouly at the end or 20U6, aller se~·era l yean or negotia tion'>. as we ll as an investigation by 
MIC A, and a reduction in the tariiT by OrP{l\'. e r4 ror the second phase, that const ruction 
commenced. 
/!.. rurther IPP was built during this second IPP framework : a 75 M W mdium speed diesel 
generator, burning Low Resid ual Puel O il (LRFO). ·1 he Pi'A. awarded 10 the Tsavo Power 
Company, was finalized in 2000, and the plant came on stream OllC YC;lf l:ner. Warbi la was the 
in ilial bidder, :11\0 subsequcntly brought on co-bidde0i, initia lly IPS, IFC, Cincrgy and CDC 
(Globek q). Delays in the Tsavo plant impl ementation have been attri buted prim arily to the 
fin rlll e in g. As Tsavo was the region's fir5t project-fin anced po wer plant, there was lillie 
knowledge Ml\nllg s takeholders, and, the pol it ical risk prevalent at the time kqn many potential 
fumil.: rs at bay. In cuntrast to the tlrst lPP frafTI ..:w" rk, whidl was a sdective international 
t..:ndcr, both the O rPowcr4 and 1 5aVO plants fo llO\\Cd international competi tive hid gLlidel iJ1~s. 
Whi le this was eOtl:iidcrcd a more transparent process, the competit inll was limited: unl y three 
fi nns bid for Ts..wo and two (of which one was non-compliant) for the OrPowcr4 plant. The 
poor respunse rroUl prospe.:live bidders ca n be ilssumOO 10 hav\! been a restl ll of gen::ral 
\\ ithdr.\waJ of IPPs from developing cOlllllr), mukets. investors' percept io ns ond assessment or 
sped lk Kenyan risks, :md th..: lack or governm..:nt gUilran l..:~ bdng (l fl~red . 
Kenya's neXI IPI'. lht: 80 M W diesel generator in Rabni, Momtxlssa is being procured 
under largely the same conditions o r the second framework . A Letter o f Comfort is bei ng 
offered hy the Government of Kenya. but once again. government gua r:mtecs ha ve not lx:en 
e.\: temleJ (nor are th..:y c.\:pe<.:t..:d to be for future plants). 
S,5 Opfralions :Jnd costs: the publie "s. the private 
It has aJn.:ady hcen s..:en that II'Ps :lre contri buting more t!ian their share of generation (sec 
Figure 5. 1. which d t:: tailed generation mix and indicated on average thai IPl's contributed wcll 
liver 15 per cent, which represents their perce ntage of" in~tu l le\1 ca pac ity). This section seeks to 
un pack each nf thc plants, starti ng with Pigure 5.3 immediately below, which illustrates the 
(;ontr ibulio n or eac h plant, 10 the couJllry's ge!ler.1tion mix. 
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l<-igu l"(' 5.3 Contribution or lPPs to ge ne ra t ion mix 
•• 
5" ~~ ~ '0 
,0 
= 
S 31) . 
" 
~ 
20 . 
OrPower4 
III ~ 
II 
Source: eQml) i l ~d by JlIthor, based on unpuhlished KPLC data, 2006 
Table 5.3 illlllled iiltely below indicates a\wag:: contri but ion to gCII,."ration contrasted w ith 
the average ins talled capacity for each plant ( for the period 1999-20(6), with OrPower4 
making the largest rdative conuibuliun based on its c8p<lcil}', foll\lwed by Iberafric8, T savo 
and fi nally Westmont. 
Tah le 5.3: 11' 1' co ntrib ution to gener ation \'S. in sta lled capacity (l999·2006) 
---'c,..- - , .- ----% j!;cllcl'ation -/0 cUjl;lcity 
---Wcst mont 3,27 3.61 
. -- .. .. 
-
.. '. .. ... _---,._--
Ihcrafr if,a 7.0S , 4.46 
-- -OrroIVer4 2_33 1,08 
-
. ,-- --.,. , ---. 
T~avo 9.26 (,,2 5 , 
, 
Sourco: compl ied by author. based on unpuhl1shed KPLC data, 2006 
Th is S<.'X: t io ll s..:eks lu unpack perforlll:mce of both siak-owncd gt: lh: ra tors and IPPs and 
sec who Ius supplied what. when, and al wl-..at COSI. 
In te rms (If a Vil ilability, hetween 2004 and 2006, IP~ app.:ar 10 h,we an average 
avai labil ity of approx imately 95 per cenl versus KenGe[l 'S Iherm,,1 pl'.IlIS, which averaged 60 
per cenl. Prior 10 th is p~riod , availabili ty of IPP" was s lightly lower at llpproximaleiy 90 per 
cent, due primari ly to major outages by Westmont. Comparing :lVailabili ly among IPPs over 
the durat ion of the ir history, Orl'owcr4 h~ an avcragli: availability o f9R per cent, fo llowed by 
TS;:lvu at 92 po;r cenl. Ibcrafrica at 89 per cenl and Westmont at 77 pr::r cr::nt 
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Give n that Il' l's have bt,-en mo re avai lable, it i~ nOI !;urprising that tlll.:ir cap.:-l.c ity utililatio n 
is h ighe r, as ind ica ted belo w. 
Fil:U re 5.4: C:lp,acity ulil izatioll of JI')'s \'s, Xen(;clI 
100 
90 
= " 0 ~ 70 
:5 60 
<, 50 
'u 40 0 
~ 
a 30 . 
, 0 
0 ' 20 
10 · 
0 
Suurc(: compik d by <Iuthur, based on unpublished KPLC data, 2006 
Wi.le d iscrepa nc ies. in ul i]i7a tiOI\ arc sccn among d ifferent plants, as wo uld be lOlispected, 
with OrPower4, the geothermal p lant registering a capac it)' ut ilizat ioll of tlt'tcn over l OOper 
cent. m Utili/.a tion I('r I P P~ over the history o f thei r operation is as fo llow s.: 103 per cent 
OrPower4, 66 per Cent lbera fr ica, 65 pcr ccn t T~avo. a nd 35 per cent Westmont. 
Fina lly . a pr ice comparison reyeal ~ that IPPs are generall y com pcti li ve will1 KcnGcn's 
the rma l, as secn imm ediately below. Allho ugh it should be Ilut<.:d til at, as with ma ny statc-
owned fll·ms. KenGcn' s costs might not be fully cost-re fl ect ive and lIol liecessari ly p repared in 
a manncr tha t makes them directly co mparable to thc IPP COsl of supply. 
21 ~ In terms of OrPowcr4. the plant utilization is based on the eomracted eapaclt) (l3 .6MW) and the: 
d ispatCh during the month; the plant may. however, do marg in:!!:y higher than this dec tared fi gure, 
OrPower4 d .... elarcd <In output of l) .bMW to allow room for n uclumion when the geotht: rmal production 
we lts or alUb i~nt cond itiuns may Yil ry. During wm~ months til<:: p lln: p(:r formancc j,; sustained at the 
higher Ilutp ul hence K PLC's Cil lculation shows ilbnve 100 per cent uti lilalioo. 
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Table 5 4 ' Co I)lrisnn of ~II plants (Inial cncr.ttio ll IIOllli1l'11 cos t per unil Ks h/kWh) 
'" 
; g 
Supplier 199912000 2000/01 ! 20001 /0 2 2002!O3 2003/04 Ju'r-nl,cl 2004/ 
iocra(ri, Ol ' .7 I O .~ 10.2 10.1) 104 6 ... ~ 
-
. . 
-
Westmont 10.4 11.1 13.5 33.S· 59.7 ' 54.S' 
OrP")wer4 · 6. 1 6.6 6 ' 7. 1 6 .1 
-.. -. 
TS:lvo · U ' 6 6 . ~ J 1.1 • 7.' 
-un CL 53 5.5 48 4 ., 4.4 4.4 
.ii.~C!.rt.~) .. , ... . . . 
KenGen ' .l 9.4 7 ,0 7.] 5.2 7 .1 
Thermal , L-
KenGen Non- 2.4 2. 5 2.5 2.4 2.2 I., 
Thennal , 
._. __ . 
. ... 
, KenO.:n ! 4.0 4.9 3. 1 2.' 12.2 2 .. Overall 
Mum ias 1 · 6.6 6 ,7 . . . 
(b,I'asse) 
.. - t- -EI' I'S ( lea,L'd 
· 
7.2 . . . . 
pl ~nl) 
I\nrlual 4 .6 6.1 4 .4 40 3.3 3.6 
IH:ightcd 
average COSt , 
per unit from i 
;aU sources I I 
. 
. . .. , . . . , . . Notes 11 1 lanlls atc a function o. the e,lpa" lly charg~ as \-Iell as volume o . • nergy gcnc.ittoo ,lOd th l! 
Ilfevailing fuel prICes. ' These part icu larly steep CCSB rc!1c.:t the (0110 \-1 ir.g situation: in 2002-~0()4 . there 
were moro .. filVourablc hydro logica l condi tions in K;:nya lwnce : I\~ unit cos: Ii-om thermal plants WJ S high 
Since the Cal)aci ly charges ,m~ paid regard less of the ;\IncH.nt o r gcr,e:-a lior. , 
Source: complt.....t by author, bas..-d on unpublislu.·d KPLC 1at;l. 2:106 
, 
In sum . il has bee n shown thal lPP~ a re contr ibut ing mote Ihan 15 pe r cen t (represent ing 
installed ~apaci ty) to Ihe generat ion mix w ith Tsavo conuihll ting the Illust in absolute 
ge neration (Fi gurc 5 .3) and O r Power4 contr ihut ing most in terms or rc la t i v~ gcncr<llion (T<lbk 
5.3). Av~ r(lgc ava ila bility of IPl's also seems to be g.reata than KcnGe n'.s thermal <IS is 
capac ity util ization. wilh O rl'ower4 aga in ranki ng first in both categuries fo ll owed by Tsavo 
for ,IVld lll biJi ty ,lI1d Jbe rafr ica for ulili n lt ion. Tariff-w ise there i ~ considerabk: di sc repancy 
among I PI' ~ depend ing 0 11 the period: if one excludes Westmont and foc uses on the 
rcnegol i:lIcd Ibe rafrica filtC. however, prices appear to be eorn ptlrah le. with competi tive rates 
seen especi ally for Ts;,vo in 2000-2002. 
Is the re tm th in the allebat ion (th:n predominated durmg the 1999-200 1 d rought) that 
invcsto rs have becn takin!; advantag~ l'[ a poor cuunt,y in a dire Situation? Or. have inves to r.:; 
seen potcnt ia l profits diminish w ith the onset o f the obsolescing barga in? Which way are the 
sca leS t illed i f at all and whal floes this say about the SLlsl:linability of the projects! 
Init ial stop-gap JI' Ps we re expensive. "" ith whoh:sa le tadf ls more than three times 
KcnGen's . (1\ the second wave of (PPs. the resu lt was significantly chea p!;: r power than the fi rst 
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wave, with wholesale tariffs appearing to be competitive with KenGen's. During this second 
wave, Iberafrica (one of the initial stop-gap IPPs) also halved its capacity charge in its 
negotiations for a second PP A. OrPower4 also agreed to a lower return for the second phase of 
its project. In the end, Kenya experienced a fairly positive development outcome. The requisite 
power was supplied, albeit initially at a high rate to the country and consumer. Later, prices 
became more competitive. As for investment outcomes, in the ftrst wave, it is believed that 
investors faired well given the high tariffs charged. In the second wave, outcomes appear to 
have been positive, but more modest. 
Thus, outcomes appear to have been out of balance initially, with the scale tipped in 
favour of investment outcomes at the expense of development outcomes, with greater balance 
achieved over time. The Westmont contract, which was notable for its exceptionally positive 
investment outcomes, was not renewed, which would seem to confirm the hypothesis of this 
thesis that when outcomes are out of balance, the long-term sustainability of projects is 
ultimately at risk. An important point, also central to the main arguments of this thesis, should 
be made here, though. While Westmont's contract was not renewed, there was no evidence of 
the obsolescing bargain. All contract terms including those most onerous to KPLC were 
respected, until such time that the contract was over. A parallel may be seen here with Egypt. 
Post-devaluation, the state cancelled plans to build more IPPs; it did not, however, force the 
renegotiation of any existing contracts. 
What led to the diverse outcomes? In particular, what contributed to the success of 
projects, particularly given the many exogenous stresses on projects? 
5.7 Drought and other exogenous stresses 
A one time exogenous shock as seen in Egypt is not in evidence in Kenya, but the country 
has experienced a gradual and significant devaluation of its currency, which has inevitably 
affected outcomes. Between 1980 and 1990, Kenya saw its currency depreciate by 
approximately 210 per cent, and then between 1990 and 2000, depreciation was approximately 
230 per cent. Insofar as all PPAs are denominated in US dollars, this creeping devaluation 
impacts on IPP outcomes. Investments are growing more costly as is fuel, which is imported in 
the case of Westmont (only up until PPA expiry in 2004), Iberafrica and Tsavo. 
A second exogenous factor to be noted is drought. The first two IPPs, both diesel-fired, 
were rushed through to help plug the power shortage created by drought conditions of 1996-7. 
The third IPP (OrPower4) was requested to increase its capacity during another drought in 
1999. In each of these instances, power was ultimately more expensive due to the emergency 
nature of the situation. Furthermore, after hydrological conditions returned to normal, the 
country was still locked into contracts with take or pay requirements. 
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5.8 Factors impacting on outcomes: the country level 
Although already discussed in detail, it is important to reiterate the significance of the 
power sector reform plan, championed by the World Bank and made a condition for public 
financing for the ESI, as spelled out in the Energy Sector Reform and Power Development 
Project. It was this plan that initially advanced IPPs in Kenya and yet at the same time, due to 
the state's failure to comply with certain conditions, temporarily held back funding, which in 
tum led to the stop-gap IPPs of Westmont and Iberafrica. 
The reform plan, once adopted, set in motion a series of reforms, including the 
establishment of an independent regulator in 1998. Thus, the stop-gap IPPs lacked the 
oversight of an independent third party, which may have scrutinized tariffs, and other terms of 
the contracts (especially contract duration) to a greater degree. Although Kenya's options were 
limited, given the donor embargo and investor wariness, an independent regulator would 
undoubtedly have helped in the negotiating process, which largely resulted in an outcome that 
favoured investors at the expense of development outcomes. In the next set of IPPs with Tsavo 
and OrPower4, the Electricity Regulatory Board played a critical role, insisting on lower tariffs. 
ERB also influenced the renegotiation with Iberafrica for a second PP A with KPLC, which 
ultimately culminated in a capacity charge equal to 50 per cent the original. The scrutiny of the 
regulator, however, came at a certain cost as negotiating time (highlighted below in the context 
of the Iberafrica negotiation) lengthened. Although the power sector reform plan and associated 
developments, including the regulator, go a long way in framing the context, this thesis 
maintains that there is more to the story than this one narrative; furthermore, it would be 
inaccurate to assign either full credit or blame to the World Bank or the standard prescription 
for shaping outcomes. 
As regards Kenya's investment climate, it was lacklustre throughout the 1990s with a 
GDP compounded annual growth rate of 1.73 per cent from 1990 to 2000 and just 1.37 per cent· 
between 1997 and 2000. Foreign direct investment fell by 3.40 per cent a year over the decade. 
Kenya faced a donor embargo throughout much of the 1990s, which also affected investments 
in the electricity sector. Although organized as international competitive tenders, the tenders 
ultimately awarded to Tsavo and OrPower4 only attracted three and two bids, respectively, as 
mentioned earlier. Therefore, those investors who did approach Kenya were few and far 
between and ultimately charged higher risk premium to offset the perceived high risks, which 
were exacerbated by the absence of sovereign guarantees. 
As with the investment climate, Kenya's electricity market had a significant impact on 
outcomes. Firstly, although common among African countries, Kenya's power demand is 
miniscule (with just 1,200 MW installed capacity) compared to other developing countries in 
Latin America, East and South Asia, and Central Europe, which saw significant IPP 
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investment. Limited demand potential therefore inhibited investment. Another factor is that 
IPPs were perceived to be competing against 'cheap hydro', the incumbent fuel in Kenya (even 
though the most economically viable hydro sites had been exploited and the country faced 
drought conditions for much of the 1990s). This (mis)perception ultimately weighed against 
investors. KPLC, the off-taker, was characterized by poor financial performance. 
Many of these themes, which were widely cited by stakeholders, are reiterated in the 
World Bank's Implementation Completion Report for the Energy Sector Reform and Power 
Development Project, which is also reported in the documentation for the Energy Sector 
Recovery Project. 
A lesson learned from this experience is that while the private sector may be desirable to 
help a country large investment capital for infrastructure, it is necessary to ensure the 
overall political, macro, fiscal and regulatory environment are not perceived by the 
private sector as unduly high risk. A gradual reform approach, based on a comprehensive 
sector policy may have higher payoffs in the long-term (World Bank 2004d:6; World 
Bank 2005c:19). 
It is, however, interesting to note that absent from the paragraph above is any reflection on 
the applicability of the reform prescription. 
5.9 A host of project level factors impacting IPP development 
While the country level factors, including the power sector reform plan advanced 
primarily by the World Bank and associated consultants, go a long way in describing outcomes, 
a number of project level factors also hold significant explanatory power. An examination of 
these factors also takes this thesis back to the question of whether Raymond Vernon's thesis of 
the obsolescing bargain, discussed in Chapter two and re-examined briefly in the case of Egypt, 
is relevant. Do deals ~egotiated with developing countries, which may at the time have less 
bargaining power, later come unstuck once the concrete is poured? If so, what are the 
(successful) ways that project sponsors have reduced or eliminated the effect of the obsolescing 
bargain? It should be noted at the outset of this analysis that in the case of both Tsavo and 
OrPower4, stakeholders indicated that there was evidence for the obsolescing bargain. 
Westmont and Iberafrica may have felt pressured by government as well, however, they did not 
articulate it as such; nonetheless the behaviours adopted by all stakeholders below indicate that 
they were trying to ensure their bargains remained intact. 
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5.91 Analysis of project partners 
There was some variety in the project partnering across the four IPPs. Only one of the four 
IPPs, Iberafrica, had a local partner.215 Two projects, Tsavo and OrPower4, saw the 
involvement of a multilateral development institution. Both Tsavo (through equity partner IPS) 
and Iberafrica had previous experience in Kenya, with IPS also identified as a more 
development-minded firm. Finally, Tsavo was the only project-financed deal, with the other 
three relying on the balance sheets of their sponsors. 
In the case of Iberafrica, the local partner consisted of the KPLC Pension Fund (who owns 
20 per cent of the project). According to personnel at Iberafrica, a local partner was considered 
a requirement for Union Fenosa given Kenya's country risk at the time of investment. While 
the alliance between Iberafrica and the KPLC Pension Fund may have helped assuage Union 
Fenosa, it has been subject to some criticism and controversy, namely that with involvement 
with KPLC, the off-taker, there could not be a fair and transparent evaluation of competing 
bids. These allegations have been denied by both Iberafrica and KPLC who argue that Pension 
Fund came in after the award of the project and hence there was no possibility for such 
influence; furthermore, the Pension Fund is governed independently from KPLC with a 
separate board of trustees. 
On the one hand, the local partner assisted in providing security to the multinational firm; 
on the other hand, the choice of local partner ultimately raised doubts about the project 
sponsor's integrity, however, unfounded. Suffice it to say, actions speak louder than words and 
Iberafrica (with the partnership remaining intact between Union Fenosa and the KPLC Pension 
Fund) has managed to negotiate a second PPA, under the supervision ofERB, for a duration of 
15 years, which would indicate that the arrangement is both sustainable and favourable. 
While DFIs were largely absent in the first round of IPPs (with the exception of limited 
technical assistance), the IFC took both an equity stake in and played an important role in 
providing and arranging debt for Tsavo, a project that was specified by name and size in the 
World Bank funded Energy Sector Reform and Power Development Project (World Bank 
200Sc:3). As the private sector arm of the World Bank, IFC saw the Tsavo investment as a 
critical development to help meet rising power shortages in Kenya, which were adversely 
affecting the economy. Funds were not forthcoming from other international donors or the 
private sector as the former was still maintaining an aid embargo and the latter was hindered by 
the myriad of risks, heightened by the political instability, of any such investments. IFC thus 
saw its role as key in assuring private sector participants of project integrity and stability. IFC 
also recognized the potential "demonstration effect" of the project as it aimed to be the first 
project-financed deal in the region. Both the investors and host country alike have benefited 
215 The reason provided by OrPower4 for not engaging a local partner was because the project was too 
small. 
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from IFC's decision to participate in Tsavo, including, as cited by project sponsors, when there 
were signs of obsolescing bargain at the end of the 1999-2001 drought. It was at this time that 
IFC helped the project company resist pressure from the government to reduce its tariff. 
As regards firms' commitment to the country, the difference in the commitment among 
project developers is stark. The Malaysian based firm Westmont had only one African project. 
The firm entered the market with the signing of its PP A in 1996-7 and left promptly in 2004 
after failing to agree on a tariff with KPLC for a second PP A. It is suspected that this abrupt 
departure was in part a function of the financial condition of Westmont's parent company in 
Malaysia as well. That said, there was little staying power and ultimately little long-term 
success. Iberafrica stands in contrast. Union Fenosa, the majority stakeholder in the project, 
entered Kenya in 1994-5, two years prior to the electricity offer, when its information 
technology (IT) arm won a contract to provide services to the government. Thereafter, the 
company established itself in the country, creating favourable ties and a solid name for itself 
Tsavo's commitment is observed through its equity holder, IPS, which has been active in 
Kenya since the 1963. Finally, Ormat's commitment spans only the time of its contract. The 
firm entered both the country and the continent for the first time when it signed its PP A with 
KPLC. 
One additional point should be made here about the nature of the firms. While Tsavo 
Power Company had no local partner per se, it did benefit from the involvement of the 
Industrial Promotion Services Kenya Limited, which as previously noted is a subsidiary of Aga 
Khan's Fund for Economic Development, which operates through its subsidiaries in the 
industrial sector throughout Asia and Africa. While IPS projects must make commercial sense, 
they must also serve a clear developmental function for the country/community. The Tsavo 
plant met both criteria for IPS. The developmental function was met by the fact that the 75 MW 
would help Kenya plug a severe power shortage, i.e. the plant amounted to 28 per cent and.34 
per cent of the country's total thermal/geothermal generation in 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 
respectively, and up to 10 per cent of the total gross annual energy requirement in 2002-2003. 
In addition the plant was expected to contribute to a reduction in tariffs, as it was significantly 
less expensive than emergency power generation procured at 0.30-0.40 US$/kWh. According 
to stakeholders at IPS, the commercial aspect was met by the fact that: a reasonable return on 
investment was expected (i.e. mid-teens); a series of first rate investors were involved; and the 
security package, together with the 20 year PP A, promised a sound and secure arrangement 
with the national utility. Ultimately, IPS played a substantial role as it formed the backbone of 
the strategic partnership with Cinergy (later Duke); together these two firms represent 49.9 per 
cent of the equity in Tsavo. Hence, it may be concluded that this development-minded firm had 
a positive impact on both the development and investment outcomes. 
151 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Although as indicated in section 5.5, OrPower4 receives the highest marks for actual 
performance, it is Tsavo that has been characterized as the most successful from both a 
development and an investment perspective by a range of stakeholders for its absolute 
contribution to generation, lower tariffs (than emergency power and most IPPs) and 
unprecedented financing structure, as discussed in greater detail in section 5.9.2.216 It is also the 
firm with the longest commitment to Kenya, and with a clear development mandate. 
5.9.2 Funding arrangements that made the IPPs 
The fmancing arrangements for each of the IPPs are quite distinct. In the case of the stop-
gap IPPs, firms were given 11 months to bring plants on line from the signing of the PP As, 
which meant that firms had to rely primarily on their own balance sheets rather than setting up 
elaborate project finance arrangements. Project costs for Westmont, the first stop-gap IPP, 
amounted to US$20 million. Little is known about how exactly the Malaysian consortium 
funded this plant, but it is believed that it relied mostly on company funds. In contrast, the cost 
oflberafrica, the second stop-gap IPP, totaled US$65.1 million and the firm shared costs with a 
local partner and through local and foreign commercial banks. The discrepancy in project costs, 
between the similar sized Westmont and Iberafrica plants, may be attributed to three primary 
factors: namely, condition, technology and location. Westmont was a second-hand plant. 
Furthermore, it is a barge-mounted open cycle gas turbine (using kerosene), located off 
Mombasa while Iberafrica is a new, diesel generator plant, l<?cated near Nairobi. 
In contrast to Westmont, Iberafrica's fmancing structure is more widely known. The 
project, which was carried out in two phases with the first phase of 44 MW priced at US$54.5 
million and the second phase of 12 MW costing US$10.5 million. Project equity amounts to 
US$ 18 million. Ownership is shared, with 80 per cent held by First Independent Power East 
Africa Limited-an entity owned by two Spanish firms, Union Fenosa (90 per cent) and JHR 
Consultants (10 per cent) --and 20 per cent held by the KPLC Staff Pension Fund. Project debt, 
amounting to US$47.1 million, was provided directly and indirectly by Union Fenosa and the 
Staff Pension Fund as detailed below: 
• Union Fenosa provided direct loans ofUS$12.7 million; 
• Union Fenosa also guaranteed a further US$20 million; 
• KPLC Staff Pension Fund provided direct loans of US$9.4 (US$5 million of which it 
borrowed itself); and 
• KPLC Staff Pension Fund also guaranteed an additional US$5 million through a local 
Kenyan bank. 
216 From an operational perspective, OrPower4 has met with the highest success (as per the availability, 
utilization and relative generation contribution) followed by Tsavo and Iberafrica. 
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Ts.1 VO fo llowed .1 d itfe renl rout<! than its predccessor5, Westmo nt and lbcr:lfrica, wi th 
regard to fin.1n.; ing. Unlike widl the fi r:;! t~\ O plams. T:jllvQ was nOI requi red to commission ils 
plant \\lthin an I I-mo nth limeframe, \~l;ich a! lowed the company to seck oul more c reative 
fina ncing schemes. Tsavo became Ihe fi rst projeci in East Africa to be finan c('d on a projec t 
fi nance o:ls is w ithout gove rnment guarantees. Project equity, amounting to 1..:5$ 18.93 mill ion 
or 22 per cen t o f to ta l p roj ect costs, was spli t among IPS,ClIlergy (49.9 ~r ce nt), which 
com prises an AKFED subsidiary :lnd an Amcriean· hascd po wer cOl1lp:my. CDC, the pri vate 
development ann of DFID, whidl has s ince been replaced hy niobeleq (30 per cellI), \Varlsi la, 
a dcs igm:r and operator of power piants (15 pe r cent), and IFC (5 per cent).'l 17 
Proj ('ct de bt for Tsavo, amounting to L'S$ 66.06 million, came in the fo llowing form: 
T:lhle 5.5; Ts:\vo's debt 
~ ---- ~nition ~ ". .- - r ,--TYllt of 1.0:1" _"mount 
Senior Loans: 
-_._-- . 
IFC A loa" !FC 's own a.:conut USS1.5.[ OO,OOO 
IFe n loan IFC symlicalcd l (Xln ~ - USS22,IOO.(}()0 
CD<" loan C DC's o\'n 3(;eoum USS 13,000,000 
DEG loan DEG's own a;;coum tUR 11.000.000 
-" 
Suhortl in:llC' d loa n! 
IFCCI loan IFC's own de{:ounr U5$1,-03,333 
----, --_ .... IfC C2 loan IFC syndicat.:d I:J Oills US$ 1.433,333 
---.. --.- - •.. _--
DF.G su/)... Ioa n DEG syndicato::d Iwns EUR 2,000,000 
" Note. DEG. German Investment & D~vdopment CorporOltlon 
(i ivell the absellce of sovcreign gll arantees, which (lfo:l generally a pre -requisite for a 
PfIJjccl· {jnaneed investment in a developing country, a series of .1 1t ~ rn.1tc art.1 ngcments were 
made. Key doculIlents for project completion were th e: Leu":f of Comfort provided by the 
~ove rnm~nt (\nd Ihe security pacbge provided by KPLC. The Letter o f Comfort addresses 
force majeure ,lI1d po litical issues, bllt does not qualify as a sovereign guarantee due to its 
limited applic:l tion ;md coverage. The security package invol\'es: an escrow account to which 
KPLC must provide One months payment of approx imately US$..; million for the d uration of 12 
yeMS, i.e . the period of primary debt repa)"ment; and :l sta nd-by Lc tle r of Cred it. which co ver.> 
-- ----
m Interviews with stakcholders re \'calcd that Cincrgy has been Increasingly less inllOrvcd in opcr:uion.\ 
of TS:lvo. This should be se.!n as :l result of Cincrgy 's decisioll around 200) to pull out o f "I) ",veslmcnts 
in dc \'c\ol' int> countries, focusi ng on investments in the USA lIlld Europe only. lIo ... cvcr, v> ith Duke 
Energy buying Cincrgy in M(lY 2005, it remains to be ~een whm will be the fUHlrc of this equity 
p:lrtncrship. 
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Ihree Illfl lllhs billing o f apprm.:i matdy OS$ 12 million. Ini tially 100 p.;r c(:nt cash COver was 
r~'qu ired fo r the Leiter of Crcd il; ho\\"c\'er, this has s ince bc.'Cn :!'ilsed to 20 p.n el.'nt. m 
It shaull! be re ilcr,r tcJ here Ihal no plants received govcrurnerll guarantees- although the 
costs of tho: o:mcrgcncy powcr plants were s upported ill P.lrt by govcrnmcr.t. Kenya has 
maintained a policy of not c:d em.ling government guamnlecs to pri vate sec lor proj ects, unless 
there is an owrriding public interest. 
In the case of OrPo'.\-cr4. financial closurc has not yct hccn reached .. ] he [)<l renl company, 
O rlllat. has invcsted marc than US$54 mill ion of its own funds- fo r hoth appmisal and drilli ng 
of lire geot hermal we lls for its first 12 rvfW of power. Contrary to its initial ex rectatioll , Orm:l.t 
h a.~ heen Imalth.: to enlis t e ither dcvelopment fi nanci ng institutions or any other inkrnationai 
energy companies (alth ough the finn d id obtain a M lGA guaram.:e, discussed hdow). As with 
Tsavo. the provis ion of an .:scrow accoun t, to which KI' LC was to provide one mon ths 
paymcnt, and a stand-hy 1.l:tter of Credit. covering three months bi llin g, was inc luded in the 
PPA signed ill 1998, wHh th'" e.xpectation that thrs sec urity package would come into force 
U!XI Il the commencement of the .seco nd phase o f the plant. This did, not, ho\\cvcr, h3.ppcn. 
Irlslcad . wilh KI)Le's lin.mci:rl situation deteriorat ing during any :r lif; r the yro~Jght , the ut ility 
sought to r~duce Ihe larilf for lhe second phase. All associated. security llIt"aSII(':S Wl"fe left to 
.... ait. 
Widl pressure from bOlh government and KPLC inlefl"lifying in 2004. O rl'ower-1 notified 
M ICiA. Although Ihe guaran tee, menti(>ned previously. was neVer offic ia lly iuv(.ked, i"IIGA 
did se nd a delegation to investiga te the detericrating rcJac ionship. which ull imatdy resulted in 
el iminating the press ure fro m governmcnt, but not KPLC. to reduc..: the tar i f.f. At the end o f 
2006, agreement was finally reached among stakeho lders. whic h invo lved IT reduction in the 
OrPower4 wri ff fo r the second phase (constituting an amendment 10 Ihe 1998 PPA), and the 
provisio rt of the finan c ial securitii:s hy KPLC. O rpowt!r4 has s ince rev ived the process for 
arrangi rtg project financing from international lenders, a nd commenced cons truction of the 
second phase, \:xpeekd on line in the fourth quarter of2008. 
ll ~ Tire security or having a 1Jr! iflvulved ~hol,lld atso lIot be underestimated a~ it may h::rvt gone 11 long 
way in as~uaging invcMor concerns. 
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Table 5.6: IPP project financing 
Projcd (USS million) Westmont It>crafrica i Tsavo OrPol,er 4 
, ,. ~.--.•. -.- ~-
Total project costs 20 65.1 ~s 54~ 
Total equity and % NA I ~ (27_6%) 18.97 NA 
(22.4%) 
~--.--.. 
Total debt NA 47.1 66.03 NA 
(72,4%) (77.6%) 
-- ----_._ .. - _ .. _._ .. _"'-
-
~-
Luc:~I, C'luity 0 3.6 0 0 I - .. Local debt 0 14.4 0 0 f--, -----~~.~ 
NA 32.7 >26 NA International (privatc) 
debt 
--
~-. ~-
nl<h 'I 0 0 40 0 
-- - 1'---- -." - .. - --- ---_._- , 
.. , 
.. Notes . Ibcratnea, total pnlJe~t cosi'; US$65 mIll ion. \\ lth first phase (44 MW) pnced at US$51 ,5 mIllion 
and second phase (12 MW) at US$ 13 .5. 1US$54 million includes the amount invested if. a 12 MW 
power pl ;lOt and completed geothermal weBs for S~ \-lW including 20 per etOnl restOrVI;: to ~upport a 4g 
MW power plan!. )Synd ieated loans may be considered from a OFI from a risk perspectIve. -iMIGA 
guarantee provided. 
[n conclUsion, it is notewOlthy that Tsavo. which has been considt:rt:d the most successful 
of the four IP Ps by a range of stakeho lders, had the most di verse project financing, although it 
was largcly contributed or faci li tated by lllultilakral dcvcIopm(:nt institutions, and the deal also 
took the longest to dose. Success does not com.: cheap, at leaST not in terms of time. 
5,1),3 From 7 years to 20: evolutiun of eonlractual terms 
Among the most apparent differences in Ih\: two [PP frameworks is the duration of the 
PPAs- with the first stop-gap fnlmework stipil lating seven years, the second, specifying 20 
years. In the first period. the Iherafrica ar,d Westmont plants, providing about 100 MW of 
power, were seen as a "stop-gap" measure to quickly meet cilpacity shortages. Publ icly 
tinunced plants, which were considered less costly, were in th\: pipeline, but fund ing was not 
forthcoming. Governmcnt opted for a short-term solution with the expectation that by 2004, if 
not before, when the PPAs were slated to end, the situation would be altered, i.c. potentially 
more favou rably for the governmcnt/country. Furthermore, given the political risk at the lime 
of stop-gap IPPs, investors wcre wary of committing to longer terms. 
There is also a marked difference in the generating costs of the IPPs with the first wave 
(Westmont and lbemfrica) amounting to approximately double the cost of the second wave, 
(Tsavo and OrPow\!r4) as depicted ill Table 5.4 . The higher cost of the first wave has been 
accredited to the short timeline allotted and severe drought condition. It is noteworthy that the 
second wave was not only cheaper than the firsl, but it also appears to be competitive with 
KenGen's plants_ 
The llwjor commonality among the PPA s of all Kenyan [PI's was the Bllild Own Operate 
structure. Reasons provided for why Kenya adopted the BOO structure afe varied: it was a 
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simpler arrangement than BOOT; it \\35 a World Bank rCl:omrllclIdation, BOO mitigatl:d 
project ri<:k. by ensuring thai developers \~ould properly maintain the ir pla nts. The vast 
majority o f stakeholders, however, appear to be ullCel1ain about why such a structure was 
adopted. Also. it is worth reiterating in this cOOlext that going forwa rd. govern ment 
51akeholders arc kee n to explore the BOOT structure. 
In add(tlon to being BOOs. the PPAs signed between KPLC and project dcvelopt!rs 
specified takc-i l ~t.:ndcreJ conditions, i.e. the pu:clmsing ulility pays for an agreed amount of 
power produccd whether it takes it or not with the following avai labrhty leyels ~tlpulatc d: 
Westmont, Ihcrafrica and Tsavo at 85 per cent and OrPow.:r4 fit 92 pcr cent. 
Of the fo ur PPAs negot iated with KPLC, nonc has been cance lled to date, but onc ha:, 
been renewed 011 (I(Herent terms, one has expired and one has had SCl::n Changes to its original 
tariff. In August 2001 , Ibcrafrica expressed its interest to both ERB alld KPLC to negotiate a 
second f'PA (as pe r the Electric Power Act ~uch a request must be initi'1\cd three years before 
li~l)l1s0!'PA expires). Negotiations commenced at th is time. KPLC and Ibcmfric<l re3ched 
3grccillent on tariffs; howevcr, ERB rejected the rates. Thereafler Ibcrllfrica find ERI3 reached 
agleeillent on rates, but KPLC rejected the rates In Decemb r 2002, the new govcrnml::nt came 
to PO\\·I::( , and a ll ncgot i,l.t iOIlS were sta ned unti l Jone 2003 due to chnnges in ERR, MoE aJld 
KPLC starr. In April 2002, Iberafrica reduced Ihe capacity ;:I1.1rgc of its firsl rPA by 37 per 
cent. This \vns not a renegotiation per se, hut a voluntal) act on beha lf of the firm to 
demonstrate ils commitment to a second l~r/\?I,) In September 2003, Iberafriea reduced its 
cap .. 1city charge again- th is time to 59 per ce nt o f the original PPA agreement Finally, when 
renegotiations rteolilllll:llced they culminated io agll::l::mcnt on a secOltd PPA (for a durat ion of 
15 years) in August 2004. in which the capacity charge agreed was 50 per cent that of the 
urii:\inal PPA. 
Wcstmont also rcquested a sccond PPA, but the firm and KI'LC cou ld not agrec on a 
tariff. As II result , West mont did not pursue any formal procedur~ wi th U{ll . In AUi:\ust 2004, 
with the cumple tion of its seven year PPA, Westmont ceased operati ng. The barge-mounted 
gas turbine W,IS ret ired thereafter. There was some specu lation thnt the plant would be bought 
by KenGen in 2005, but this did not h;,ppen, and instead the st<lte-o wtll.:d generation company 
is pursuing other new generalion options. III the case of OrPo\~~r" , as described In deta il in 
sectiOIl 5.9.2. the tar iO" lor the second phase, approximatel)" 40 MW, was ultimately 
renegoti:ued (to be lower) with negotiations only conclud ing II I 2006, eight years after the 
original PPA was Signed. 
Suffice it to say that Tsavo, the project that !Ias been chara~'teri7ed as meeting \\i th the 
greatest success, is the only project Ihat has seen no changes to its contract terms. 
:19 Comruy t ll popu lar press rt:ports, Ibcrafrica did not amorlize ils plant oyer the sevcn ycars of its first 
PPA due to thls yoluntary red uction in 2002. 
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5.9.4 l'ulJli\: perception alltl its eo nsC(llu· n c c.'i2~" 
The [PI's have genera lly heen perceived a s expensive. i.c. nlOre eX jX'nsivc than KenGen. 
To quote one press report, "comp:u-ed to stale-owllcd KenCie:l, wh ich sel[s its power to KPLC 
al Ksh 1.76, 11'1) rates have been seen as il mass ive rip orf IloJ the power utility" (lYeslJn rlllt 
Bow., (lut of Power Dea/2004 ). There are repom in Ihe prcss of Energy Minister Mr. Oehillo 
Ayacko indicat ing that he wi ll cont inued a sustained campaign for c hellrer po ..... er by tak ing on 
the [PPs and the co ntracts that have been a "heavy burden to I~ economy" (Cithahu 2004). 
Owners have also nee t! portrayed as opportunistic, profiting frOIll Kenya 'S drought situation 
ant! poor in vestment climate. References to IPPs as being enemies of Kcnya havc even been 
made by puhlic stakeholders. Absent fr om these pot1 raYld~ lills bee n an accurate description of 
the slotc's inahility to financc and build co mpetitive plants within a short timcfrmne. Init ially 
few 11'1' owners countered th (; stef(;otypes, with Ille e.'(ception of TSiw o. Tsavo has also 
deve loped n US$1 million commun ity development fund, disbur<; ing US$ 50,OOO annua lly (over 
the 20 year PPA ) to be nefit environmenta l and soc ial activities ill Kenya'S Coasl Region. [t 
should also he noted thaI while leis publicized lberafrica also has a social responsihility 
programme. 
Tlte public campa ign has cont ributed to bringing ab,)ul a rcduction in Ibcrafrica's and 
Orl'owcr<! 's l:l riITs. It also may have conTr ibuTed to Ihe halt in lPP dcvelopmt'nl un Iii ,hen end 
of2005. when KrLC announced that il wod d !cr:dcr for a 1(0 MW UOOT. 
5.10 C onclus io n 
-11H~ IPP cxperience in Kellya is interesting in a number o f r es~cts. Despite represcnting 11 
diHkult investmcnt dim;1te (e.g. ;m aid tmhargo lind 11 0 sovtrt:ign guarantees availahle), 
foreign inveSTment was made in IPPs. Ini tial stop-gap I PP~ were understandably expensive, 
with wholesah: la rilT<; more than three times Ke nGen' s. High prices arc attrihuted to the fact 
thnt pl iml s \w rc procured during a drought. under se vere ti me pre~sures, wilh a tnmcated lender 
process. Furthermore. with PPAs of only seven years duratioll, investors had little time to 
extract returns. [n the second wave of IPP5, projects were tendered under internntion aJ 
competitive bid standards. The result was significantly cheaper power than Ih ... first wave, with 
who lesa le tariffs appearing to be compctit ive with KenGen 's. During th is second wave, 
lherarr ica (one of the init ial slop-g;'p IPPs) also halved its capac ity charge i:l its negoti,1 tions 
lo r a second PI' A. ;md Orl'ower4 ;Igreed 10 reduction in the tarilT for ils additional 36 MW. In 
the e nd, Kenya experienced a fairly pos itive llc\'elopment outcome. Tht: requisite power was 
supplied, nlilci! in itially al a high rate 10 the country and consumer. Latcr. prices became mo re 
compcti tive. Throughout. however, Kenya has experienced significant devaluation of its 
-- -------- -
no Although this thesis has fl at surv~yed the publli.:: at large, it has followed general press accounls and 
parlimncnlnry dehates related to IPPs. which arc seen as a proxy to: Ihc general public. 
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currcm.:y. Betwec n 19'10 and 200), the Kenyan Shill ing deprcciated more tlmn 300 per cc nl 
Although the c urrency deprcc imion has largely abated over recent years. considering Ihat all 
tile Kenyan IJPAs lIrc dellomiualed in US dolla,..,., more pOIell tial change cou ld weigh heavily_ 
As lor invcstment outcomes, in Iht' fi rs t wave, it is bd icved th:,t invcstors iit ir..:d wdl 
given the high tariffs charged. In the second wave, outcomes appear to have been positiv.: , but 
morc muUest. All deals (in both the first and second waves) hav~ held, with minor 
modifications as noted in the case o f OrPower4, wltich is a positiw indicator for invest ment 
outcomes_ As OIlC sponsor indicatcti, " retllms could have been higher, but we d() have a good 
relilli ollship wi th the o ff-tllker and an acceptable r..:turn for our inveStors." 
Situating Kcnya's [I'll experience ill the context of the World B,mk led Energy Sector 
Re form and Puwo.;r Development Project goes a long way in e ... pl aining how and why 
investments unfolded as they did, viz. failure to comply with conditional lending terms led to a 
delay in new plant, which in turn necess itated the stop-gap IPPs, With the Gu vernment of 
Kenya iil1ally assenting to conditiuns by the end of the decade, a series of rd orms were set in 
mot io n, including mnre IPl's and a regu lator. with thc n: form plans supported by a number of 
intenlational consu ltanc ics. Also, in this secoad wavc of IPI' developmell t, the World Baak's 
privulc seCtor ti nancc arm, the IFe. took an eqlli l~ st.,ke in Tsavo and was instrumental in 
arrang ing debt. IFC is crcd ited Wilh hdping Tsavo to resist pres:wre from the go\-ernmcnt ane' 
normal hydrological conditions returned_ when an aU e-mpl '''',"is made to renegotiate l:\( iffs, 
thereby ki.'cping the obsol,-'"SCing bargain at bay. IFC also is cited as among the factors that 
hdped convince the American pow<!rhouse Cinergy to invest ill the project, i,e. it was reassured 
by the multi lateral pr<!sen':l' . OrPo wer4, which was also part of this second wave. o btained a 
MIGA guarantee, And although the MIGA guamntee has not bee n invoked, the threat of 
MIG,\ 's involvement. follow ing resist:mce by the guvernment to honour the eQll traet. may also 
be counted as among strategies to ward off the obsolescing hargai n. 
Furt hermore, the regulatury board, which was among the mtilly cnnditio!ls o f the Energy 
Secto r KefOfm Power Development Project left its mark On the projects. Inaugurated in 1998, 
:Ifter rp,\ s wilh West mont and lbcmfrica had been signed, ERO was noticeub!y absent from 
the tirst wave. Tho.: ilonrJ was, however. able 10 apply pressure on Ibcmfrica :IS illlegOliatcd its 
second PI)A and may be crcdi ted with belping to reduce capaci ty charges. ERB ove rsaw 
T::oavo'S development from start 10 lin ish and has a~so been intricately invol\'o.:<1 in (X Power4. It 
maintains an important tariff scning function. Desp ite these ac hievements, ERA's institutional 
memury and capac it)' have ~cn undermin ... -d b) changes in personnel : in Ihe six years o f its 
operation, it has had fi ve different chairmen (all appointed by the President) and lIumerous 
board changes. 
Altho ugh () Il l! may easily look to the World Bank proj ect 10 ex plain outcomes. this thesis 
has raiscd a number of add itional impo rtant factors that expla in the evolvin g balancing act. 
ISS 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
mo~t notably !he natun: of the project partners. Malaysian-based Westmont had no prior 
ex pc ricn.;e in A frica. Equally un--ex perienced in Africa was Orma! , an US/\/lsraeli bascd fi nn. 
The..'>C two companic..'> opted not to engage loca l partners. Westmont has s ince left alter it failed 
to reach agreement on a second PPJ\ . Ormat (through project company OrPowe(4) has 
developed only 12 MW, or j ust 10 per cenl o f Ihe maximum s ize spccifioo in its w lit rac t. 
a lthough recent agreements, which saw the finn reduc ing it.'> la riff, arc now leadiHg to the 
deve lopment of" furt her 36 i\.·\W.221 
In contrast. Iberafrica had a local partner as a shareholder. Furthermore, Union Fenma, the 
dominant sh;treho lder in Ibcrafrica, also had additional projects in Kenya '~ 11' sector. Tsavo 
had 110 loc; tI partner, ouT IPS, which jointly hold ~ 49.9 per ce nt of the er]llj!y with Duke, was 
incorporated in Kenya in 1963 and therefore h;ts extensive country exper iencc. The Iberafrica 
and TS3vn plants Inlve faired significantly beTter titan Westmont and OrPowcr4 in terms of 
conlracls, 10tO"l I generation Cl"\lltribution and ultimately puhl ic pcrce pti on. Iberafrica negotiated a 
second IS year PP/\, and T savo provided a third of the country' s tlH:rmallgeoThermal 
genera tio n between 200 1 and 2003, helping the country to avoid morc costly emergency 
generator.;. Tsavo has also made a g.ood name for itself through il.> US$l mill ion commun ity 
deve lopment fund . Finally. noteworthy in the context ofproj!.lct p..trtnl;rs is the rolc that II'S and 
G lobcleq, bo th characte rized as more dcvelopmcm-nlmdcd fi rms. :"Ire playi rlg in Sub-Saharan 
A i'riclt. As European and American based f irms such as ]nter( ien and AESlU re treatcd to their 
ho me markets, IPS and GJobel!!q STepped ill to fi ll the development g:IP, picking up majority 
s takes in Egypt 's Sidi Kr ir (6K2 MW), Tanzania's Songa;, (I SO MW) and Uganda's Bujagali 
(250 MW).2ll Wh ilc motivated by commac ial in h:r!!S~ , bOlh G lohdcq and [PS abo hay!! a 
larger apf>ct ite for risk and a commitment to emerging Illilrkcts. It should, huwever, be 
re iterated here that Globeleq is in the midst of selling o ff its enTi re portfo lio of genaatjon 
aSSl.!ls , wi th tl,e c.\ct:pli on nfthose in Sub-Saharan Africa, as the firm prepares to concentrate in 
greenfie ld deve lopment. Al though recent tren ds pointed to the fact tim! African JPPs migh t be 
led by these types of firms. Globdeq' s exilleaves anoTher que~lion tnnrk . It may be that more 
dcvell1pment · mindcd firms , morc third worl d multinat ionals or potentially even more domestic 
capiTal wil1 ull im;I\e ly fi ll the void. 
While the ex isting lPPs appear to be here t" stay (~ave Westmont), p.llure development 
rcmains IIIl..:erta in. Unti l the end of 200 5. it appeared lha! the count ry had fcturncd to public 
~cctor fina ncing o f plants , including \' ia concessionary lo..10S. St:lkeholders al KPLe aud 
221 As hiJ:;hlighl..:d in section 5.5_ UrPowcr4 has. Ilt'v",:\'cr. ou:· pl:rfo rmed its. IPP cOu::tCrp.1rts. recording 
the higllC:'l l 3vai labil ily, ulili7ation and relative contribution to generl IIO". 
m AES is. howevcr, once again exp.lIlding i~ 0pt'I"al ions into t.'m erging and dcvdopint; m<Jrkt.'1s. 
includ rng in 2006: grel..'Illicid im'cslment in Bulgaria. Jordan. Chi lt), Panam3, tr.Cla, Indoncsia :;10<1 
Vi!!lnam {i\ ES Corporation 2006 : 13). 
m II'S and CDC/G lobekq have a l~o maintained shares in Cote d' lvoirc' s Al ito IPf' since tht illception 
of the projt.'Ct in the late 1 990~. with IPS ho lding 23 per cent and CDClGlobclcq. t t per Cl!nl. 
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KenGcn ind ic;llcd , huwI.wcr. that such fu nding was lim ited and s low 10 rn al enalize. KPLC 
suhsequcnlly inv ih:d bids for an IPP for an 80 MW d iesel plant Most reccmJy. Kcn)a has once 
again cngagc,l Ihe private sector 10 supply emergency relief fur the persistent drought. 
KenGen's WO of 30 per CCIlI or its shares may further change the dyn:unics or the el~lri city 
m:ukcl. as ~'ou ld the creat ioll of an i ndepende~ l : tran~m iss ion company. Ex isting investmen t is 
nOI. however. sufficient to meet th.:.latcllt power needs in Ken);!, \\hc rc only 15 per cent of the 
population has accc~s. Creating and maintaining a sustainable b:dance between development 
and investmcnt outcomes is Kenya's challenge as it seeks to att rac t new invcstmcnL 
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Chapte,. 6 
Tanzania's Experience witb 1PPs 
6.1 InlroduClioli 
Un like many ckmcnls of Tanzani::t' s reform pbns in .he 19905, such as establish ing a 
Tq;ul;uor. rcstr m;tm ing tile $eCIOT, and prival ising the ut ili ty, the iU lroduclion of I PI's is one of 
Ihe few pieces thnt material ized. Tanzania' " "- !celriciIY S,(pply [rlli ustry. d larac tcri Zt:d by 
persistent state-ownership and controL has been transfonned by the addition o f .wo IPPs. Prior 
to the inception uf IPl's. nearly Xo per cent of powe r was provIded by hydropowl.:r; in contrast, 
!>l:IWCl' l1 2002 and 2006. thenllill IXl \Wr a~co lJntcd fur about 60 pcr cellt uf gene ration. which 
was almost cx dusivcly gl.:neratcd by IPPs, 214 B\:nctiting fr om new thermal capac ity, Tanzania 
was among the few Ellst Africfln cuuntries abk to avoid suhstantial load shedding. However. in 
early 2006, drought cnnd iliollS eroded Tanzania's hydro capaci ty Ixyond wh at the I P P~ cou ld 
provi de, lind the country rc~ot1ed !o e."(tensive load shedding in February 2006. which 
contin ued throlJghOlH all o r 2006. amoullting to app(Oximmdy 100 MW.m 
T:lIu ania is a part icularly important ea,e for uw.lcrstanding 11'1' dcvd oplll <: nl and 
i n ves t ll~en t outco mes for A frica. Notable aspects o f Tan7 .. 1nia's 11'1' programme incl ude: [PP5 
making extens ive contr ihul il'ns to the ESI, Ihc Government Or T an7 .. 1nla·s early c Ou rts 10 adopl 
re fo rms, th t: major COnlribution o r IPPs to redue:: load shedding, the cOlltrover;;ial nature of tht! 
11'1' costs and d <: \e!opmt:1l1 process, an d the Go\'<:rnlll<: 111 of T :iJrZlmia's (GoT) inte rvenlion 10 
a:>.'.,;sl TAN ESCO. thc stale utility. with its mo nt hly payments. T;lllz;lnia 's IPP -:x pcr~nc~ also 
o ffcl" s the uPIXJrlunit)" 10 cxnmine the rok of di fferent s takeho lders in the IPP proet:ss, 
including govcrnm~nl and private sponsors-both local !uld to reigo- togdhcr with the 
invu[veme nt uf mu lti lateral dcvelopment institutions, sueh as the World Bank. A.dditi onally, 
th e: M ini slry of Energy and M im:rals (MEM) is consideri llg dcvt [opi ng addit iona l I PP~. 2,6 
Over 30 interviews were cond ucted with more tlmn 20 stakehulders in January, Ft:bruary. 
,,\ ugust. N\)vembcr and December 2005 in Dar-es-$alaam. Wtlshinglon f).c. and via 
tcleconf('rem:c in Londull . Interviews wac follow~-d by emllil correspondellce to c larify 
no I.k! wc~n January and May 2007, the latest dale which [his fh ~sis recorded , II'Pslthertnal power 
accullnt.;tI ror only aboul 20 per cenl or lOla! g~nt.· rLl[ion due IQ Ih~ return of A()rmal hrdrological 
condi tions. There has been no t .... ad shecding recorded in 2007. 
m Tam'~1n ia 's neighhours (Uganda, Burundi. Rwanda) all resorted to load shedd inC between 2002 and 
2005. a per iod wh ich enincided wilh S~ \'ere tlm ughl in tlu;:: regIOn. Tan7Lllll1l was a:' <~' to m;\kt;" tip tltiS 
diffcf(!llI:e with \Pt's (al though out-olges due to t h~ t;}!lurc orlranSJlliss:cJl (lUd d lstn bul ll'Jl were rrequent). 
In enrly 2006, under continued drou£ht conditior.s, hy:iro short falls r~a,hed lorger levels th,m IPPs could 
mok~' lip. anti T:mzani;;l also began load sheddi r.g. Load shed::ling reached t2 to t8 hours per day in 
Illany lueas of the \"OUJllry in FehruOl ry 2006 anI.! contmued Ihrougholtt lhC year, dt:~p l le tPI's funning at 
I"ull C;'P:h:ity. 
l!ft Kerero::n.:es 10 both Government of T anzullia (GoT) ilnd Minist ry of Energy and Minerals (M EM) are 
made repeatedly throughout the pilpcr. While ME.\-1 is parI of GoT, it .~hould be noted Ihat explicit 
rcfcrcn.:e to GoT imp lics thaI stakeholdefS may have inc luded, but were not limittd to those. in MEM . 
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d iscuss ion poilltS. with tht' lasl reyi.:w of data conduclcd in May 200 7. Stakeholder interviews 
incl udcd prescnI and ron ner din:ctors and managers al Orca ExploTut ion, lPTL. Songas, 
EWU RA, M ~M. PSKC. TPDC, VIP, TANESCO, NETGroup Solutions. S ida, and the World 
!lank. Dill' tv sensitivity of dartl. rhe n,lfnes of.~/alcelrollJers, who hUI'e been Ihe primary source 
of datu f or this Illesis. have largtdy heen left 0111 uf the lllscuJ,siutJ' musl sllIlcehufclers are only 
idemiJicd if 1I11I1I. hy orgalli:nlilJlIui aftifiOlioJl in the re.lt A.~ <l ,·c.i:,II. /III/cit of ille dlllo, which 
fOrllLI' Ihe h(l.~ i.\· of this Chaprer. is not cited In certain illstances. howe)!!! ,.. where .\·tokelwltlerJ 
have indiCated (heir \l'ilhngne.~s. cilations do inelllde nllmes and tile desiglla tiun of "per com" 
jor persol/al camll/lmiCalion. 
6,2 TUIlZ:lni;, ' s Iwo m:lill IPPs: IPTL lind S onglls 
TaIlZ<l t1i ,\ deve loped two main [PI's over th.: last decadc .m Togtdhcr. they ..:ontribute 
appro)(i rnaTdy 300 MW, or abollt one third of the country' s present ge neration capac ity of 
I (J05 MW (im:l usivc o f emergency power a~ of May 2007) . In terms o f cllcrgy ~o ld, as of 2006. 
Tan/':lIIia' s IPl's w.::rc contrihuT ing over half or the e lectricity gCllcrut i()!I. and represented thl:! 
main source ilft hen nll ilnon-hydro) ":<lpaciry. Starting in 2007, however. with the resumption 
of Ilonnal hydrologica l conditions, II'P contribution dropp.:d to ahout one third o f total 
production. 
Independent Power TllllZirn ia Limited (IPTL) was the firs t II'P to begin to scl l dedri..: ity 
10 Ihe lIal ion;l l eleclric uti lity. An i nde l~ndently ne-gOliatoo (PI> among MalaysJ::an iJ1\-eS lor~ a 
local Tanzanian firm and the GoT, the constructiun of WT L was compkterJ in 1998, but IPTL 
startcd prwuci ng pow<.' r only in January 2002, after a three ycar delay resulting from a d ispute 
ove r construction co::;ts ilnd related capacity payments. The 100 r-.-IW die.:oel planl cunsists of 10 
medium-spee d units o f 10 megawatts each, wh ic h prcselllly rult on imported liFO. Eventual 
convcrsion IC1 do m.::stic natural gas has been intended for II'TL since its original PPA and is 
expected in the ncar-t(' rrn. 
~n Sever-II sm:!!l k if- producers han~ also sold power 10 TANESCO for many years. includlnS Tanwat 
(2.5 MW ). Kiwir:l Coal Mine (6.0 MW}-which ",eTC the tirs! IW O IPI'S"-3nJ K i l om~ro Sugar (2 .5 
MW). lIowever, Ih.::y sell only small ~mounls of C;':Ci':SS power, ant] Ilals are nOI Irc;del.! Within the score 
of th is study. KiwirJ's proposed add itions wi ll be treated ~ Iow together with the recent ly .:omrnissioncd 
MtWll!:l Energy Projcct. 
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T a ble 6. 1: ' I'crhnica l s rccilica(ion~ ror Tan7.ani:t·s II'l's 
"rojccls ' ! Size IMWn 'r«hnolo~y 
1 IFuel 
. t U'TL 100 Di.:scl 
generator! ) 
~;-;- , --- _J!~ 18. OCGTI , 
lX.!:iljccl _ Nawmll!:ls I 
Conlr:lcl r 
Iyp~ 
BOO 
-- -
. ... 
BOO 
. 
~~~~~­O) nlr:tcl ~ 1 L Cll p:u:iI)' Time from 
Y" :~r~ ! utililalilill lender 10 
, - 1 :lr r>cll:~ ol)crot lio ll 
'
20
0 
-1- 85% I i~2 
91 % 11)1)3-200..\ 
.-----
Songas, Tanzania 's second IPP, commcnc~d operalions in July 2004. The 180 MW 
Ilat\l rn l glls-ti red plant consists of six open cycle gas Turbines. which ute run on na1mnl gas 
sourced from the domestic off-shore S0ngo Songo gas field (four of the tu rbines were pre-
c.xis tillg and co nverted 10 rlln on natural gas) , The 11'1' is part of a larger gas project, which 
included: rt: furbishment an d dcvelopment of offshore gas we ll s; in stall lll iOIl of a gas proc essing 
Clcil ity; construction of a 232 kill pipeline to Dar es Salaam; convers ion uf all e)(i~ting 11 5 MW 
powe r station (U bungo) fro m j d fuel to natural gas, consisting o f four tllrbir:cs. as ment ioned 
above; the pruvision o f 65 MW add itional capacity aT the tlbun go stat ion; the supply of gas for 
thc Tw ig:'l cemenT pIaU[ a t Wazo Hill; and thc development o f a la1ser commercial market for 
sas. 2.10 The Song:ls proje..:t bem:tited from loans from the: World Bank' s lOA , EIB, and Sioa 
and involved numerous private sector companies and morc than 20 conlr.tcts Development of 
Song;)s lOok more tlmn a dcc'lde. 
: !! Cap:lClty ul illzation ta rgets arc set in the p<.lwer pt.n:hase agreem::nts 
m There was 110 formal lender for IPTL, rahcr IPTL was a result of a bilataal agrecment with 
Malaysian investors al1<1 l(>cal TanL1nian i n\'eslor~ 
lJO t\s of r.1a~' 2007, (he projed was suppl) ing gas 10 16 addit ional firms. namely: Aluminium Africa, 
Hora Industries, Kar ihu Texlile. KI OO Limited. LOlkh,tn, Mukwano. MUllah I, MI.rl ah 2. Murmh 3. 
;\ida Texti le. Tanzania 8rt"wcry Limil o:d , Tanzania·China friendship Te .~ lIle , Tan/ani<l Cigarctlc 
C<lI11pany .IIIJ Ur~fiki Texti le. ~nti t\\\J additi()nal p() Wer plOduccr) lAggreko, anJ Dowans). 
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"able 6.2: f1i nancial spcdfic~lt ions fnr TlInzani:, 's l PPs 
'>ruj~l ~ '>rpjtcl Tplal TOlal . \ UII':! I cquil)' Lpca l Inl ' l OFf 
enst eq uity ({Ok) tlt'b l (%) debt Ilrh'a lt: lin :mein!! 
, (USS deht 
m illlfnl) , 
IPTL S 121.2 S)S. 16 S ~N .04 USS I land , $IN .OJ -:"'-
(30%) (70% ) lease + in kind : 
(PPA& 
~~M.mlt...:.lO_,!j .- .. _-_. __ . 
::.onjpS , $266 $60 S206 S4 r roFL) - - $206 
Pmj" CI I (l3%) (77%) \ $4 (lfl ki rld by wilh .. ut , T A).IESCO & 
C\r :I!I .~i(tn 
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Tf'DC)lJ2 , 
(l IS i I\fW)ll l , I ' ------S(,nll;LS $5 1) S50 I - - - - -
" roJel' t I 
, ( \00%2.1.1) 
, 
i 
I 
, c .,,;r:ln ~ ini ! I , 
--.tf> 5 1\1 W) ~-----
-
, __ , ___ L ____ I j 
[t should be llo t.:d at till! o llts et or this C hapter that the maj o ri ty o r the rm alys is is rocuscd 
o n W r L :lnd Songas ,md the years lead in g up to 2006. Since there Itas bee n a flurry of private 
powe r a ctivity. includ ing seve ral t!lnc rgc ney power p la nts. the 1-. li wara Energy ProjCd ;'J11\1 ullits 
at K iwira Co .. 1 Po we r Lim ite d . Althoug h liS o r yet, o n ly h m ite d cll l>a..:i ty hilS ;u;tually been 
b ro u!;ht o n line . A br ie r desc rip tio n o f these d~\'elopmellls is p ro \' id cd im m \.'d ial\: ly belo w rOT 
general.d e fe nce. New pub licly s po nsm cd p lants will oc d isc ussed in secrio ll 6.3.3. 
Emt!rgl!tI(.), /lower 
A t the cnd of 2006, w ith persis te nt dro ug ht condilio ns, Ihc GuT engagcd IWO e mergenc)' 
p lants (with sho rt-term contracts of appro xim ately o ne year) . a ,10 M W gl.:l)l.: r;ltor pro vide d by 
Agg rc ko and :I se~o lld 40 MW gencl1Itor provided by a s ubs id ia ry of A lslo Tll . T he Aggreko 
p laul is using g;lS fro m the Songo Songo gas field at a price (I f US$2. 17/ 1\-1illio ll Briti sh 
Therma l Unit (MMlltu) (Tall=ania 2007b:4). In add ition to these two c rnc rgc T1 ~y plant s. 
ngreclIlc nt wa s struck w ith Ri ~ hnl(lnd , a sped nl purpose vch k le ro rmed in 2006 to provide 
I OOMW o f cmc rgclH.:y po wer, ro r two years start:ng in SepTe m ber 2006 (20M W) follo we d by 
m Songas projccl COstS include re furhishmeot o f gas \\ eUs, a I1t':W ga3 pr'()l,;es~ing illC ili!y, pipeline 
construction and flld conversion of the e J( isling powl.'r sliuion (UbungoJ, in lotal amou nt ing to USS266 
mill ion. :lod no additional USSjij IlIilI ion for e xpaosion 10 terms of two add itional lurbines (Iotal 6 5 
M W) aod r.:iat(d inlj-aslructul'C. T he ( Kp;!nsiol1 was fi nanced entirely by e qui ty. A rough tSlimale fo r the 
electricity generalion componenl would b( 40 pcr cent of project COSH or USS130 mill ion, hm;ed on 
USS35 mill io n for refurbishment ;md fuel con version 0: a isling lurbines, 1 JSS45 million assumed loaos 
011 l·xist ing turbino;os, a nd US$50 mill ion for eKpanStOn. I: should he nOled. liS will be rlcs.: ri lKd in delail 
in the 1( ;(1 . Ih<l t lherc was considerab le evolution io terms o r ltlc planned ~'3pac t ty for Ihe ?1:lII t, from 60 
MW tn th( current I ~O MW. 
~,~ Tanzania Uevelopmcil t Finance Company Limi ted (TDfL). 
m TAN F: St:U is (um'll lly pursuing rctl nancing of the Songas expans ion for a ~p lit o f 75: 25 debtfequi ty. 
which would re,; uce cnp ~lCi!)' charges. 
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the balance (80MW) by February 2007, which was safeguarded by a government guarantee. 
The first 20MW (of the 100 MW) was brought online in October 2006, fuelled with natural gas 
supplied by Songo Songo, however, only after the government advanced Richmond funds (as 
neither the parent company, which it turns out is a publisher, with no prior experience in power 
supply, nor the subsidiary, operating from a residential address in Houston, had money to lift 
the generators). Dowans Holdings, based in the UAE, has since bought the plant and taken over 
the contract. The remaining 80MW have yet to be brought online, and there is speculation that 
the additional capacity may be cancelled. Meanwhile although Tanzania's Preventative 
Corruption Bureau (PCB) recently issued a statement denying corruption in the Richmond 
case, there is general public dissatisfaction with the PCB's pronouncement and with how the 
plant came into existence. It is possible that further investigations may be launched to answer 
the many outstanding questions. 
Mtwara Energy Project 
In May 2007, Artumas Tanzania (Jersey) Limited (ATJL) brought online 12 MW, which 
is being fed by the Mnazi Bay gas fIeld.234 Also known as the Mtwara Energy Project (MEP), 
this project dates to 1994, when Tullow Oil was selected (via a selective tender) to develop the 
Mnazi field. In the decade that followed, however, no developments took place, with Tullow 
citing poor economics of the project as the main stumbling block. In 2003, the Canadian-based 
Artumas (which had also been involved in the selective tender of 1994) expressed its interest 
once again to develop the field and related gas and power infrastructures.235 Subsequently, a 
Production Sharing Agreement was signed by ATJL, the GoT and Tanzania Petroleum 
Development Corporation in May 2004. The firm re-entered an existing, unfinished gas well to 
drill it to acceptable levels in May-June 2005. In July 2005, the parent company, Artumas 
Group, sought to raise additional funds by listing its shares on the Oslo Stock Exchange as ~ell 
as by engaging the Dutch Development Company (FMO) in a 20 per cent equity share in 
A TJL. Seismic studies, the drilling of two more gas wells, and the purchasing 6 x 2MW gas 
engines to serve the isolated administrative regions of Mtwara and Lindi (on the southern 
border of Tanzania and Mozambique) followed. 
Previously Mtwara and Lindi were served by TANESCO at US$0.42lkWh using old 
diesel engines with less than 50 per cent reliability, compromised by (1) fuel supply challenges; 
234 ATJL, which is jointly owned by Artumas Group (80 per cent) and FMO (20 per cent), is the 100 per 
cent shareholder in four subsidiary companies: Artumas Group and Partners Gas Limited (AG&P Gas), 
Artumas Group and Partners Power Limited (AG&P Power), Umoja Light, and Artumas Energy 
Tanzania Limited (AETL). AG&P Gas oversees the development of the Mnazi gas field; AG&P Power 
is responsible for developing the power infrastructure; Umoja Light will run the transmission and 
distribution component, and AETL provides management services to each of the subsidiaries. For the 
sake of simplicity, however, A TJL alone is used in the discussion above. 
235 At the time, however, in 1994 Artumas was known as Tonardo Resources. 
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(2) shortage of cash; and (3) frequent breakdowns. In July 2006, ATJL signed an interim PPA 
to act as an IPP and sell power to TANESCO at US$O.l195lkWh for the first year. After a year 
of operations, T ANESCO is expected to lease the distribution infrastructure to A TJL, and 
ATJL will manage an isolated franchise area for 20 years (with less or no subsidy). 
Negotiations are still on, thus the project has not yet reached financial closure. Sponsors have, 
however, indicated that negotiations are due to wrap up in 2007 with financial closure expected 
by early 2008, at the latest. At this stage, apart from interim measures there is no bankable 
document or long-term agreement. It should be noted that there has been considerable 
disagreement about the demand of the Mtwara and Lindi regions, with some reports indicating 
demand of up to 300 MW and others as little as 9 MW. Project sponsors meanwhile have stated 
that they have identified approximately 90 MW of incremental industrial load, which will be 
the focus of its business development efforts in the near-term. 
Kiwira Coal Power Limited 
Kiwira Coal Power Limited presently supplies excess generation from a 6MW plant to the 
grid. In 2006, the company expressed interest in feeding a further 200MW to the grid. Fifty 
MW were expected by December 2006, followed by another 50MW in June 2007, and 100 
MW in December 2007, however, the firm has not yet secured (as of May 2007) the funds to 
finance the transmission line from Kiwira to Mbeya (a distance of approximately 135 km). 
Although the firm claims to have sufficient funds to develop the (first) power project, no work 
has commenced due to the lack of transmission funds. 
6.3 Power sector reform context 
6.3.1. The start of reforms 
The initiation of electricity sector reforms in Tanzania was catalysed by a combination of 
macro-reform priorities, national energy policy, electricity sector conditions, and international 
donor priorities. In 1992, the government expanded macro-economic reforms started under 
structural adjustment in the mid-1980s236 to include sector-focused objectives. Also in 1992, 
the first National Energy Policy, which included intentions to involve the private sector in 
development of the energy sector, was enacted. In the same year, facing a drought-induced 
electricity crisis and extensive load shedding, the government lifted the state utility's monopoly 
on generation to attract private generation and alleviate shortages, which paved the way for the 
country's two IPPs, discussed in detail in subsequent sections. The reform imperative was 
236 Tanzania's World Bank and IMF supported structural adjustment began with the Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP) in 1986-1989, following on two earlier national economic programmes. 
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reinforced by changes in World Bank lending policy, as spelled out in Chapter two (World 
Bank 1993a). 
6.3.2 Early efforts to commercialize and restructure T ANESCO 
The driving model of Tanzania's electricity reform was originally aimed at restructuring 
and unbundling the electricity sector for eventual privatization. 
At the time of initial reforms, TANESCO, the national utility, was already corporatized, with 
the firm operating under Tanzania's Company Ordinance Act since 1931. During the 1970's to 
mid-1980's the national utility functioned adequately, yet toward the end of the 1980's utility 
performance deteriorated (Katyega 2004:9). Despite its corporatized status, from the early 
1990's, the firm recorded poor technical and financial performance, making status quo 
operation increasingly untenable. 
In 1992, the utility was forced to shed 130 MW (Tanzania Electric Supply Company 
Limited 1992:5) due to lack of generation availability. By 1994, load shedding amounted to 
100 MW, still nearly one third of maximum demand in the grid system (World Bank 2001:4). 
Combined technical and non-technical losses amounted to 20 per cent in 1992 up from 15 per 
cent a decade earlier. Losses reached a high of 28 er cent in 2001, after briefly improving 
between 1995 and 1998 to 12-14 per cent (Katyega 2004:11). TANESCO was unable to cover 
its operation and maintenance costs and debt service repayments from its revenue collection, 
which fell during the 1990's. In the early 1990's, the average tariff was below costs due to 
reluctance to increase tariffs during prescribed currency devaluations. However, efforts were 
made to correct the trend, and the average tariff reached a strong position by the mid-1990's, a 
situation that continued throughout the decade (Katyega 2004:16). Additionally, TANESCO 
faced difficulties in enforcing payments for services and arrears. Debt collection days 
deteriorated from 203 days in 1990 to 413 days in 1999 (Katyega 2004: 16). Particularly 
difficult were collections from public institutions (Marandu 2001:37). With diminished 
revenues for maintenance, outages and distribution losses increased during the same period 
(Katyega, Marandu et al. 2000:4; Katyega 2004: 16). 
Efforts were made to commercialise and improve TANESCO's operations in the 1990's 
via the support of the World Bank Power VI project and the World Bank's Energy Sector 
Management Program (ESMAP) Power Loss Reduction Study and Technical Assistance to 
TANESCO Project (World Bank 2003b). However, despite these efforts (including 
introduction of prepayment electricity meters, loss reduction measures,237 and contracting out 
services), TANESCO remained in a weak financial position by the late 1990's, and utility 
performance deteriorated to unprecedented levels. It should be noted in this context that Power 
237 Improvements in losses in the mid-1990's, referenced above, were a result of an ESMAP Technical 
Assistance project. 
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VI, similar to Kenya's Energy Sector Reform and Power Development project, tied the 
development of the 180 MW Kihansi Hydropower station to power sector reforms, including 
plans for restructuring the sector and introducing of private participation into both power and 
natural gas development. 
In 1997, TANESCO was put under the President's Parastatal Sector Reform Commission 
(PSRC), as discussed in section 2.5.1, created in 1992 to oversee the privatization of state-
owned enterprises in industry and manufacturing. Formal intentions to restructure the power 
sector to achieve unbundling and eventual privatization were spelled out in a 1997 letter of 
intent to the World Bank, including restructuring plans to unbundle T ANESCO into two 
generation companies, one transmission company, and two distribution companies.238 A 1999 
Cabinet decision outlined an electric industry policy and restructuring framework to move 
ahead on restructuring and unbundling in preparation for privatisation, which as previously 
described, was informed by a study tour through, among other Latin American countries, 
Argentina, funded by Sida and organized by the World Bank. Among the next steps was 
engaging the international consulting firm, Mercados Energeticos, as noted earlier, to assist 
with a plan for unbundling, privatization and the introduction of competition. 
6.3.3 The management contract and future reforms 
Seeking more dramatic financial tum-around in preparation for privatization, the MEM 
issued a request for proposals for a management contract for TANESCO in 2001, which was 
won by the South African company, NETGroup Solutions in 2002.239 It should be noted that 
the management contract, in contrast to the Mercados work, which was funded by the World 
Bank Privatization and Private Sector Development Project, did not fall neatly into one World 
Bank credit; instead, for the management contract, Sida funds were administered through a 
World Bank trust fund. 
Under NETGroup Solutions and with the support of the GoT, TANESCO doubled revenue 
collection from US$11 to over 22 million per month between May 2002 and May 2004 (Davies 
2004, and unpublished T ANESCO data). These gains were achieved mainly through enforcing 
collections and arrears payment, with particular attention focused on the large arrears of public 
institutions. Enforcement has included high profile service disconnections and collections from 
the police, the national post offices, and even the entire island of Zanzibar in addition to private 
customers. 
In 2004, the management contract was extended for two years, through the end of 2006. 
The extension expanded the mandate of the consultants to include technical tum-around in 
238 Tanzania's commitment was outlined in a Letter of Sector Development Policy written to the World 
Bank in advance of the Songo-Songo gas-to-electricity loan. Such letters are common requirements to 
World Bank lending. 
239 Eskom of South Africa was an unsuccessful bidder. 
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addition to fmancial-turn around, specifically including electrification and reliability targets. 
When the contract fmally reached its end in 2006, significant revenue gains for T ANESCO 
(albeit concentrated in the first part of the contract) continued to be cited as among its 
achievements. Also, an achievement was the track record of working with GoT. The 
management contract failed, however, to bring more lasting changes in the financial and 
technical operations of TANESCO. Stakeholders cite financial constraints external to the 
contract-namely poor hydrological conditions, costs of IPP power, and insufficient tariff 
rates-to have limited TANESCO's ability to make investments to improve electrification or 
reliability (Ghanadan and Eberhard 2007:30-33).240 
In a few short years, T ANESCO went from being optimistic about prospects for financing 
service investments from utility revenues to crisis conditions where TANESCO urgently 
needed additional funds and emergency supply to account for increasing generation costs, 
supply shortfalls, and load shedding. These conditions hindered the performance of the 
management contract and the ability to make necessary investments in reliability and 
electrification. The prospect of making up the difference of increasing generation costs via 
large tariff hikes, raises the question of affordability, namely how high tariffs the economy and 
society can bear. Residential rates have already tripled in the last three years, and access 
remains only 10 per cent overall. 
Although initially the MEM was considering several different options for T ANESCO at 
the end of 2006, including an extension of the contract and standard reform steps as 
recommended by Mercados, TANESCO ultimately reverted to public control. Privatization no 
longer appears to be a near-term goal, and as of end-200S, TANESCO was taken off the list of 
utilities specified for privatization. Management is being decentralized, with the re-introduction 
of administrative zones and corresponding customer services. GoT is also facilitating a 300 
billion Tanzanian shilling loan (equivalent to approximately US$230 million based on May 
2007 average exchange rate) to TANESCO as part of a three year Revenue Recovery Plan, 
with the sole purpose to commercialize TANESCO and improve the quality of service-
notably goals under the management contract. The entire loan is being syndicated domestically, 
with the first tranche of approximately US$l 00 million made available in 2006. Stanbic Bank 
of Tanzania is the lead arranger; the Government of Tanzania is providing a government 
guarantee, but in contrast to the past several decades, no World Bank involvement has been 
seen to date, and none is expected. 
240 One important aspect of restructuring and institutional development has been efforts to develop a 
Rural Energy Agency and Rural Energy Fund (RENREF). Legislation was passed to establish the 
RENREF in 2005 although as of end-2006 it is still not functional. The RENREF is intended to 
complement commercialization efforts and consolidate donor activities, as non-commercial rural 
electrification will be separated out from T ANESCO operations and all donor projects and funding will 
operate through the RENREF. 
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Meanwhile, in terms of new generation, TANESCO plans for new plants, although 
delivery continues to be a problem. Initially 105 MW of new TANESCO generation was 
expected at Ubungo (60 MW) and Tegeta (45 MW) in April and December 2006, to be fuelled 
by gas from Songo Songo. Due to delays in these two projects, however, Aggreko and a 
subsidiary of Alstom provided 40 MW each, under short-term contracts. Richmond provided 
20MW, also under a short-term contract. The two TANESCO plants that were planned are still 
expected on line, albeit later and in a slightly different form and timeframe. A permanent 
100MW Wartsila gas turbine is currently under constructed at Ubungo, with commissioning 
expected in September 2007 and to be fuelled by Songo Songo. A further 45MW are expected 
at Tegeta, with 50 per cent funded by a grant from the FMO's Development Related Export 
Transactions Programme and 50 per cent via a loan from FMO. This plant is now expected to 
be commissioned in July 2008. A further state-led initiative, which has been in the planning 
stages since the mid-1990s, but for which attention increased in 2006, is the interconnector to 
link Tanzania with the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). 
In following the theme of power sector reform through this thesis, it is important to 
reiterate on the one hand the extensiveness of the World Bank's involvement and promotion of 
the standard model, which also found its champions within the country, and on the other hand, 
the significant deviation from any such prescribed model, as also evidenced in Kenya. 
6.3.4 Structure of the sector 
After a decade of reform efforts, TANESCO remains a vertically integrated utility but no 
longer holds a monopoly in generation. The two main IPPs, IPTL and Songas now contribute 
to generation, in addition to TANESCO's state-owned hydro and small diesel facilities. Small 
amounts of imports and self-generators also contribute to the ESI. Furthermore, as noted 
previously A TJL commenced natural gas based power generation for the southern-east 
franchise of Mtwara and Lindi in March 2007. 
MEM oversees sector direction. The TANESCO Board of Directors is appointed by the 
MEM and approves the day to day operations of T ANESCO. Since mid-2006, Tanzania has 
also seen the emergence of an independent regulator. Although legislation was passed to 
establish the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) in 2001, EWURA 
only became operational in mid-2006, with the following mandate: licensing, tariff regulation 
and quality of service regulation of the electricity, water, petroleum and natural gas sectors.24I 
Although the terms of any future IPPs may be subject to EWURA's review, all the country's 
existing contracts, including that negotiated with Richmond fall outside its purview, and in its 
241 Debates over the structure of the utility regulatory agencies and their relation to existing oversight 
bodies and line ministries caused delays in the development of EWURA and the other utility sector 
regulators. 
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founding documents, the regulator is discouraged from challenging any such agreements 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2001: 7(2,50». 
Figure 6.1: Structure and oversight of Tanzania's electricity supply industry 
MEM 
Oversees Sector Direction 
T ANESCO Board of Directors 
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6.4 Development of Tanzania's IPPs 
EWURA 
Regulatory Oversight 
6.4.1 Early gas discovery, drought and gas-to-electricity plan 
Gas was discovered in 1974 at Songo Songo.242 The initial plan was to harness gas for 
fertilizer production. GoT partnered with Agrico, an American company, in 1981, to form.the 
project company Kilwa Ammonia and Urea Company, KILAMCO (51 per cent GoT, 49 per 
cent Agrico). 
By 1989, with little to no progress made, negotiations collapsed. Failure to close the deal 
is attributed in part to the poor investment climate at the time, with little support for foreign 
direct investment.243 Meanwhile, the idea to use gas for power had long been considered by 
MEM, but there were insufficient public funds and private investment was not forthcoming. 
MEM began a more focused evaluation of the gas-to-power option after the Agrico deal fell 
242 Songo Songo 1 (SSI) was drilled and funded by AGIP, which had a Production Sharing Agreement 
with the GoT; SS2, SS3 and SS4 were drilled by TPDC using Government of India financial and 
technical assistance, which had been extended to the GoT; the rest of the wells (SS5, SS6, SS7, SS8, 
SS9) were drilled in the 1980s by TPDC. 
243 One stakeholder characterized the investment climate as follows: Tanzania was emerging from a 
command economy; firms were (legitimately) concerned with nationalization; the currency was not 
convertible and firms were not able to repatriate profits. 
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through. By 1991, it had been determined that gas-based power generation was the next least-
cost to hydropower and quicker to develop than other sources, which became a comer stone of 
the Power System Master Plan of the same year. 
Around the same period, in the early 1990s, the GoT was approached by Ocelot (today 
Orca Exploration), a Canadian-based gas company, with a proposal to develop Songo Songo. 
Among the options that Ocelot and GoT discussed were LNG development, a gas pipeline for 
export to Mombasa, and gas for domestic use. Two different plans were endorsed by 
consultants, but no conclusion was reached at this early stage.244 
On the heels of Ocelot's initial proposals, starting in 1992, the country experienced a 
major drought. The MEM in tum sought emergency measures to plug its power shortage. In 
November 1992, Sida, Tanzania's largest bilateral energy donor, provided funds for 
TANESCO to procure approximately 40 MW of power {two 18 MW ABB GT lOA open cycle 
turbines, which ran onjet fuel).245 The turbines were installed at Ubungo. Sida also committed 
to meeting the operating costs (primarily fuel costs) of the turbines, in the first two years, 
which amounted to about US$35 million. It was expected that by the end of 1993, or shortly 
thereafter, gas from Songo Songo would be available, i. . before the grant for fuel was 
exhausted, the country could convert to domestic gas to feed the two turbines (despite the fact 
that the gas infrastructure had still not been contracted). 
With persistent power shortages, and mounting pressure to procure fuel for the Ubungo 
plant, in FebruarylMarch 1993, the MEM invited 16 companies, which had experience in gas 
and power development, to bid for the Songo Songo gas-to-electricity project. According to 
stakeholders at the MEM, competition for the project was a pre-requisite of the World Bank, 
which at the time was active in reform proposals for Tanzania's ESe46 
The invitation contained a basic project concept to rehabilitate the existing gas wells 
(which had been drilled in the 1970s), develop a pipeline to Ubungo, convert and supply twq 
existing (ABB) turbines and add an additional 60 MW (in the form of two additional units), 
244 Export of gas and electricity from Tanzania to Kenya was recommended by Hardy BBT Limited and 
the Songo Songo Gas Development Project (gas for domestic use) was recommended by National 
Economic Research Associates, based in the U.S. 
245 The turbines were a conditional grant to the GoT, but a loan to TANESCO and whoever 
inheritedlbought the units. The book value of these two turbines amounted to US$15 million on Transfer 
Date (August 31, 2004). 
246 World Bank involvement at the time included the Power VI Programme, as referenced in the previous 
section, a US$200 million loan to help rehabilitate the Tanzania ESI, under which the Kihansi 
Hydropower station of 180 MW would eventually be developed (initially planned for 1995 but came on 
line in 2000 only). A key provision in the Power VI Programme was that for any new investments to the 
power sector of greater than US$5 million the World Bank should be informed-a less stringent 
condition than that spelled out in the Songas loan agreement which required World Bank approval. The 
rationale behind this policy, which applies generally to World Bank IDA countries, was to ensure 
coordination, namely coordination with the World Bank, which was among the largest lenders to the 
sector. 
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under a Build Own Operate Transfer arrangement.247 Firms were allowed to form consortia to 
ensure both upstream and downstream expertise. Among those companies invited were: Enron, 
British Gas, Amoco and Ocelot. 
At the time of the initial invitation, no credit enhancement was provided (i.e. no sovereign 
guarantees, no escrow accounts) despite a widely perceived poor investment climate and an 
insolvent utility. Furthermore, firms were given only six months to submit bids with a deadline 
of August 1993 set by the MEM. It should also be highlighted that the plant size (of 60 MW) 
was small for international standards. 
Due to these limitations (namely, investment climate, time, size), of the 16 invitees, only 
two submitted bids: OTC, a joint venture between Ocelot and TransCanada Pipelines (a 
Canadian firm with expertise in power development), and a joint venture of Enron and Andrade 
Gutierrez.248 In December 1993, the MEM, TANESCO and TPDC met to review proposals, 
ultimately recommending the OTC bid to the Minister of Energy. The World Bank was 
consulted in January/February 1994, and OTC was officially awarded the tender by February 
1994. By July 1994, negotiations commenced in Dar-es-Salaam with the project company 
Songas, which was composed of Ocelot, holding a 25 per cent equity stake, and TransCanada, 
which held the balance of the equity. 
As negotiations were gaining momentum, the country experienced yet another drought in 
November 1994. At this time, additional equity partners were under consideration, including 
TPDC and TANESCO, which would eventually formalize their stakes in the project by October 
1995, together with those listed above. In addition, over twenty different contracts were being 
drafted to satisfy the requirements of the Songo Songo project participants, and financial 
closure had not yet been reached. Rather than wait the six months or more before the project 
was finalized, the MEM sought to install additional emergency capacity at Ubungo. 
6.4.2 Persistent power shortages and the emergence of IPTL 
It was at this time that GoT began considering, among others, the Independent Power 
Tanzania Limited (IPTL) project proposal/49 which would ultimately yield an additional 100 
247 This project concept would evolve significantly over the decade-from 60 MW to later 150, then 
scaled back to 115 and eventually to the present 180 MW. 
248 Enron put up a proposal but did not submit it in July 1993 (due to a court injunction against the firm). 
Only two proposals were received - one from the Joint Venture of Ocelot Energy Inc and TransCanada 
Pipelines Limited, and the other from Andrade Gutierrez. Since the latter was experienced as a road 
infrastructure construction company without petroleum exploration skills, during the clarification period, 
and after Enron was cleared by the court of law, Andrade Gutierrez and Enron formed the joint venture 
and re-submitted their proposal (in a form of clarification addendum) in November 1993 before the 
negotiations started. 
249 Among the other project proposals cited to address the 1994 power shortage is one by an Irish 
national, Reginald John Nolan, with investment interests in Tanzania since 1986 including through 
supplying military equipment to the GoT. Also under consideration since the mid-1990s has been an 
interconnector to link Tanzania to the SAPP. 
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MW. The IPTL project company was formed between a Malaysian fIrm, Mechmar (70 per 
cent), and the Tanzanian fIrm VIP Engineering Limited (30 per cent). 
According to numerous stakeholders, the IPTL deal grew out of genuine South-South 
collaboration, which was being heralded at the time as an alternative to the North-South donor-
recipient model of the previous decades. Within this context, Malaysia was seen as a 
promising partner, a leading "Asian Tiger", whose growth could be replicated in other 
developing countries. Potential investments were earmarked for the transportation sector, but a 
fIrst priority was given to electricity. At the time, Mechmar had been contracted by CDC to 
develop a 2.5 MW unit for the Tanwat wattle factory in Tanzania (see footnote 148). The fIrm 
also had experience in developing six other biomass plants outside of its home country. VIP 
had never worked in the power sector, but had considerable experience as a promoter and 
negotiator for projects. 
On November 21, 1994, IPTL submitted a proposal to the GoT. It should be noted that 
unlike Songas, there was no formal tender. However, with the persistent power shortages the 
GoT had been seeking a fast-track solution to increase its non-hydro generation capacity. A 
meeting was convened on December 15, 1994 to address the proposal, attended by the then 
Permanent Secretary of Energy and Petroleum Affairs, Commissioner of Energy and Petroleum 
Affairs, Assistant Commissioner of Energy and Petroleum Affairs, Managing Director of 
TANESCO and other key representatives from the GoT including the Treasury, State House 
and Attorney General. At this time, both parties (IPTL and GoT) agreed that IPTL could not 
meet the fast-track power deadline for mid-1995, but that the fIrm's proposal might be 
considered within the context of the country's long-term power plan. 
Instead, through a World Bank facility (that existed as part of the Power VI project) the 
GoT was able to fInance two additional turbines of 35 MW each (two GE LM 6000 open cycle 
turbines, burning jet fuel). Combined with the previous turbines, this now made up a total of 
approximately 115 MW at Ubungo, which met the immediate shortage, and IPTL was deferred. 
As with the previous turbines, it was expected that the GE LM 6000 would be converted to 
bum natural gas at the earliest possible date.25o 
6.4.3 The AFUDC and increasing Songas engagement 
Meanwhile, Songo Songo negotiations continued. Tanzania Development Finance 
Company Limited (TDFL) (sponsored by EIB), IFC, DEG and CDC all joined the project 
company by February 1996. Among the key provisions agreed to later in 1996 was the 
allowance for funds used during construction (AFUDC) and the escrow account. 
250 While the choice of jet fuel as the preferred fuel for the gas turbines is understandable in the light of 
plans to covert the turbines to run on natural gas within a short time, it can be argued that it was a risky 
and costly strategy - particularly as the special quality of jet fuel used was otherwise not commonly 
available in Tanzania. As a result, the fuel bill was unnecessarily high. 
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In the case of Songo Songo, the MEM sought to engage the project sponsor's equity 
(before debt) for three primary reasons: to commit the project sponsors up to completion (with 
the consequence that they lose their equity if they quit prematurely); begin work on 
refurbishment of wells (rather than await financial closure which was expected to take about 
two years); and finally, debt funds were not available at the time. To entice sponsors to start 
development, the MEM offered a nominal interest rate of 22 per cent on all equity 
(denominated in US dollars) disbursed during construction, also known as the AFUDC. Due to 
the fact that there were no funds to pay sponsors at that time, it was agreed that the AFUDC 
would be compounded annually until such time that the project started generating revenues. It 
was expected that revenues would be generated starting at COD, within a one year period. At 
COD, the AFUDC would be added to the project capital cost (and repaid through the capacity 
charge), then sponsors would subsequently earn an annual return on equity of22 per cent (non-
compounded). The AFUDC started accumulating in 1996.251 
In addition to the AFUDC, sponsors required an offshore escrow facility to cover 100 per 
cent of target equity contributions ahead of the Transfer Date (TD, i.e. July 31, 2001), as an 
exit strategy if nationalization occurred prior to construction completion date. The amount in 
the escrow account was to be reduced to 50 per cent on the 3rd Anniversary of TD i.e. August 
1, 2007 and zero on the 6th Anniversary ofTD i.e. October 2010.252 The escrow was to be 
raised through a surcharge on fuel. 
6.4.4 IPTL agreement and disagreement 
Although Songas was expected to materialize in the near-term, during the same period, 
negotiations reached completion with IPTL. A PPA was signed between the GoT and IPTL for 
a 100 MW diesel generator in May 1995, which was expected to be converted to run on natural 
gas with the completion of the Songo Songo gas-to-electricity project. Standard security 
arrangements and credit enhancements, as will also be seen in the case of Songas, were sought 
and obtained. A sovereign guarantee was extended to the project for the full value of the PP A. 
An escrow account, to be held by the Central Bank of Tanzania, equivalent to between two and 
four months capacity charges, was also negotiated.253 These terms differ from those negotiated 
by Songas, described above, which may be explained by the fact that the MEM never 
251 It should be emphasized here that neither the AFUDC, nor any of the other credit enhancements 
extended to IPTL or Songas, is not uncommon, and (especially) in the case of the AFUDC that the terms 
agreed upon were based on the assumption that the project would be completed in a timely fashion (i.e. 
COD was expected by June 1999 which would mean an AFUDC of US$25 million). That assumption 
proved wrong, and significant interest accrued as it took five more years for the project to reach financial 
closure and almost a decade before COD, delays that are largely associated with disputes over IPTL. 
252 At the moment, the amount in the Escrow Account is US$2.5 million (with funds having been used to 
buy down the AFUDC) and will reduce in the same way (as specified above) or if negotiated otherwise. 
253 The IPTL escrow account is in effect a liquidity facility, although it is termed an 'escrow account' by 
stakeholders. As of May 2007, the escrow account has not been established. 
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di lTerenl s takeholders. 
Financial dosure required anillher Iwo years , and ult imaiely involved Iwo M:lbysian. 
based banks (Dal1 k Bumipulra Malaysi:. Ba had--now Rank Hum tputm Cnmml!n:i,l llJank--.md 
SIME Bank) and an info nna l gua r.mtee by th ;:: M:lt:tys ian government 10 thl,! llanks that their 
i nve~ t !l1 cn t would w st:cure in T<ln l.ania. 
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<among others, lucal partner VII' and II 'TL m"n~g\:mcn t itself. who a/gue Ihal the project 
emerged from a genuine SOUlh-South collabor~t ion with M <l laysia, the project was ick nt ilioo as 
a viable solut ion by GoT s tarl ing in December 1994, and the parlies agreed ( legally) 10 tcnllS of 
the I'I'A .lS-I 
·1 he impact of thc 1PTL agre~m~nt was not imnwdialc . Ncgol inlions with Songas were 
o ngu ing Bnd the project W1llpany continued 10 ma ke c4uity disbm scme nts to fund the 
development o f the proj ect (with an imp:1Ct on the AfO [)e) unti l 1 ~7 . Itt Ih is year, several 
things hH pp~'ned . First ly, JPT L rcached finan cial closurc and st:l.rlcn construct ion, w ith an 
Engi neering l'r()l.; urCmClll and Cons truction Contract (EPC) comp letcd wi th Stork-Wartsila 
Diesel B. V. of the Netherlands i.c. the plant bcgan If, materialize. Sccond ly. in the latte r part of 
1997 , 't anza nia's hydro logica l s ituation reve rser] 1i,le 10 El Nino. Stan ing in Dcce mne r, 
rc:s\; lvoirs begun li tl ing and would u ltimately Qverllow (and bt: ab le to s ustain the coullI ry 
Ihrough II lIl iI 2001). Final ly. lPTL pbnl c osh C<l ffiC in at USS:SO mil lion (with ,III additiona l 
USSl3 mi ll io:l budgeted for fu el ..:onvels io:l to natc r,ll ~as for a 10lal o f US$163 million). As a 
~ ,\ p:U1 f.·om the arbitra tion proc<-"'<:dinl,'S, disctlSSt..-n bclo .... , in ..... hich corrupt ion ligurcd promrn<;,ntty. an 
investigmioll was also comllkted to document the corrupt ion, but ch;l/"g<.; ~ wcrl.'" never hruught by the 
lioT. <'::~'rt l1 in sl1Ikcholders inJ i.::atL-J that the fa ilure to bring charges was du to to the filet that "too many 
were imptic:lII:d," others that "the investigation itsel f WflS fbw~J" ar.J ~t i t1 lJt h cr~ tha t il was "i n th ... best 
interest of tlw country not 10 pursue". 
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result, Tanzania found itself overcommitted in terms of capacity; the country needed at the 
most one plant but certainly not twO.255 
With power now in abundance and fmancialliabilities mounting, and under pressure from 
World Bank representatives, T ANESCO served a notice of default to IPTL in April 1998 with 
intentions to terminate the contract. The charge made by the utility was that IPTL substituted 
medium speed engines for slow speed engines, but did not pass on the capital cost-savings to 
the utility. Contrary to earlier cost estimates, the government determined that for a similar 
size/technology plant, it should be paying no more than US$90 million.256 Disagreement over 
the substitution257 and the capacity payment persisted throughout 1998, culminating in a 
Request for Arbitration on behalf of TANESCO at the World Bank's International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), headquartered in Washington D.C. Meanwhile, 
IPTL filed a petition with the High Court of Tanzania claiming that commercial operations 
were to commence in August 1998, and as a result, IPTL was owed capacity charges ofUS$3.6 
million for each month since that date. This petition would eventually become part of the 
ICSID tribunal once it was convened, in June 1999, with both parties agreeing to a cessation of 
the High Court proceedings. 
The tribunal involved several phases. In the ftrst phase, TANESCO attempted to rescind 
the PPA on the basis of technical issues (namely that medium speed engines were substituted 
for slow speed engines). In April 2000, in the midst of ftrst phase proceedings, T ANESCO 
additionally requested the Tribunal to hear corruption charges. The request was refused, as no 
allegations of bribery had been formally pleaded. In May 2000, the tribunal ruled against 
rescinding the PP A, but stipulated that the capacity payment must be lowered to match actual 
construction costs. Following on the initial ruling in what may be termed a second phase, 
TANESCO made additional efforts to rescind the PP A, this time formally raising bribery 
charges through an Ancillary Claim. Sworn statements were provided by the Perman~nt 
Secretary of MEM, Assistant Commissioner for Energy (petrol & Gas) and Assistant 
Commissioner for Energy (Electricity). In June, the tribunal ruled that TANESCO could 
pursue bribery charges, but only within the existing timeframe of the ftnal hearing in one 
month's time. The tribunal ordered both parties to produce any documents in relation to the 
charges. The tribunal did not allow wide-ranging interrogations or include a forum to require 
parties to answer speciftc questions on bribery allegations. 
255 As will be seen, however, the country's demand increased dramatically over the ensuing years and 
eventually required the capacity of Songas, IPTL and is presently in need of additional capacity. 
256 In initial discussions with IPTL sponsors on December 15, 1994, spokespeople for the GoT indicated 
that they would be willing to pay capacity charges of US$27.5 kilowatt (kW)/month, which is 
considerably higher than the US$90 million investment costs arrived at in 1997. 
257 IPTL contends that it briefed T ANESCO on the substitution well in advance and that it was made to 
enhance maintenance of the plant. 
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By July 2000, TANESCO produced some documents to the Tribunal but requested an 
extension of three months as it had not yet completed its bribery investigation. The tribunal 
disallowed any such extension, but proposed to T ANESCO to withdraw the bribery charges 
with the option of raising them later in separate ancillary proceedings after completing its 
investigation, which the utility never pursued. The Tribunal ultimately ruled: i) allegations of 
bribery had failed based on information presented, ii) capacity charges should be reduced based 
on actual and reasonable costs incurred, and iii) there had been no breech in the fuel supply, as 
alleged by TANESCO. The final award, made in May 2001, upheld the PPA signed in 1995, 
adjusted the capacity charge to US$2.6 million per month, and indicated that conversion to 
natural gas would be as per the original PP A - with the costs of conversion paid by TANESCO 
(with a benchmark ofUS$11.6 million ser58) and work to be carried out by Wartsila. 
6.4.5 Implications of IPTL dispute on Songas 
During the three year dispute between IPTL and TANESCO, Songas would be put on hold 
out of concern that the utility could not absorb power from two plants and that the ESI was 
implicated in corrupt dealings. Three critical developments occurred during this period. First, 
although no additional work was completed by sponsors, the AFUDC continued to compound 
at a rate of 22 per cent per annum (which will be discussed in detail below). Secondly, the 
scope of Song as was scaled down from 151 MW (per 1995 negotiations) to 115 MW in light of 
the expected IPTL capacity.259 Thirdly, significant changes occurred to the composition of the 
project sponsors. Both the IFC and DEG pulled out of Songas shortly after the IPTL dispute 
became known (with CDC taking over their associated financial obligations of approximately 
US$12 million).26o Furthermore, by 1999, TransCanada arranged for the sale of its majority 
share to AES, citing a strategic decision to consolidate its assets in North America. Two years 
later, Ocelot (known at that time as PanOcean, later EastCoast Energy and presently Orca 
Explorationi61 would do the same, however, for different reasons, namely consolidating it~ 
258 Current estimates peg this conversion cost at US$20 million. 
259 The additional capacity in Songas (previously referred to as the Songas expansion) would be 
demanded with the 2003 drought. 
260 IFC's pull-out has also been linked to the small scale of the investment, namely that it was difficult 
for the organization to go to its board for project approval for an investment of US$4 million. DEG's 
pull-out has been linked further to the size of its own organization: the associated dispute with IPTL 
exposed DEG to too much risk given its small portfolio of projects. 
261 Ocelot, the initial investor in the Songo Songo gas-to-electricity project, was replaced by its 
subsidiary company, PanOcean in the Songas project. PanOcean sold its shares in the power project in 
2001 to AES to concentrate exclusively in the gas development. In 2004, Pan Ocean spun off its interest 
in Songo Songo to a separate company: EastCoast Energy, which in April 2007 changed its name to 
Orca Exploration. PanOcean maintains significant interests in oil fields in Gabon. It should be noted that 
EastCoast Energy did not bid to development the Mtwara Gas-to-Electricity Project. Project inception 
for Mtwara coincided with the time that EastCoast was negotiating its production sharing agreement for 
Songo Songo; an additional venture was beyond the appetite for the firm, at the time. 
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interests in the Songo Songo gas field exclusively.262 Thus, by the time the IPTL arbitration had 
been concluded and sufficient demand had been ascertained, the AFUDC had increased 
substantially and the original lead Songas' sponsors had all but transformed (with only CDC, 
TPDC and TDFL maintaining their minority shares in the project). 
It was under AES that the PPA was completed and financing for Songas eventually was 
finalized in October 2001, nearly a decade after Ocelot had first approached the GoT. As with 
IPTL (for which financing required an informal guarantee by the Malaysian government), the 
financing for Songas was atypical in terms of global IPP investments. With no available 
commercial finance, the GoT obtained an IDA credit together with a loan from the ElB which 
it then on-lent to Songas at a rate of 7.1 per cent.263 The total debt available to the project, as of 
October 11, 2001, was equivalent to US$260 million (US$200 from IDA and US$60 million 
from ElB).264 265 
262 In terms of the production sharing agreement between TPDC and Orca Exploration, profits are shared 
on production with respect to 'additional gas' only. Additional gas is defined as all gas other than that 
'protected gas' designated for Ubungo turbines I-V (150 MW) plus the cement factory for the 20 year 
PP A. For average daily sales of 0-20 million cubic feet per day (MMcfd), TPDC's share of gas revenues 
is 75 per cent while Orca's is 25 per cent; for 20-30 MMcfd, TPDC 70 per cent, Orca 30 per cent: for 
30-40 MMcfd, TPDC 65 per cent, Orca 35 per cent; for 40-50 MMcfd, TPDC 60 per cent, Orca, 40 per 
cent, for greater than 50 MMcfd, TPDC 45 per cent, Orca, 55 per cent (Orca Exploration 2007:9). Profit 
sharing for gas in the as of yet unproven section of Songo. Songo, will, regardless of average daily sales, 
be divided on the following terms: TPDC: 45 per cent Orca Exploration: 55 per cent. 
263 Throughout the 1990s, all export credit agencies were off-cover in Tanzania; no foreign commercial 
banks were willing to lend as there was no clean track record of commercial loan repayment. 
264 As per Table 6.2, however, only US$206 million in DFI funding was ultimately used, only half 
(US$108 million) of which came from the IDA credit "Songo Songo Gas Development and Power 
Generation Project" (World Bank Credit 3569-TA). The remaining debt was sourced from Em, old loans 
and previous credits. 
265 The reason why concessionary loans were not passed on in entirety to Songas and subsequently to 
T ANESCO to reduce costs further was that the Songo Songo gas-to-electricity project was part of a plan 
to gradually commercialize TANESCO. Thus, while loan rates were increased from 0.75 per cent to 7.1 
per cent, they were still significantly below commercial bank loan rates in the mid-teens. 
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AES 's exi t from th.: project was a product of the g lobal downturn in the pri v"te power sector 
and fo re ign direc t investment in gencmi, caused by thl' Asian and subseq uent I.atin American 
I1nancial crisis, after-shocks of 9/ 11 and the Enroll scandal-to which liES \'iilS c\osdy 
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the lIew lend shart.:h o lder ill Songas, with the balance going to FMO.261 Thus by April 2003, 
st ill one year lx:fofc CO D, th  proj ect had seen Illre.: differe nt h::ad ~ han:ho ldcrs. It was during 
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wra pped inlo thl.: ca pac ity c!wrgc, however, by April 2003 the amoun t had ba llooned to 
US$103 m illion an ti wlluld have meant a monthly capacity charge of more than US$6 mi llion. 
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AFU DC, as di<:eusso.:d ill dct<l il laler, total co.~l'; were aetua!!y greater not leSS. 
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:... ,\ fiet" the AES snle, equity ShOlfCS Olnd associated tinanei;l l commItments (expres!.('c in US$ million) in 
Songas were as fo llows: Globd eq: US$33.11 (56%); FMO: USS 14.6 (24%): TDFL: USS4 (7%); CDC: 
USSJ.6 (6%), TPDC: USS3 (S%) and TANESCO: USS I (2%). This does not renl'Ct the adll it ional 
USS50 million thai Globclcq committed for Iho: exp.msio n. which as n()ted in footnote 23 1, TANtSCO 
is pn:scntly tr)ing to refinance, however, as of May 20t)? no progress flas b..:cn recorded, 
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the Songas Escrow facility (40 per cent) which by 2003 totalled about US$50 million, Ministry 
of Finance (50 per cent) and TANESCO (10 per cent). Globeleq did not require an escrow 
facility as a condition of its purchase, and the facility has not been replenished post AFUDC 
buy-down. 
With financial closure completed, the AFUDC out of the way and a new shareholder at the 
helm, Songas was nearly set for operation. The only piece left was the plant expansion of 65 
MW, which although foreseen in the original PPA, was postponed until 2005 due to lack of 
demand. The expansion was 100 per cent financed by Globeleq (although presently efforts are 
being made to refinance). The following section addresses operations and associated costs of 
each plant. 
6.5 Analysis of IPP operations and costs 
Although Tanzania's IPPs were considerably delayed, since coming on line starting in 
2002, the plants have brought about a transformation of the country's ESI-from nearly 80 per 
cent hydro dependent to thermal plants making up more than 50 per cent of generation during 
2005 and 2006. By 2007, with the return of normal hydrological conditions, reliance on IPPs 
dropped to 20 per cent of total generation. Songas has been running at about 50 per cent 
capacity, with limited amounts presently contributed by the emergency plants (Aggreko, 
Alstom, RichmondIDowans) as well as about 4MW from AG&P. IPTL is, according to 
stakeholders, virtually shut down due to the difference in fuel costs. With the two of the three 
emergency plants running on Songo Songo gas at US$2.l7IMMBtu and with IPTL's 
conversion to natural gas outstanding and therefore running still on BFO at US$8IMMBtu, 
there is little argument about who to dispatch first. It should, however, be noted, as mentioned 
at the outset, that this and subsequent analyses focus primarily on the period up to 2007 and 
therefore almost exclusively on IPTL and Songas. 
6.5.1 Generation and capacity utilization 
During a period of drought, starting in 2003, the country turned extensively to power from 
IPTL. Subsequently, Songas was integrated into the ESI, albeit later than initially expected, for 
drought-relief. As noted in the introduction, the thermal power from IPPs helped the country to 
avoid serious load shedding between 2002 and the end of 2005,269 which has saved it around 
US$l.OO/kWh of outage averted (or about 5-10 times the cost of generating electricity) 
(ESMAP, 1998).270 
269 See footnote 225 for a discussion of load shedding due to generation constraints commencing in 2006. 
270 A study by ESMAP (ESMAP 1998) estimates US$I.00 per kilowatt hour as the cost of outages in 
Tanzania, which is derived from earlier studies showing: the cost of unannounced outages to industrial 
customers at US$ 2.25/kWh (Tanzanian Industrial Research Development Organization, TIRDO study), 
the cost of outages to other customers at US$ 0.30-$1.00/kWh (Acres International and USAID 1992 
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Figure 6.2: Composition of electricity generation, January 2002- January 2007 
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July 2004: Oct-Dec 2005: 
Dec 05 - Dec06: 
Acute hydro shortfalls, Transformer Acute hydro shortfalls, Hydro >90% IPTL online Hydro shortfalls Emergency generation Songas online breakdow ns, loadshedding 12-16 IPPs 0-10% Hydro >90% Hydro 75% to avoid loadshedding Hydro 45-60% power rationing hours/day during 2006 IPPs 0-10% IPPs 25% Hydro 60%, IPPs 25%, IPPs 40-55% during repairs Hydro 40%, IPPs 60% 
Source: Ghanadan and Eberhard (2007:32) 
With increasing pressures due to drought combined with growing demand, the IPP plants 
were run at near capacity, between 2003 and 2006, contrary to initial concerns about the 
country's ability to absorb the power. 
Several points are noteworthy in this context. Firstly, delivery of Songo Songo gas was 
delayed, which, due to an acute power shortage necessitated emergency generation, namely 
running existing Ubungo turbines on imported jet fuel as well as additional usage ofIPTL. 
Secondly, Songas was not at full availability its first year of operation, which also necessitated 
additional use of IPTL. 271 
Explanations for Songas' delays and subsequent shortfall in capacity have been attributed 
to failure of a sub-contractor working on the gas infrastructure to deliver on time, expansion 
work and technical failure of existing turbines. The plant was offline in January 2005 to make 
connection for the expansion project. Availability suffered again in May-June 2005 due to 
failure of turbine III. Although Songas was required to pay penalties for these missteps, 
according to sources within T ANESCO and Songas, penalties do not match the additional costs 
study), and the cost of diesel back-up generation at $0. 12-0.33/kWh (ESMAP estimate). It can be noted 
that the latter estimate has increased considerably over the past few years due to the strong increase in 
international crude oil and refined products prices. 
271 IPP monthly average capacity factors are calculated from name plate capacity and monthly electricity 
generation, based on 100 MW capacity for IPTL and incremental increases in capacity with development 
of Song as: 78 MW (Aug-Sept, 2005), 115 MW (Oct 1, 2004-March 9, 2005),151 MW (March 10,2005-
June 7, 2005), and 190 MW (beginning June 8, 2005). In the case of Song as 190 MW represents the base 
maximum capacity, according to sponsors, with the base dependable capacity at 178 MW (Songas per 
com 2007). In all other instances, throughout this thesis, 180 MW is used as the capacity figure for 
Songas. 
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incurrcd hy the ul ilily during the per iod , which amounted 10 US$o1 ) mi ll ion i1 nd was fin ;mccd 
Ihrough an <;:nle rg<!nc), World Bank loan .l71 
Figure 6.3 hig hlights the c xle lll to which the c;'p.1e iry factor ;.lters the per k ilowatt hour 
c harge o f cac h pf the planls. Fo r ins tance m a capacity f.1clor o f I per cenl , a t wh ich IPTL W<l S 
run in iti:lIly, the co untry &W o' c harges of US$4.80IkWh. Approac hing nea rly 100 pe r cent 
capac ity USL'. IPTL charges fa ll to US$o.or)? ?Cr kWh. A I fu ll c<lpacity, ho wever, tPTL c 1targe~ 
a rc still IH.:arly do ub le those of Songas, despite the fac t that the Songas c<lJAlc ity ( harge is 
comprehe ns ive of the ga~ in frastructure, 
" ~ 
• ~
~ 
·0 
• ~
• <.> 
Fig ure 6,3: [1' 1' Total Ch:'r/!cs per Unit at Different Lt'vd s (If Pl:lnt Usc, Uased (In 
Monthly Data, J u n 2Um _ Dec 211{)(,11J 
1 0 
0.' 
0.6 
0 .. 
0.2 Oct> 
O<!» 0"0 
10 100 
Total Charges per Unit (UScIkWh) _log scalo 
Source: based on Gralwick, Ghanadan and Eberhard (2006:4 5) and geno.:r:ltcrl by Gbanad:m 
6,5.2 f uel bills, d eals and connrsion 
1,000 
Wh ik till.: capacity fa ctor goes a long way in explnin ing th e differe nt prices at Ihe end of 
th e sp('clnllll , cspc..: ially ror IPTL, there is a crit ical difference in pe r kWh elwrges (and IOlal 
mo nth ly (h:lrgc~) th:lt is explaine d by the difference in fuel on whic h II'TL and Songa ... art 
olX!ratillg, Songas u~cs domest ic natural g:L~, where as WI L rel ies (In impo rted diesel fue l. 
m Funh~'r ollt ag~'s III :006 lIere (:1use..-l by .... ha, has !xc" described us technical f3ttgue due 10 tbe fact 
that the open cycle pl<l!lt was base-loaded f,x slXh an e~tendcd period , :-longus " .lid t'or rep'urs, and 
T ,\N ESCO d id not bea~ :lOy direct eo.'>t other than of course 103t rc,'cnoe due to Ihc tiKt thaI the uli lilY 
had no reserve m:ugin. ;\ s a result ofll\e outage, du: ing 2006, Songas' ilvailabil ity dropped to 89.4 per 
cent, slight ly Inwcr than the target of 9 1.3 per cent, specltied in the PPA, Thc planl. as of 2007, has. 
howc\'cr, maintainl'ti an avct3gc of9 1_8 per cenl. 
In TOl!l l ch.lrgcs pcr ullit inclmk energy and capacity c1WfgCS nor:nalilcd to gcntr;t lion, ;In!! r ~prtse nt 
monthly avc ragts, (PTL dm.l points ifldud~ ran 2002-Deu:mber 2006 (n=58 months); Songas data 
points inc)ud ~ July 20M-December 2006 (n~28 me nths). Unit charges arc V AT exclusive, 
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The g.as price for Songas for turbines J-V and for the Tw iga ce ment plant, wh ich was 
dcveloped as part o f the Songo Songo glls- to-elc ctr icity pro,iect. is set a l U5$ 0.551 MMBIlI. 
i nd~xed 10 the tlSA C PI u\'er the course o f the 20 year PI'A The special price o f US$O.55 
only pertains to the ' protec ted gas' thai has been ea:m:uked fur UbLlngo turbines I- V anlilhe 
cement f.1clory.l74 All addi tiomd gas that is sold from Songo 501:go is priced :113 nl<lximum of 
7S per cent the buyer's liquid fuel equivalent. Pre:>enrly TANESCO is negotiat ing long- term 
!I"S COfl tra..:ls at bctw~cn appruximate ly US$2. 00 and US$2.4IJ pe r Gig.youlc OJ (I GJ = .95 
MMUtll).!1S 
Tab le 6.5: Sungu Son~o gas reserve.., pr i ei n~ lind IIS:l~C 
-
.-. ~ 
C h:truete r i:r.:1 tiOn .. r Price ~ol~s 
J. Protected Gas 
. .L_~_S$O. ~5IMMntu Allocated IOf Songu~ (llirb i n c~ I-V - 150 MW) 
_ e lll.:: .~~ment fa..:ta ry for 20 ~e:lr [>[' A 
11 . Add i t ia n~l GilS i Maxi mum 75% of A ll non-pro tected gas. includes both reserve gas : , liquid fu el de,crib~d below and ga~ ~ lI rrcnt l y uSed for , , i ~'t1 uivaknt Cbungo VI (below), IPTI. fu el Wtlu1d .;orne i 
-
i) Re~erve Gas Maximum 75'!o. of 
__ )i:~m 'additlllnaillas' i 
100 (kr of Sas set aside fo r go\<e rnt;;;nt to 
liquid fuel det\!rm ine US\! .... ith lll 5 ycar~ of lmmf;,:r date 
, uivalcm (luly 2004) _ ._ 
- .. Nocc. Ik f. bI llion cubiC feet 
Although gas sales wilh lhin! parties ::re den doping (from sc\en comp.mks ir. 20061016 
as of 2007), until recent ly they were a fracti on of total pr(lduction: Songas and therefore 
TANESCO (since fuel is a p<lss·through) .... as the prim:lry taker, and thcrd ore in css~'ncc thc 
market makcr. Songas' fuel price was eOllcC"ivd of as pan o f the initia l projec l conce pt tLl 
offse t the capacity d largcs su that the utility would nOI shulilder the full we ight of dc\·doping 
the country's g:lS infras tructure. 
White not benefi t ing from special ' protected gas ', II'T L was, from project inception, 
sla ted III l'l\: co nyerted to run on natural gas and source its fud from the ' addi tiona l gas ' 
rese rves of Songo Sun go. The project was the refore to benefi t from an estimated m inimum 
fue l cost savings o f 25 per ccnt (given the additional ga~ pric~ s~ t at ,( nwximum of 75 per cent 
the liquid fu el equivale nt). This plan was reconfirmed ill ti n! IPTL <lrbitral'ion whcn US$11 .6 
mill ion WiL., tagged as an eSli 1l1~t!! to be paid by TANESCQ for convertin g lPTL. 2?~ Although 
m The r~;L'>On why Ub UJJS(l lnrbine VI WliS nOI included In the original ga~ dea l j., due tu lin; fact lhat il 
was nOI jXlrt of the original projcci concept. V3S is pes~n l l , (as o f May 2007) being ~old al US1i2.1 7 
MM Otu High Heal Va lue CHIIV). the same price I~r which IPS is being sold to i\ ggreko and 
Richmond/I)ow"ns. 
m !Jenchmark ing Ihese price$ rrprrsents a particular cl'la lkngc since Ihere w{'!"e fe ..... options Jor the gas 
as it was virtually a stranded a~t. A comparison with the Henry l lub natu",1 gas spot prices of 
USSI 4 .IW/MMBtu (December 2005) provides linle actual Yah:\! A potemkllly Ir:ore aecU!'l.te 
comparison may be the m:l-baek Y-.llue of cxpurting ,gas to Kenya ( MombaSSJ), whk h has been 
a£pro.\ imat~d (Lt r'U or~ Ihan US$J.oo/MMBlu. 
l " As noted in footnote 258 currenl cost estimal~~ for conv:::rsion arc d os\'t 10 US$20 milli (JrJ. 
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the savings is not equivalent to Songas, it wO'.lld amount ttl n reduclion of <lpproximatcly USS I 
mil lion po:: r month (gi\'en a current average month ly fuel charge o r about US$3.6 milJion).m 
Songo Songo gas was available starting July 2004 . Ilo\wver, W'I L has std l not been 
convclted. Conversion has repeated b.:'Cn delayed. In 2005, stakeholders allributed conversion 
delays to a host of fae lOrs: probabi lity and ava ilabili ty o f fuel rescr\cs; tochnological 
convcrsioll c hallcngi:s; s~uring fi nancing: resistance from lendcrs ~ fuel pric ing formula ; and 
debt and equity rencgoti:ltion/disputes. O f these six factors cnrmibuting to delays, among the 
mo~t COUlmon ci ted by stakehukkrs was that concl:ming cOllversion of tile techno logy itself 
The cngines needed tl"l he converted, but Wartsila S\\/[) I!! V 38 diese l engines had never run 
on rratu ml gas. Thus \\I"arts ila, which is also the operator of IPTL, tirst Ilt:edcd to conduct a 
se ries of tests. Although according to one stakeho lder close to the projec t. "th is is not rocket 
science". a test-bench must be booked and time allotted to carry Ollt the wnrk. As of 2007, 
convers ion de lays nrc primnrily attribut.ed to agreement not yet being rC:lchcci hetwccn owncrs 
and debt-holders (which will be discussed in detail in secti n 0. 5.3). Furthermore, new 
po tentia l chalkngcs have a risen with regard to the Song<> Songo gas prllcessing plant. 
The capacity of the gas processing plar.t i.~ about lOS mill ion s l;ruci;ml cubic fee t per day 
(l\'I Mc!(l), and as of May 2007, Ihe plant was uti lized at 65 per cent, wilh Songas, Aggreko, 
Alslom nnd Ih(.' 14 other gas customers, With the IPTL conversion (l(JOMW), capacity 
uti li7.alioll w ill he IOf) p CI' celli with a buffer of approxim.'llc ly 20rnmscfd. '.1 hus. when/if 
rainfilll subsides. the re wi ll he in.sufficiCll t capacity to feed the 100 MW Wartsila plan! at 
Ubungo (expet;ted in Scph!mber 2007) and the Tegela plant (expected in July 2008). Although 
the procurement proce~s has slarted to increase capacity, here also delays have heen 
encountered, which coul d impede gas del ivery. Thus, presc ntly nnder discussion is a plan to 
further d,day Ihe IPTL conversion to ensure that Wartsila is supplieu. Conversion might 
thcref'lre happen as late as 2009 . 
6.5.3 Monthly ch:lrges to TAl\'ESCO 
A(:\lIal monthly charges to T ANESCO for operating the two [PPs ( inclusive of hoth 
encrgy and capacity pilymcllls) during 2005 amounted 10 an ave rage o r USSJ3 million per 
month, or well ove r 5U per ccnt of TANESCO's monthly rcvcnue. For 2006, this figure 
sky r()Ck~ tl!d to a sl:rlillcring 96 per cent of T t\ NESCO's l1lonthly rCVi:l1ueS due to exchange rate 
HuelunliOlls, increases in the price of HFO and the reduction in T A:-.JESCO's re venues. 
Allhollgh c:lpadty lac tvN mailer in terms of the price per kilowatt hour, they have no hearing 
on Ihe 10lal capacilY charge, which is a fi xcd monthly charge to the ut ili ty fO finance Ihl! cap ital 
-_ ... _--
m Stakchol .. krs ill Ilu: MEM indicate that fue l ~'~lVings wi!! be t'vI,:n gro::ater for IPTL, al 60 per cent (nol 
75 per ccm) of present costs, based on HFO prices. In :tddilion, furl/rer roonctlol".s in co .• 1 may result 
rrom the increase in the c tTrdency oCtile plant running on natural gas. 
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cost o f the project, unlike the e llcrgy chargt:. whi:.: h varies with operation. For WI L, these 
c'.pacilY charges we re negotiated on a straight-line basis l'Or the 20 year du ra tion o f the PPA, 
which means provided therr;: are no chang,,-,-s 10 the project owm:rsh ip or debt. the ut ility will 
pay US$2.6 mill ion month ly, :Idj usted for inflatio n. g{ling rorw~rd . For Songas, the s ituation is 
dilTcrcll1, a.s the c.-tp:le i,)' charge decl ines on a stmight-linc basis to 7.ero O\'er the life of the 
project, w ith the loan repaid by }C,lr ! H. 
T:thll' ( •. 6: 11'1' m onthly char!,:,':;: and gcnn:tliun17H 
r--"~~-----' 
II'TL 
, I 
" 
, I 
, , 
rgcs I/S. Rcn'Jluc , 
" a 
JPI' ,·S. Tota l 
II . Lmscd un a i 
Note : (i\Vh : gigawatt hours: mo: month 
L 
1J7. I 
I , 
L 
Whole-
('erind 
$ ).9 - 9.6 
I , 
" 
A nu mber o f issues are worth reiterating in this ':O(1('e,'(I. First. the tluelL talions in the 
capac ity .:h:lrgc depie tcd in 'Iable 6.6 relate to: annual inJlation adj us tment s for both IPTL and 
Sllugas: change in Snngas dt: bt paymcnts (discu.~sed below): increased Songas. capacity, with 
turbines V :md VI coming onlinc mid· February and cnd-»1:;ly 2005, rcspt:c li\"t: ly. Second, 
Songas' cap.""Icil)' chaf!~es arc indusi\\~ of tht!" entire gas inrrastructure and shoulll not bc 
mis taken for the price o f elcctr icity gc r.cr:ucd from Ubungo alo ne. Th ird. as a lso diS<:llsscd 
m Average JI' I' monthly charges for 2005 UTe based on monthly dala a" ~ i l a blc for Ihe perio i:! Jan \U Se-pt 
2005. AI/crag..: I/;I[UCS lilr the whulc period for each ~e~pecti vc lrp include: U'TL Jan 02-()t.'C 06, for 
Songas Jut} 04 · Dec 06. AIs{' nOle IhJ t total wr charges and tol;ll 11'1' gcncratlon dunn:; whuLe period 
do 110\ C<.{ 1I ~ 1 the sum of indivi..lualll'TL lU la Song:3s vatu::!> . r otal charges ~an the \lholc period from 
2002 10 Dec 2006 . Howt:vcr, Songas only calnc or.c line ill Jul)' 2004. Thus fur many munlh~ only 
II'TI. wa s running. and average va llics and n nges do not ..::orrcspond. 
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above, the most significant monthly charge for 2005 has been the variable energy charge for 
IPTL, a cost, which is expected to reduce by a minimum of 25 per cent after the plant is 
converted to run on natural gas. 
A final issue relevant to the present capacity charges is that TANESCO has not been 
paying the subordinated debt portion of the Songas capacity charge since May 2005, and the 
liquidity facility is presently at zero.279 Full charges would reflect the 7.1 per cent interest rate 
and amount to approximately US$5.8 million per month (plus US$I million VAT), with 
US$4.2 million for turbines I through N and an additional US$I.6 million for turbines V and 
VI. 
Figure 6.4: Songas financial arrangement 
0.75% Monthly capacity 
,.----W-O-rl-d--~I-----~;----------.------+,...---------. ch&ge 
J'--___ --' 7.1% "I t-_--flJr-----, Bank 1 GoT .... Songas ~ T ANESCO 
6 yr grace period 
on interest 
Source: author's compilation based on stakeholder input 
7.1 % intended to be 
reflected in capacity 
ch&ge 
The current non-payment of the subordinated debt was provided for in the subsidiary Loan 
Agreement dated October 11, 2001. Due to the fact that GoT borrowed funds from IDA and 
on-lent to Songas (at a premium), if TANESCO fails to pay Songas the amount equivalent to 
the principle and interest, Songas is relieved and forgiven up to that amount, while TANESCO 
is treated as a borrower at more stringent interest but relieved until it is able to pay. Since 
TANESCO is wholly owned by the state, it is up to TANESCO to make a case either to payor 
swap with other obligations of the State. Initially it was expected that the existing arrangement 
would continue until such time when the government declares the utility bankrupt or 
TANESCO becomes liquid and pays, however, presently, there is a strong likelihood that the 
debt may be forgiven by the GoT as part ofTANESCO's Revenue Recovery Plan. Regardless 
of the final resolution, this arrangement has helped the utility to reduce its present financial 
liabilities for Songas to almost half. 
Although there has yet to be impact on either plant operations or charges, equally 
noteworthy in this context are the idiosyncrasies and conflicts related to IPTL' s debt structure, 
which have evolved after COD. In February 2002, only one month after IPTL commenced 
commercial operations, local partner VIP petitioned the High Court of Tanzania to wind up the 
project company. Reasons provided by VIP were: oppression by the majority shareholder 
(namely that Mechmar refused to involve the VIP nominee director of IPTL in corporate 
279 The utility is still paying the EIB portion of its subordinated debt, i.e. it only applies to the World 
Bank portion of the debt. 
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decisions); fraud by Mechmar in inflating the IPTL capital cost; and failure by Mechmar to pay 
its equity contribution (i.e. the project was 100 per cent debt fmanced). IPTL management has 
denied all claims. 280 There has been no resolution of this conflict. 
In the meantime, however, IPTL's debt, which was non-performing, was first purchased 
by Danaharta, a Malaysian entity that bought up many non-performing loans after the East 
Asian financial crisis, and then resold to Standard Chartered for US$74 million in November 
2005. VIP has subsequently contested the sale to Standard Chartered on the basis that the very 
loans that were resold are under dispute. Meanwhile, since the sale to Standard Chartered, the 
GoT has been in negotiations to buy IPTL's debt, with the Ministry of Energy indicating that 
such a purchase should be fmalized by end-2007.281 Furthermore, it is expected that subsequent 
to the debt purchase, the government will also buyout the firm's equity. Should any sale be 
finalized with GoT, the project may see a significant reduction (if liot complete elimination) in 
capacity charges (see Appendix A for a breakdown of project costs). Finally, an important 
point to reiterate is that conversion is expected after the gas processing plant increases capacity 
and the debt and equity buy-out is finalized. There is a remote chance that if conversion is 
delayed, with new TANESCO thermal due online (namely the 100 MW Wartsila plant at 
Ubungo), IPTL may actually be mothballed until such time that it may run on natural gas. 
6.5.4 Benchmarking costs 
It has been established that IPTL is presently more expensive that Songas, but are the 
costs reasonable? Based on construction costs per kilowatt, at both its pre-arbitration costs of 
US$I,635 and its post-arbitration costs of US$I,272, IPTL appears to have the highest such 
costs within a sample of similar size/technology IPPs in developing countries. Kenya's 
Iberafrica plant is, however, in close proximity, indicating that costs may be generally inflated 
for the East Africa region. Although Songas employs a different technology, namely OCGT,282 
it is worth noting that isolating project costs related only to the plant (as detailed in footnote 
231), the per kilowatt construction costs are approximately US$684 or about half those of 
IPTL. 
Given Songas' lower variable cost, the plant has been dispatched before ITPL (following 
basic merit order dispatch protocol). Thus, Songas is contributing more in terms of total 
generation. A notable point in this context is that although IPTL constituted only 37 per cent of 
280 With regard to the equity contribution, IPTL maintains that equity has been contributed by Mechmar; 
the firm's financial situation has changed drastically, however, since the arbitration, during which 
geriod, IPTL incurred significant debt. 
8! The sale price to GoT has been estimated at between US$70 and 80 million, although VIP asserts 
that, according to the amortization schedule in the arbitration award, the value of the debt should be no 
more than US$40 million. 
282 Using natural gas as a fuel makes Songas also more efficient from a fuel usage perspective. 
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the total IPP generation for 2005, when both plants were running at full capacity, its costs 
accounted for 62 per cent ofthe total (IPP generation). 
An analysis of the kilowatt charge per hour of the two projects confirms the contrast in 
costs. Although IPTL has been running at a slightly higher capacity factor (70 per cent in 
2005)-the total kWh charge for the plant was still more than two and a half times that of 
Songas. 
In sum, IPTL costs do appear to be higher both than the international norm and than its 
IPP counterpart, Songas. There are, however, several costs to Songas that are not presently 
reflected in the capacity charge, namely the AFUDC, the full cost of debt, the escrow 
facility283, and the sunk cost of the original drilling of the wells in the 1970s. An assessment of 
Songas' total charge per unit including these elements would be measurably higher. 
6.6 Balancing outcomes? 
The development outcome for Tanzania has been mixed. The country has been able to 
expand its generation capacity and did not resort to serious load shedding between 2002 and 
2005 (see footnote 225). Tanzania also has succeeded in commercializing its natural gas, 
which has helped reduce the fuel bill for the state utility and numerous other small industries 
(previously reliant on petroleum imports) as well as alleviate the pressures related to securing 
quality fuel in a timely manner from abroad. GoT may claim a payback period of less than half 
the time originally estimated on turbines I-IV of the Songas project (or three years instead of 
six), due to the increase in JET A-I fuel prices?84 Songo Songo gas has also been critical in 
fuelling emergency plants, Aggreko and RichmondIDowans. 
Despite these developmental gains, power in the case of IPTL is, as has been shown in the 
previous section, proving to be more expensive than the international norm (even post-
arbitration). Furthermore, the IPTL arbitration was particularly costly to Tanzania, both in 
terms of direct and indirect costs of arbitration, and eroding credibility of the project in the eyes 
of many stakeholders. Songas, while less costly than IPTL, did incur significant costs to the 
country in the form of the AFUDC and the escrow account. The extent to which IPTL and/or 
283 Additional costs related to Songas: I) the AFUDC was paid down by GoT, Treasury and TANESCO 
for US$103 to reduce the capacity charge; 2) the subordinated portion of Songas World Bank debt is 
currently not being paid; 3) the escrow facility ofUS$50 million (which was used to help pay down the 
AFUDC is presently only US$2.5 million) but did until 2003 tie up GoT funds; 4) the cost of the original 
drilling of the wells, which amounted to approximately US$IOO million, is as indicated above, treated as 
a 'sunk cost'. 
284 This is calculated by taking: the total project cost (debt US$206 million + equity US$60 million), 
divided by the product of 12 months and monthly energy saving (replacing Jet A-I fuel with natural gas) 
of aboutUS$3.5 million for UGTl -UGT4, by the then prices, which means that the payback period is 
almost 6.33 years. Since Jet A-I fuel prices doubled in 2005, the payback period is reduced by half to 
almost three years. 
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IPTL-related events inflated Songas costs (particularly the AFUDC being 75 per cent more 
expensive than expected) should not be overlooked. 
With regard to the investment outcome, it too has been mixed. Parties have secured a ROE 
of 22 per cent, but there has been significant equity turnover, and Globeleq is the third lead 
shareholder on the Songas project, after previous ones lost interest due in part to project delays. 
The present majority shareholder in IPTL, Mechmar, has been trying to sell the asset for 
several years, and the minority shareholder issued a winding up petition to terminate the 
company four years ago (which remains pending). TANESCO has been unable to make its full 
debt payments (to Songas and hence to the GoT), and IPTL's loans were declared non-
performing, and then bought by Danaharta, an initiative of the Government of Malaysia, and 
most recently by Standard Chartered. New IPP capacity, namely ATJL, has been added, 
without a formal framework. Meanwhile, the emergency power that plugged the 2006 power 
deficit was fmanced through state and concessionary funds, as are the new plants expected at 
Ubungo and Tegeta. 
With considerable negative results reported, and outcomes ultimately recorded as mixed, 
is it appropriate to discuss balance and sustainability? It would appear that such results do not 
translate into sustainability for IPTL. A resolution may be on the horizon if the government 
buys the IPTL debt, but such would not represent sustainability with regard to the original 
project concept and partners. In terms of Songas, although results have been superior to IPTL, 
according to the firm, as of June 2007, "the investment has the poorest payment and security 
record of any of our plants in Africa and Asia." Although the firm is presently selling all of its 
other assets, as previously discussed, it is retaining those in Sub-Saharan Africa due to the fact 
that the indicative bids have not been favourable. Does this in tum mean that outcomes are 
rated poorly? This thesis would argue that the Songas contract may ultimately be upheld, but it 
is unlikely that a similar experience will be actively sought again. It may be sustainable for one 
project, but surely not replicable. 
The following sections examine the myriad factors that affected outcomes. Of the 
different exogenous stresses reviewed to date (civil strife, macroeconomic shock and associated 
currency devaluation and drought), only one is taken up in the discussion below, and only in 
the broader context of electricity sector reforms. As seen in Kenya, there has been no evidence 
for macroeconomic shock; instead, in evidence is creeping devaluation throughout the course 
of the 1990s, in Tanzania, followed by a relatively stable currency environment in the period 
since the IPPs have come online. Thus there has been little to no perceived impact to date, 
however, with PPAs of 20 year duration, denominated in US dollars, there is always a risk of 
future impact, which may be exacerbated by the rising price of fuel imports (so long as IPTL 
relies on HFO). 
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6.6.1 The investment climate: risk perceptions 
The first initiative to develop the Songo Songo gas field collapsed in the 1980s largely due 
to the poor investment climate. At the time of the inception of the IPP plans in the early-mid 
1990s, little had improved in terms of the investment conditions. It is arguable that conditions 
had even worsened, with an all time high inflation level of between 30-35 per cent reported in 
the mid-1990s and no foreign commercial lenders willing to lend to the sector. 
While there were several impediments to the initial bid for Songas (size of plant and short 
bid time), the investment climate features prominently in why more investors did not come to 
the table. With the risk of expropriation still perceived, investors took little interest in the 
Songas bid, with only two of the 16 firms invited submitting bids.285 It should also be noted 
that the mere fact that there were no previous such investments exacerbated the perception of 
risk. 
Both IPTL and Songas eventually obtained debt at interest rates of less than 10 per cent 
(below commercial rates, available in the mid-teens), but the debt was not easy to come by, 
which may also be linked to the poorly perceived investment climate in Tanzania. In the case 
of IPTL, eventually the Government of Malaysia intervened to convince two Malaysian banks 
that their loans would be secure, which amounted to an informal guarantee on the part of the 
Malaysian government. 
In the case of the Songo Songo gas-to-electricity project, in a departure from most project-
financed IPP deals globally, the GoT obtained concessionary loans, which it then on-lent to the 
project sponsor. Although less costly than commercial debt (which again was not available to 
the sector at the time), these loans required substantial time and conditions (with the World 
Bank mandating that any future power investments in excess of US$5 million first receive 
World Bank approval--a more stringent condition than that laid out in the Power VI plan, 
which only required notification not approval, see footnote 246). 
Although both IPTL and Songas were able to obtain debt at interest rates of less than 10 
per cent, the two project companies required a ROE of 22 per cent, a further indication of the 
riskiness of the investments and the general climate. According to sponsors, this was 
comparable to the ROE of projects with similar risk profiles within the region and adequately 
reflected the risk inherent in the Tanzanian ESI, namely that TANESCO, the off-taker, had no 
experience in paying IPP capacity charges and was fmancially feeble at the time. 
It is arguable, however, that much of the risk was mitigated by additional facilities 
negotiated by the projects, which have been used extensively for infrastructure projects 
globally. Both projects negotiated liquidity-type facilities, (although IPTL's is referred to as an 
escrow account and has yet to materialize). In addition, IPTL obtained a sovereign guarantee 
285 Insofar as there was no organized competitive bid for IPTL, it is difficult to evaluate the direct impact 
of the investment climate on the bid. 
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equivalent to the value of the PP A. Songas received no outright guarantee, but it did convince 
the GoT to establish an escrow facility and provide a rate of 22 per cent on AFUDC 
compounding annually. 
Public stakeholders contend that fear of the obsolescing bargain, in such an investment 
climate, did motivate these extra protections. This has, however, been countered by private 
stakeholders who insist on both the standard nature of such additional protections as well as the 
now accepted position of the private sector playing a critical role in providing infrastructure, 
i.e. no longer accepted practice that assets should default to state hands. What does the 
evidence say? Have bargains obsolesced? Have security measures, as seen in Kenya, reduced 
and/or eliminated the obsolescence? For Tanzania at the end of a decade of private power, one 
of the IPPs may be returning in part to state control and the next long-term power is being 
provided by the state, with concessionary funding. These developments do not, however, 
represent any outright or creeping expropriation. Instead, they seem to point to an attempt at 
redressing the perceived imbalance in development and investment outcomes. Thus, the 
obsolescing bargain may have played a role in motivating behaviours, but associated 
protections that follow from the obsolescing bargain have, in contrast, to Kenya, not been 
determinative. Instead, it is the apparent imbalance that has been instrumental in bringing about 
changes to the present and future deals. 
This is still not the whole story. More remains to be said about how such an imbalance 
came about. Although the investment climate contributed significantly to outcomes, one cannot 
attribute to it all the project ills or benefits. There was after all no independent regulator to 
review PPA contracts. Furthermore, other factors such as actual project plans and execution 
have contributed significantly to outcomes. 
6.6.2 The electricity sector: drought, doubt and reform 
The management of the electricity sector, which was widely affected by drought and the 
intervention of other ministries, played an equally if not more important role in determining 
project outcomes than those previously discussed. The primary issue of relevance in this 
context is the planning and execution of the Power System Master Plan, which initially 
included specifications for Songas, but not for IPTL. 
Throughout the early and mid-1990s, Tanzania experienced severe drought conditions and 
power shortages. It was in this emergency context that four turbines were installed at Ubungo 
prior to completion of the Songas deal. It was also in this context that IPTL first bid to build 
fast track power in Tanzania. According to several stakeholders in the MEM, they were 
roughly operating within the Master Plan but on a six month time frame with the intent of 
solving the drought induced shortages as expeditiously as possible. But six months came and 
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went with Songas, and sponsors and other key stakeholders did not see the project 
materializing. 
With deadlines passing and power cuts persisting, it is alleged that other ministries, 
affected by the power cuts, started second guessing the six month fix. There was a general 
sense that TANESCO and MEM, following the World Bank procurement procedures and 
relying on concessionary loans, were not able to deliver projects on time to address the 
shortages. As noted previously, the cost of unserved electricity to the economy was high and 
therefore Tanzania paid dearly for no power. Thus, the backdrop of the IPTL agreement 
appears to have been a failure to deliver on the Master Plan and hefty associated costs for many 
Tanzanians facing loss of services, TANESCO facing loss in revenue, and the Tanzanian 
economy facing loss of productivity, together with a clear interest in collaborating with 
Malaysian investors in the context of South-South partnerships. Ultimately, the sector suffered 
from poor planning and execution, which interfered with the one plant solution and the original 
Master Plan. 
It is difficult to fully assess the impacts of the overall ESI reform process on the IPPs. The 
IPP deals were concluded, despite the postponement of the unbundling of T ANESCO, its 
privatisation, and the establishment of the regulatory agency. Thus, the sequencing of the 
reforms did not follow the standard prescription outlined in Chapter two. Although such a 
sequence, to take just one example, may ultimately enhance the transparency of procurement 
processes by having the regulator precede IPP bids, it was not followed in Tanzania due to the 
realities of the day: immediate generation required amidst drought conditions.286 The private 
management contract for T ANESCO initially improved its financial position, and the utility 
was in a better position to service its PPAs - however, persistent drought conditions changed. 
Initially, the GoT stepped in to assist TANESCO with approximately 30 per cent of the 
charges, however, as of mid-2007, GoT shouldered 100 per cent of the charges, which is 
expected to continue until such time that TANESCO recovers (via its Revenue Recovery Plan). 
In reflecting on reforms, stakeholders provide a range of comments. Some assert that full 
implementation of reforms would have radically changed that status quo. The country could 
have had cheaper power, including possibly sourced from the Southern African Power Pool, 
and may not have faced the same level of emergency situation as it did through 2006. Ot)1ers 
argue that reforms may not have altered the present condition of the ESI. The drought and 
political interference could have easily sabotaged any Master Plan and attempts to screen 
projects by an independent regulator. 
Stakeholders insist further tariff increases are necessary to deal with the increasing costs 
of generation with reliance on more costly IPPs. However, these increases have a high cost to 
286 The extent to which such divergence from the model calls into question the validity of the model will 
be probed in section 7.7. 
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the economy and society, as Tanzania is trying to make industrial tariffs competitive with 
neighbouring countries and residential customers have already experienced a tripling of 
residential bills in the last three years. The need for further tariff increases - effectively a result 
of IPTL's high construction charges, Songas' high interest charges, delays in conversion of 
IPTL, and ostensibly high private sector returns - flies in the face of promises to the public that 
tariffs would decrease rather than increase with reforms. Notably, electrification rates have not 
increased, as revenue gains are going to pay for more costly generation rather than investments 
in expanding services. The IPPs filled a critical gap in supplying much needed power. 
However, combined IPP charges have left little for other improvements, despite the utility's 
doubling of revenues. 
6.6.3 Making and breaking the Songas project 
Although both the investment climate and the state and management of the electricity 
sector go a long way in explaining development and investment outcomes, a series of project-
specific factors provide even further clarity as to how and why projects have faired for the host 
country and investors. In terms of Songas, five main issues standout: the characteristics and 
the conditions of the project partners, the idiosyncrasy of the project financing, the PPA's 
AFUDC, the benefits of the gas agreement and the equity turnover. 
World Bank put Songas on hold in 1997 after it became clear that IPTL was coming 
online. The World Bank only gave the go ahead for the Songas project to recommence in 
2000-01, following the arbitration process (which according to some stakeholders served to 
cleanse IPTL and the sector of alleged corruption); it had been proven that Tanzania's demand 
growth could absorb capacity from both plants; and following justifications by MEM.287 
Although the root cause was the IPTL dispute, during the time that Songas was postponed, the 
AFUDC accumulated, reaching over US$100 million by 2003. Furthermore, all procurement 
processes were aborted and then restarted. While the project may not have happened without 
Bank support, the presence of the Bank led to a very distinct set of outcomes. 
The GoT, Songas' largest lender (on-lending the World Bank and EIB funds to the project 
company) has supported the project extensively. The fmancing agreement was that the World 
Bank would on-lend to the Government of Tanzania, which would in turn on-lend to the project 
at a higher rate, in an attempt to move T ANESCO toward commercialization. With 
TANESCO facing financial constraints, particularly since May 2005, the terms of finance have 
been readjusted, as per the 2001 subsidiary loan agreement, with government accepting a 
postponement of interest and principal. This agreement is presently reducing TANESCO's 
287 The World Bank exerted significant pressure on GoT to cancel the IPTL plant. According to MEM 
and World Bank personnel, the Bank made no attempt, however, to cancel the Songas project for the 
following reasons: it fit the Power System Master Plan; cost of production was comparatively 
favourable; and there were no allegations of corruption. 
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capacity charges to Songas by almost half. It is an arrangement that could not have happened 
under a commercial bank agreement, which would have most likely resulted in project default 
(then again, no commercial banks were available to lend to the project at the time offinancing). 
While the terms and conditions of the concessionary loan are currently making Songas 
less expensive, the buy-down of the AFUDC on the part of the GoT has also contributed to 
lower costs for the utility. Without the buy-down, TANESCO would currently be facing 
charges ofUS$6 million per month for turbines I-N. 
A final factor in 'making' the Songas project is the equity turnover and the emergence of 
Globeleq as lead shareholder. Globeleq's appetite for risk, which may be largely a function of 
its lower cost of capital, combined with its knowledge and experience in Tanzania has meant 
that the project materialized even after TransCanada and AES grew sour on the investment.288 
6.6.4 Disputing and depending on IPTL 
IPTL reveals an equal range of factors that have affected outcomes. Project partners have 
also made a significant imprint on the project as has the project finance and the fuel type and 
agreement. Among the most visible factors related to IPTL, however, has been the allegation 
of corruption. According to numerous stakeholders, it was bribery that helped seal the deal 
between IPTL and the GoT, causing inflated project costs, postponement of Songas, and 
ultimately arbitration and subsequent delay of IPTL. An attempt by T ANESCO to cancel the 
plant based on corruption, however, failed, and the utility did not pursue further investigation, 
as offered by ICSID. Similarly, an investigation into corruption led by GoT was completed, but 
charges were never pursued. The legacy of the alleged corruption is that today Tanzania has a 
plant with construction costs that are among the highest for similar size/technology IPPs in the 
developing world for no particular reason (other than poor planning and/or execution). On the 
other hand, it has a plant that did reduce the country's load shedding during acute power 
shortages, serving as an important insurance policy, and has since been termed "a saviour", 
even by stakeholders who indicate that corruption was likely. 
In terms of the project partners, local partner VIP took IPTL to court shortly after the plant 
commenced commercial operations due to oppression by the majority shareholder, alleged 
business fraud and failure by Mechmar to contribute equity. VIP has also since objected to an 
attempt by IPTL to devalue VIP's shares. The dispute, which reflects the poor investment 
outcomes for the local partner, may also ultimately impact on the project debt, due to the fact 
that VIP has petitioned to cancel the recent sale of the project's debt to Standard Chartered. 
288 Stakeholder in GoT have indicated that Songas would have gone ahead after AES's exit even without 
Globeleq or a 'Globeleq type firm'. At the time that AES exited, construction was nearly complete. GoT 
would therefore have completed construction with funds from the escrow facility. Furthermore, provided 
AES had not found a willing buyer and opted to leave the project, the GoT would not have been required 
to pay down the AFUDC. There would be no ROE expected and the capacity charge would have 
dropped to US$2 million for the original scope (turbines I-V). 
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Project financing, which was initially hard to come by, is at the root of the local partner's 
dispute, with VIP arguing that the project was financed 100 per cent by debt. IPTL 
management counters this allegation insisting that Mechmar did contribute equity, but the 
project became highly indebted during the arbitration period (1998-2001) and therefore the 
project was required to devalue shares. As of the writing of this report, these issues remain 
unresolved. 
IPTL's use of fuel is equally contentious. Although conversion to natural gas was 
specified in the 1995 PPA, the plant continues to run on HFO, which means the energy charge 
is at least 25 per cent more expensive than it would be if it were running on domestic gas 
sourced from Songo Songo. Although initially the most common reason cited for the delay in 
conversion was the lack of precedent, as the specific type of engine has never been converted 
before. Here again, however, poor planning and execution among the diverse stakeholders has 
played a serious role, together with the ongoing disputes and negotiations related to the 
project's debt and equity. Signs now point to the fact that GoT will purchase the debt, and most 
probably the equity as well, with conversion slated thereafter (provided there is sufficient 
capacity at the gas processing plant). Mothballing remains a remote possibility for this plant in 
the interim. 
In closing, it is important to emphasize that although charges have been remarkably high, 
they do remain less than the cost of unserved energy, and therefore do not negate the more 
recent perception (throughout much of 2005 and 2006) of IPTL as a well run plant that has 
saved the country from power shortages. 
6.7 Conclusion 
Tanzania's IPPs were born out of the push for private participation, led primarily by the 
World Bank, and supported by international consultants and domestic champions of the new 
model for power sector reform. IPPs were only one part of the reform package, which, as 
initially laid down in the Power VI project, tied the development of the 180 MW Kihansi 
Hydropower station to power sector reforms, including plans for restructuring the sector and 
introducing of private participation into both power and natural gas development. A 
duplication of IPP efforts, however, ultimately undermined the effectiveness of the plants and 
may have been among the significant contributing factors for slowing reform plans, including 
TANESCO being removed from the list of utilities specified for privatization. 
In the end, neither the IPP development outcome nor the investment outcome has been 
stellar. Furthermore, no balance appears to have been achieved between the two, which has 
translated into a sense of precariousness with regard to individual projects as well as how IPPs 
relate to the sector, rather than any sense of long-term sustainability. Interestingly enough, 
however, the general perception by the public and public sector is that the outcome for 
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investors has been highly profitable (at the country's expense), whereas most investors see the 
development outcomes as far outweighing any investment rewards. There is general agreement, 
however, that Tanzania's gas industry is developing, which is a benefit to stakeholders across 
the board, due to lower fuel prices and greater security of supply.289 
The IPTL arbitration, which in tum led to contract changes, was prompted by a perceived 
imbalance between the development and investment outcomes, namely that investment gains 
weighed too heavily against the country stakeholders. However, the aftermath of the 
arbitration has still not brought a complete sense of satisfaction to the deal makers. Changes to 
Songas' capacity charges via the buying down of the AFUDC also led to a greater balancing, 
however, in contrast to most other rebalancing acts, it was the government (rather than the 
sponsor) that made the compromise by absorbing what would have otherwise been passed on to 
the rate payer. 
The suboptimal developmental outcomes may be attributed to the investment climate and 
the perceptions of risk, poor planning processes, no clearly articulated private power 
framework, together with the lack of regulatory oversight and possible corruption. Factors 
contributing to the suboptimal investment outcome app ar to be primarily related to project 
delays, which may be linked in tum to allegedly corrupt or poor business practices and poor 
planning and execution. Project sponsors together with a unique set of financing arrangements 
have also made significant impacts on outcomes along with the fuel arrangements for each 
plant. Projects have survived these stresses through equity turnover, and refinancing. A 
striking feature of Tanzania's IPPs is that none has failed outright. Instead, government 
stakeholders have intervened to buoy projects, including, as mentioned above, via the buying 
down of Songas' AFUDC, and firms such as Globeleq have identified projects as new market 
opportunities. 
Despite the mixed results, the MEM together with TANESCO indicated, in the first 
quarter of 2006, that they planned to put more IPPs on the ground. At that time, although the 
terms and conditions were not determined, officials insisted that they would be different from 
those for the existing plants. What ensued, however, was a deal struck with Richmond, which 
as noted in section 6.2, ultimately only delivered the contracted capacity once GoT intervened 
to help airlift the engines. Kiwira coal mine has also failed to deliver, after not raising the 
necessary finance. Once again, emergency power was brought in to plug shortages. Although 
conditions were to be different than those of existing plants, procurement processes for neither 
Richmond nor Kiwira followed international competitive bidding processes, with EWURA 
providing no oversight due to the fact that it came into existence only after the fact. In the case 
289 With prices capped at 75 perc ent the liquid fuel equivalent, however, there is a risk that investors 
may not see a clear incentive for future development of the field. Orca Exploration has not, however, 
indicated any such concern. 
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of Richmond, again, corruption allegations were made, which although since cleared, still raise 
doubts about due process being followed. 
If the case were not clearly made with IPTL and Songas, it appears today that there is a 
powerful need to enumerate the lessons ofthe past and be cognizant of a coherent way forward 
to ensure sustainable outcomes. 
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7.1 Recapitulation 
Chapter 7 
Synthesis and conclusions 
The story of Independent Power Projects in developing countries is not a simple one. 
Initially conceptualized within the broader context of power sector reform, these projects were 
intended to relieve state utilities of the burden of financing new plants, bring quick, quality 
power and reduce costs for end-users. Actual implementation of projects has, however, been 
intertwined with controversies, delays, and debates over costs of power. In many developing 
countries, IPPs have not lead to either quick or cheap power. States previously haunted by 
issues related to insufficient public funds are now grappling with critical issues related to 
affordability. Additionally, several IPPs were negotiated with the aim of alleviating immediate 
crises and needs, and were often only loosely connected to sector reform plans and policy 
models. In numerous cases, IPPs have been a lightening rod of national and international 
debate and have led to rethinking of reform policies and the role of private sector participation 
by both advocates and critics of IPPs. A number of IPP projects globally have also either been 
re-negotiated or cancelled. IPPs offer a critical opportunity to glean lessons for reform and 
private sector participation in the power sector. 
This thesis has sought to evaluate the African IPP experience by focusing on development 
and investment outcomes and the extent to which such outcomes are in balance. The central 
question has been whether a balance between these two outcomes ultimately improves the 
sustainability of IPPs. Efforts have also been made to unearth what may be the contributing 
elements to such sustainability or success, particularly given a suite of exogenous stresses. 
Throughout, this thesis has repeatedly drawn on both the power sector reform context, 
especially the extent to which the standard model was applied, as well as the potential for the 
obsolescing bargain to further elucidate the understanding of how and why African IPPs 
developed as they did. 
This final Chapter has three main goals: first, to provide an analysis of the balance 
between outcomes across the pool of projects evaluated; second, to systematically review the 
exogenous stresses as well as the factors that contributed to success, and finally to reflect on 
the overall theoretical and analytical framework for this thesis, namely the role of power sector 
reform and the obsolescing bargain. Although the majority of examples are based on the IPP 
experiences of Egypt, Kenya and Tanzania, as treated in Chapters four through six, efforts are 
also made to incorporate data from a larger pool of experiences, namely those of Cote d'Ivoire, 
Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia, as profiled briefly in Chapter three. 
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7.2 Reviewing the balance 
Detailed reviews of nine IPPs in three African countries have been completed, and another 
11 privately sponsored generation projects have been considered across a further five countries. 
The tally is small, but amounts to 80 per cent of the total African IPP investment and 75 per 
cent of the continent's IPP capacity, installed since the 1990s. Of the larger project pool of 20 
IPPs (detailed in Table 3.1), there is scant evidence for projects unravelling, in contrast to the 
international experience, even in adverse and unexpected circumstances such as currency 
devaluation- and civil strife. 
Instead, across North Africa, there is considerable evidence for all original deals holding 
in their entirety (with the exception of Tunisia's SEEB project), which has been largely 
credited to the greater balance between development and investment outcomes, that is, the 
achievement of both affordable, reliable power and reasonable investment returns. 
In the East and West African cases examined by this thesis, contract changes have been 
more numerous. For example, Kenya's Iberafrica voluntarily reduced the capacity charges in 
its first PP A. OrPower4, also of Kenya, finally agreed in 2006 to drop the price of its tariff for 
its second phase of 35MW, which represented a departure from terms agreed to originally in 
1998. In Tanzania, IPTL, the country's first large-scale IPP, went to arbitration over what were 
deemed unreasonably high costs, with the settlement shaving about US$30 million off the total 
capital costs. The buying down of Songas' AFUDC (of approximately US$103 million) by the 
Government of Tanzania cut the monthly capacity charge by about one third.290 
In West Africa, Nigeria'S EnronJAES plant faced a renegotiation after complaints 
intensified about high capacity charges and the project's fuel choice. The Okpai project is also 
undergoing a renegotiation, with parties presently in disagreement about the [mal investment 
cost, which has ramificat ons for the capacity charge. As with OrPower4, Iberafrica and AES 
Barge, the dispute has not been elevated to international arbitration. Surprisingly, Cote 
d'Ivoire, despite civil war, has been free of any such renegotiations, as has Ghana. For Ghana, 
however, a special note must be made; two ofthe projects that were expected to become IPPs 
(in the case of SIIF Accra, by extending its contract, and in the case of Osagyefo Barge, by 
inviting private participation) never produced a kilowatt of power. The second phase (110 
MW) of Ghana's Takoradi II has also not materialized due to a disagreement over costs and 
lack of guarantees. In addition, it should be noted in this context that Kenya's Westmont 
project, although not unravelling per se, did not negotiate a second contract, in contrast to 
29Drhe buying down of the AFUDC, which was negotiated by the Government of Tanzania during AES's 
sale to Globeleq, has not, however, negatively impacted on the sponsor since the full amount of the buy-
down was paid to G1obeleq. In addition, since May 2005, TANESCO has not been paying the portion of 
the capacity charge that relates to the project's subordinated debt. Although such an arrangement was 
provided for in the subsidiary loan agreement of 2001, what this means is that the IDA credit that the 
Government of Tanzania on-lent to TANESCO at a higher rate is presently not being serviced by the 
utility. 
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Iberafrica, after agreement on tariffs could not be reached between parties. In contrast, Kenya's 
Tsavo appears to have resisted pressure to lower its tariff, with its 20 year contract intact. 
In sum, of the 12 Sub-Saharan IPPs evaluated, seven underwent some form of contract 
change. The figures are even more dramatic if one focuses exclusively on East Africa, where 
five of the six projects evaluated have seen changes to the original deals. To reiterate, however, 
is the equally if not more noteworthy fact that none of the contracts have actually unravelled.291 
In virtually each case, the contract changes cited above appear to be prompted largely by 
what is seen as an imbalance, on the part of the host country, in outcomes, which is often 
exaggerated by a suite of exogenous stresses, including electricity shortages caused by drought 
in hydro-dependent systems. Generally, tariffs are deemed too high to be sustainable over the 
long-term. Investment outcomes have come at the expense of development outcomes. The 
subsequent balancing ultimately appears to introduce a greater level of sustainability to the 
project. As one investor has noted, "It is not the best possible outcome. We have compromised, 
but it is a happy ending. We now have amicable terms with [the state utility], and a decent 
investment. " 
What has led to the original balance between outcomes in the majority of North African 
cases? Furthermore, to what may the absence of such balance in most of the Sub-Saharan 
cases be credited and the greater attainment after original deals were signed? Did the 
obsolescing bargain in fact playa role, and the new protections not work as expected? 
The following sections review just what exactly contributed to success in the North 
African IPPs as well as what may have led to greater success and what could enhance 
sustainability in IPPs throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Sections are both descriptive and 
prescriptive, describing what host country governments and sponsors did, and what they could 
have done to achieve more favourable results. 
A final note should be made that while sustainability has been achieved through either an 
original balancing of outcomes or an eventual balancing after changes have been made to 
original contract terms, this does not mean that projects have been replicated. Egypt, despite its 
development and investment successes, has seen only three IPPs. The terms of any future IPPs 
will be markedly different from the existing ones. Thus the focus is on the sustainability of the 
particular project, not on a platform of projects, which raises more questions ultimately about 
IPPs within power sector reform. 
291 However, as noted above, Westmont did not renew its contract, and two projects in Ghana, SIIF 
Accra and Osagyefo Barge, although not fully IPPs, never produced any power. 
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7.3 Building up the contributing elements to success, at the country level 
7.3.1 Favourable investment climate 
The investment climate is not a deal breaker per se. IPP investments have been made in 
challenging contexts, most notably Kenya, which faced an aid embargo during its first wave of 
IPPs. However, the investment climate determines the degree of interest by foreign investors 
and hence the competitiveness of bids and ultimately the cost of the projects. The most 
favourable investment climates have been characterized as those with macro-economic 
stability, an active capital market, an efficient banking system, a history for upholding contracts 
and where recourse to arbitration is easily available. The relative absence of corruption, the 
availability of a well educated and productive labour force at reasonable rates and a growing 
economy with a focus on increasing the private sector's role also contribute. Finally, the 
fmancial health of the power sector, namely the solvency of the off-taker, together with the 
prospect of more than one investment may mean that less costly risk mitigation techniques may 
be required and that the cost of capital is reduced and reflected in the target return on equity. 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia distinguished themselves from their Sub-Saharan Africa 
counterparts, with Tunisia scoring the highest in terms of its investment track record as 
evidenced by its investment grade ratings for foreign currency (BBB) and local currency (A). 
Both Egypt and Morocco score just one notch below investment grade (at BB+). 
In contrast, the Sub-Saharan IPP sample has no investment grade ratings. Of the three 
countries that have received a speculative grade rating (Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria), two of 
these ratings (Kenya and Nigeria) were given in the last two years, long after IPP deals were 
signed, with Kenya's investment climate defmed by its aid embargo in the mid-1990s, as 
previously noted. Furthermore, Ghana's speCUlative rating (at B+) is four notches below 
investment grade and therefore not comparable to the speculative grade ratings of Egypt and 
Morocco. Tanzania is also worth mentioning in this context. Throughout the 1990s, all export 
credit agencies were off-cover in Tanzania; no foreign commercial banks were willing to lend, 
as there was no clean track record of commercial loan repayment. Consequently, the possibility 
for a traditional project-financed IPP deal in this climate was limited. To summarize, for each 
of the three North African IPP success stories described here, countries have either had an 
investment grade rating or one notch below, in contrast to the five Sub-Saharan Africa IPP 
cases, where no country has received an investment grade rating and even speculative grade 
ratings have been few and far between. 
Furthermore, despite the difference in the perception of the investment climate between 
North and Sub-Saharan Africa, incentives offered to investors in IPPs were relatively similar 
across the pool of eight countries and 20 projects, with some variety with regard to tax 
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breaks.292 For instance, nearly all 20 projects appear to have benefited from both customs and 
VAT exemptions during construction as well as full repatriation of profits. Currency 
conversion was also provided for in virtually all of the projects. In terms of tax holidays, all 
three countries in the North African sample had tax holidays of five years. In East Africa, 
Tanzania provided a tax holiday of five years, but Kenya's tax holidays only extended until 
plant commissioning. Although one would expect the investment incentives to increase with 
the perceived risk (with increased incentives offered in Sub-Saharan Africa), such a pattern is 
not evidenced. 
How did the perception of the investment climate impact on project development? Quite 
simply, with demand for IPPs outweighing supply, those countries with a better investment 
profile (primarily the North African sample) attracted more investors and ultimately were able 
to cement deals on more favourable terms to the host country. While not the only factor in 
influencing outcomes, the investment climate context goes a long way in setting the stage for 
negotiations and more balanced contract terms and helps explain the initial imbalance in so 
many of the Sub-Saharan cases. 
7.3.2 New policy frameworks and regulation 
An ideal framework involves a clear policy statement backed by legislation that: 
elaborates where and how power sector developments fit into overall energy policy; clarifies 
the governance of state-owned utilities (including corporatization and commercialization, 
transparent ring fencing of costs and adequate cost-recovery, together with a plan for possible 
unbundling); and makes room for private sector participation, including IPPs. Furthermore, the 
framework with regard to IPPs, ideally: defines the relative role of IPPs and the incumbent 
state-owned enterprise; specifies how IPPs will be procured and which agency has 
responsibility; introduces international competitive bidding standards; establishes an 
independent regulator and defines the powers and functions, among them the licensing of IPPs 
and approval of PPAs, including pass-through costs, and dispatch rules. 
Although all eight countries in the sample have introduced legislation to allow for private 
generation, few countries have actually formalized and then realized a clear and coherent 
policy framework. Thus there is abundant evidence of tentative experimentation with private 
power that does not always lead to a sustained opening of the electricity market for private 
investment. Furthermore, long-term PP As have the potential to constrain wholesale 
competition in the future, as forewarned in section 2.7.1, although means to transition to 
wholesale competition with IPPs have also been identified (Woolf and Halpern 2001). In 
292 Although many investment incent~ves were similar, there was considerable variation in terms of the 
security arrangements and credit enhancements that firms negotiated, including within specific countries 
as will be highlighted in section 7.4.3. 
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addition, state-owned utilities are rarely exposed to market costs of capital and direct 
comparisons of their costs with IPPs are often difficult to discern. 
Nowhere is the standard reform model for power sector reform being adopted full-cloth, 
namely unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution, introducing competition and 
private sector participation at both the generation and distribution level (the question of 
whether such a model is ultimately relevant will be tackled in section 7.7) (United Nations 
Environment Programme and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2006:67; 
Malgas, Gratwick et al. 2007a; Malgas, Gratwick et al. 2007b). All utilities evaluated were 100 
per cent state-owned with the exception of the Kenyan utility, which is owned 48 per cent by 
the state, and the Nigerian utility, which is in the process of being privatized (however, this 
development occurred after the two contracts evaluated in this thesis were bid, and PHCN still 
maintains a coordinating role).293 Thus, state-owned utilities remain in a dominant place, with 
IPPs on the margin and the future frameworks in many countries as of yet undecided. 
The most coherent policy framework exists in North Africa, with Egypt defining itself as 
the frontrunner. In Egypt, 15 IPPs were specified by the EEA (later the EEHC), which was 
clearly charged with carrying out the IPP programme following ICB practices. IPPs were to 
provide the majority of new generation capacity to the grid. They were also to assist in 
benchmarking state-owned and operated plants and improve the overall performance of the 
sector. A regulator was to be integrated into the ESI and assist in oversight. Corporatization 
and commercialization of distribution assets was to follow. Of the numerous features of the 
policy framework, it was perhaps the clear mandate given to the EEAlEEHC to procure IPPs 
that helped define its early success. Even with a clear policy and the power to implement 
decisions, however, Egypt's IPP programme was derailed (after the first three plants were bid 
out), due to macroeconomic shock and a severe currency devaluation. In shelving the 
remaining plants, the government sought to reduce additional foreign exchange risk. 
Furthermore, reform of the incumbent state-owned utility has been slow. Thus, policy was 
either not implemented or was rewritten during implementation, a practice evidenced across the 
sample, with the present policy framework in Egypt favouring a return to publicly-financed 
generation. 
While more piecemeal than Egypt, Kenya's policy framework has yielded one element 
that the other seven countries in the sample have presently parked or only pursued late in the 
game, namely the establishment of an independent regulator to aid in sector oversight. In 
Kenya, the regulator, together with the adoption of ICB practices, has helped to radically 
reduce PPA charges (between the first set of IPPs negotiated and the second). Kenya's ERB 
293 In addition, it should be reiterated in this context that Cote d'Ivoire has had its state utility under a 
concession contract since 1990-an arrangement that is expected to continue until 2020. Tanzania has 
just completed a management contract of four years, and Kenya has just begun one. 
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has also been instrumental in helping to set tariffs and manage the overall interface between 
private and public sectors. In Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania regulatory 
agencies have come into force only after IPPs have been negotiated, and there has been little 
impact as of yet, with, in the case of Egypt, the regulator'S powers severely limited. Finally, no 
attempt to establish a regulator has been made in either Tunisia or Morocco, with the ministries 
the de facto regulators in these two countries. What has emerged as a general trend is that the 
mere presence of a regulator is not in and of itself a defining factor. An independent regulator 
may have positive, negative or no impact on outcomes, as previously indicated in both sections 
2.7.1 and 3.2.4. If, however, regulatory governance is transparent, fair and accountable, and if 
regulatory decisions are credible and predictable, then there is greater potential for positive 
outcomes for host country and investor alike. Evidence also points to the fact that effective 
regulatory oversight may lead to a reduction in the stated capital costs of projects for 
selectively bid projects (Phadke 2007:10,25)?94 
A final policy and practice is worth noting in this context: in three of the eight sample 
countries (Nigeria, Tanzania and Tunisia) efforts have been made to exploit stranded gas as 
part of the IPP programme.295 296 In Nigeria, a reduction in gas flaring is central to the push for 
gas-fired power. In Tanzania, the IPP programme commercialized previously stranded 
(although not flared) gas via Songas and Mtwara. In Tunisia, although the primary goal was to 
attract new investment into the hydrocarbon sector, one significant spin-off has been the 
reduction of gas flaring. Each country has seen a distinct set of challenges,297 however, 
generally this larger policy has insulated projects from intense public scrutiny with project 
sponsors and policy makers alike able to point to the benefits of the commercialized gas and 
the reduction in fuel imports. 
As first documented in Chapter two and will be assessed in greater detail in section 7.7, 
behind many of these policies sit the development finance institutions, notably the World B~nk, 
which has had a hand in nearly all power sector reform programmes in Africa. These 
institutions were particularly instrumental in advancing private sector participation in 
generation. As many of those same institutions began reconsidering publicly-funded 
294 Furthermore, alternatives to strictly independent regulation are increasingly being considered, which 
may provide a better match to a country's regulatory commitment and institutional and human resource 
capacity. Alternatives include: regulatory contracts, the outsourcing of regulatory functions, expert 
~anels and regional regulators (Eberhard 2007:14). 
95 Domestic gas reserves were used for IPPs in both Cote d'Ivoire and Egypt, however, unlike for the 
other countries mentioned above, this did not represent the establishment of a new gas infrastructure. 
296 An attempt was also made to exploit stranded gas reserves in Ghana's Osagyefo Barge project, which, 
as described in Chapter three, however, has been led by the state, with as of yet no private participation, 
and no power produced 
297 In Tunisia, gas quality has proven poor and water also flooded the wells; consequently the plant has 
been repeatedly offline; in Nigeria, although the gas is of good quality, stakeholders have seen costs 
escalate which in turn has caused the utility to withhold payments. In Tanzania, costs have also 
escalated, but for reasons unrelated to the gas project itself. 
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infrastructure investments again at the end of the decade, countries have often followed with 
policies that reflect this movement-from state to market and back again. 
For many of the sample countries, however, the future framework remains uncertain, even 
as there appear to be more concessionary loans available. As one policy maker indicated: "The 
government is reviewing the impact of IPPs and the trend in countries like [ours]. [The utility] 
needs a breathing space. Soon[er] or later, the government will publish a strategic paper on the 
way forward." In the meantime, in this same country, emergency power has been ordered to 
plug an immediate power crisis, as will be further explored below. 
7.3.3 Coherent power sector planning and execution 
Intricately connected to sound policy frameworks are coherent power sector plans. Ideally, 
the latter follows from the former and includes four components: setting a reliability standard 
for energy security; completion of detailed supply and demand forecasts; a least cost plan with 
alternative scenarios; and clarifying how new generation production will be split between the 
private and public sector as well as clarifying the requisite bidding and procurement processes 
for new builds. Among the most important aspects of coherent power sector planning is 
vesting planning and procurement in one empowered agency to ensure that implementation 
takes place with minimal mishaps. 
The sample evaluated in this thesis has several noteworthy planning mishaps. In evidence 
are examples of demand and supply not being accurately forecast due partly to extended 
droughts, which in tum necessitated fast tracking IPPs, i.e. plants were sped through to meet 
immediate power shortages. The first two plants in Kenya (Westmont and Iberafrica), the first 
plant in Nigeria (AES Barge) and Ghana's IPP were negotiated amidst drought conditions. 
Generally, the speed was at a cost. Although both Westmont and Iberafrica came online within 
eleven months, later they were the source of scrutiny and investigation (due to un-transparent 
bidding practices and what were perceived as unnecessarily expensive charges). Furthermore, 
Westmont did not secure a second PPA due to disagreement over a tariff, with public 
stakeholders unwilling to make similar concessions a second time. In the case of Nigeria, 
although fast-tracked, the AES Barge took nearly two years to come on line due to a 
renegotiation of the PP A. 
An inability to accurately estimate demand and supply as well as set a clear reliability 
standard has also necessitated several cases of emergency power where units have been ordered 
for one to two years with the purpose of plugging a short-term power crisis. In both of the East 
African countries in this sample as well as Ghana, the governments have ordered units to 
address drought and system collapse. In Kenya, the country harnessed 100 MW of emergency 
power twice: in 1999-2001 and again in 2006 (supplied by Aggreko, Cummins and Deutz in 
the first instance and Aggreko alone in the second). Emergency power has been turned to 
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repeatedly in Tanzania also. In Ghana, emergency power was instrumental in reducing the 
impact of the 1998 drought, but with drought conditions reversing, the state failed to honour its 
contracts with SnF Accra, which as of 2007, seven years later, remains an unresolved conflict. 
Costs for this emergency power, at approximately 30-40 US cents/kWh, are high, however, 
they are still less than the cost of no power (IFC per com 2005). As previously noted, Tanzania 
has estimated that it has saved around US$l.OO for every kWh of outage averted (or about five 
to 10 times the ordinary cost of generating electricity)?98 
In Tanzania, the speeding through of one plant, described in Chapter six, has resulted in 
perhaps the most high profile IPP story on the continent to date. In this project, absent are 
critical planning elements, namely the lack of: a clear reliability standard, an accurate demand 
and supply forecast, a detailed plan for privately powered and publicly powered generation and 
most importantly a defined agency to implement the plan. 
The Songo Songo gas-to-electricity project was in the Power System Master Plan, initially 
slated to come online within six months. However, the project was slow to materialize given its 
technical and financial complexity. With deadlines passing and power cuts persisting, it is 
alleged that other ministries, affected by the power cuts, started second guessing that 
TANESCO and the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, following the World Bank procurement 
procedures and relying on concessionary loans, would be able to deliver the project on time to 
address the shortages. As noted previously, the cost of unserved electricity to the economy was 
high and therefore Tanzania paid dearly for no power. Thus, the backdrop of the IPTL 
agreement appears to have been a failure to deliver on the Master Plan and hefty associated 
costs for many Tanzanians facing loss of services, TANESCO facing loss in revenue, and the 
Tanzanian economy facing loss of productivity, together with a clear interest in collaborating 
with Malaysian investors in the context of South-South partnerships. 
The impact of this planning mishap was multi-fold: IPTL, which was negotiated quickly, 
behind closed doors, announced its total investment costs as US$150 million (US$163 
including fuel conversion), which the Governrnent of Tanzania and the World Bank would later 
argue was inflated by 40 per cent. This argument would in tum lead to a lengthy arbitration 
process spanning three years. During the time that IPTL was being disputed, the Songo Songo 
gas-to-electricity project would be put on hold, mainly through pressure from the World Bank, 
its largest donor, due to alleged corruption in the sector. Although the arbitration would 
ultimately lead to IPTL's investment costs being reduced to US$127 million, the cost was still 
above and beyond the price that the governrnent sought to pay. Furthermore, due to the delays, 
Songo Songo accumulated US$100 million in interest charges on owner's equity, i.e. which the 
298 In terms of international norms, however, it should be noted that Tanzania's cost of unserved energy 
(CUE) is low. South Africa's CUE is approximately US$10, which is in line with the CUE in many 
industrialized countries (Global Energy Decisions 2007). 
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sponsor was owed by TANESeO. Additional costs to the state include emergency power that 
was required due to both IPPs being unavailable until 2002 and 2004, respectively. 
Although it is easy in hindsight to accuse stakeholders of acting imprudently in the face of 
emergencies, the actual conditions of load shedding and shortages appear to have provided few 
alternatives. The solution appears to be in: taking steps to improve the investment climate, 
drawing up and implementing clear policy frameworks, (namely spelling out where and how 
private power fits into a single buyer model), building contingencies into the planning process, 
vesting planning in one agency, and conducting open bidding but under less cumbersome 
bidding procedures-all much easier said than done, but not infeasible for host countries to 
adopt and thereby move one step closer to balancing development and investment outcomes. 
7.3.4 Competitive bidding practices 
While policy and planning frameworks go a long way in determining outcomes, the type 
of bidding has been linked to outcomes, with considerable attention paid to the importance of 
international competitive bidding practices over selective bidding practices. Two recent studies, 
cited in section 2.7.1, have evaluated the relationship, demonstrating that while there is 
evidence for IeBs leading to up to a 60 per cent reduction in the stated capital cost of plants, 
there is also evidence for selective bidding proving effective in certain instances, provided 
there is regulatory scrutiny (Deloitte Touche Tohrnatsu Emerging Markets Ltd. and Advanced 
Engineering Associates International 2003; Phadke 2007). 
IeBs were conducted for 11 of the sample of 20 IPPs, including all three projects in Egypt 
and Morocco, and one of the two projects in Tunisia. In the East African group, IeBs have 
been less common, with three of the seven projects (OrPower4, Tsavo and Songas) recorded as 
having conformed with such bidding practices. In West Africa, an IeB was conducted for only 
one of the five projects (Azito). 
In terms of gleaning meaning from IeBs versus selective bidding, of the six projects that 
have faced renegotiation, four of them were bid selectively rather than via an IeB (IPTL, 
Iberafrica, AES Barge and Okpai), with the two exceptions being Songas and OrPower4. The 
absence of regulatory scrutiny is noteworthy in each of these four projects as well. 
Furthermore, Westmont, which was selectively bid, quit the country after its first seven year 
PPA expired. The other selectively bid projects have also, with the exception of eIPREL and 
Mtwara, encountered some difficulty or another, which has led to a change in how the project 
is being developed?99 Ghana's Takoradi II has not been able to raise the finance for the second 
phase of the plant, and Tunisia's SEEB has not been able to secure its fuel supply and is 
299 Although Tullow Oil, which initially won the contract to develop the Mnazi gas field in 1994, did 
encounter difficulty, this related primarily to the upstream portion of what is today known as the Mtwara 
Energy Project (see section 6.2). ATJL has indicated that since negotiations began in 2003 it has 
encountered no such difficulties. 
208 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
presently offline. Although reasons for these stumbling blocks may be traced well beyond the 
presence or absence of an ICB, the correlation is nonetheless revealing. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the success of the ICB process is intricately linked to 
the number of bids received, with more bidding driving down prices. The number of bids 
submitted to ICBs in North Africa was generally double to triple those submitted to ICBs in 
East Africa--with only three bidders in Kenya's Tsavo plant and two in both OrPower4 and 
Songas plants. All three projects have since been pressured to lower tariffs, as discussed 
repeatedly. In addition, the time and associated cost required to complete an international 
competitive bid should not be underestimated, with drought related energy crises often cited as 
the reason why ICBs have been passed over. Just as alternatives are being considered for 
strictly independent regulation, including contracting out, to match the institutional and human 
resource capacity in a country, as discussed in section 7.3.2, the Sub-Saharan African 
examples here point to the need for more efficient bidding processes that while focussing on 
transparency and oversight also expedite timely outcomes. 
7.3.5 Abundant low cost fuel and secure fuel contracts 
The availability of competitively priced fuel supplies for IPPs has also emerged as a key 
factor in how IPPs are perceived and ultimately whether there is public appetite for more such 
projects, in large part because fuel is generally a pass-through cost to the utility and in many 
cases to the final consumer as well. Thus, if the IPP uses a fuel different from the incumbent 
fuel, and ifthat fuel is more expensive, then there is greater potential for stress on the project. 
In three of the sample countries (Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania,), at the inception of IPPs, low 
priced hydropower was the dominant fuel source. In these countries, IPPs were thermal 
powered, using a combination of imported fuel oil and domestically procured natural gas. IPPs 
helped the countries to achieve greater fuel diversification, however, when the costs of IPPs 
(other than those running on domestically procured natural gas, namely Songas) were 
compared with state-owned, generally amortized hydropower, the new privately owned 
generation was seen to be largely more expensive, due partly to the energy/fuel charge. 
Furthermore, these countries witnessed a series of debilitating droughts over the course of the 
1990s. Drought has also wreaked havoc throughout the East African region between 2002 and 
2006. During this time, the existing hydropower infrastructure proved insufficient, and 
thermal, provided almost entirely by IPPs, was increasingly integrated into the fuel supply mix 
(from 10 per cent to 60 per cent in Tanzania), forcing up the price of power. Although more 
thermal power may be required, the public perception is that IPPs drive prices up, rather than a 
number of factors, including drought, which means that gaining public support for such 
projects is all the more challenging. 
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Contrast this story with Morocco and Nigeria. In Morocco, at the inception of IPPs, oil 
and coal, largely imported, were the incumbent fuels. Hydropower also played an important 
role in contributing to the generation mix. Through Jorf Lasfar, the country's fIrst and largest 
IPP, Morocco changed its fuel composition; as of 2005, coal had become the dominant fuel, 
accounting for more than 60 per cent of generation. Although only 50MW, the country's wind 
power plant also contributed to the diversifIcation, together with Tahaddart, which introduced 
over 300MW of natural gas-fIred generation. Thus, like Kenya and Tanzania, Morocco has 
achieved fuel diversifIcation through its IPPs, however, unlike the two other countries, 
Morocco has seen prices come down, due to a host of factors, including the relatively cheaper 
price of imported coal, and the use of gas via the Algerian-Spain pipeline, which fuels 
Tahaddart and which the government receives as a royalty.30o Nigeria has relied entirely on 
domestically procured natural gas, and gas is the incumbent fuel. Until recently, although a 
series of issues affected project outcomes, most notably the investment climate and bidding 
procedures, fuel had been of no issue; however, recent civil unrest in the Niger Delta has led to 
a disruption in the fuel supply. 
At the beginning of this section, the claim was made that when IPPs use fuel that is either 
cheaper than the incumbent fuel and/or the same as the incumbent fuel, IPPs have a greater 
chance of success. There are, however, several noteworthy exceptions. Tunisia's SEEB plant is 
one such exception. Although natural gas is the incumbent fuel in Tunisia, the SEEB plant was 
part of an initiative to attract investors to exploit stranded gas associated with oil production. 
Thus, since SEEB's fuel supply has been compromised, there has been no other source of 
supply for the plant. In Tanzania, the natural gas from the Songo Songo fIeld, which was 
dedicated to supply the Songas plant and later to fuel IPTL, is cheaper than the imported fuel 
oil presently powering IPTL. There have, however, been signifIcant delays in fuel conversion 
of the IPTL diesel units. Finally, in the case of Egypt, natural gas is the incumbent ·fuel and also 
the fuel of choice for all IPPs to date. Fuel is a pass through to the utility, but presently not to 
the fInal consumer. Fuel is also subsidized. In the last few years, the country has emerged as 
the sixth largest LNG exporter in the world. Presently a debate is raging about how to allocate 
the remaining natural gas reserves. Should they go for additional electric power generation, 
LNG export, or present and future industrialization projects? The issue then is not simply 
whether a country has abundant, low cost fuel, but whether security of supply is guaranteed 
through fuel contracts well into the future (for up to 30 years in the case of Jorf Lasfar and on 
average 20 years for the other projects). Fuel must be abundant and low cost, both now and 
later, for it to have a positive, not negative, impact on outcomes. 
300 Other contributing factors to a reduction in tariffs in Morocco include: economies of scale that Jorf 
Lasfar offers (in 2004, 66% of the country production was from one single plant), the reduction in 
government fuel taxes (undertaken at the start of IPPs to make tariffs more competitive with region) and 
the increased management efficiencies at ONE (technical as well as economic). 
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7.4 Building up the contributing elements to success, at the project level 
Who were the investors and what did they do to navigate the varying investment climates 
as well as the changing policy and planning frameworks, including fuel supply? Starting with 
an evaluation of equity arrangements, this section examines trends in investor behaviour, and 
how investors secured revenue to service debt and reward equity, particularly in the face of 
exogenous stresses. 
7.4.1 Favourable equity arrangements 
Did the presence of local equity shareholders make a difference in project outcomes? 
Were projects with such participation less like to encounter the obsolescing bargain? How did a 
firm's prior experience with a country play out in terms of the making and breaking of deals? 
What about the presence of development-minded firms such as IPS and Globeleq as well as 
DFls? Table 7.1 immediately below lists each of the projects, followed by the country origins 
of sponsors and their respective equity share, whether projects faced a change in contract terms 
and finally if there was turnover of the majority (Mj) equity partner. 
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Azito (C) Cinergy (JV between Swiss ABB, 50% and French EDF, 50%) N 0 
holds 65.7% of shares, CDC/Globeleq (11%), and IPS (23%) 
Takoradi II CMS (USA, 90%), VRA (Ghana, 10%), CMS sold shares to Y 1 
(G) TAQA (UAE, 90%) in 2007 
AES Barge Enron (USA, 100%) sold to AES (95%) and YFP (Nigeria, 5%) in Y 1 
(N) 2000 
Okpai Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Nigeria, 60%), Y 0 
(N) Nigerian Agip Oil Company (Italy, 20%), and Phillips Oil 
Company (USA, 20%) maintained equity since 2001 
.. Notes: N: no change In contract terms and/or In ongInal project concept as laid down In PPA, Y: yes 
change in contract terms and/or original project concept. 
Foreign firms were the dominant player in African IPPs. There were no exclusively 
locally sponsored projects, unlike in Malaysia and China where local IPPs abound (Woodhouse 
2005:22-23,91). This should not be surprising given the limited capital available in countries 
across the sample, however it is worth noting, and it does raise the issue of foreign exchange 
exposure, treated in section 7.4.2 below.304 Following this logic, there were only two projects 
in the pool in which local partners were the major stakeholder, Morocco's Tahaddart and 
Nigeria's Okpai. However, in both cases, the majority stakeholder was either the national 
utility or the national petroleum company. Furthermore, in the case of Morocco, ONE, the state 
utility initially intended to hold only a 20 per cent share and increased its share after EDF 
pulled out (Malgas, Gratwick et al. 2007a:16). In Okpai, the power project falls under the 
rubric of a state-led gas flaring reduction programme, in which international oil companies, 
presently operating in Nigeria, are being engaged in power projects. In the next such project, 
Afam, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation also has a majority share (of 55 per cent). 
Local participation has been cited as a possible means to reduce risk (Hoskote 1995: 11; 
Woodhouse 2005).305 A total of seven of the 20 projects had local equity participation, namely: 
Tahaddart, Iberafrica, IPTL, Songas, Takoradi II, AES Barge and Okpai. To what extent then 
did such local participation impact favourably on outcomes? Of the seven projects, six have 
encountered some form of change to their contract. Furthermore, in four of these six projects, 
either the state utility or another government entity held an equity share, which would indicate 
that the mere existence of a local partner might not be critical in setting an original sustainable 
balance. What about in the renegotiating of terms, how might a local partner make a 
difference? Kenya's Westmont and Iberafrica were both negotiated at the same time under 
similar policy frameworks. They are the only two examples in the project pool where one had 
304 As first noted in Chapter three, projects such as Osagyefo Barge in Ghana and several projects in 
Nigeria (Ibom and Omoku) have been financed by either national and/or state governments and have 
been loosely termed IPPs for the following reasons. In Ghana, private participation was anticipated, and 
in Nigeria, projects have been independent of the national utility, led entirely by the Rivers State 
Government and the Akwa Ibom State Government, respectively. As of end-2006, however, Globeleq is 
"pursuing" investment in the Ibom project, which would include both investment in the existing capacity 
and an addition of up to 500 MW (Globeleq 2006:7). 
305 Stanford PESD limits the benefits of local partners to "near-term and tactical business management, 
[the] study suggests that they play little role in grander tasks such as enforcing contracts," (Woodhouse 
2005:98). 
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local participation (Iberafrica) and the other did not (Westmont). As has already been 
discussed, Iberafrica first voluntarily reduced its tariff and then went on to negotiate a second 
15 year PP A, in contrast to Westmont, which quit after failing to come to agreement on a 
second PP A. The presence of a local partner may have helped in creating a longer term 
solution, however, with just one example, the evidence is not conclusive. 
Origins, experience and mandate of partners 
Although globally, IPP investments during the 1990s were led by a host of American and 
European investors who saw returns in their home markets diminishing, there was also a wave 
of investors originating from developing countries, particularly from Malaysia.306 In both 
Kenya and Tanzania, this thesis has profiled Malaysian firms committing to projects (including 
in one of the projects, Westmont, cited above where the firm took neither foreign nor local 
partners). In Egypt, EDF has recently sold its assets to Tanjong, a Malaysian firm, and 
Globeleq has entered into a conditional sale for its entire Asian and North African portfolio, 
which includes Egypt's Sidi Krir, to a joint venture between Tanjong and Saudi-based Al 
Jomaih.307 308 While it would be inaccurate to say that these firms overlooked the higher risk 
profiles of the African continent (and/or did not ultimately charge higher returns), there may 
have been a greater willingness to consider investments in the first place. 
While the number of developing/emerging country-based firms appears to be growing, 
three of the southern-based firms are trying to sell their shares (Mechmar and VIP in IPTL and 
Westmont). Thus, the origin ofthe firm does not mean that project equity is set for life, or that 
such a firm is best positioned to service debt and reward equity since each of these sales 
appears to be motivated in part by an inability to do just those things. 
A more revealing aspect than firm origins appears to be a firm's experience and mandate. 
Across the pool, examples pile up of firms being actively involved in the country prior to the.ir 
IPP investment. For instance, EDF had a long-term relationship with Egypt in terms of 
providing technical assistance. Union Fenosa, the parent company of Iberafrica, had an existing 
relationship with Kenya through an IT contract. IPS, a major shareholder in Tsavo and Azito, 
had operated in Kenya since 1963 and in Cote d'Ivoire since 1965. CDC, from which Globeleq 
306 Michael Schur, Stephan von Klaudy and Georgina Dellacha provide a preliminary analysis of the 
contribution of firms based in developing countries in infrastructure projects between 1998 and 2004, 
noting an overall increase and a particularly steep climb in transport investments by such firms. The 
authors conclude by indicating that the involvement of such firms is encouraging, however, the jury is 
still out on whether such firms are better positioned to deal with a host of complex political economy 
issues that characterize developing countries (Schur, Klaudy et al. 2006). 
307 Another example of an emerging economy firm taking market share is BTU, based in the Gulf 
Cooperating Council, which bought shares from PSEG Tunisia's Rades II plant, in 2004. 
308 There is evidence that Chinese and Indian firms may assume a greater piece of this market. India's 
Tata is among the bidders for South Africa's IPPs and Chinese firms are leading power projects in Sudan 
(Merowe dam project), and in Nigeria (Omotsho and Paplanto), (China in Africa: from oil & gas to 
infrastructure 2006). 
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was spun off, had a 50 year history in Tanzania. While the long-term presence of a firm does 
not appear to be decisive (as many such projects did face contract changes), it may help explain 
why more contracts did not unravel. Long-term relationships, with strong local management, 
previously cited in section 2.7.1 as a critical success factor and to be discussed in greater detail 
in section 7.4.6, appear to have contributed to the staying power of firms and often the 
rebalancing of contract terms. 
The mandate of the firm also appears to playa central role in the investment decision as 
well as the terms of the deal. Until recently, the two firms that were increasing (rather than 
maintaining or reducing their stakes) were Globeleq and Industrial Promotion Services. Until 
May 2007, Globeleq held an 11 per cent share in Cote d'Ivoire's Azito, a 100 per cent equity 
stake in Egypt's Sidi Krir, 30 per cent equity in Kenya's Tsavo and 56 per cent in Tanzania's 
Songas. IPS holds a 23 per cent share in Azito, and together with Duke Energy, a 49.9 per cent 
share in Tsavo. IPS is also leading development of Uganda's Bujagali project, a 250 MW 
hydroelectric plant, which was formerly being developed by AES. 
Although both Globeleq and IPS are driven by commercial interests, these firms have 
emerged from agencies with a strong commitment to social and economic development. 
Globeleq remains wholly owned by CDC, the private sector promotion arm of DFID. IPS is 
Aga Khan's Fund for Economic Development operating arm in the industrial sector throughout 
Asia and Africa. While projects for both firms must make commercial sense, they must also 
serve a clear developmental function for the country/community. It is this commitment to 
development that appears to be particularly helpful in the face of African risk. 
None of the projects with involvement of such development-focused firms, save 
Tanzania's Songas, has seen any changes to contract terms, which may signal a greater 
perceived balance from project inception as well as a better ability to withstand public 
pressure. Furthermore, in terms of the Songas change, although the buying down of the 
AFUDC of US$I 03 million brought about a reduction in the capacity charge, the firm received 
full payment upon the buy-down and therefore it represents a different case than many of the 
contract changes cited above. 
An important development must, however, be reiterated in this context. Globeleq, which 
until 2006 seemed to be expanding its portfolio of assets, is in the midst of selling off the 
brownfield plants it bought to in tum position itself as a global, greenfield developer. The firm 
always intended to take this course, as it saw its brownfield investments as part of a stop-gap 
measure during the global downturn in private power. Recent, indicative bids for Globeleq's 
Sub-Sahara African assets were not, however, deemed viable and therefore for the time being 
Globeleq is holding on to its stake in Azito, Tsavo, and Songas. On the one hand, Globeleq's 
sale of Sidi Krir and its Asian assets signals that there may indeed be a renewed interest in 
private power. On the other hand, the absence of favourable bids for Sub-Saharan Africa 
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indicates that such renewed interest is still limited in scope (beyond supplying emergency 
power), and there may indeed be need for this type of development-minded firm in less 
developed countries. 
Meanwhile the presence of DFIs persists in project equity. Although none of the North 
African projects saw such participation, four of the Sub-Saharan African IPPs saw DFIs pick 
up equity shares. IFC holds a 5 per cent share in Tsavo's equity. Until 2005, IFC also held, 
together with BOAD and the Investment and PROPARCO, a 12 per cent share in CIPREL. 
Both IFC and DEG had an approximately US$12 million equity investment in Songas, with 
both organizations selling their shares after the IPTL dispute became known. FMO maintains a 
24 per cent share in Songas (excluding the expansion of 65 MW) as well as a 20 per cent share 
in Mtwara. CDC, independent of Globeleq, also holds a 6 per cent share in Songas (excluding 
the expansion). It should be reiterated here that none of these projects, save Songas, has seen 
any contract changes. 
Equity turnover 
Equity turnover represents a final piece of this evaluation related to equity arrangements 
and how such arrangements have impacted on outcomes. Of the 45 original equity partners in 
the sample pool, 15 have exited from 11 different projects. This statistic, however, tells only 
part of the story. First, as previously indicated, three shareholders have been actively trying to 
sell their assets (both shareholders in Tanzania's IPTL and Kenya's Westmont) for several 
years. In the case of IPTL, Mechmar, the lead shareholder, has indicated that the arbitration 
settlement ultimately hurt equity partners, which has motivated the sale. VIP, the minority 
shareholder in IPTL, cites the following causes: oppression by the majority shareholder; fraud. 
by Mechmar in inflating the IPTL capital cost; and failure by Mechmar to pay its equity 
contribution (i.e. the project was 100 per cent debt fmanced). There has been no resolution of 
this conflict, and no willing buyers. In terms of Westmont, the firm did not secure a second 
PPA, due to disagreement over tariffs and has, since 2004, been seeking to sell the asset. 
Second, if one focuses exclusively on majority shareholders, nine of the majority shareholders 
in the 20 projects have sold shares at least once and two of the majority shareholders have been 
actively seeking to do so for at least three years, as described above. 
The repeated refrain from most sponsors is that the sale of assets is motivated primarily by 
changing circumstances in home markets and/or related to corporate strategy; that is, the sale 
has little to do with the host country actions and reactions and/or poor investment outcomes, 
namely the ability to service debt adequately and reward equity. As noted in Chapter four, 
InterGen's reason for selling its interest in Egypt's Sidi Krir to Globeleq in 2004 was based on 
the fact that its shareholders (Bechtel and Shell) made a strategic decision to move out of the 
business of owning and operating private power facilities. For Bechtel this meant moving back 
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to its core business of designing, engineering and building plants, but not operating and 
maintaining them, and for Shell, it meant focusing on the petroleum exploration and production 
business. Similarly, Edison has sold much of its global portfolio because of a decision to return 
to its core business in Italy. EDF also cites its plans of concentrating its investments in Europe. 
In terms of Tunisia's Rades II plant, PSEG described Tunisia as "an excellent place to do 
business" and noted that ''the sale in no way reflects any unhappiness with [our] experience in 
Tunisia, but rather is in keeping with the company's stated strategy of reducing its international 
risks by selectively selling assets if they can obtain an attractive price" (Malgas, Gratwick et al. 
2007b:15). 
How does this refrain square with the contract changes? The majority shareholders in two 
of the eight projects that saw contract changes exited after such a change (namely, eMS in 
Takoradi II and Enron in what is presently known as AES Barge). Furthermore, as noted above, 
Westmont has sought to sell the plant since it failed to renegotiate a second contract, and 
Mechmar has actively been seeking to sell its shares post-reneg tiation. In addition, although 
no contract changes are in evidence, one should not overlook the larger IPP programme change 
in Egypt. All three original sponsors have sold their assets, following the failure of the utility to 
follow through with 12 additional IPP projects as originally specified, which could have given 
existing sponsors a larger market share. 
While less than expected investment outcomes may be partially motivating sales, turnover 
does not in and of itself appear to be challenging the long-term sustainability of contracts since 
in nearly all cases sellers have found willing buyers to take over the original or recently 
renegotiated PP As. The two exceptions here again are the Westmont plant, where the first PP A 
has expired and which was shrouded in controversy and IPTL, which has been embroiled in 
lawsuits and therefore it may be understandable why the plants have not attracted buyers. One 
stakeholder went so far as to assert, "[equity turnover is a] healthy factor in a maturing market. 
It is a good sign when investors come and go - not a bad or threatening thing." The return of 
the government as shareholder, as planned in the case of Tanzania's IPTL as well as Globeleq's 
decision to hold onto to its SSA portfolio, would, however, signal that some markets might 
actually be less mature than expected. 
What in the end have been among the most critical characteristics of equity arrangements 
that have led to project sustainability? Overarching characteristics appear to be firms' prior 
experience in a country, the presence of development-minded firms and development finance 
institutions. 
7.4.2 Debt arrangements: global and local 
With debt financing covering often more than 70 per cent of total project costs, low cost 
financing has emerged as a key factor in successful projects. How and where to get this low 
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cost fmancing is the challenge, but possible approaches in the African cases lie in DFI 
involvement, credit enhancements, and some flexibility in terms and conditions that may allow 
for possible refinancing. The goal for sustainability appears to be that the risk premium 
demanded by financiers or capped by the off-taker matches the actual country and project risks 
and is not inflated. 
While there is no uniform pattern in the debt financing for the projects considered in this 
thesis, there are a series of trends for how investors handled costs as well as practices that may 
ultimately contribute to success. Important to note at the outset is that although non-recourse 
project fmancing is the norm for privately financed electric power plants in developing regions, 
this sample of twenty projects saw several notable exceptions, including Nigeria'S Okpai plant, 
which was 100 per cent financed by the balance sheet of equity partners, together with the 
second phase of Songas (however refinancing is presently being pursued in the latter case). 
Westmont, Iberafrica and OrPower4 were also all financed entirely with the balance sheets of 
their sponsors. For Westmont and Iberafrica, the reason cited for this arrangement was that 
insufficient time was available to arrange project finance as plants had to be brought online 
within 11 months. For Orpower4, reasons are linked, by the sponsor, to the lack of a security 
package, which was not forthcoming until 2006. 
DFIs and their impact on projects 
With limited appetite for projects among many commercial banks/o9 development fmance 
institutions are conspicuous in providing debt to projects across the poo1.31O Such entities 
participated in nearly every IPP, including significant participation on the part of the World 
BanklIDA (CIPREL, Songas), IFC (Azito, Port Said, Suez, Tsavo), CDC (Tsavo, Azito), EIB 
(CED, Songas), DEG (Tsavo, Azito), FMO (Azito), African Development Bank (Azito) and 
PROPARCO (CED). In addition a number of export credit agencies were involved in providing 
financing: the USA Export Import Bank (JorfLasfar), OPIC (JorfLasfar), and JBIC (Rades II). 
Much of this involvement is related to the long history of DFI activity throughout Africa 
coupled with the real and perceived risks across the continent, which preclude private investors 
from filling the financing gap. The involvement is also, however, linked to the broader mandate 
of power sector reform, introduced in Chapter two, alluded to throughout this thesis and to be 
discussed in greater detail in section 7.7. Still, it is noteworthy that African IPPs, which by their 
very definition imply private investment, had such significant public involvement. 
Although projects with DFI funding tended to take longer to reach financial closure, 
sponsors did cite clear benefits; multilateral and bilateral development institutions helped 
309 A recent review indicates that Africa has attracted less non-recourse bank debt relative to private 
investment in infrastructure than other developing regions (Sheppard, Klaudy et al. 2006). 
310 See footnote 1 for a definition of development finance institutions. 
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maintain contracts and resist renegotiation in the face of external challenges such as Egypt's 
currency devaluation and Kenya's droughts when developers were pressured to reduce tariffs. 
A particularly revealing contrast is in the two Kenyan plants, OrPower4 and Tsavo, negotiated 
under the same policy framework, including via ICBs. The former plant saw no multilateral 
involvement in either its equity or debt whereas for the latter, IFC arranged all the debt and 
took a 5 per cent equity stake. Tsavo has since resisted pressures to reduce its tariffs by KPLC 
and the government, with the presence of a multilateral development institUtion cited as among 
the reasons. OrPower4 on the other hand has ultimately reduced its tariff for the second phase 
of the plant. Tanzania's Songas project, for which the World Bank together with Em provided 
all the project debt, also deserves special mention here. The project took almost a decade to 
reach financial closure, but the World Bank played an instrumental role, in among other things, 
pressuring the IPTL arbitration, which ultimately led to what has been widely perceived as 
more balanced contract terms. 
Locally denominated finance: the cost and benefit 
Locally denominated financing appears to be among the solutions for more sustainable 
foreign investment, however, capital markets in many African countries are insufficiently deep 
or liquid to provide such financing for all projects. As previously noted, only one project 
across the pool, Morocco's Tahaddart, a 384 MW CCGT, negotiated a locally denominated 
PPA due to the fact that all of its debt (€ 213 million) was sourced from local banks. This local 
financing was aided by a number of factors including: the state utility's prominent role in the 
plant (holding nearly 50 per cent of total equity) as well as the fact that Morocco's commercial 
banks have a significant degree of state involvement.3l1 With or without state involvement, no 
other country in Africa, 'has, as of yet, managed to arrange this level and depth of financing for 
IPPs. Thus, Morocco stands as a pioneer in this respect. 312 313 
The main drawback for IPPs without locally denominated finance may be seen as projects 
undergo the effects of macroeconomic shock and currency devaluation. In Egypt between the 
end of 2002 and early 2003, the currency lost half of its value and PPA payments in local 
311 Banque Centrale Populaire (BCP) put up MAD1300m and MAD960m was extended by a consortium 
of banks consisting of BCP as the lead lender, the Banque Marocaine pour Ie Commerce Exteriere 
(BMCE) and Credit Agricole (CNCA). Average exchange rate for the Moroccan dirham in 2003, the 
year that construction started, was 10.95MAD=1.00EUR (Interbank Rate). 
312 Local currency financing has been recently employed by AES in Cameroon for the 80 MW Limbe 
power station. The local offices of Standard Chartered Bank, Ecobank, Afriland First Bank and the 
Commercial Bank of Cameroon provided short-term local currency financing for the AES project, which 
served as a bridge to longer term dollar denominated debt (The role of local banks in financing power 
~rojects 2005:1) 
13 Stakeholders involved in Namibia's Kudu gas-to-power project are also raising the possibility oflocal 
currency financing, which could slowly help to change the face of African power, by introducing a new 
level of financial sustainability for all those involved. Kudu involves commercializing domestic 
(Namibian) gas and the construction of an 800 MW plant, initially intended mainly for export to RSA. 
219 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
currency terms doubled. In the short-term the US dollar and/or Euro denominated PPA 
represented among the greatest safeguards for sponsors, as equity and debt holders in Egypt did 
not see the value of their investments decline. The host country, however, paid dearly for the 
plants. Furthermore, one could argue that equity and debt holders did lose out indirectly due to 
the fact that a decision was made to cancel additional IPPs after the devaluation.314 While no 
country other than Egypt in the sample experienced the crippling effects of macroeconomic 
shock, over the course of the decade, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania saw serious creeping 
devaluation, with the currencies losing more than 100 per cent, 200 per cent and 400 per cent 
of their value, respectively, over the 1990s, which has inevitably had an impact on capacity 
charges.3I5 There has been pressure to reduce such charges as well as to reconsider IPP 
development in each of these countries at different stages. 
Although few projects have benefited from locally denominated financing, there are some 
promising signs, including in South Africa's IPPs. Sponsors for South Africa's two new 
peaking plants, totaling a combined 1000MW slated to come online in 2009, have been given 
access to the country's capital markets and capacity payments will be denominated in rand. 
Furthermore, as discussed in section 3.4.3, four Nigerian firms (Farm Electric, Supertek, rcs 
and Eithope) have all been licensed to build power plants as of August 2006 with the 
expectation that power will start coming on line from these firms within the next four to five 
years, funded in part through domestic sources. 
Where US dollarlEuro denominated financing is the only possibility, the use of a foreign 
exchange liquidity facility may be one solution, as it requires the PPA to be indexed to the local 
currency inflation, rather than the foreign exchange rate, and hence power prices will not go up 
faster than domestic inflation.316 In terms of the sample, however, the most wide-spread and 
effective practice witnessed to date is the indexation of payments to a basket of currencies, as 
seen in Morocco's Jorf Lasfar, CED and Tunisia's Rades II project, highlighted in section 
3.4.1. 
314 Egypt's Sidi Krir plant did obtain local currency financing, however, it was US dollar denominated 
and therefore this ultimately did not help assuage the effects of the currency devaluation for the host 
country. 
315 Morocco and Tunisia saw minimal fluctuation, and Nigeria's fluctuations were limited to the period 
before 1998, when the first IPP was negotiated. Cote d'Ivoire experienced a major currency devaluation 
in 1994, however, this predated the IPPs, and was prompted by a World Bank and IMF proposal rather 
than an exogenous macroeconomic shock. 
316 There has, however, only been one such application to date, namely the AES Tiete project in Brazil. 
A standby credit facility ofUS$30 million was used to mitigate devaluation risk and closed in May 2001 
(Matsukawa, Sheppard et al. 2003: 19) 
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7.4.3 Securing revenue: The PPA and other security arrangements 
All of the projects evaluated had a long-term power purchase agreement with the 
(majority) state-owned utility317 to ensure a market for the power produced (with the exception 
ofMtwara).318 Such a contract was demanded by equity and debt holders alike given the lack of 
liquid markets for electricity in the sample of countries---':"'a practice which held true across the 
larger Stanford PESD IPP study as well. As a result, in most cases there was competition for 
the market, but no actual competition within the market once the PPAs were negotiated, with 
contracts averaging approximately twenty years. 
In addition to indicating who would buy the power, the PP As detailed how much power 
would be bought and at what cost. How plants would be dispatched, fuel metering, 
interconnection, insurance, force majeure, transfer, termination, change of law provisions, 
refinancing arrangements, dispute resolution were generally all clearly laid out as well. Nearly 
all of the contracts specified some form of international dispute resolution and all but one 
contract specified a minimum availability, with Tunisia's SEEB being the exception. 
These contracts were in tum backed by a series of security arrangements, including in 
some cases escrow accounts, letters of credit, stand-by debt facilities, committed public budget 
and/or taxes/levies, targeted subsidies and indexation in contracts. For instance, the Tsavo plant 
in Kenya, in which IPS is a major shareholder, has an escrow account equivalent to one 
month's capacity charge and a stand-by letter of credit from KPLC, which covers three months 
billing of approximately US$12 million. It is known that a minimum of eight of the twenty 
projects had either an escrow account or a liquidity facility or both, with typical terms being 
between one and four months capacity charge in reserve (with one month most typical for 
North African countries and up to four months seen in Tanzania).319 
Not surprisingly, the number of security arrangements and credit enhancements appears to 
diminish as risk profiles improve, however there are noticeable exceptions such as the fir.st 
317 Section 7.3.2 reviews the exceptions, namely Kenya and Nigeria. 
318 Mtwara currently operates under a two year interim PPA, which is expected will be replaced by a 20 
year PP A, to be finalized in 2007. 
319 As detailed in Appendix A, Morocco's 10rfLasfar has an escrow account equivalent to one month's 
capacity charge and Tahaddart has a letter of credit equivalent to one month's payment (which also 
serves as a form of a liquidity facility). Tunisia's Rades II has an escrow account, however, the amount 
is not publicly available. The security arrangement for Kenya's Tsavo plant is detailed above in the text, 
and OrPower4 has since been granted a similar security package. It was specified that Tanzania's IPTL 
would have an escrow account equivalent to between 2 to 4 months of capacity charge, but this account 
has not been established. Songas was granted an escrow account for the first 115 MW, with the 
Government of Tanzania to match every US$1 spent by the project company. No escrow account was 
required for the Songas expansion; furthermore the escrow account was used in part to help buy down 
the AFUDC. The project also negotiated a liquidity facility equivalent to four month's capacity charge 
for the first three years, declining to two months starting in year four through the remaining years of the 
contract. To support its interim PPA, Mtwara has an escrow account (amount unpublished), which will 
be replaced by a form of liquidity facility, termed the Tariff Equalization Facility, once the 20 year PPA 
takes effect. Cote d'Ivoire's Azito plant has an escrow account equivalent to one month's capacity 
charge. 
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wave of plants in Kenya (Westmont and Iberafrica), where the risk appears to be entirely 
reflected in the (higher) capacity payments negotiated, however corruption was also alleged in 
both of these plants.320 Thus, the 'security arrangement' may lie not in a formal escrow 
account, but in an informal agreement among sponsors. 
In all but one case, sponsors negotiated or were granted outright US dollar or Euro 
denominated PP As, thereby reducing project sponsors' exposure to currency devaluation, 
which in certain cases such as Egypt's devaluation was severe. This may in fact be considered 
among the greatest security for sponsors and one that ultimately has influenced countries to 
change their position about further IPP investments. The one exception is in Morocco's fmal 
IPP, Tahaddart, which as discussed above was an entirely domestically financed plant, and 
which therefore had a Moroccan dinar denominated payment stream. 
How then did the PPAs and security arrangements fare over time? As discussed at the 
outset of this Chapter, eight of the projects, nearly half, have faced some form of change to 
their contract. Thus, many have not proven iron clad as first mentioned in section 2.6.1. 
Although there does not appear to be a strong pattern between security arrangements and 
contract changes (meaning that projects with either more or less security arrangements have 
been more or less susceptible to change), there is evidence for contract changes being directly 
related to the terms of the PPA in six projects. 
Costs in Kenya's first wave of IPPs were inflated in part due to the short duration of 
contracts (of only seven years). With Iberafrica facing ongoing pressure to reduce its tariff 
coupled with an interest in negotiating a second contract, the sponsor voluntarily reduced its 
capacity charge, enshrined in the PP A, which meant that it did not amortize the full cost of the 
project over the first contract. At 15 years, Iberafrica's subsequent PPA is notably longer than 
its first (and with negotiations presided over by the ERB, tariffs have been deemed 
significantly cheaper). The oft-referenced Westmont did not negotiate a second contract after it 
failed to obtain the same terms, namely capacity charges, spelled out in its first PP A. The 
changes in Kenya's OrPower4 and Tanzania's Songas have also been related in part to the final 
amount of the capacity charge (as originally spelled out in the PPA).321 In terms of Nigeria's 
AES Barge, initially sponsored by Enron, the renegotiation of 1999-2000 brought about several 
changes to the PPA, including a change in the fuel specifications (from liquid fuel to natural 
gas), which led to a major reduction in the fuel charge for the off-taker. The present 
renegotiations with AES Barge involve among other things reconsideration of the availability 
deficiency payment. Under the existing PPA, liquidated damages recoverable for a shortfall in 
availability are only 30 per cent of the agreed unit cost and payable only at the end of the year. 
320 In 2005 it was found that the then Managing Director of KPLC, Samuel Gichuru, received US$2 
million from Westmont. 
321 It is, however, worth reiterating in this context that failure to agree on both the security package and 
the capacity charge contributed to delays in the development ofOrPower4's additional 36 MW. 
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The current proposal tabled is to increase this per cent significantly as well as ensure that 
payments are made on a monthly basis. In each of the five cases reviewed here, it has been the 
original terms of the PP A that have in hindsight been viewed as unsustainable for the host 
country and hence challenged. The case of Tanzania's IPTL is slightly different. Although the 
contract was considered unsustainable due to the added capacity of Songas, the IPTL 
arbitration was prompted by what was deemed a breech in the PPA, namely the project 
sponsors' substitution of medium speed engines for slow speed engines, without passing on the 
capital cost-savings to the utility, as per the PPA. 
Thus, the PPA has been a central document, however, not necessarily because it has been 
bombproof. Rather, it has been the focal point of many ofthe discussions when deals have been 
considered out of balance. 
7.4.4 Credit enhancements and other measures 
Of the many different credit enhancements and other risk management and mitigation 
measures, it is the provision for international arbitration and sovereign guarantees that have 
been most commonly employed. All projects in the pool specified some form of international 
arbitration. Sovereign guarantees were extended for seven of the 20 projects in the pool: all 
three of the Egyptian IPPs, Morocco's JorfLasfar, Tanzania's IPTL, Nigeria's AES Barge and 
Cote d'lvoire's Azito and Ghana's Takoradi II. However, one of the projects without 
guarantees (Rades II in Tunisia) was given added assurances by the government. Furthermore, 
in the case ofthe Okpai plant in Nigeria, security in the form of the state-owned oil company's 
revenues were extended. Thus, if the off-taker defaults, NNPC, among the most liquid firms in 
the country, is liable. 
World Bank partial risk guarantees are seen in two of the projects: JorfLasfar and Azito. 
In the case of JorfLasfar, the partial risk guarantee protects the commercial lenders should the 
off-taker and the government fail to make specified termination payments. In the case of 
Azito, a PRG ensures that commercial lenders will be paid, even if the utility and state default 
on payments (of both interest and principal) (World Bank 1997; World Bank 1999). In both 
cases, it is only after there is a breech in the sovereign guarantee that the PRG is triggered 
(Sinclair 2007:36).322 
In addition, other measures were engaged. AES Barge has political risk insurance 
provided by OPIC. OrPower4 has a MIGA guarantee. Jorf Lasfar has a political risk guarantees 
from the World Bank, the Italian Export Credit Agency and the Swiss Export Guarantee 
322 Among the more well documented World Bank partial risk guarantees has been one extended for 
Uganda's electricity distribution concession with Globeleq. Here, regulatory risk related to changes in 
exchange rates, namely the risk that the regulator will arbitrarily interfere in foreign exchange-tariff 
adjustments, has been mitigated through the use of partial risk guarantees (Globeleq 2006:21; Eberhard 
2007:1). 
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Agency. Despite the multitude of risks perceived, however, and the plenitude of risk insurances 
available, it is here that the list ends, with no cover for the majority of projects. 
What then is the relationship between such credit enhancements and the sustainability of 
projects? To what extent have they been effective at attracting and/or assuaging lenders? And 
to what degree have such mechanisms helped keep projects intact or led to a swift resolution, in 
the face of external pressures? 
For each of the Egyptian IPPs, sponsors have indicated that the sovereign guarantees were 
essential to the deal, given the novelty and size of the projects. There is also evidence for 
Azito's partial risk guarantee as being among the key's to attract commercial lending (World 
Bank 1999). The lack of sovereign guarantees has also been cited as the main obstacle for 
developing the second phase of Ghana's Takoradi II. In Kenya, the only country in the SSA 
pool not to extend any sovereign guarantees, stakeholders in Tsavo indicated that without such 
a guarantee, the presence of IFC became critical, both to help arrange debt and share in equity. 
Across the board, sponsors of the Kenyan projects a well as KPLC cite the absence of 
sovereign guarantees as hampering the ability to raise private finance. ERB's rejoinder to this 
charge is that IPPs have been introduced to help comm rcialize the sector; government 
guarantees work against this goal, and MIGA and other risk insurers are available to provide 
such cover. 
Finally, In no projects have the sovereign guarantees, PRJ or PRGs been invoked, 
including in those projects which ultimately have faced a change in the contract (namely AES 
Barge, IPTL, OrPower or Takoradi II). Recourse to international arbitration has only been 
made in the case of IPTL, with the arbitration serving to shave US$30 million off of the 
investment cost. In addition, there is evidence, as described in Chapter five, that a MIGA 
delegation was sent to ascertain facts in the case of Kenya when OrPower4 was pressured by 
both the government and KPLC to reduce its tariff, but the guarantee was never officially. 
invoked. Although pressure from KPLC continued thereafter, pressure from the government 
subsided (after the MIGA visit). 
7.4.5 Positive technical performance 
Virtually all IPPs in the sample have been characterized by positive technical 
performance, with exceptions noted in the case of Tunisia's SEEB and Nigeria'S plants due to 
fuel supply (section 7.3.5). IPPs performance is generally superior to state-owned plants, with 
the example of Kenya highlighted here as an illustration. In terms of availability, between 
2004 and 2006, IPPs had an average availability of approximately 95 per cent versus KenGen's 
thermal plants, which averaged 60 per cent. 
Positive technical performance has been instrumental in changing the way IPPs are 
perceived. Consider for example IPTL, which performed optimally throughout the recent 
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drought and helped Tanzania to stave off load shedding until 2006. The plant has since been 
termed "a saviour", even by stakeholders who indicate that corruption was likely. At the same 
time, an unexpected break in Songas' power in 2006, amidst the drought, temporarily tarnished 
the projects reputation, despite the fact that the plant still reached its average availability as 
specified in the PP A and all costs were borne by Songas: During its ownership of Port Said and 
Suez, EDF noted that its management of technological risk, namely by not outsourcing to any 
firms and handling all contracts within the fully integrated EDF, was also a key factor in 
leading to relatively positive outcomes for the firm (EDF 2005). 
7.4.6 Strategic management and relationship building 
Once twenty year contracts are in place, it would seem that the deal is set and the revenue 
secured, with clear provisions to ensure debt repayment and reward equity. There are, 
however, several other interrelated actions that deserve mention here. One involves relationship 
building, including via local partners (as previously discussed) and community social policies 
adopted by sponsors. Yet another action relates to how sponsors handle the onset of stresses, 
including through capacity charges and refmancing. 
In terms of social policies, numerous project sponsors have adopted outreach programmes 
to improve relations with local communities. For instance in Kenya, Tsavo power set up a 
US$l million community development fund for the duration of the 20 year PPA, from which 
grants of US$50,000 each are disbursed each year to benefit environmental and social activities 
in Kenya's Coast Region. Iberafrica has a social responsibility programme, and IPTL also is an 
active donor to its immediate community. Jorf Lasfar received the American Chamber of 
Commerce award for community development and developed an ash disposal facility 
(previously ash was pumped into the sea). CMS's social responsibility involvement in Ghana 
included providing scholarships for secondary and tertiary education as well as providing 
support for both medical clinics and the construction of drainage systems. Although the sums 
are not significant, these programmes, particUlarly when well advertised, have the potential to 
win allies and counter the stereotype of IPPs. 
Another perhaps more significant action is how sponsors cope with stress, such as 
macroeconomic shock and associated currency devaluation or pressure from host governments 
who perceive costs to be too high. Although anecdotal, there is evidence for how such strategic 
management aided the Egyptian plants, which may be judged among the most successful in this 
pool of IPPs. There is also evidence for how strategic management helped put Kenya's 
Iberafrica back on track, in contrast to Westmont, where no such management is in evidence. 
Finally, both of Tanzania's IPPs may accredit future sustainability in part to such an element. 
In the case of the Egyptian devaluation, EEHC appears to have approached Sidi Krir 
management when the country was experiencing an acute scarcity of dollars to request 
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payment in pounds to the maximum extent feasible, but that due to its US dollar denominated 
debt the firm was unable to acquiesce. Minor changes, since the devaluation, are limited to 
partial payment of the local operating and maintenance component (both fixed and variable) in 
local currency, which amounts to approximately 4 per cent of the total charge. With Sidi Krir, 
the change is an informal agreement between the project's general manager and EEHC. With 
Port Said and Suez, the agreement has gone through negotiations with IFC, but EDF could 
have chosen to return to US dollar payments at any time, i.e. it was not contractually bound. 
Although small, these actions do send the message that sponsors are willing to work where 
possible to make the situation less onerous for the host country. 
Kenya's Iberafrica has dealt with two stresses: drought and alleged corruption. It is 
important to reiterate in this context that the project was also up for a contract renewal at the 
time when the following actions described were undertaken. According to stakeholders at 
Iberafrica, the IPP voluntarily lowered its capacity charge at a time when KPLC was operating 
in the red, due in part to a drought-related recession, to show its support for the country and 
signal its interest in a second contract (the first lasted seven years). Iberafrica later secured a 
second contract, albeit after even further reductions were negotiated and passed by the 
electricity regulator.323 
A final area which may yield greater balancing in terms of development and investment 
outcomes is in the refinancing of projects, evidence for which one may see as Songas seeks to 
refinance its 100 per cent equity investment in the second phase of the plant. Possible 
refinancing in the case of IPTL with the Government of Tanzania proposing to buy the 
outstanding debt, and possibly equity, could also lead to what may be perceived as more 
balanced outcomes. If and when the Government of Tanzania buys back IPTL, it will make a 
once-off payment on behalf of the utility and then pass the asset ownership to T ANESCO, 
which may subseque tly decide to convert the plant to run on natural gas. Through this 
transaction, the capacity charge will be reduced to a token amount, and following gas 
conversion, the energy charge dropped from US$9-12 million to US$1-1.5 million per month. 
The PP A will be terminated, a new agreement drafted, and the customers will see discounted 
tariffs. 
Refinancing does, however, only have limited application, and must be dealt with 
carefully during the project negotiation for as one banker candidly indicated: "if project finance 
bankers are expected to finance projects with the understanding that periodically it will be 
necessary to have a restructuring, the outcome of which is uncertain, the result will be to 
323 It should, however, be noted that the fact that Iberafrica was not project-financed meant that the 
company was at greater liberty to change the payment streams. 
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eliminate the availability of non-recourse fmancing"-which, given the already low levels in 
Africa should be avoided.324 
It is the government's willingness to share risks over the life of the project, which may 
also be pivotal in the long-term sustainability of projects. Strategic management does not 
occur in a vacuum, with the sponsor alone. Often the host country government may not only be 
an active counterparty, but even, as evidenced in the refmancing ofIPTL, initiate such strategic 
management. Other government led initiatives include, among others, Morocco's ONE 
assuming a greater equity share in Tahaddart when EDF pulled out and the Government of 
Tanzania's buying down of Song as' AFUDC. 
In sum, how may one understand the limited but still revealing sample of IPPs analyzed 
by this thesis? There are two natural fault lines. The first cuts between North Africa and Sub-
Saharan Africa, and the second, between those projects in SSA that faced some form of 
contract change and those that did not. 
The main difference between IPPs in North Africa and those in SSA is that the former 
took root in significantly more attractive investment environments than the latter. In tum, 
competition was greater, as were ICBs, which may have also contributed to cost reductions. 
Also of significance in most of the North African projects is that despite exogenous stresses, 
policy frameworks remained largely intact and planning mishaps were fewer than in the SSA 
sample. Most North African IPPs benefited from abundant low cost fuel and secure fuel 
contracts as well as credit enhancements such as sovereign guarantees. For the most part, with 
few exceptions, these contributing elements to success were absent in SSA. Certain SSA 
projects did in fact benefit from ICBs, as well as abundant fuel resources and credit 
enhancements, but generally speaking, the abovementioned elements were largely consistent 
across the North African pool. 
Although distinguished by relatively less attractive investment climates, the SSA IPP 
sample is not homogenous. What if any are the shared characteristics among the seven projects 
(Iberafrica, OrPower4, IPTL, Songas, Takoradi II, AES Barge and Okpai), eight if Westmont is 
included, that underwent some form of contract change? Furthermore, does the balance of SSA 
IPPs that did not see any form of change (Tsavo, Mtwara, CIPREL and Azito) exhibit any 
common elements? 
The IPPs that have seen changes to their original contracts were all procured amidst a 
form of electricity crisis, mostly as a result of drought in largely hydro-dependent systems. 
Furthermore, often W orId Bank sanctioned power master plans and/or conditional loans were 
passed over to plug the immediate power crisis. In such crisis situations, ICBs were only 
324 See footnote 309 for indication of low project fmance levels in Africa. 
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followed in two of the eight IPPs; furthermore, in the two projects that did see an ICB (Songas 
and OrPower4) only two bids were received. Such crisis conditions did not predominate to the 
same degree in the group of IPPs that have not seen changes. Although ICBs were still limited 
(Azito and Tsavo), it is arguable that the IPP framework was more clearly defined, bidding was 
more transparent and ultimately more thorough due to the fact that plants were procured under 
less urgent circumstances than in the group of eight discussed above. 
Furthermore, there is a discrepancy in the prominence of DFls and/or development-
minded firms in the two different groups ofSSA IPPs evaluated by this thesis. In all four of the 
projects that have stayed intact to date in SSA, multilateral and bilateral development 
institutions and/or development-minded fums have been equity holders (IPS and IFC in Tsavo, 
FMO in Mtwara, IFC in CIPREL, and Globeleq and IPS in Azito). In addition, most of these 
projects have also benefited from concessionary funding, provided and/or arranged by DFls. In 
contrast, in the eight remaining projects, which have encountered some form of change, such 
agencies and firms have been notably less present on both the equity and debt side. Only one of 
the eight projects had a development minded firm as an equity holder (Globeleq in Songas).325 
Only one of the eight projects saw involvement of a DFI on the debt side (World Bank in 
Songas).326 Finally, it is important to reiterate here that Songas' contract changes were linked to 
the delays caused by the negotiation and ultimately arbitration ofIPTL. 
The two elements described above, namely the electricity crisis and the prominence of 
DFls and/or development-minded firms ate (like the favourable investment climate of North 
Africa) by far the most far-reaching elements in terms of differentiating the two groups of SSA 
IPPs evaluated here. There are, however, a couple additional elements that help explain some of 
the variation in the two groups. The absence of abundant low cost fuel also characterizes five 
of the eight projects that saw changes (Westmont, Iberafrica, IPTL, Takoradi and AES Barge), 
with only one project in the group of four (Tsavo) that have not seen changes not benefitin~ 
from abundant low cost fuel. Also worth mentioning is the fact that four of the eight ended up 
funding projects entirely with their balance sheets (Westmont, Iberafrica, OrPower4, and 
Okpai). Interestingly, although PPAs, credit enhancements, security arrangements, positive 
technical performance and strategic management have all emerged to shape particular projects, 
there is no fully conclusive data across the pool. Also noteworthy is the fact that of the four 
projects that have seen no changes, there were no local partners, including no participation on 
behalf of the government. In contrast, of the eight that did see a change, local partners, 
including government were present in six ofthe projects. 
325 However, Globeleq only came into Songas, after the AFUDC had accumulated and is credited in part 
with allowing the buying down of the AFUDC by the government. 
326 Furthermore, OrPower4 did obtain a MIGA guarantee. 
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including technological selection, joint ventures with local partners, as well as a suite of new 
protections (including political risk insurance and partial risk guarantees) and international 
arbitration also emerged to help protect foreign investors and their investments from outright or 
creeping expropriation. 
What then did the review of three in-depth country case studies and five additional 
country narratives reveal about the obsolescing bargain and the new protections as well as their 
relationship to the balancing of development and investment outcomes? 
7.6.1 Setting of the initial bargain and risk management measures 
As discussed throughout, the investment conditions (and perceived investment risks) 
between the North African and Sub-Saharan Africa examples are markedly different. 
According to the theory of the obsolescing bargain, detailed above, one would expect to see a 
corresponding difference in the relative power between stakeholders at the initial contract 
negotiation, which in tum should affect the terms of the deal and security measures engaged .. 
Thus, investors in SSA should, according to obsolescing bargain theory, attempt to tilt 
outcomes their way at the outset, due to the perception of higher risks, and obtain more 
safeguards for such arrangements. Likewise, it would be expected that there would 
subsequently be a greater effort by host countries to rebalance projects, in their eyes, or even 
expropriate value (as will be assessed in the next section). 
There are signs that investors in some of the first SSA IPPs (namely, Kenya's Westmont 
and Iberafrica, Tanzania's IPTL and Nigeria'S AES Barge) indeed sought to tilt outcomes in 
their favour, with higher risk premia demanded at the outset, and in most cases debt amortized 
within the first few years of the contract. Little evidence appears to point to such actions in the 
North African sample. In this respect, investor behaviour does appear to conform with the 
obsolescing bargain theory. In each of the more risky cases, agreements were safeguarded via 
long-term PPAs, however, this has also been observed across the entire pool, with the one 
exception of Tanzania's Mtwara plant. In addition, all projects have specified recourse to 
international arbitration should a dispute arise and not be able to be resolved in local courts. 
Thus, neither the PP A alone nor the provision for arbitration is unique to the more risky cases. 
As regards other safeguards, about half of North African projects had government guarantees 
(Egypt's three IPPs and Morocco's Jorf Lasfar). Surprisingly, however, less than half of the 
Sub-Saharan plants had such guarantees (only Cote d'Ivoire's Azito, Ghana's Takoradi, 
Nigeria'S AES Barge and Tanzania's IPTL). Furthermore, contrary to the prediction that a 
more risky investment environment would mean more investment safeguards, only two of the 
Sub-Saharan pool of 11 projects had any form of political risk insurance (MIGA for OrPower4 
and OPIC for AES Barge). Although this is greater than the North African pool, where only 
Jorf Lasfar is reported to have PRJ, the scarcity of such insurance in the relatively more risky 
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Sub-Saharan African pool is noteworthy. In addition, only two projects in the sample benefited 
from partial risk guarantees (JorfLasfar and Azito), both provided by the World Bank. 
In reviewing the North African cases, one World Bank official, heavily involved in the 
sector indicated, "Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco are acceptable risks so do not need credit 
enhancements, although we did provide a PRG for JorfLasfar, [due to the size and the scope of 
the project]." This comment sheds light on the paucity of such credit enhancements for North 
Africa, but it does not explain the absence in SSA. Development finance institutions did, 
however, take an active role in both equity and debt, which may, in some respects, have served 
as a form of credit enhancement. Yet again, though, the numbers do not fit precisely with the 
obsolescing bargain theory: six out of the twelve SSA projects recorded involvement of a DFI 
in contrast to five out of the eight North African projects. That is, such involvement was 
relatively higher in the less risky North. 
The data does, however, conform to the prediction with regard to local joint venture 
partnerships, as the majority of Sub-Saharan projects engaged some form of local partner (in 
contrast to just one project in North Africa that did so, namely Morocco's Tahaddart). Another 
example, as noted previously, is that escrow accounts in th  North African sample appear to be 
of shorter duration than those in the Sub-Saharan sample. 
Thus, while the possibility of the obsolescing bargain theory does appear to help explain 
some of the investor behaviours adopted, including the higher premia, security arrangements 
and joint ventures, there is also a divergence between theory and practice, which points to the 
possibility that firms did not take such a threat seriously, believing instead that the original 
deals would endure. 
7.6.2 Evidence for the bargains obsolescing 
Did projects face pressure over time from host governments to renegotiate? If so, did the 
iron clad PPAs, the security arrangements and credit enhancements fend off the obsolescing 
bargain? As reviewed at the beginning of this Chapter, the complete unravelling of contracts 
has been almost nil, with the special cases of SIIF Accra and Osagyefo Barge being the two 
exceptions. One might therefore conclude that the theory of the obsolescing bargain did not 
apply. On closer inspection, however, there is significant evidence for sponsors being pressured 
to renegotiate contracts as well as several notable changes to contracts. Eight of the 20 projects 
have faced a change in their contract (Tunisia's SEEB, Kenya's Iberafrica and OrPower4, 
Tanzania's IPTL and Songas, Ghana's Takoradi II and both of the Nigerian plants, AES Barge 
and Okpai). Furthermore, one additional IPP has been pressured to do so, but ultimately 
resisted (Kenya's Tsavo), and Kenya's Westmont was pressured in the negotiation ofa second 
contract to do so, and ultimately decided to withdraw. Thus, about 50 per cent of the sample is 
known to have faced pressure, with the majority in SSA. 
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Following the prediction of the theory, the obsolescing bargain unfolded primarily in those 
cases where outcomes were later perceived by public stakeholders to be tilted toward investors, 
at the expense ofthe country, i.e. where there was the growing perception of an imbalance. As 
reported in Wells and Ahmed, "ultimately, security for most investors lies in how a particular 
project is perceived by its hosts-by government officials, but also in a democratic Third 
World, by the press, labour, and nongovernmental organizations" (2007:298). 
Thus, there are almost no examples in the North African sample, and the examples in the 
SSA may be identified with certain types of projects where the gap was seen to be relatively 
greater. In each case, with the exception of Okpai, for which the renegotiation is ongoing, 
tariffs have come down from what was originally agreed upon. Post-renegotiation, however, 
although in most cases, pressure has continued from the host country government, there have 
been limited additional contract changes, with the one exception that of AES Barge where the 
firms has seen a withholding of the tax exemption certificate; that is, there is no evidence for 
outright expropriation and creeping expropriation may only be noted in one case. In sum, new 
agreements are reached, and generally, operations continue. 
7.6.3 A case for the new protections or for balancing outcomes? 
Do the numerous examples of contract changes that occurred with SSA IPPs in turn signal 
that the obsolescing bargain is applicable, and that the standard risk strategies adopted by 
partners were insufficient? Alternatively, might there be another answer to this question that 
does not fit within either Vernon's original thesis or those who built on it including Wells, as 
described in section 2.6.1 ? 
Although security arrangements and credit enhancements, as described above, were in 
existence, they were not as plentiful as one would expect. Furthermore, many of the projects 
that did see some form of their contract renegotiated had such protections: OPIC political risk 
insurance and sovereign guarantee for AES Barge, sovereign guarantee for IPTL and a joint 
venture with a local partner, and MIGA for OrPower4. Thus, perhaps one could speculate that 
such arrangements helped prevent further unravelling from happening, but the data is 
inconclusive in pointing to the pivotal role of such protections in keep the obsolescing bargain 
at bay. 
In sum, on the one hand, where there was a perceived balance between sponsors and host 
country governments, contracts generally remained intact, as seen in most of the North African 
cases, with the balance largely accredited to the more favourable country level factors (such as 
favourable investment climates, clear policy frameworks, and ICBs, among others). On the 
other hand, perceived imbalances (often exaggerated by exogenous stresses) between sponsors 
and host country governments frequently did lead to an obsolescence of the original contract. 
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Contrary to expectation, the series of protections described above were not the determining 
factor in outcomes.327 
Although the evidence is not conclusive, strategic management on behalf of sponsors and 
government as well as strong technical performance have been used to cope with the 
obsolescing bargain. Furthermore, the fact that projects with participation of development-
minded fIrms and DFls were less likely to feel the effects of the obsolescing bargain signals 
two points: such projects may have been more balanced from the get-go, and when an 
exogenous stress struck, they may have also been better equipped to resist the obsolescing 
bargain. 
Thus, the fIndings are four-fold. First, evidence for the obsolescing bargain is widespread 
across the pool of African IPPs where an imbalance is perceived, which largely corresponds to 
the more risky SSA projects. Focusing on identifying the key variables to explain project 
outcomes across the pool of 34 projects, the Stanford PESD IPP study passed over the 
obsolescing bargain as holding signifIcant explanatory power. This thesis would, however, 
argue that the theory does explain more about investor behaviour, which has an inevitable 
impact on outcomes, than PESD reported. 
Secondly, the incidence of the obsolescing bargain does not signal the end of a project's 
operation. New agreements may be reached, albeit at a cost, that prove sustainable. Third, 
efforts must continue to close the initial gap between investors and host country governments 
(or else examples of the obsolescing bargain will continue), as Vernon himself argued at the 
end of Sovereignty at Bay (1971). Finally, the means to closing the gap may not necessarily be 
via increasing the sort of new protections, including political risk insurance, which have been 
reported to often confound political and economic issues (Moran 2006:80-81) and may instead 
lie in the numerous contributing elements to success defIned by this thesis. 
7.7 Power sector reform framework 
7.7.1 The reform agenda emerges 
IPP investments were made within the context of a broader reform programme, which 
sought to address the poor technical and fInancial performance that persisted in many 
developing countries. At the heart of the programme was the idea that the private sector could 
procure, operate, and often own electricity assets more efficiently than the public sector. This 
fundamental shift-from state to market-reversed decades of state-led development and 
327 The protections do, however, hold some explanatory power, as seen for instance in the case of 
OrPower4. Following the visit paid by the MIG A delegation, pressure from the Government of Kenya on 
the firm reduced (although pressure from KPLC continued and ultimately led to a renegotiation of 
tariffs). 
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operation, which had become the accepted truth for most ESIs (and other infrastructure 
industries) globally in the post World War II years. 
Electricity sector reforms were pioneered in the USA, UK, Chile and Norway, countries 
that were known for their relatively high access rates (including Chile). In addition, a number 
of these early reformers had excess supply capacity, conditions that differed drastically from 
the majority of developing countries, which would later be the subject of reform. 
Despite differences in starting conditions, gradually the reform crystallized into a standard 
model, which specified the need for corporatization and commercialization of the state utility, 
followed by passage of legislation, establishment of an independent regulator, the introduction 
of IPPs, restructuring, divestiture of state assets and the introduction of competition. 
Caution over the enactment of such a model was urged. As highlighted in section 2.4.4, 
the inapplicability of one-size-fits-all solution has long been acknowledged, at least in print. In 
Bacon (1995a:32-33), not only was possible exemption made for small systems, but the reform 
approach was one based on questions (not answers) as presented in his conclusion. To take the 
example of IPPs, according to Bacon, the order was not, introduce IPPs, but rather "What will 
be the gains, in terms of the price of entry of IPPs, from separating transmission from 
generation? Over what period will the IPPs enter, with what capacity, and what price 
advantages will be gained in comparing the bids into a separated system as opposed as into an 
integrated system?" 
The thinking espoused by Bacon in 1995 as well as other voices of reason did not, 
however, filter into practice, in all instances. Instead, a standard prescription, with a specific 
end state, has been the main message spread by DFIs, international consultants (involved in the 
early reforms particularly in the UK and Latin America), as well as domestic champions of the 
reform model over the past 15 years. This model has been promoted, despite the fact that it was 
never made official policy by DFIs, most notably the World Bank. 
7.7.2 Enacting the reform agenda 
In each of the countries evaluated in this thesis, as well as many other countries across 
Africa and other developing regions, power sector reform, a la standard model, has been 
undertaken. Despite these efforts, in no country in Africa (and virtually none in other 
developing regions) has the end state of the standard model been realized. 
That is not to say that pieces of the model are not in evidence. Over the course of the past 
two decades, ESIs have adopted greater commercialization practices, and steps have been taken 
toward corporatization. There is evidence for the passage of energy laws providing for third 
party access; new regulatory organizations abound. Numerous countries, as documented by this 
thesis, have also adopted IPPs. It is here, however, where the steps of the standard model stop, 
with little achieved in terms of full unbundling (vertical as well as horizontal), privatization of 
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the ESI, and the introduction of wholesale and retail competition. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that the sequencing of the steps that have been undertaken, has not always been per the 
original model. For instance, in many countries, regulators came into existence only after the 
first IPP contracts were negotiated. Commercialization efforts have often only picked up post-
IPPs as well. 
Not only have the steps been out of order, but the actual motivating forces have also 
differed from what was conceived in the standard model. For instance, the rationale for IPPs, 
according to the model, was that the introduction of privately financed and often privately 
owned generation would help the sector move toward greater efficiency by providing a 
benchmark to state-owned plants. Further advantages cited were that IPPs would introduce 
competition for the market (yielding lower tariffs), which was also considered a step toward 
competition in the market. 
In practice, however, IPPs have been adopted in numerous countries in this thesis' sample 
at a time when there were no public funds available and often an electricity supply crisis 
prevailed. Thus, the situation was often one of emergency, with the need for urgent power the 
impetus, rather than long-term efficiency of the ESI. Decisions taken in such crisis situations 
have frequently locked countries into 20 year commitments, with widespread evidence for 
renegotiations in such instances, as the original terms are deemed obsolete. 
It is perhaps valuable to briefly consider what has happened in African countries that have 
experimented with the standard model, but have not developed IPPs. How have they fared, and 
are they any closer to or further from the end state of the standard model? Malawi, 
Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe have also sought to unbundle, privatize and introduce 
competition, but did not attract any IPPs. In each case, however, the countries also stopped in 
the reform path, long before unbundling and competition were completed.328 Thus, the presence 
or absence of IPPs does not appear to explain the lack of progress in achieving the standard 
model to date. 
7.7.3 Mid-way or a new path? 
What does the fact that no African country has adopted the standard model full cloth, 
despite the intense pressure to reform ESIs as outlined in Chapter 2, say about the model? Is the 
road simply longer than anticipated and the standard model still applicable, or has a new model 
come into play? 
Although IPPs may slow the process, particularly when associated with alleged 
corruption, as described in Chapter six in the context of IPTL, they are not impediments to the 
328 A number of authors chart the reforms of one or more such countries: Zimbabwe (Dube 2000:121-
151); Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia Zimbabwe (SAD-ELEC 2004:24,27,51,55); Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe (United Nations Environment Programme and United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa 2006). 
235 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
enactment of the standard model, particularly if they are procured in a transparent manner and 
are part of a country's power system master plan. The means to integrating IPPs into wholesale 
competition are many and may include: forced market integration by enacting legislation; 
integration through a change in market rules; forced renegotiation; financially facilitated 
market integration, contract buy-out and facilitated voluntary renegotiation or buy-out (Woolf 
and Halpern 2001: 13). 
Despite such a wide range of alternatives for moving from IPPs to wholesale competition, 
t4ere is little evidence, for such movement. Instead, largely state-owned utilities are 
maintaining significant (often dominant) market share. New publicly funded plants are being 
built, often with support of concessionary loans. A hybrid market is emerging where long-term 
take or pay contracts with IPPs exist alongside publicly owned and operated plants. Might this 
signal then not a mid point in the standard model but rather a new model altogether?329 
If a new model is indeed emerging, which the evidence would suggest, then it is time to 
acknowledge that the standard model, which has been the organizing principal for power sector 
reform over the last decade and a half, serves neither a descriptive nor a prescriptive role. 
Simply stated, the death of the standard model must be broadcast.330 Instead, a tailor-made 
solution as recently acknowledged again by' Besant-Jones is in order, given the range of 
economic and political/institutional conditions that predominate (2006: 1). 
Within such tailor-made solutions, serious attention should be paid to policy and planning 
frameworks and the institutions that will carry out such work. Clear policy frameworks, 
signalled throughout this thesis in the context of evaluating contributing elements to success for 
IPP projects, must be enshrined in legislation, and specify the market structure (generally a 
single buyer) and the roles and terms for private and public sector investments alike. Before 
coherent power sector planning is undertaken, decisions about where to site such planning must 
also be taken. In a hybrid market, should planning still be undertaken by the state-owned 
utility, or should an alternative be found, vesting planning in an independent government 
329 Although a discussion of why the standard model may not have been realized in the country cases 
above is beyond the scope of this thesis, two points are worth noting in this context. A country's 
commitment has often been cited as the key (missing) ingredient (World Bank 1993a:72; Bacon and 
Besant-Jones 2002:4; Besant-Jones 2006:2-3; Woodhouse 2006c:22). In their recent work, Victory and 
Heller posit that the answer to this question may run deeper than mere political will/commitment and 
relate to investment crises predominating in countries at the inception of reforms as well as the lack of 
financial and judicial reforms undertaken by a country (2007:256,259). 
330 Numerous authors have challenged the applicability of the standard model, describing how a 
mismatch between the conditions that predominated in those countries where power sector reform was 
initiated and most developing countries, has led to negative outcomes (Wamukonya 2003: 1285; 
Williams and Ghanadan 2006:836; Yi-chong 2006:821). Proponents of the model are, however, still 
numerous, and as indicated previously plans to enact the model are still be considered in among other 
countries Tanzania (Joskow 2006:7-8,14; Mercados per com 2007; Parastatal Sector Reform 
Commission per com 2007). Such criticism is slowly beginning to make its way into the mainstream as 
seen through the recently published World Bank treatise Reforming Power Markets in Developing 
Countries: What Have We Learned, cited above (Besant-Jones 2006). 
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agency, a single buyer office or an independent system operator? In making such a decision, 
the guiding principle should be what organization is most capable of making independent and 
fair allocations of new builds and overseeing a transparent bidding process? It may ultimately 
be decided that additional governance mechanisms must be introduced into the sector to ensure 
such a fair allocation between private and public players.'Although seemingly mundane, unless 
properly addressed these issues could hamper investment on the continent as private producers 
perceive that they are competing in an unfair game where the incumbent state-owned utility 
always has the upper hand, or vice versa. It has been demonstrated that the standard model no 
longer serves a descriptive or prescriptive role, what now needs to be developed is how to 
efficiently manage a hybrid market, taking into consideration the wide array of considerations 
of stakeholder. 
This thesis sought to evaluate the experience ofIPPs in Africa and explore the relationship 
between development and investment outcomes. The primary question asked was whether the 
balancing of such outcomes leads to more sustainable projects. The answer, as illustrated by the 
experiences of eight different countries in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, is that indeed a 
balance between outcomes does lead to sustainability; however, such a balance is, given the 
conditions that predominated at the time that many IPPs were procured, often only achievable 
over time, including via renegotiation. In elucidating the issue of balancing outcomes, this 
thesis developed a suite of contributing elements to success and analyzed the interplay between 
such elements and outcomes. Although each of the elements proved relevant, the most far 
reaching were: favourable investment climates; clear policy and planning frameworks and 
favourable equity and debt arrangements, including the participation of a development-minded 
firm and/or a DFI. 
To better understand both the investment and power sector context of African IPPs, the 
thesis engaged two different sets of literature. The obsolescing bargain theory, within FDI 
literature, was drawn upon to help understand the original conditions of the deal and their 
impact. Following the prediction of the obsolescing bargain theory, the African IPPs evaluated 
here demonstrated that deals perceived to be out of balance, by public stakeholders, were often 
forced to renegotiate. Although there was no outright expropriation of assets, original deals in 
nearly half of the projects studied did obsolesce. Furthermore, in most instances, the spate of 
new protectionisms, including PRI and PRG, did not ward of the obsolescing bargain. The key 
lay instead in the original conditions of the deal, namely creating more balanced development 
and investment outcomes, as evidenced by the lack of the obsolescing bargain across the North 
African IPPs. For those projects that did face renegotiation, DFI involvement, rather than PRI, 
proved significant as well as a number of other elements identified by this thesis, including the 
strategic management of projects. 
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Although this thesis has attempted to take the understanding of African IPPs forward, 
including by engaging the obsolescing bargain, the greatest contribution to knowledge of this 
thesis may be in its analysis of the power sector reform context in which IPPs arose. Through 
detailed case studies as well as an extensive review of reform literature and interviews with 
policy makers, this thesis found that the standard model for power sector reform had many 
authors and proponents, including a band of international consultants involved in some of the 
earliest reforms in the UK and Latin America; that is, it was not exclusively owned or led by 
the World Bank. In addition, despite numerous warning signs not to apply the standard model 
to small systems such as those characteristic of most Sub-Saharan countries, the model was 
used extensively with little regard to country specifics. Furthermore, such a model although 
applied, has not actually been realized. Instead, hybrid electricity markets emerge, which 
include state-owned and privately owned entities and present a series of challenges, as this 
thesis has illustrated through its review of country cases. Finally, an attempt has been made to 
outline key elements that may help improve the organization and ultimately the performance of 
such hybrid markets, without, however, suggesting that any standard approach be adopted. 
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Appendix A 
Detailed specifications are presented for each IPP discussed in this thesis. The organization 
of the data is as follows. Information is first grouped into regions with North Africa, followed 
by East Africa and West Africa. Countries within each of the regions are presented in 
alphabetical order. Under each country, IPPs are then presented in terms of chronological 
order, based on the date when the IPP first came online, as per the outline below. 
RtlgionlCountrylPro.iect Pa2e numbers 
North Africa 255-261 
Egypt 255-256 
Sidi Krir 255 
Port Said & Suez 256 
Morocco 257-259 
JorfLasfar 257 
Compagnie Eolienne de Detroit (CED) 258 
Tahaddart 259 
Tunisia 260-261 
Rades II 260 
Societe d'Electricite d'EI Biban (SEEB) 261 
East Africa 262-268 
Kenya 262-265 
Westmont 262 
Iberafrica 263 
OrPower4 264 
Tsavo 265 
Tanzania 266-268 
IPTL 266 
Songas 267 
Mtwara 268 
West Africa 269-273 
Cote d'Ivoire 269-270 
Compagnie Ivoirienne De Production D'Electricite (CIPREL) 269 
Azito 270 
Ghana 270 
Takoradi II 271 
Nigeria 272-273 
AES Barge Limited 272 
Okpai 273 
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North Afrie:l 
£~:Jl!U1.. ?f..JJ.mJjclU) _ .. -
I 
I'rujtct ~id i Krir 
~~e 683 MW 
C (lSI USS4 U.9 llI ill ion 
-
-S rkW 60' 
-
T('chnoIO!:), Nmural 'asish,:am c ck , 
I ~.!l I Yes 
-Co ntract BOOT, 20 v<!:Jrs , 
-- --
.-'----_ ... 
Ocbll l~9.u~j)' 33/67 
~I" I in cq!ljlY an~ d~.bl None 
--
LOCft l parlleillalion III V.:s kquity) 
~'lluily IIIHI,h'l1l 
Eqllity pal'tners (rouJ1tr)' lntcrGcn (U SI\, 60%) & Edison (U~/\, 40%) sold to Globeleq (U K, 
h e;ld( iu ~rters & "I. nf 100%) in 200'i-200S, condi tional saj ~ to PI:.L (J V between 
t~~~!.! 
-
Malaysia Tanj ono & Saudi ArabIa AlJomaih, IOO%)'in 2007 
--,-_. 
1.~IHkn 60% s ourc~d rrom 10;.;,,1 Egypti.m blinks. k ct by COlllm~dal 
International Bank, I'dlh remaining 40% provided by in tcrn:lt ionai 
commercial hank.~ 
--- -
- - .. . ... _-
C rt:dill'lIh:ulcc nlcr.!ts _ Sovereign guarantee 
--
_~~~ 'i!.~ a .~!!!.!lg~m( II ts __ ~onc 
..•. -
-
Pr,, 'te l tender con 1996 2002 
--.. -.'.'----- -- - - . 
Contnlct eh:lIl"t None 
File! ;trr.tl1g,' III\'111 Fuel provided by Gasco, nat ional ga., w mp,IIIY, :It ~ub·ctOnomic raii:s, 
proJC(:1 spon.~ors IXly Ga,,;;o and <I re subsequently rcimbur,crl by EEHe , 
0_' n OI iI direct p~_tbrou,; h __ 
-
-._.,--
--
"I Previously projeci costs w~r~ estimated al USS4 17 .8, however, following negoltat ions with Egyptian 
customs aothorit ies costs were reduced to US$4 1 3.9. 
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EI:J'pt (l & J of J fJ",jl·~·t/Jl) 
.,-----------------------------
I'orl Said & Sue/. J 
6SJ MW each (ror a total uf 136fi) . 
Sailli!1d (J S1JJJlI million (Suez) 
" 
li:q~~~:;:;i;;~;(,~. ~,~, ;;,;;:yiEiDFTfC;;;",·~.'I Oo% so!tJ to KuasOl;;' rc;;;;;;-;;;i;;.:;;J"ii,;Y·Ofr;;;;,,;;" ,,--1 
& 'II. or c:lr h (Malaysia. 100%) in 2{J(J6 
Lenders ., \ . Uatd~y~, and 10hn Hancock 
., 
" 
" 
. provid.:d ,ompany, at . i · " 
rroj..:ct sprmsof:'; pilY (ia....:(' 1,IIId :o r.: ,>ub;,t:\juenlly rcimbu:scd by EE HC, 
L ________ -'-_J i.e. not a dlrect pass th rouSh 
111 Pori Said and SUl"Z are group.:d under olle profile as lh ~' prujecl size. typ.: and sponsor \\crc id.:nli,ai 
The only uislincliun bdwetn Ihe IWO plants w,,~ in Iho; tar iJa] C0:>1 . .". ilh Sm:z. whi;;::t was ncgollah:d 
aller Port Said, r.:cording J lower tJpi lal cost 
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Morocco ( 1 of J pmjecll) 
~----l 
I'r"j~( 1 Jorr L3s rar 
Sizc 6!10 1680 r.,-IW 
---
. __ . 
Cost USS 1500 mill ion I 
S perk\\' 
--
USS I, IOJ 
r+JEhnO I~' Coal , 
-
- ---. ICR y" , 
_J 1 =~~j 30' tt:<i~s - ~ -C •• mr:ld 
Ih:htil' <lll iIV 
-
])FI in \"I'lIly :Iud uevt 
-
YC1;(rlcht) 
Lil,·; .1 (l :lrlh:ipatillil in None 
. C([uit)· :In~ ,jeht 
---
E'luilY p:Jrlners (cIlU llI '1' eMS (USA. 50'%) ac:d ABB (Swiss, 50%) sold shares 10 T AQ!I. (UAE, 
/lfurigil1 $o "/" url'adl ~ ll:Irdlo ltJ ~ri __ .• 
100%) in 2007 
Lcnders USA Exlm (US$200 mill ion), OP IC and a syndicale o f approximatcly 
50 commercial banks 
.. _ ... -.. -.. -_._. 
C ,'I'dit enh;11ll:~·1;·;~·;;t;·- PRG from the Ilfllian EJ.:?or t Credit Agency (SI\C£), the Swis.s Export 
Risk GuanUllee (ERG) a:1d the World Bank 
S~CIlI'i~ aua!!Zclllents Escro\\ Ol~counl cqU!val ~nt to I mOnth ell adl ~har 't: 
, 1'~'Ej('ct tender, COl! 1994,2000 
ContrOl ~ l d.:ut:;c None 
-
-
- . ~ 
"' lId :trr!lIH':Clllcnl Coal pro~ured by pro jeci. wilh 8m", 01 (;oal , , ;SIS rcinlbur:.ed OIl the 
I L 
i\\·crag..: (OSI o f 0: 001 proc.ll r ~d by projco;t u:tu 20% of costs r..: nnburscd al 
_ilverage t:Ost or 0:001 illlportt"d lnlu ,"ul'='Pella Union 
-~ -
1lI '1 he first 680 MW refer 10 ~n ~xisl ing Illci lity , i.e. a brownfield i:wcstmclIl; (he gro:cnfield investment 
was all arldil ional 680 M W. 
) )4 The project COS IS included the upgradc of the coal rcn:iving ra<: ll ity and abo the illfraSlruC(ure for 
transporting (oal lo ONE'~ Mohamcdi~ plant. 
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i I'rojcct ,._ '" - - - , Comp:lgnic F:nlil'nll ~ (Ie netroi t (C F.O) 
. ----
-
. . 
-
Size SO MW 
. . _. ~.-. 
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-- -
~crk~_· _ 
---_. 
S 1,1 70 
.--
Tcchnolol! .... 
-
Wind 
IC" y" 
-f~llt";I ~l p l O.19ycars 
.-
VebliE uil ' 70/]0 
pH ill cqu.~ alit! debt Yes (debt) 
Local llartieiJl<lti,," in Nonc 
• e(llIily'~ml (kbl 
F.'llll ly parlner, J:: OF (France, 49%), Par ihas (F ran~e, 35.5%) & GERMA (Fr:mcc, 
(collntryoforigin & 'Yo 15.5%) maintained equity silL<:c 1,)97 
of each slmr!holdcrJ 
--_. 
Lrndrrs EIB (€24.4 milli;;nJ:-jiROPARCO, Cred it Agriwk (flDW C alyon) and 
llther commercial hanks 
Credit t'nhancements None 
-
St'curit\· arrall 'l'lIIfll h Nunc 
--
- -
< 
I'ro ' fU undtr. COO 1995,2000 
. .--< 
Coulra(1 dian , None ; 
-I Fuel :Irrall!::ement .. No energy eh.ltge, \\ ind.powered , 
m l' rojcCI costs quoted ill I:uros at €45.7, w!1H,'ned to USS on .'\ u~ust 24 2006 at exchange rate of 
€J=US$1.211 
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--- -
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bsi~:; --. :i84 MW 
-C~ ..... US$364 .9 million 
S per kW- -US$I, SO 
Ttehllolo\:y Nil!u .. :! l 'as/combined c d e I 
Icn y" f-6;~lrlICl - --- -
-
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Ihbl/~ uil, 75/25 
-
Df'1 ill c9.!lill:..!!,nd ddJI None 
-
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Ct ulty ami ilebt 
-
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-
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-
•. - , 
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-
-('n.-tli t ~nh~ntcmCnlS NOlle 
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Pro'ctl h'!~"'r_ CO il ._-
-
1999,2005 
CO llt ra ct ehau 't' None 
- -
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," 
-
Al 'crian Sp<lin ~ ipdine) 
-
--
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(,f l'ae h ~!. :t r~c~yfdcr) 
L"n((.'n JBIC, IJNP Sanwa and other commercial banks 
C I'cditl' nh:ll1l'1'tllents No sovereign guar~ntee but did rece ive reaSSl tranccs from government 
lh[1I STEG would be able to meel ib obligations; 
JSIC also rC"Ceivcd Letter of ComfOr1 from MinIstry of i:.ncrgy 
indicalin!,; .!,:overnment committed 10 success ofllrojccl 
Sccu ril y ~rrnn 'cUlcnl~ b,row account (amount nOI publkly ayailabl~ 
Proj~<'t _trtld!r. COD 1997, 2002 
Conl"'~cl cI':llIgC None 
I' ud :ur:tln 'cment Fue l su lied ~y SH.t!. ~nd fuel CO,b at e a ass th roU'+ to STEG 
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~CCI 
, 
' rkW 
Itnolo.&r 
Iract 
t1Es.ui l . 
li !:l..!-·qllil~.' and dd'll. 
31 partici(J:lliOIl in 
ity and d.cb!.. ___ 
,ity llat'tl1~'n 
nt'1' of oril!in & % 
Pm 
Size 
CO~ 
S , 
To< 
IC H 
Coo 
,Deb 
OF 
lA, 
, " 
t:~p 
(el)O 
of c 
LI:I1 
Crc 
SC~ 
I~ 
e ml 
Reb sll:~rrh o h[c"L_ 
Ikr~ 
. . 
d.i) cnil:lurcf!\cnts 
uri'\' arran '~'ml' nl S 
. 
~~.t...!.£!!dcr, L-:!)I) 
tract cll;JIlI!C 
Fm ., arran gement 
~ol'.i(· 11' d ' [Icclricilc d' EI.Hib:m (SE£II) 
27 MW 
USSJO Illi llionJJl>-
... 
US$ l.l ll 
. 
Natural ,,, '0 en c d e 
None, bm selective imcrn:l.Iional tender conducted 
.. 
BOO..:1Q.Icars 
67133 
-
Nooc 
Yes (debl, but US$ denomin;lcd) 
... 
Centurion (USA, 50%) sold to Cantlcx (Canad:l.. 50%) in 2()O5, 
C~lcrpijj[\r (USA. 50%) malll lllincd eqUIty Since 2002 
_. 
ABC Internati"onallhnk 50%). AMEN 11:lI1k (50%) 
None 
. ." ... -. -, 
None 
2000,2003 
Project has not bl.:cn ubII' to secure its fu~1 supply and is presently 
am ine 
Project rL'SlK'n:<.ible fo: :lwviding fuel 
))6 Project eosls include Ih .. gas infrastructure. 
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Eas.t 1\ I"r u;u 
Kenytl (I OJ 4 J'Mject.~) 
-
I'rojt'(t \V .. ""lmonl 
Size 46MW 
Cost USS65 million 
S p('r kW USS{35 
Tl:chnnlogy' Kcrosenef~ condcn,).1tcf&!!~t.~~bine (b3.£ e mQumcd 
l e ll None, bUI selective internDfiorl3llCndet COII(hICIOO 
Contract noo. 7 years 
-
~!WF.(luj!L NA 
-
01<'1 inC'Quily anti d~bl None 
--
Local I)arliclpation in None 
l·qU.ity ;lI1d dcb~ , 
.,.,-
"'Iltity p;lrlllcr~ Westmont (Malaysi<l. 100%) h<ls sought to sell plmll sill(':c 2004 
(cu nulr)' nr nri~ill & % 
of each sharchl)ldcr) 
-- -
I .~rdl'1"S NA 
-
Credil ~'nhannment~ NOlle 
;~~'!~i!y_~_r.!!l!t:c "!t;.~~~ ___ ;"; onc 
- -
r roj c!= I .!-:nd~ r I..-C;:Q. U 1996, 1997 
CUntr:lct (hanJ:c Not a contract cll~n~e per !\C. but fi;m railed to nq;oti :lIc a second 
conuaet after its 7 year controet ended in 1.004 due 10 failure 10 agree on 
tariffs. 
---
Fuel ~ rr..nJ:cm('nt Origin:,t1 ly Wesum.mlto procure fl.e' and then p."l:SS th rough to ut ihty, 
however. fol!nwir.g di~pl.le with fud sllpplicr about t a.~e s after the first 
I YC:U ofoocrat ion. u t ili~2!£r.2..rocl.remem 
.- ... --
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Kellya (2 o!" projects) 
.= .. I 
"rujltCl l bc! rafriCli. 
~: 56 MW -C(J~ I USSJ5 million 
~~r k~\\, USS I , I61 
T Cfhu" lv .. ... HFO/mooium sp<!<!d tI:t:'>l'! en inc 
ICU None 
PcO-;;tr'liIIct 
-
_ BOO, 7 ycars -<- 15 years 
-
Ikbl/[ goiIY 72/28 
r¥f'1 in fllu i l}, anti d ebl None 
-Y~s(~uity and deht) . Local PQrt lcipalion in 
~h ami deh! 
.. --,~ J.:llu i~Y paN;~;;:;(country Union Fenosa (Spain, 10:0%), K I'LC I' en~icn' " und (Kenya, 20%) since 
of or li;in & 'Yo, uf ":l l,h 1997 
slmrt holtlcr) 
- .. -
LCllu crs Union Fcnosa (US$1 2.7 million ill direct loans auu guarantt;>t;>d 
US$20 million) ; KPLC Slaff PCfls ion Fund (US$9 .4 in di rect 
loans and guaranteed US'S5 million thWUg tl a local Keuyan 
bank)_ .. _ 
-
-_ .. 
Cn 'uit cn hanct! rllcnl.~ Non..: 
- -. 
-_ .. -
~cur i t) affllli 'emtnh None 
.. 
Pro 'cclle ndc r, COD 1996, 1997 
Cllnir:h'\ chan:,:", Ycs., Ibcrafrica rc tlucl:d the capaci ty charge of ilS li rst 1'1'/\ by 37 pcr 
cent in /\pr i12002 anti Ihe n 10 59 per cenl of lhl: origlnal l'!'A in 
September 2003,m ___ 
Fnd :lf ra ngcmcnt !berardca buys fud and p..lsses cost through 10 K"LC h;lscu 011 Ih~ unil~ 
-
- . 
I gcnerat<.--d and specifk conSUmnlrQII nal<llllderS al.!r~'t:d un b Ihe I'PA 
m Ibcr~rrlcll ha~ h~d I \~O Jiffcrent PPAs, Ihe firsl ~pann ing 7 ycars, Ihc second, slgnl-d III 200'; , ,\ hi(;h 
" ill 5pal115 ),,' ars, 
Ul FunhcrlllorC', ,Ilthough nOI a conlraCI chango:: per sc, tho:: va l u~ oflhc capa~ ily ~harge for lbernfrica', 
second PPA W:lS 50 per ccnt thai of lilc first PI'A, 
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Ke/t)'lt (3 of if pmjt't",\) 
r:o~~:~- .. Orl'IIwer4 
.. " .... _. .. _ . .... 
-
Si..:c 13 MW 
. . 
.. -
_<;;~~t _ US$54 million 
-¥-!kW USS4,1 54 . . .... 
Technnlll .\. . Geothermal 
len y" 
. .. . . . ~--- . '--'-Cllnlrad B09, 20 years 
_n~bI/Equ!!)' NA 
J)rl in ~~~!.r a-::-tI tto.:bl None 
--
. .. --. 
Local parlicilllllion in None 
,!,quity amI debt 
.-
E:t]uity parln~r~ (country Orma! (100%) since i9!l8 
of origin & % of clleh 
silllrcholdtr) __ . 
--" ... -
~,CI'S NA 
~I,'l!~it cllhanC\'IIiCIi ts M ICIA uaran t~ 
Security ~rrllllgcment!j Escrow acoount. (lnt: month cupaci!y eharg~s.. and a stand-by Letter of 
Credit , cownng three months hill ing (although only fi na l17.cd at cnd· 
2U06) ' . 
---I'ro cCllcn.lcr. ("01) 1996.2000 
-
. 
Conlr:tr l C":III 'C Yo.:s. tari ff for the sec~:I.rJlh:lsed ( 35 1\1 W) reduced ~_ 
Fuel arrangrmclIl T he only fu d arr,mgemcm per so:: is th~t OrPowcr-l leas.:!> thc we lls rrom 
, the govern,!ls nt, t?":.I'.~c h it pays :1 rOya lly of sorts 
-_._. 
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. 
Pr<l j."- ' T~~vo 
----. 
S ill' 75 MW 
-
. 
~'''S l USS85 milhon 
-llcr~W 
. 
USS I.IJJ 
~~IUOIO:n' HFO/m<'dium ~ l'cd di:;:s.:1 c.!!l!inc 
. -. leu y" 
. - -
. . 
-Contr:lf.1 1100, 10 YCiirs 
_. 
Dc IJtlt:<jui! \' ;8122 
.. 
IIFI in t' u i l . :md deh! yc~ , 
"' 
and debt 
Loc:tllHu'tidpa tiOIl in ! ""one 
_ '·t1.lIil~· and d ebt , 
F 'IIIII .\' 1)~U"'Jll'n (cOuntry Cin..:rgy & IPS jointly owned 4\) . 9% .. Cincrgy sold to Duke 1 
nfl,ri!::! n & "j., n f c:lch Energy in 2005. CDCIGlobc]eq (UK, 30% ), W,trhila (Filll;JmJ, 
shu r~!l.2~U~'rl J 5%), [Fe (5%) retain remain In" Sh<lfCS sine!) 2000 
L\' lld~·ts IFe own account (USS 16.5 miJIilln), [Fe syndicated (USS2J.5 million); I 
CDC own ilC(:ount (CS':> 13 million); DEG uwn account (E II lI1illion). 
~---·-··"· --··· i DEG sz:nd icatcd (El millionl _ ~ r¥.~dit cnhanttmenlS J..cl tcr of Comfo~cvidcd ~lVernmcm 
S~ru nl )' :.rrangcm~nl s Escrow acccunt, equil'aien: to I nk1nlh ciipaci!), charge, and it stand-by 
, Letter of Cred it. c 'Iuivalcr:( to 3 tnomhs bill ing I r4I.2i!'CI letHl er , COl) 
.-
I')?5,2001 
• (.llIlr:lr t til :III"e Nom" but w~cssu~d 10 lower tar.ff 
Fuel ~ n ',. ngemenl T S:lvO buys fi:cI and passcs COM through to K PLe b;oSo."(j on the units 
, I I':cncralcd and ecific consu~io~rametel1' al!.r~·l.'d I'n to tire PPA 
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TUfI 'lania ( I of J Wfljec:ts) 
. ; 
1l:l l"l nl'f'li i i , h 
of origill & ftJ. sOllght to sel l shares 
, ; 
, I months ,;,:upucity charge (bUI nHl yet 
CUlllrael change , 
i i 
h 
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Tll/nli l/in (2 of J projeclx) 
. -
I'rojec! 
S i7.e 
, .. 
C ost 
~:kW ---. --. --,. 
Technology 
IC R 
- - ----("ont n,," 
J)ehUElIuily 
r-n-n-~; C<:Pli ly and dc bi 
.-
-
.. _ --_._----
-
Loc:lIIl ~lrticipalil)" in 
£9, lIit ' and deh! 
Equity partncr~ 
(countfY nf ori j! in ,~ 'V. 
of ~ach sh:lreh()lder} . __ 
. 
Lenders 
~llit enbll nr emcllt ' 
Sec:llrit} arr:lngcmelUs 
... 
I' ro·ect h~nder,_~_On 
C ontract chan ge 
--.. _-
Fuel a rr" n 'eme nl g 
L 
. 
Songas 
180 MW 1J 
. . 
L'SS) 16 million :10 ----
. . 
USS2,3 13 (for fi rst 115.Nl\{)' a(~ USS769 {for 65 MW ex ansiun 
Natural 'asio en eye Ie 
y" 
--_. -_. 
--
. 
BOO. 20 )'cars 
-_. 
70130 for 115 MW 
1 00~'" cquitl financed fur 65MW ~-xE;m~ ion 
Yes 
_-00-_' 
Yes (TANESCO. I DFl) 
T ransCanada sold maJunty sh(tres to AES (L'SA) in 1999 and 
A ES sold maj urity shares to Glubeleq (L' K) in 2003141 
World Bank (US$I 36 million), I:.IU, (USS:'i:) million), S ida. (U SS 1 5 
million) 
:\"ont: 
Escrow accoent: fur firsl l i S M W, \,,~h the gOVt:fll1 lH:nt mllh .. hing every 
USS 1 spent by the project company, 1i tl 'J~d!l)' fad ltty cquivah:nt to 4 
month< capaclfr charge [or the first 3 years. declin ing to 2 months 
. startins In ~-ear " thro41 !;';h th~ fClllllining years of the contract 
1·1994, 2004 
Yes, the buy ing down of S\JIlgas ' AF UDC (of approxin;;;i~ly US$ 1 03 
mi llion) by the Government of Tanzania cUl thc monthly capacity 
char ' C b about one third H~ 
Soo o Son '0 "3S r()vided 1(1 ro·cel com 
'" 
g gop P1 p y at a rate of 
lJS$n.55/MMOtu for lurbin<.; s I-V and al USSZ.17 M i\1Blu for turbUl~ 
VI 
I 
, 
, 
l)?- I here was considerable evolt rlinn in terms (If th ..: plan:Jcd c:rp3.; ity for the plam, from 60 M W to the 
current I ~o ".j W . 
H<lSonga~ project costs include refurbishment of gas wclls, a new gas processing faci lity, pipcline 
(;llnmuclion and fuel conversion of the ex isting puwer sta ti on (L'hungo), in tutal amouming \0 US$266 
mi llion, and an add it i o n ~ l US$.~O milliun for expansb:1 ill terms ()f two additiunal turb\l1cs ( tota l 65 
M W) and re lated infrMtru.;turc. The expansion was tinl;no,;cd L' mirely by equity. A rou!:;h c~:i!l1nte fur the 
electricity gcnenttloll ~ompunent wuuld he 40 pcr cen~ of projcct CUS~5 or US $130 mi ll ion, based on 
(IS$)5 mitl ilJD fo r refllrbishrn o,;nt and rue! convers ion of existing turbmes. (JS$45 l1l ill i\Jn ~1;!s lltll ed loans 
un existing tu rbin~ s.. and US$SO million for cxpansiun. 
HI Due to cump le :t ity , turnover is detai led in this footnote: OCeillt (Canada), TransCanada (Canada). 
TPDC fl anzania). TANESCO (Tanz.lnia). T DF L (Tanzania, sponsorc<i by EIll), IFe (multilatera l" 
DEG (German), CDC (I:K) were sharclh llde rs by 1996, with 1 rans.Canada :hc majOlily $har.:holder, IFC 
and DEG sold sha res to CDC in I 997/S; Tran:;CaMda sold shares to AES (USA) 1I1 1999; 
Occlotll'anOcean sold slmto.'s to AES in 200 1; AES sold majurity shar.:; to Globeleq \UK) and fMO 
( Ho lland) in 2003. Ajier the II £.S .,afe, equity shun's u"J auoci/Jlt:djinancl(l f c()mmllmem.l· (l!:tprcSJt:J III 
USS milium) In Songll.\" ",en' 11:>' ful/ow ,,.. Globdeq U'iS3J8 (515%1; FMO: USS14.15 (U%); TDFI, . 
US'S'; (7%); CDC' US-SJ 6 (6%); T/ 'De· US$J (5%) ()nd TA N£SCO: USS I (1%). Thi.l" does nul rejlt!C1 
Ihe aJJlliollal US55 0 mdlion Ihat Gloheleq cammlffed for Ilw e.rpOII.<ion. 
J41 Thc buying down o f the AFU DC, which was negoti31cJ by thc Gov~rn l11e nl of Tam:UIlia dll ring AES 's 
sale tl) Glubeleq. has not. however, ncgat ivc ly imp3ctcd on the spom.or $inc~ the fu ll amount of the b l.lY-
down was paid 10 Globc lcq , In add ition. since May 2005, TAN[SCO has II\lt been paying the pOTl iOli o r 
the cap ac ity charge that relates to the project's subordina·cd debl. Although ~uc h an arr3ngcment W~ 
provided fOI tllihe ~u~id i:lIY loan agleemem of ZOO !. whal Ihis m~an~ is Ihat lhe JL):\ aedit lhat the 
Government or Tanzania e n-IcO! 10 TA:'\ ESCQ at a higher rate is pre ;:ently not bcmg :;ervict.'d by the 
ut ility 
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Tal11,allia (1 of 3) 
lO\~l1 l 11:1 r'ti r.i 1"1 tin ~i;;--­
c{ uitv fwd deht 
Equity partners 
{cou ll l ry!lf origin & %, 
Artllmas (Canada, 80%,). rMO (Netherlands. 20%) 
_ ur each ~ h a rchuldcr.t .. -._.h""OCCT-- _ _ ___ . __ _ .. ,. 
Lrud(' rs I 00"10 final1c~d w:th habncc s h ~c! of slw rchn ld cr~ to du(~ 
Cn'tiil rnhllncelllen t ~ Nom: 
Sec urity arra ng~ mrnt~ Escrow account during interim 1'1'/\ (2 ) ears). during 20 year PI'A, 
Tariff Equal i.t..ation Fund expected. a fixed-value accaum dc~ignoo!(l 
make ur the d ifference bel ween the natJnnai tann-ami the Co~1 of power 
Coner-II:I ("hang~ 
Flrcl arr:ln j!cnrell l 
under the proj ect 
1994. 2007 
None 
Fuel pro\'idcd by sponsor, al a ch:!.r.,;c o flJ$SS.OO per MM l)tu, which is 
I pas~~ _~ough 10 lJIility, ___________________ , 
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West A fric.'l 
O'fl! II 'JI'l,in~ (J of 2) 
PrOjtt! Compag nie )\'oi ril' nne de l'rud uc!iull tl' EltCfr icilt (C1I' Rt: L) 
:Si~.e -- 210 [I,'IW 
... ---
-
COS! US$ I05.6 mi llion 
:s per kW US$503 
Trdllwhl ., Natural 'asia en c c!~ 
len Non&;: 
Contract BOOT,19ycars 
l)ebt/ F.quilv -
-
-DFI in etluity lind ddJl Yes (equit)' and debt) 
- - --. 
LOl'al parlidpatitJn in None 
._equit) .1! ntl d~hl 
[tluit) purtners SAUR InternationaL with SS% (1V betwcert French SI\UI{ Group 
(cllunlf.\ of origin & % owned by l3ouygucs, 65% and EDF, 35%) 130AD, PROPI'IRCO, 
of cuch ~h ;ln' ho'dtr) and IFe holding the remain ing 12%; in 2005 nil s hnrc~ ~o l d r,o 
-
-
BOUYJ<ucs (France, 98%), cxccnt 1301\0 (20/.) .... 
Lenders World Rank 
Cn'uit {'nhHlln'lII~nI S None 
--SCC llril~- ~rr:lng~m~nl~ Nonc 
~~(,I ",tHl er. CO L) 1<)93.1995 
- -
~11';Il' t d, :,,, \;\' _ N('ne 
Fuclllrron"cment Govcrnmcnl procurc, f .. cl 
- -
m l ll \'c.~tlllcni cost H7 .811l or 57,6 billion CFA , wi:h the average 199~ COllv\: TSion o f USS to CFA. 
545. 100 
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West Arrie.'l 
COIl! Il'h'()in~ (I of 2) 
- -.-
Vmjeci Com[l:lg nk h 'oiril'lmr de l'ruduc lilll1 11 'f;leCfricile (C II'R El) 
:"Si1.e -- -2 10 t\'IW 
--- -Cost US$ I 05.6 mill ion 
S per kW._ USS50J 
--
-
'!"l'dlllOlo " Natl! ral gas/open cyc ie 
len Nonc 
('ontraci ROOT, 1 9 .:tear~ 
I)cbUF.quitL - I 
- - . --
IlFI in C\lllity and dd)1 Yes (equity and debt) 
-
-['0('111 p:trliripatiun in Nonc 
rqui!) :Ind ddJl 
Equit) pllr1ncn SAUR International. with SS% (1V b<:lweell French SAUl{ Group 
(cIIU!!1ry of origin & <y" owned by l3ouygues, 65% and EDF. 35% ) ROAD. PR OPAR eo , 
or ~:tch 'h :lrdlOld~r) and IFC holding the r~majning 12%; in 2005 <I II shnrcs sold to 
l30UYJWcs (Fran~ . 98%), ~ XCCDt BOA D (2%) 
Lenders World Hank 
l'reu it l'nhllnn'I1I~II l'> None 
-- ----Scr urity. ~rr:ln g:~II1~~nt' None 
-1'(lljc\· t lendtr. CO L) . 1993. 1995 
.'--
Contract dl :'n~ NNW 
-('ud arrangcmcllt Governmenl procure, ruel 
--
m Investment cost t:l! 7.lS m or 57.6 billion CFA. with th ~ average 199 .. conversion or USS to CFA . 
.54.5. 100. 
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ChUll1l (/ oI l) 
Pnojl'd T:tkllr:ldi II 
~~------~ ~~----------------------
" 
" , 
eqllity :111\1 d cb,-
E'IUil) 1):1 rt nen Ic'iSjjj"l;iiiJj'l.VRP~"';';""I., 11 "v.I , eMl; "",iJ';;,,;;;;,,;;;'i'A:Q,,-l 
(('ollnt )')' nfo rigin..\ % 
'I ' ) 
:I .. II 
government 
meanwhile 
and further 
, ; 
" 
ill li rs! proS\! of TDkol"Jdi II} 
1t-"lI the EI'C costs are IUO high 
; 
J~' The initial pr\)jecl C\H1CCpl illcluded spccitkations to add a second phase of I to MW l1.:Jd convert 10 
combined cyc le, however, lac k uf rUlldin~ has limited the compJctiull \l f Ihls ph<lSC. 
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Niger;/! ( I of 1) 
---
- -- I 
l'rojL"'1 AES Kargc Umited 
--Si/.c 270 ~'I W , 
CC).~ t USS2-10 
S'I~r kW -
Tt:chnulogy Natura l <las/open cycle (h:arge moumed) 
len NOIllO ~r:Lc t ... -. -noD 20 ,cars 
Debt/F., lIie\' NA 
OFI ill c( nit alltl deb t None 
Lo,'alllHrtidpation in Y~ (equity) 
l'( Ult\' aJIII dcht 
F.4uity p:lrll)Crs EnrOll (USA, 100";") .w ld to liES (95~'.) and YFP (Nigeria, 5%) in 2000 
(cn unt ry "f Migilt & % 
uf cach sharl'holdcr) 
Lcmkrs NA 
-
.. _._._0 ... '" 
C redit cnh:lu cemCllts OPIC polilica l risk inst:rance 
~~Jrity :ll'r .. n~cn\enU 
Soverei 'n guarantee 
--
US$60 million l,caer of Crcdi l from \1 j nl ~lr' () f F i n ~l1ce 
---0]0 - --"ro ' c~t telldtr. CO}~._ 1999 2001 
-(c>liIr:II:1 rh:ln gc Yes. initial plant size increased frum 90 MW to 270 MW (9 unllsof30 
I M W ca1;h) and change in the fllel liom lhluid lue l 10 11l:lU rnl gas. !loth of 
~ whIch had the cff<.'Ct of reducing the capacity charge, cur~cnt w ntract ch;mg~ under d lscus.l.ion lIlvo lvr among other thlllgs the 1\\'ai tab jlily dcfkicn.;y paymrnt , mC'dr.wh ile lax exempl ion cerll ficate has been I 1-- - withheld by govcmmcru lor the durmion oflile proJc":! ---Fuel ar r1\ugenu!ll1 Iltihty armoges fu<!'1 
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NiJ;l!r ill (2 fill) 
,- --
I'roj~'" Okpai 
Si/.c 4S0 MW 
-r CoSI USS 462 • 
S l}CrkW 1 N~t}lra l .a5Icombind cydo: nchll() log~ 
-- --len None 
-Contracl BOO, 20 years 
Od,,/ .:( Ui[L I OO~-;' egui t): financed 
-
. IWI in ~'q(l it~ and lIebl None 
LUl·:tl pur'icip:ttiull ill Yes (equity and debt) 
c' [l.til~ :t ltd!!~!!.!. __ 
~:l lltity ,):If,"crs Nigerian Nationall'etro leum Corpor<l[ion (Nigeria, 60%). Nigerian 
(CillJ utry or (,riJ,!in & % Agip Oil Compml)' ([[al),. 20% ). anrJ Phill ips Oi l Com pany (USA, 
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